Redefining naturalism with an infinite sequence of meta-laws to make supernatural events impossible

Sirius

Do you think we can argue against the logical possibility of a miracle ? As far as I'm aware of, the problem of induction is the biggest obstacle.

We define miracle as an event

1. That cannot be explained by the (first order) laws of nature or an event which requires the (first order) laws of nature to be violated , and

2. Explained by God or other supernatural entity

Attacking 1 :

Most proponent of miracles weaken naturalism to make room for miracles. My aim is to broaden the definition of "nature" and "laws of nature" to include any irregular event ( Fire not burning wood , Walking on water ) as a possibility in nature by introducing meta-laws which preside over what we commonly regard as the laws of nature.

Some scientists have already introduced symmetries as meta laws.

Quoting from https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1355219806000943

"Symmetries are meta-laws; they are not mere byproducts of the dynamical and force laws. Symmetries then explain conservation laws whereas conservation laws lack the modal status to explain symmetries."

I'm not claiming my understanding of meta-laws is similar but there is clearly nothing wrong with introducing meta-laws ( or meta-meta laws if it helps
in our conception of naturalism )

What this will do is subject any possible claim of miracles to science ( physics and mathematics primarily ) and push God, supernatural explanation away. If we follow Hume's definition of miracle, then miracles are impossible.

But most importantly, it does away with one indirect implication of the problem of induction, which is that If all the laws of nature belong to the same category or hierarchy , and if any irregular event in the future is possible, then there may well be no "laws" of nature in the strict sense of the term, making room for supernatural miracles.

However , if we introduce meta-laws, then the problem of induction doesn't imply there are no laws of nature. On the contrary, we have meta-laws which are capable of explaining all the possible future irregularities

Reasoning : Assuming principle of sufficient reason as a useful rule ( theists would not object ) , suppose there isn't uniformity of nature ( without getting into the degree of irregularity), then an irregular event would require an explanation, which would be included in a higher order (meta) laws of nature which relate the usual order of events to the exceptions.

To give an analogy, in mathematics we can assign values to a function where it's not continuous. It just extends the definition. This undermines the first condition of a miracle.

Attacking point 2

It's not unreasonable to argue that the principle of sufficient reason can only be used to invoke reasons (explanations ) that are comprehensible , this would rule out God since no one understands how God interferes in the universe. The surface grammer of "God caused Y miracle" resembles "X physical event caused Y physical event" or "X mental event caused Y physical event" or "X physical event caused Y mental event" but it lacks the depth grammar of the latter expressions. In other words, language does go on a holiday if we intend to convey the meaning of "God caused Y miracle".

jgill

What this will do is subject any possible claim of miracles to science ( physics and mathematics primarily ) — Sirius

Gee, thanks. If things weren't complicated enough already with the pseudo-miracle of entanglement.

To give an analogy, in mathematics we can assign values to a function where it's not continuous — Sirius

( f(x)=0 if x<1 and f(x)=1 if x>=1 is already defined at the critical point. Can you cure this sick function?)

Sirius

↪jgill

( f(x)=0 if x<1 and f(x)=1 if x>=1 is already defined at the critical point. Can you cure this sick function?)

You didn't get my point

Ofc,we can

For the graph f := (x,y)

Let G ((x,y),(x',y')) := (x'',y'') be the function which pastes the graph p = (x',y') on f = (x,y) filling the discontinuous gap at x=1 and returns (x,y) at other points besides x=1=x'

Where p is x'=1 , the line segment connecting the discontinuous gap at x=1 , defined for 0=<y'<=1

jgill

For the graph f := (x,y) — Sirius

What is f=(x,y)? A function is a certain kind of collection of ordered pairs. I suspect you are tacking on a vertical line segment to link the two end points.

We define miracle as an event — Sirius

At the very outset, what evidence do you have that a single miracle has occurred? Tales of miracles are simply stories.

