I have no objection to there being unrepresented facts. — Banno

In light of current understanding of the universe as a quantum state (admittedly a gigantic one, but nothing more) what type of facts would you find embedded in the universe? It's just a constantly changing state.

I have reasons to believe whatever form a so-called fact may take, it cannot be declared such without accepting that information is incomplete and this the fact is subject to change depending upon a given observer's perspective. — Rich

Hm. This is more difficult.

I submit that some things must be taken as undoubted in order for discussion to take place.

Roughly, on can doubt anything, but not everything.

"The kettle was boiling at 11:15pm on my stove". — Banno

I would call this an observation by you. Since it is passed there is no way for any verification of time or temperature. I would think that facts have to have persistency so that a consensus can develop. Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility.

I think it a fact that you are writing to me in English.

Then we are using "fact" in different ways.

Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility. — Rich

I don't see why.

Hm. This is more difficult.

I submit that some things must be taken as undoubted in order for discussion to take place.

Roughly, on can doubt anything, but not everything. — Banno

Ok. I think we have reached the crux of the issue. At this point, only further contemplation of the issue by you and me will lead us to a different understanding than the ones we currently hold. Suffice to say we understand each other's current understanding of the issues.

↪Rich Then we are using "fact" in different ways.

Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility.
— Rich

I don't see why. — Banno

As understand it, it i is your position that it is enough for an observation to be called a fact if the observer felt all of the facts were true as represented. No verification or consensus of any sort is required. In such a case, a fact would be totally dependent upon how the observer represented it.

Meaning is use.

A consequence of that view is that meaning is embedded in what we do.

It is tempting to say that language is both in us and in the world; but even that juxtaposes "us" and "the world" in an erroneous fashion. We are not separate from the world.

Hence, it would be a grievous error to suppose that all there is, is language. It would also be wrong to suppose that all there is, is things.

You're boobing and weaving here, "the something more going on here" is a claim which based on a deduction, and is not intrinsic to the situation of locking your keys in the car. The validity of your claim would be impossible with out a plurality of observes who can potential verify it.

And yet the keys are still in the car.

There is more going on here than "The keys are in the car".

it i is your position that it is enough for an observation to be called a fact if the observer felt all of the facts were true as represented. — Rich

No, but this will take a longer post and I am off to lunch.

It is enough for an observation to be called a fact if it is true.

It is enough for an observation to be believed if... well, that depends.

No, but this will take a longer post and I am off to lunch.

It is enough for an observation to be called a fact if it is true.

It is enough for an observation to be believed if... well, that depends. — Banno

I think we have reached the end of our discussion. Nice conversing with you. Enjoy your lunch!

There's a knot that philosophers sometimes get tangled in. They set themselves the task of explaining the stuff around them. They notice that both the thing being explained and the explanation or justification is presented in a language.

Through thinking about this, they reach the conclusion that all there is, is language.

Hence, they adopt some form or other of idealism. — Banno

Have you looked into enactivism? It's an interesting theory that seems to bridge realism and idealism. It suggests that a statement like "the keys are in the car" (which we can see to be true) doesn't refer to the environment sans-observer, but to an observer-environment interaction. It accepts that there is an environment that is separate from us (or, if you prefer, that there are parts of the environment that are separate from us), but that perception is an interaction with the environment, and not simply information about that environment being presented to us.

St. Paul said

For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known.

There is a difference between knowing something deductively and actually viewing the keys in the ignition.

that perception is an interaction with the environment, and not simply information about that environment being presented to us. — Michael

If one envisions the human brain as actively evolved in the process of perception, i.e. as the source of a reconstructive wave, and the environment as holographic in nature, them the whole process of perception becomes an interactive, holographic process.

This is a completely new way of envisioning perception, but it does eliminate all of the subject/object problems and explaining how images in the environment emerge from a brain. There image is actually "out there" and we perceive it out there, not in here.

This is all as Bergson described it, pre-holographic discovery. This is not enactivism though though somewhat akin.

Suppose you did an experiment in which people answered questions about the colors they see. You'll probably find there are differences among your subjects, and you could say color is observer-dependent in that sense.

