There are two opposing errors going on in these responses.

The first is the rejection of physicalism in its entirety, the attempted denial of all things physical.

The second is that not only do we live in a physical world but that physical explanations are to be preferred to any other sort of explanation.

Each respondent defends one or the other, few taking as extreme a stance on either, preferring a little nuance. Each seeks to provide a single overall account of how the world works.

But that's not how the world works.

Folk should be familiar with this image:

And the accompanying text:

Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which a complex of elements corresponds. The primary elements are the coloured squares. “But are these simple?” I wouldn’t know what I could more naturally call a ‘simple’ in this language-game. But under other circumstances, I’d call a monochrome square, consisting perhaps of two rectangles or of the elements colour and shape, “composite”. But the concept of compositeness might also be extended so that a smaller area was said to be ‘composed’ of a greater area and another one subtracted from it. Compare the ‘composition’ of forces, the ‘division’ of a line by a point outside it; these expressions show that we are sometimes even inclined to conceive the smaller as the result of a composition of greater parts, and the greater as the result of a division of the smaller.
But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine? And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — LW, Philosophical Investigations, §48

What you have in your thread is somewhat like two teams looking at this diagram, the one insisting that the Numbers explain what it is about; while the other insist it is the Colours that allow us to understand. Their error is to think that there must be one explanation. Their argument is as a result interminable, and doubtless will go on long after I post this. (See PI§402)

There's more, of course, since this initial error leads one to compound one's mistakes. The idealists, when held to account, find that they are unable to give a simple account of error, or even of their not being alone. The physicalist uses words like "reduction" or "emergence", waving a hand in the air when asked what such things might actually be.

The alternative to both is found most explicitly in that grandmother of philosophy, Mary Midgley, but can be seen in other Oxbridge philosophers from the middle of last century. It's simply that we use different types of explanation in different situations, that we need not, indeed ought not, commit to there being a single monolithic explanation of everything.

The world is far too interesting for that.

The alternative to both is found most explicitly in that grandmother of philosophy, Mary Midgley, but can be seen in other Oxbridge philosophers from the middle of last century. It's simply that we use different types of explanation in different situations, that we need not, indeed ought not, commit to there being a single monolithic explanation of everything. — Banno

:100:

Best explanation I've ever heard. Thank you, my friend. :up:

The alternative to both is found most explicitly in that grandmother of philosophy, Mary Midgley — Banno

There's my weeks delve.

Anyone else you'd append for someone to explore?

But can anyone set out clearly what emergence is? — Banno

Maybe Christoffer can articulate it in a way that I can't see how to at the moment, but I can point to examples. For instance, suppose I have designed a voltmeter. When an instance of such a voltmeter is powered, it has the emergent property of displaying a number corresponding to the voltage applied to the input terminals. That emergent property supervenes on the particular properties of components within that specific instance of the voltmeter design.

Another instance of the same voltmeter design might have a different emergent property due to having different specific components. For example, voltmeter A may be more accurate than voltmeter B. Because the emergent accuracy of voltmeter B supervenes on B's components, changing the emergent accuracy of voltmeter B would require a change in one or more of the specific components of B that the emergent property supervenes on.

It's simply that we use different types of explanation in different situations, that we need not, indeed ought not, commit to there being a single monolithic explanation of everything. — Banno

In other words, then, there are no good arguments for physicalism, insofar as it is presumed to be a monistic explanation (i.e. that everything that exists is, or is reducible to, the physical.) Agree that Mary Midgley is an effective critic of that, notwithstanding her school ma'amly prose.

But can anyone set out clearly what emergence is? — Banno

Similar to 'supervenience' - a convenient term the meaning of which can be adapted as required to fill the explanatory gap.

As you implied, the key to your differences with ↪creativesoul is in divergent definitions of "To Be / To Exist". A typical dictionary definition says that "To Exist" means Objective Reality, which seems to exclude Subjective Ideality — Gnomon

I have long felt there ought to be a distinction made between what is real and what exists, the latter being a subset of the former.