My aim is to broaden the definition of "nature" and "laws of nature" to include any irregular event ( Fire not burning wood , Walking on water ) as a possibility in nature by introducing meta-laws which preside over what we commonly regard as the laws of nature. — Sirius

How can one "broaden" the definition of nature without requiring repetitions of miraculous events? And when the first such event cannot be verified where can one go?

Nevertheless, interesting idea.

Sirius

↪jgill

What is f=(x,y)? A function is a certain kind of collection of ordered pairs. I suspect you are tacking on a vertical line segment to link the two end points

Yeah, l am treating them as an ordered pair. f(x,y) is different from f:= (x,y)

The first is basically z = f(x,y) whereas the second is y=f(x)

Yeah, I gave f and a line segment to a higher order function to give me a continuity at x=1 and return f elsewhere

How can one "broaden" the definition of nature without requiring repetitions of miraculous events? And when the first such event cannot be verified where can one go?

Nevertheless, interesting idea.

Well, for every "miraculous event", which is violated at a lower order law, we would keep digging deeper ( or higher ) for higher meta laws.

Feynman did suggest this as a possibility, that nature is like an infinite onion. With each new experiment, we peel another layer of reality; because the onion is infinite, new layers will continue to be discovered forever. Another possibility which l reject is that we’ll get to the core, and arrive at the most fundamental laws and complete physics.

jgill

Another possibility which l reject is that we’ll get to the core, and arrive at the most fundamental laws and complete physics — Sirius

Agree.

alan1000

We can argue against the logical possibility of a miracle, because the definition of "miracle" given here presupposes the existence of a Godlike being; and nobody has yet succeeded in establishing the existence of any such being, beyond the level of assertion unsupported by scientific evidence.

In the history of science, there are many phenomena which could not be explained by contemporary scientific orthodoxy. In every case, the difficulty has been removed by improving the theory or by replacing it with a better one. As yet there is no reason to believe that miracles, as defined above, actually occur or are necessary to complete scientific knowledge.

The "miracle" hypothesis is, prima facie, unnecessary to science, and is chiefly of value to those who prefer the paths of darkness and superstition.

NotAristotle

the definition of "miracle" given here presupposes the existence of a Godlike bein — alan1000

Aren't you just assuming here a "no-miracles" disposition? Because as it has been defined, a miracle would effectively prove a Godlike being, would it not? I see nothing logically infelicitous about belief in miracles.

Philosophim

I think you can simplify this down further. First you need to demonstrate a supernatural being is actually possible. A 'miracle', or a violation of the known laws of physics does not necessarily lead to a supernatural being.

Two basic alternatives are:

1. Our understanding of physical laws was incomplete.
2. It simply happened. No other explanation behind it.

The idea that it was a conscious supernatural being that caused it is introducing a level of complexity that should not be considered until the other two are ruled out. Even then, you would need concrete proof that such a being existed and caused the miracle.

NotAristotle

↪Philosophim

Surely that is context dependent though. If the miracle is: "my coffee mug is floating!" I don't see how that would suggest any sort of supernatural mind. If the miracle is something more like "we ran out of wine at the wedding but the coffee turned into wine!" That, to me, would suggest a supernatural mind that has understanding.

Philosophim

Surely that is context dependent though. — NotAristotle

The idea that it was a conscious supernatural being that caused it is introducing a level of complexity that should not be considered until the other two are ruled out. Even then, you would need concrete proof that such a being existed and caused the miracle. — Philosophim

Basically I'm noting that there needs to be evidence of a miracle, and that this requires a methodical approach. Wine eventually turns into vinegar if its too old. That happens independently from a conscious intent. First we need to see if wine can naturally turn into coffee given certain conditions. Then we would check if those conditions were caused by a human, which we already know can exist. If caused by a human, we can learn how they did it. If we are not aware of any natural process, nor can find any human did it, then we seek to see how the process can occur at all.