Now do an experiment where you put some keys in a box and ask your subjects if the keys are in the box. Let's imagine they all assent. Then we describe keys being in boxes as not observer-dependent.

But wait -- what about non-human observers? Don't know how to test them, so we'll be content to say the result only applies to human observers -- if you're human, we predict you'll agree the keys are in the box.

What about when there's no observer at all? Tricky to test, but maybe we can at least form an hypothesis: if it doesn't matter which human makes the observation, then it doesn't matter whether any human actually does. We might feel bad about forming an hypothesis that's unfalsifiable, but then all hypotheses that exclude observation probably are. At least this one feels like a natural inductive step from our observations.

Would that we could avoid "...isms"; it's not clear what sort of nominalism Q. meant.

I don't think that Q's conclusion follows. As I mentioned before, Wittgenstein is setting out that the primary metaphysical consideration is not things, but predications to things. Now predicates include relations between things. It's not obvious that this is a rejection of holism.

Indeed it is arguable that the conclusion of the Tractatus is holistic. — Banno

What makes you say that the conclusion in the Tractatus is holistic?

The nominalism in the Tractatus seems to be with the subject who observes the world, not objects themselves per se, which I incorrectly stated in the OP...

A la, the picture theory and the resulting picture one perceives is entirely dependant on the observer's relation to the object's of interest.

I would call this sort of subject based nominalism as a sort of psychological nominalism which Wittgenstein greatly elaborates in the Investigations. E.g family resemblances, language games, the beetle in a box, meaning as use.

What about when there's no observer at all? Tricky to test, but maybe we can at least form an hypothesis: if it doesn't matter which human makes the observation, then it doesn't matter whether any human actually does. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, one can embrace this belief, but it is only that. How a real external quantum state is transformed interested a "thing" is unknown. I would postulate, that the mind with the brain creates a a reconstructive beam which manifests the thing in holographic form. Without the reconstructive beam it is just a entangled quantum state.

A quote in support of what I have mentioned in my previous two posts could be;

If a lion could speak, we could not understand him. (PI, p.223)

Interesting. No, i had not seen it before.

I don't see that what you said differed from what I said.

What makes you say that the conclusion in the Tractatus is holistic? — Question

Arguably...

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

To understand the Tractatus is to transcend the text, to see the whole picture.

Nominalism has many meanings.

The core is that something is no more than a name; that it has no independent existence.

To use the term effectively we need to be clear about what the something is.

To me it is not clear wha the something is in the nominalism of the OP.

Yep.

I would add that if you put the key in the box, wait a bit, and then open the box to find the keys still there, then it seems to me unreasonable to suppose that, while you waited and the keys were unobserved, the keys were not in the box.

It seems equally unreasonable for one to say that, because we could not see them directly, we do not know that the keys are in the box.

This goes back to Rich's thinking that the world is in a state of constant change; while I agree that the world indeed is in a state of flux, the changes are not so great that we cannot know anything.

To understand the Tractatus is to transcend the text, to see the whole picture. — Banno

I strongly doubt that even the early Wittgenstein thought there was one whole entire picture of the universe or reality. Again, each and every picture is subject dependent.

Perhaps.

Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names?

I would say one difference between my hypothesis and yours is that mine is motivated. I don't have a definition of "motivated" handy, but at least the conditional I've tacked on repeats a claim I've established by induction.

My conditional has a contrapositive, the conclusion of which I believe has been shown to be false: if it matters whether a human makes the observation, then it matters which human. Now that could still be false, if its antecedent is true. I can't test that. But at least I'm still talking about the same thing as when I was showing inductively that for some things, it doesn't matter who makes the observation.

And I think we want to keep the distinction between observations that depend on the observer in a way we can understand (can find mechanisms to explain) and observations that don't seem to be observer-sensitive.

My conditional has a contrapositive, the conclusion of which I believe has been shown to be false: if it matters whether a human makes the observation, then it matters which human. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. There are similarities and differences, so a hypothesis has to be developed to account for both.

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.