Hey @Count Timothy von Icarusare you actually Tim De Mey? Lol

what do you think the best arguments for it are? — frank

I think I've only ever seen one kind of argument for it, and it is fallacious. They all depend entirely on setting up definitions about the world so as to define any non-physical phenomena out of existence. That's question begging and that's irrational.

There are different flavors of idealism, but in general they have the same starting point as physicalism. The external world and other minds exist. This would include modern forms of idealism, e.g. Kastrup, or Hegelian absolute idealism. They simply claim that the external world is made of mental substance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As one who defends idealism on this forum, I have to take issue with this. I've read (and listened to) quite a bit of Kastrup, and I don't think he says that, although it you could provide a citation supporting the idea I would consider it.

Kastrup himself, describing his own philosophical development, says this:

I ended up as a metaphysical idealist – somebody who thinks that the whole of reality is mental in essence. It is not in your mind alone, not in my mind alone, but in an extended transpersonal form of mind which appears to us in the form that we call matter. Matter is a representation or appearance of what is, in and of itself, mental processes. — Bernardo Kastrup, magazine interview

Now I think that is different from saying that 'the external world is made of mental substance'. I think that use of the term 'substance' arises from the translation of the original Greek 'ouisia', which was found in both Plato and Aristotle, into the Latin 'substantia', and thence into the English 'substance'. 'Ouisia' is a form of the verb 'to be', and accordingly the original word now translated as 'substance' in philosophy (and as distinct from 'substance' in ordinary language') meant something nearer to 'being' (This article discusses the translation of 'ousia'.)

Whereas the phrase 'mental substance' carries the notion that there is some literally 'thinking stuff', or alternatively imbuing matter with mental qualities, as panpsychists such as Goff and Strawson do. And I know for a fact that Kastrup is severely critical of their form of panpsychism (see this post for instance.)

many physicalists embrace a sort of Kantian dualism and indirect realism, such that we don't ever "experience the world," but experience only "representations of the world." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Any examples of physicalists of that type? I had thought most of them, like those who post here, were naive or scientific realists (=mind-independent world.) I know that John Locke is classified as 'representative realist' but then, I don't know if we would call John Locke a 'physicalist' (although that term had not been coined in his day.)

It's very simple: anyone who believes the universe existed before it contained any minds is a physicalist, as long as they don't posit a transcendent mind. We may not be able to exhaustively and comprehensively define physical substance, but what we know gives us good reason to think it is at base energetic.

Talk of mental substance, when everything we know tells us that mental phenomena are entirely dependent on this energetic foundation seems to me to be incoherent. We may not fully understand the idea of physical substance, but we have no idea at all of what mental substance could be.

I find the attempt to dismiss physicalism on the grounds that it entails the idea that everything should be explainable in the terms of fundamental physics to be a red straw herring.

I ended up as a metaphysical idealist – somebody who thinks that the whole of reality is mental in essence. It is not in your mind alone, not in my mind alone, but in an extended transpersonal form of mind which appears to us in the form that we call matter. Matter is a representation or appearance of what is, in and of itself, mental processes.
— Bernardo Kastrup, magazine interview

Now I think that is different from saying that 'the external world is made of mental substance'. I think that use of the term 'substance' arises from the translation of the original Greek 'ouisia', which was found in both Plato and Aristotle, into the Latin 'substantia', and thence into the English 'substance'. — Wayfarer

Interesting. I can't quite see the distinction so far. I got from Kastrup that he believes there is only mentation. All of reality is mind-at-large (his version of Schop's Will) and we are all dissociated alters springing from that cosmic consciousness, the way tributaries spring from a river.

Interesting. I can't quite see the distinction so far. — Tom Storm

As I said earlier, I don't believe there is a coherent distinction. And I received no answer from @Wayfarer in the way of an attempt to explain it. So, I am left thinking that he cannot explain it.

SO the play has begun, the teams have taken their place, and the only game in town is now physicalism vs idealism.

Which is a shame.

Talk of mental substance, when everything we know tells us that mental phenomena are entirely dependent on this energetic foundation seems to me to be incoherent. We may not fully understand the idea of physical substance, but we have no idea at all of what mental substance could be. — Janus

That's a bit misleading I think. I agree with you that Kastrup, while interesting in some areas, goes off the wall with attributing "dissociated boundaries" to objects, this is an extreme extrapolation.

But I think we have a pretty decent idea of what mental substance, if one wants to use that term is, we have it with us all the time, it's what we are best acquainted out of anything. Which is why we can read novel, participate as jurors, pass laws, create art, etc.

The nature of the non-mental physical, is rather stranger. We only understand 5% of it, from a theoretical standpoint, even here, we have plenty of problems understanding this 5%, it's the other 95% of the universe, that we know almost nothing about, save that it needs to be postulated in order to make the 5% we do know, work.

The alternative is to avoid holding to substance ontologies altogether, which is my way of dealing with the issue.

1) Some things are physical
2) Monism is true
Therefore: 3) Everything is physical

:up:

I think it's easier to defend a version of "dialectical materialism" over "physicalism" -- the physical is the social space we inhabit. We can speculate about the nature of mind and matter but what enables us to live our lives, the economy, is the material reality which these speculations do not touch.

According to this belief we're embedded in an economy, and that economy is material, and that it takes priority to the mind-body problem in determining what's real.