Even ruling that out, none of this indicates a supernatural conscious being. This is a "God of the gaps" fallacy. There is no logical link between not understanding how something happened and suddenly implying some supernatural being beyond our understanding must have caused it.

NotAristotle

↪Philosophim

Right, but my point is, if it seems like a supernatural mind contributed to an apparent miracle (viz. understanding, intent), then we might as well say that a supernatural mind contributed to a veritable miracle.

Philosophim

↪Philosophim Right, but my point is, if it seems like a supernatural mind contributed to an apparent miracle (viz. understanding, intent), then we might as well say that a supernatural mind contributed to a veritable miracle. — NotAristotle

Certainly. But it should be 'seems because evidence points to this' vs 'seems because it requires far less work'.

NotAristotle

↪Philosophim

Fair point, I fully support a method that would rule out natural explanations.

Relativist

↪Sirius

Meta-laws are an unnecessary complication. It suffices to say that naturalism entails the fact that natural law accounts for all events in the world. Our knowledge of natural laws is incomplete, and often only approximation, but we don't need another layer of laws to account for this.

Naturalism is a metaphysical theory, and many of us embrace it, because it seems the simplest account of reality. Clearly, the natural world exists, and it's not at all clear that anything unnatural exists.

If naturalism is true, then miracles are impossible. If a true miracle were found, this would falsify naturalism. But how could one ever establish that one occurred? Refer to Hume.

Two basic alternatives are:

1. Our understanding of physical laws was incomplete.
2. It simply happened. No other explanation behind it. — Philosophim

Concerning 1., the further assumption you need is that physical laws, were we to understand them completely, would explain the purported miracle. I'm not sure what the warrant for this would be. Compare to mathematics: No one can say with certainty whether numbers are "real" or "natural" or "simply happen" (whether in the Platonic world or human brains). Is this because we lack the necessary physical laws to explain them? I think this is doubtful.

So the point is that -- unless you want to call numbers and other abstractions "miracles" -- you need to show why particular miracle X requires a physical explanation. Otherwise I think we're going in a circle.

NotAristotle

Concerning 1., the further assumption you need is that physical laws, were we to understand them completely, would explain the purported miracle. — J

I think Philosophim intended this as an implication of the view, although I think you are right that it is an assumption that is necessary for the argument to work.

you need to show why particular miracle X requires a physical explanation. — J

Not sure I agree -- so-called "scientific miracles" (like the discovery of the atom), in my opinion, do not need to be shown to be physical, we can assume that they just are physical. But perhaps you are defining "miracle" to exclude "scientific miracles." If so, how would you define miracle in a way that does not include "miracles" that are "scientific."

Although, I suppose one could hold the view that everything physical is miraculous, including the regularities of physical laws, or at least that every scientific miracle is a supernatural miracle.

↪NotAristotle

I'm not familiar with the term "scientific miracle." Probably I should be, but could you explain it for me? Thanks.

NotAristotle

↪J

I don't recall where I heard about it before. I was thinking it was like a miracle insofar as it does not adhere to known natural laws or regularities, but that it is an occurrence that can ultimately be explained by natural laws. And so it is an occurrence that would be contrasted with a veritable supernatural miracle.

NotAristotle

Thus the experimental discovery of the atom (or more accurately, the proton in the atom) by Ernest Rutherford (edited) : unpredicted, but explainable in natural terms.

NotAristotle

↪J

Nevermind, I guess "scientific miracle" is not a thing and I'm just making up words.

↪NotAristotle

:smirk: Happens to the best of us!

alan1000

I've always found that downwards causation correlates positively with the quantity of Semillon consumed... sorry, I know I'm being facetious, but I think the philosophical implications have been fairly well explored, and it's time for a little humour.

alan1000

Actually, nude bathing is my favourite form of naturalism... (shut up, alan)

Redefining naturalism with an infinite sequence of meta-laws to make supernatural events impossible

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