3.5

User
what is the best way to explain emergence and supervenience to philosopher

ChatGPT
To explain emergence and supervenience to a philosopher, you can describe emergence as the phenomenon where complex systems exhibit properties or behaviors that cannot be straightforwardly deduced from the properties of their individual components. Supervenience, on the other hand, is the idea that higher-level properties are dependent on, or supervene upon, lower-level properties.

For example, consider the mind-brain relationship. Emergence suggests that mental phenomena, like consciousness, arise from the complexity of neural networks in the brain, but you can't predict consciousness just by examining individual neurons. Supervenience, in this context, emphasizes that mental states depend on the underlying neural states.

In essence, emergence highlights the unpredictability of higher-level phenomena, while supervenience emphasizes the dependency of these phenomena on their underlying components.

Extended conversation with Chat GPT on the topic of philosophers understanding supervenience and emergence.

From which:

For example, consider the mind-brain relationship. Emergence suggests that mental phenomena, like consciousness, arise from the complexity of neural networks in the brain, but you can't predict consciousness just by examining individual neurons. Supervenience, in this context, emphasizes that mental states depend on the underlying neural states.

However,there is also such a thing as top-down causation which mitigates against purely physicalist explanations of consciousness. This concept becomes evident in phenomena like the placebo effect and other instances of psychosomatic medicine. Then there's also the discovery of neuroplasticity. as highlighted in Norman Doidge's book "The Brain That Changes Itself," demonstrates the remarkable ability of the brain to change in response to various kinds of training and stimuli. Neuroplasticity refers to the brain's capacity to reorganize its structure, functions, and connections in response to experiences, learning, and environmental factors.

Doidge's book explores numerous case studies and examples that illustrate how the brain can adapt and transform itself throughout a person's life. Some key points regarding the implications of neuroplasticity include:

Recovery from Brain Injuries: Neuroplasticity has shown that even after traumatic brain injuries or strokes, the brain can rewire itself to compensate for lost functions. This provides hope for rehabilitation and recovery in individuals who have experienced such injuries.

Learning and Skill Acquisition: Neuroplasticity supports the idea that the brain can continually learn new skills and adapt to changing circumstances. It challenges the notion that learning is limited to specific developmental periods.

Cognitive Rehabilitation: The concept of neuroplasticity has led to the development of various cognitive rehabilitation techniques for conditions such as dyslexia, autism, and other neurological disorders.

Changing Behaviors and Habits: Neuroplasticity implies that individuals can change their behaviors and habits by rewiring neural pathways through conscious effort and practice. This is relevant in fields like psychology and addiction treatment.

Mental Health: The book also explores how neuroplasticity plays a role in mental health and emotional well-being, offering insights into the potential for rewiring negative thought patterns and managing conditions like depression and anxiety.

In summary, the discovery of neuroplasticity, as presented in "The Brain That Changes Itself," underscores the brain's remarkable adaptability and capacity for change throughout a person's life. It challenges traditional views of the brain as a static organ and offers hope for a wide range of applications in rehabilitation, education, and mental health.

So the question I would ask, is when does the ability of volitional activity to mould the structure of the brain and other organs commence, exactly? Might it be possible to consider that volitional action, in the broadest sense, is present in organisms of all kinds, even very simple organisms? Which again mitigates against a purely physicalist explanation.

Thanks also to ChatGPT for some input and formatting.

However,there is also such a thing as top-down causation which mitigates against purely physicalist explanations of consciousness. This concept becomes evident in phenomena like the placebo effect and other instances of psychosomatic medicine. — Wayfarer

There certainly is the term "top-down causation". However simply assuming top-down causation occurs is begging the question against physicalism. Now if you can provide some empirical evidence demonstrating that top down causation occurs then you could falsify physicalism. However simply asserting that top-down causation occurs isn't good enough.

Do you have incontrovertible empirical evidence of top-down causation?

Then there's also the discovery of neuroplasticity. as highlighted in Norman Doidge's book "The Brain That Changes Itself," demonstrates the remarkable ability of the brain to change in response to various kinds of training and stimuli. Neuroplasticity refers to the brain's capacity to reorganize its structure, functions, and connections in response to experiences, learning, and environmental factors. — Wayfarer

Neuroplasticity is not problematic for physicalism.

