. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, now the point is that there is incommensurability between the different types of numbering systems. And, this incommensurability exists within the same field. Therefore your conclusion that fields are closed to each other when there is incommensurability between them, is unsound. Furthermore, your argument that geometry and psychology are distinct fields is also unsound. And, we can conclude that your presumption that these two names are representative of two distinct fields is nothing but a prejudice which is presented a premise for a fallacious argument, due to the fallacy of assuming the conclusion, begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
Did you not read where I explained the difference between "being the same thing", and "being of the same type". I'm really starting to think that you do not even bother to read half of what I post JZ. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, here you are talking about reducing the concept of a triangle to a pure psychological act. And this is where my refutation comes in. The processes that lead to the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle cannot be determined as psychological operations, since the difference between the terms and operations of both fields is necessary. You would have to make this reduction and explain it. But I know you won't do it, because it can't be done. Any attempt at something like that would only establish association relationships between elements. But association does not mean identity, much less identity in operations and relationships. — JuanZu
The field of geometry is closed in relation to the field of psychology. You are not reading, you are assuming things and creating straw men. Saying that the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate. That is, certainly the field of geometry is closed to a psychological approval that attempts to found and determine it. — JuanZu
The incommensurability between both fields is especially present in the methodological order: Association is not equivalent to identity or equality. — JuanZu
You have said that they are incommensurable, but that incommensurability, as you treat it, if we follow your strange reasoning, since it evokes an absolute difference, you cannot speak of two numerical systems. You would have to talk about a numerical system and something else that can no longer be a numerical system. That is why you fall into a performative contradiction, because you are involuntarily assuming the same within what you try to express as different. — JuanZu
I read it and refuted it. Showing how your argument leads to the misunderstanding that would not allow us to talk about two types of anything. Well, I contrasted analogy with equivocation: that a thing be identical and different at the same time. — JuanZu
When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being. — JuanZu
And things imagined by the mind are studied in the field of psychology. — Metaphysician Undercover
These are all created by the imagination, and so is your supposed "object itself", a product of the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. — Wayfarer
What I am saying is that there is no such difference, it is all psychological — Metaphysician Undercover
You are only providing more evidence that you are simply begging the question with your claim: " the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate."
What you appear to be saying, is that this premise is not made "necessary" by any real evidence, it is just necessary for your argued position. However, as I explained, it is the only way that you can support your conclusion, by starting with a premise which leads necessarily to that conclusion. Begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
This very poor logic. There is no "absolute difference" implied, even though I cannot say that I understand what that would actually mean. As I explained already, two things of the same type can be called by the same name. Two different dogs are both called "dogs". Two different numerical systems can both be called "numerical systems". And, the two incommensurable numerical systems can exist within the same field, mathematics. Your claim that only one could be called a numerical system, and the other would have to be called something else, is nonsensical and clearly illogical, as being not supported by any premise which would produce that conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, if you do not agree that two different things can be said to be the same type, then I believe this discussion is pointless. And I really do not see how you conclude that this would make it impossible to speak of two different types. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is all psychology, as explained above. The supposed "elements", lines and angles, along with the internal relations, are completely imaginary. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. That is the error of psychologism. Geometric shapes and numbers are not mind-dependent in that sense at all, even though they can only be perceived by the mind. As Bertrand Russell remarked of universals 'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' — Wayfarer
I'm sorry but that is absolutely false. Even empirical evidence refutes it. For example, as children we do not imagine something like a "triangle" but rather we find it in books or in the virtuality of a screen. — JuanZu
But there is no approach in which the terms, operations and relations of geometry are equivalent or can be replaced by other terms, other operations and other relations. — JuanZu
Let me teach you something: When you say that something IS psychological and is reducible to the psychological, you are determining an identity, that is, you must necessarily determine it semantically as well, and go from that identity to a reduction that results in a replacement of terms, then of operations and then of relationships (since geometry is constituted, like any science, by these things). So assuming you have the terms of psychology you have to carry out a replacement, as long as you are talking about BEING X. If the reduction is understood as an identification then it is an eliminativism. — JuanZu
The principal point of my argument is that you should developed or presented a real reduction. But you didn't and just constantly repeat that something is psychological because geometry is something created by humans. That kind of statements need to be well explained and demonstrated. But that's not your case. — JuanZu
Psychology is the study of mind and behavior.[1] Its subject matter includes the behavior of humans and nonhumans, both conscious and unconscious phenomena, and mental processes such as thoughts, feelings, and motives. Psychology is an academic discipline of immense scope, crossing the boundaries between the natural and social sciences. — Wikipedia: psychology
Not at all. That the field of geometry is closed to the field of psychology means that the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing. Again, the relationships that are discovered, the semantics that are implicit, operations, terms, etc. — JuanZu
When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being.
Otherwise the rest of your answer is based on introducing notions such as intentional acts (voluntary, with a purpose, with priorities and scales of value). But introducing these notions is wrong, in the sense that they are far from being able to describe the non-intentional and non-voluntary aspect that belongs to the thing that occurs as an internal relationship between elements of something like a triangle. Except for the notion of "order" which is referred to formalization of set theory then also transcends the psychological act. But I suspect that what you understand by order is rather referring to the human act of ordering things. — JuanZu
What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer
You seem to be trading on the obvious truism that all our judgements are mind-dependent to draw the unwarranted conclusion that all existence must be mind-dependent. — Janus
Yes, but the judgement that that they may have an existence outside of any perspective is neither demonstrably false nor unintelligible. You seem to be trading on the obvious truism that all our judgements are mind-dependent to draw the unwarranted conclusion that all existence must be mind-dependent. Existence and judgement are thus unjustifiably conflated — Janus
↪Wayfarer ↪Joshs I'm well aware that we cannot speak about the nature of what lies outside the scope of our experience and judgement. So neither of you seem to have carefully read and considered what I've been saying, which was in no way contesting this obvious truism. — Janus
“Questions, what things ‘in-themselves’ may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? ‘Thingness’ was
first created by us” (Nietzsche, WTP 569). Just talking about an uncategorized reality is already applying categories like “thingness” to it, and hence is precisely not talking about something uncategorized. If we were to remove all categories, then existence, substance, and causality would have to go, and they are the materials from which Kant built his concept of noumena as the source of our sensory data. Indeed, they are the conceptual resources that any discussion must draw upon; withdraw them all and we are left with, as Hegel said, just “a pure direction or a blank space” (Hegel, PS 47, §73).
Goodman puts it succinctly: “We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described” (Goodman 1978, 3), or “talk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating;
for the talk imposes structure, ascribes properties.”
You seem to be trading on the obvious truism that all our judgements are mind-dependent to draw the unwarranted conclusion that all existence must be mind-dependent. Existence and judgement are thus unjustifiably conflated. — Janus
For the classical realist the extramental world can be known in itself precisely through the rational, perspective-grounded mind. — Leontiskos
For the classical realist the extramental world can be known in itself precisely through the rational, perspective-grounded mind.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos
I would assume that Wayfarer wouldn’t deny existence outside of perspective — Joshs
By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. — The Buddha
Would you agree with the following?
“Questions, what things ‘in-themselves’ may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? ‘Thingness’ was first created by us” (Nietzsche, WTP 569). — Joshs
Goodman puts it succinctly: “We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described” (Goodman 1978, 3), or “talk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, ascribes properties.”
Each being possesses this storage consciousness, which thus becomes a kind of collective consciousness that orders human perceptions of the world’ — even though this apparent world does not possess an intrinsic reality.
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