If it's dialectical materialism, where is the immaterial part?

a red straw herring. — Janus

:rofl:

The big-picture idea is that the material is the social world we inhabit. So, given that this is a materialism, no immaterial. "dialectical" because the idea that the social world is the economy is Marx's, and so credit where due.

The big-picture idea is that the material is the social world we inhabit. So, given that this is a materialism, no immaterial. "dialectical" because the idea that the social world is the economy is Marx's, and so credit where due. — Moliere

In order for it to be dialectical, there has to be an opposition. That's what "dialectical" means in the Marxist sense. Where is the opposition?

Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

etween the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. — Moliere

I don't think so.

I can't quite see the distinction so far — Tom Storm

If indeed there were 'a mental substance', and if 'substance' is taken to mean something that actually exists, then why doesn't science detect that property in such a substance? What does 'mental substance' mean?

It's not a hard question to ask of physical substances, as they have objective and measurable attributes. The natural sciences as we all know have made great strides in the analysis of matter. So why can't any progress be made with respect to the purported 'mental substance?' I'm saying that the very simple reason is, that there is no such substance, but I also don't think that Kastrup defends any idea of 'mental substance' (which is the claim I took issue with).

All of reality is mind-at-large (his version of Schop's Will) and we are all dissociated alters springing form that cosmic consciousness, the way tributaries spring form a river. — Tom Storm

As I said in my essay on mind-at-large, this is very similar to mystical theology and to Advaita Vedanta (indeed recently listened to an absorbing dialogue between Kastrup and Swami Sarvapriyananda of the NY Vedanta Society on this topic.) But again, I don't believe that you can legitimately posit the existence of any such super-mind. At best it is an analogy or metaphor, but I think it's a grave error to 'objectify' any such conception, it leads basically to dogmatic beliefs which can never be adequately demonstrated. Essentially you fall back on 'belief in God' and have obtained no philosophical insight whatever.

anyone who believes the universe existed before it contained any minds — Janus

'Before there were any minds' is an idea that only a mind can entertain.

It's very simple: anyone who believes the universe existed before it contained any minds is a physicalist, as long as they don't posit a transcendent mind. — Janus

I think that's a good way to characterise it. I think the clearest dividing line is between emergentist and non-emergentists regarding mind. When materialists or physicalists identify as such, what they usually end up meaning is that they don't think any consciousness or intentionality was there at the start.

Galen Strawson possibly bucks this trend as he claims to be a physicalist panpsychist.

Mkay. Focus on the big-picture idea then. "dialectical materialism" because the main perspective thus far has been from the mind-body problem, and I'm attempting to point out that we can think of "materialism" in terms aside from the mind-body problem, such as the terms Marx presents. He's pretty much as die-hard materialist as you can be, but the problem of consciousness is not one for him.

I agree with you that Kastrup, while interesting in some areas, goes off the wall with attributing "dissociated boundaries" to objects, this is an extreme extrapolation. — Manuel

I wonder if there isn't some merit to the concept, if reframed in terms of us being elements of a social species, whose thoughts are very much a function of of our encounters with conspecifics.

Mkay. Focus on the big-picture idea then. "dialectical materialism" because the main perspective thus far has been from the mind-body problem, and I'm attempting to point out that we can think of "materialism" in terms aside from the mind-body problem, such as the terms Marx presents. He's pretty much as die-hard materialist as you can be, but the problem of consciousness is not one for him. — Moliere

I did a dive once to try to understand what Marx's ontological outlook was. I read that he was into Feuerbach, so I read about him. I looked into the way Marx was supposed to have used Hegelian dialectic. Once I came out of the dive, my conclusion was that Marx had no coherent ontology. That's just not where his focus was. Calling him a materialist just doesn't mean much (to me, anyway). Does it mean something to you?

1) Some things are physical
2) Monism is true
Therefore: 3) Everything is physical — bert1

Oh, very good. Ignoring the idealists, this brings it down to how we fill out (2).

Manuel mentioned earlier: if dualism is true, we can't figure out how the two substances interact with each other. Monism solves that problem.

Monism solves that problem — frank

Except for the traffic lights.

And so finally we arrive at supervenience. Now it might get interesting.

It only has a meaning within a context or a background of some sort. One context is the mind-body problem, and there the contrast is with mind, where the material is associated with the body. In Marx the material is dialectical, though different readings of Marx will emphasize different aspects. The reading I'm putting forward here is the one which reads Marx as a Base-Superstructure theorist such that the economy forms the base for all the social forms that we see. It's only because we're typing on computers which are produced by an economy that this discussion can take place -- it's by having jobs and paying bills and participating in the economic form that we are able to have a philosophical conversation at all, and so it takes the priority of the real. It's these visceral sorts of appeals that make Marx's idea more defensible than variants based upon the mind-body problem; epiphenomenalism is easy to consider from afar, but I've got bills to pay and a job to do, and that's real regardless.

But others would say that this reality is not material, which is why I think you need Marx to call this a kind of materialism.

Except for the traffic lights.

And so finally we arrive at supervenience. Now it might get interesting. — Banno

I did a thread on that!

What I hear you saying is that Marx was a materialist, except we aren't using the meaning usually associated with that term in philosophy. Ok. That's fine.

Ehhh... not quite. Rather that materialism can be defined by more than the mind-body problem, as can philosophy. Marx was, after all, a philosopher.