Do you have incontrovertible empirical evidence of top-down causation? — wonderer1

I don’t believe the substance of this exchange can be explained in physical terms. If I say something that affects you it might increase your blood pressure. Yet nothing physical would have passed between us, unlike if I had administered a medicine. That’s an example.

I don’t believe the substance of this exchange can be explained in physical terms. — Wayfarer

Even if you really really really believe it, it doesn't falsify physicalism.

If I say something that affects you it might increase your blood pressure. Yet nothing physical would have passed between us, unlike if I had administered a medicine. That’s an example. — Wayfarer

I'm awfully confident that you physically used a computer input device to compose your post so that it was physically sent over the intenet to the TPF server. Then when I reopened the thread my Kindle was able to receive the data representing your post, as a result of that data having been physically transmitted from the TPF server to my Kindle.

You being unaware of the sequence of physical events in the causal chain, does not constitute evidence that nothing physical passed between us.

I'm awfully confident that you physically used a computer input to device to compose your post so that it was physically sent over the intenet to the TPF server. Then when I reopened the thread my Kindle was able to receive the data representing your post, as a result of that data having been physically transmitted from the TPF server to my Kindle. — wonderer1

Of course. In each transition, the physical constituents of the information change and also the underlying media. It's translated between electrical pulses, pixels on the screen, then you might even write it down. But the substance of the information stays the same. So how could that be physical?

Emergence of individual minds from, and their supervenience on, the physical can be in principle explained just five via certain versions of idealism, such as that of Peirce’s objective idealism.

But I here want to mainly illustrate that this emergence and supervenience route of argumentation is a red herring avoiding the very issues concerned in respect to what physicalism is:

There is no logical reason why spiritual realms—replete with forest and house fairies, ghosts, angels, and less than omnipotent deities that can thereby conflict with each other—cannot all be hypothesized to exist via emergence from, and supervenience upon, that realm of reality consisting of corporeal consciousness, awareness, and mind applicable to life in general—with the latter itself being affirmed to emerge from and supervene on physical particles, fields, and the like … ultimately from and upon the omnipresent quantum vacuum state.

Yet, point being, this supposition would be antithetical to physicalism for tacitly maintained reasons—something to do with an aversion to spirituality as expressed. Physicalism though it would yet technically be given the premise of emergence and supervenience.

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As to rejecting these here hypothesized apparitions on grounds that they are not empirically verifiable, neither are consciousnesses (the philosophical problem of other minds attests to this), whose reality no one here is debating. So lack of empirical proof isn't much of a rational argument against the deity-inclusive physicalism just expressed.

On the other hand, asking me "how" and "why" questions regarding this hypothetical is akin to me asking any physicalist "how" and "why" questions regarding gas atoms (two hydrogen and one oxygen) comprising a liquid when a grouping of H2O molecules are at room temperature. I have no good answer to give, no more than the physicalist does.

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No psychobabble here included or intended, but if by this presented argument one would want to project upon me some laughable fear of annihilation upon death or of some such other physicalist proposition, I’ll then duly project upon the stated physicalist the phobia of an afterlife … together with psychologizations of the deeds in their life which might make this fear so potent.

I'm hoping replies to this post, if any, don’t lower themselves to such speculative and ad hominem rebuttals. If replied to, I'd much rather be rationally evidenced wrong in the argument just made.

Note this thread Is 'Information' Physical where this idea was dragged over the coals discussed at length some time ago. I don't know if you've encountered Apokrisis on this forum but he was a major contributor to that debate.

Of course. IN each transition, the physical constituents of the information change and also the underlying media. It's translated between electrical pulses, pixels on the screen, then you might even write it down. But the substance of the information stays the same. So how could that be physical? — Wayfarer

You are assuming the mental content in my mind as I read your post is identical to what? Do you think it was identical to the way you were mentally modelling me interpreting it when you wrote it?

