As far as I know, Tomaszewski is an advocate of Divine Simplicity.

I am only quoting him for his quotations.

So. the Will of God is a property of God and this Will of God is the same, whether A of B is created?
And God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B? — Walter

I think we're back to the beginning, and you are just going around in a circle. God only makes one of the two choices, A or B. The choice was A. So we have "God's action to create A". There is no "God's action to create B" because God did not make that choice. That is a false premise. So your conclusion "God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B" is an unsound conclusion because it requires the false premise that God created bot A and B.

Maybe you ought to consider it in terms of a counterfactual. Take your own will for example. Suppose you could have gone to work this morning, but you stayed home instead. Therefore "went to work this morning" is a counterfactual, it is not what you really did. And if I say "you went to work this morning" when you did not, that is a false premise. It is not a true description of you. Likewise, if God chose to create A, then "God's action to create B" is a false description of God, in the very same way. Therefore to say "God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B" is false in the same way that "your action to go to work is the very same as your action to stay home" is false.

What I would like to ask you now, is are you really having so much trouble understanding this? Or, are you just refusing to understand, denying, for the sake of supporting an obviously ridiculous argument?

I think we're back to the beginning, and you are just going around in a circle. God only makes one of the two choices, A or B. The choice was A. So we have "God's action to create A". There is no "God's action to create B" because God did not make that choice. That is a false premise. So your conclusion "God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B" is an unsound conclusion because it requires the false premise that God created bot A and B. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since it seems likely that Walter is asleep...

Would you agree that there is no possible world in which God creates B and therefore it was necessary that God create A?

Would you agree that there is no possible world in which God creates B and therefore it was necessary that God create A? — wonderer1

By what Walter stipulated, A and B are incompatible, so not only is it impossible that such is necessary, I would say that it is not even possible that God create A, if God has already created B.

By what Walter stipulated, A and B are incompatible, so not only is it impossible that such is necessary, I would say that it is not even possible that God create A, if God has already created B. — Metaphysician Undercover

So would you agree that means that if God is simple then he did not have a choice to create a world other than this one?

No. How would you draw that conclusion?

So this already created world is B. How is it that the following is not saying that God creating a different world is not even possible?

I would say that it is not even possible that God create A, if God has already created B. — Metaphysician Undercover

So this already created world is B. How is it that the following is not saying that God creating a different world is not even possible? — wonderer1

It's not possible that God created a different world, because the world that we have is the world that God created. However, at the time when God was about to create, it was possible for him to create whichever world he wanted.

I don't see why that is hard to understand.

What is your view on possible world semantics?

You'd have to be more specific in your question for me to give a reply, but off the cuff, I'd say that possible world semantics is inappropriate for discussing God as the assumed "necessary Being". Perhaps this is why I am not getting anywhere with Walter. Walter seems to want to apply the terms of possibility to something which is necessary, and that opens a gap of incompatibility. So we just continue to talk past each other.

I'll leave it to @Walter.

If 'at the time when God was about to create' it was possible for Him to create whichever world He wanted, then you deel to be the one 'applying the terms of possibility to something which is necessary'.
My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things.

My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things. — Walter

I don't see any evidence that God wanted anything other than what He created. We are agreeing that it is logically possible that God could have created something other than He did, because He is deemed to have had the capacity to do such, but nothing indicates that He wanted to create something other than He did. And, since God is deemed to have the highest possible degree of intelligence, and also deemed to want only what is good, then I do not see why you would even consider the possibility that God would have wanted something other. Don't you find that to be illogical?

Here is an example which may be analogous. You and I are capable of doing many things, not nearly to the degree of God, but still at any moment each one of us has the capacity for a wide assortment of activities. We have many possibilities in front of us. But this in no way implies that we "want" all those things. In making a decision we would consider different things which we want, and this presents us with a very much narrowed field of possibilities, in comparison with what is actually possible to each one of us. Then, we judge and choose from this field of possibilities which is present to our minds, but is very much narrowed from the overall field of what is possible.

In the case of God, He only wants what is good, the absolute best in fact. This means that God narrowed His own field of possibilities to one thing, the absolute best. The narrowing of possibilities is not due to the non-existence of the infinity of other possibilities, they were all still available to Him. The narrowing was due to Him only wanting one thing, the best thing.

If you want to argue that God actually did not create the absolute best thing, then that's a different argument.

OK, if we live in 'the best thing' that God could have created, then God could not have wanted anything else, which means this creation is necessary.

Right, from our perspective it is "necessary" in the sense of 'what we have is what we got, and things are not otherwise'. From God's perspective, prior to creation, it was what is "necessary" in the sense of needed or wanted.

From God's perspective, prior to creation, it was what is "necessary" in the sense of needed or wanted. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think God wanted me to be autistic, or needed me to be autistic?

Maybe He just wants you to think you are…

Maybe He just wants you to think you are… — AmadeusD

Do you think that is the case with all people who believe themselves to be autistic?

Anyway, don't answer. I've threadjacked too much already.

From God's prespective, prior to creation, A was necessary because His "wanting" A is necesary and cannot be otherwise.

No, that's why I was clear to differentiate between two senses of "necessary". It was necessary in the sense of needed. For example, if I want to walk it is necessary for me to move my legs. But moving my legs is not necessary in the absolute sense of "cannot be otherwise", because I might decide not to walk.

But in what way might God have decided otherwise?

If you are asking if I know what God's intentions were, the answer is no I do not. Otherwise, the answer is in the way that I've already described, a way similar to the way that you or I might decide in taking action, we are free to choose according to intention.

But I am not abolutely smple. So, my 'intention' is a contingent part of me. But God's intention can't he contingent since God is identical with His intention.

So, my 'intention' is a contingent part of me. — Walter

I think this displays a misunderstanding of "intention". Contingent means dependent on a preceding cause, but the will (intention) is understood to be free from such determination. Therefore your intention is not a contingent part of you.

You are not "absolutely simple" because this part of you is combined with the contingent part (known as dualism). In the case of God, there is said to be no contingent part. All contingent existence is derived from, as created by, the Will of God, which is prior.

Contingent means neiher necessary nor impossible..If the intention is not determined, it can be different
So, if God van have different intentions, those intentions are Parts of Him. And if they are not necessary, they are contingent unless they are impossible.

Contingent means neiher necessary nor impossible.. — Walter

In theology, in the sense of "contingent being", contingent means requiring causation. Any existent which is dependent on something else, as cause for its existence, is said to be contingent. "Contingent" has a number of different uses, we need to adhere to the relevant meaning.

So, if God van have different intentions, those intentions are Parts of Him. — Walter

Nothing I said implies that God would have differing intentions. And I see no logic in your statement: "If the intention is not determined, it can be different". God's intention is "not determined" in the sense that it is not caused, just like the free will is not determined by causation.

The fact that there were many possibilities open to God does not imply that God had differing intentions. And the fact that God only wills what is good implies that He does not have differing intentions.

In philosophy contingent means neither necessary nor impossible. Free Will, if it exists, is not determined yet it is contingent.
Did God 'freely' choose among the many possibilties that were open to him? If so, His choice, Will, intention or whatever is contingent.
If not, it is necessary and God could not have decided otherwise.

OK, by your definition of "contingent", from God's perspective, the thing He creates is contingent. But God's Will, as an essential property of God is necessary. As explained earlier, we must be careful to distinguish between the properties of the creation, and the properties of the creator, or else we produce a pantheist God. Does that make sense to you, and how does it bear on your argument?

I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse.
I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A.