I think what happened is you wrote based on your intuiton as to how I would interpret it. I read the pixel based form of the data and my intuitions generated the interpreted content that occurred for me. It is clearly naive however to assume identical content for both of us associated with the digital data. If such verbatim content transfer occurred, I wouldn't be so frustrated about people here not understanding emergence and supervenience. :rage: :razz:

Note this thread Is 'Information' Physical where this idea was dragged over the coals discussed at length some time ago. — Wayfarer

Argument from authority. So what?

Well, I slogged my way through a decent amount of:



..and it actually reduced my confidence in "emergence," being any sort of magic wand for difficulties in forming an ontology that is both plausible and strongly framed. The arguments in Kim's "Physicalism or Something Near Enough," are a doozy.

The problem is that "what constitutes emergence," is deeply tied to metaphysical considerations that lie upstream of the concept, and how dependence is framed. Emergence is an old concept, but it seems many classical formulations of it are dead in the water.

I understand why people think we need emergence. My intuition though, is that a lot of attempts to build a definition of emergence are being built on top of prior assumptions that simply preclude the possibility of such a thing.

"How do you combine a bunch of building blocks and get something completely new that wasn't in the blocks to start with?" Intuitive answer is you simply don't. Same as how you don't get an ought from an is.

I've decided that ontologies are a lot like impressionist paintings. They look better from far way. :rofl:

It is clearly naive however to assume identical content for both of us associated with the digital data. If such verbatim content transfer occurred, I wouldn't be so frustrated about people here not understanding emergence and supervenience. — wonderer1

I understand what you're saying, but I don't agree with it. The point is, however, that we speak the same language and can convey ideas through text. That is what I say is not meaningfully reducible to the physical.

"How do you combine a bunch of building blocks and get something completely new that wasn't in the blocks to start with?" Intuitive answer is you simply don't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Combine enough blocks and you get a black hole, which wasn't in the blocks to start with.

The problem is not in finding examples of phenomena that might exhibit emergence. There are plenty of those. It's in framing what emergence is in a way that meshes with the overall ontology (which would generally be physicalism since the overwhelming amount of work on emergence is in that context).

The blocks example is about our intuition — a metaphor.

I was wondering what your view of information is.
This is actually a good example of where physicalism and reductionism used as tools can keep you out of trouble.

So a principal of physicalism is that everything can be reduced to physical matter and you just questioned how information can be physical. Anyone who projects information as something existing outside of brains is going to run into trouble here. Physical signals with information piggybacking along for the ride.

The better view is information exists as brain state which is reduced to physical matter and communication is possible by physical signals. No brain external information.

No brain external information. — Mark Nyquist

What's the sitch when the information is in transit?

I understand what you're saying, but I don't agree with it. The point is, however, that we speak the same language and can convey ideas through text. That is what I say is not meaningfully reducible to the physical. — Wayfarer

Bringing in reducibility is shifting the goal posts, and I understand that you don't agree with it, but can you give me a reason to think that your disagreement is not simply a matter of biased intuitions on your part?

It's in framing what emergence is in a way that meshes with the overall ontology (which would generally be physicalism since the overwhelming amount of work on emergence is in that context). — Count Timothy von Icarus

How many words do you think it should take, to explain "what emergence is" for all cases of emergent properties? Are you sure this should be considered a serious question?

Just encoded physical matter that will be decoded by the receiver.

I've decided that ontologies are a lot like impressionist paintings. They look better from far way. :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

For my part, I applaud this sentiment. :grin:

quote="frank;870141"]Best explanation I've ever heard. Thank you, my friend. :up:[/quote]
You're welcome. It's just me sorting stuff out.

Anyone else you'd append for someone to explore? — AmadeusD

Chapter five here is worth a read. Thanks, @Ludwig V.

In other words, then, there are no good arguments for physicalism, insofar as it is presumed to be a monistic explanation — Wayfarer

On the contrary, physicalism is exactly true, if what you are doing is physics. That's the methodological point made way back in the second post here. Physics has no place for explanations that are not physical, but in turn it has to restrict itself to not presenting explanations of things from outside its purview.

Trying to slip spirituality or Zen into physics is like trying to win Chess by presenting a full house.

...it actually reduced my confidence in "emergence," — Count Timothy von Icarus

As with causality, it doesn't seem to stand up to close inspection.

Right, right. Ok, cool thank you!