I think yours is an inadequate definition of time because "registered change" implies observation, judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I actually didn't mean to imply that. I'm not a person who believes all reality is dependent on our observation. I do believe there need to be at least two 'pieces' of existence for time to occur as it would be the change relative to each other. No observer required.

Yes, physicists are actually heavily invested in the use of "causation". Take a look at the concepts of "lightcone", "timelike & spacelike", "worldline", "propertime", for example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, denial of causation is fundamentally silly. Its also completely indefensible if you remove the abstract. 'What caused your message to appear on the forum today?' for example, causes even the most passionate causality deniers great difficulty.

Good OP. Personally, I don't see why we should accept that space and time, or space/time fabric, is a substance--as they seem, to me, to be merely the forms of our experience. If they are simply the modes by which we cognize objects, then the objects themselves are beyond space and time, or space/time fabric. I honestly don't think we will ever understand the world sans space and time (conceptually) because it is so ingrained into our mode of experiencing it; and this is why we end up with all sorts of problems with the big bang theory when taken not as a convenient model but, rather, as if it is literally what the universe is in and of itself.

Yes, it is entirely possible that some things have no causes or that there is an infinite of them: I don't really see how one can decipher which one is more plausible: if time and space are not substances, then causality (in a spatiotemporal sense) doesn't exist either but, rather, is a representation of (nonspatiotemporal or otherwise) relationships of objects in-themselves.

Another interesting point (to me) is that knowing the negation of a concept doesn't necessarily entail any real knowledge of it, and, in this case, thusly, being directly acquainted with temporality (like we all are) doesn't give us any insight into the nature of atemporality. Most people think "well, atemporality would just be no change, and so I envision an object, like a chair, which is frozen in time": but is this a really accurate understanding of the nature of atemporal objects and their relations to other objects? I don't think so. So when people start trying to come up with hypotheses about 'prior to time' in the big bang, I think, in summary, (1) time doesn't exist (as a substance) and (2) even if it did neither of us have any clue what the nature of atemporality really is at all.

Yes, physicists are actually heavily invested in the use of "causation". Take a look at the concepts of "lightcone", "timelike & spacelike", "worldline", "propertime", for example. They use knowledge of the temporal order of events (causation) to establish timelines in relativity based observations. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Russell observed, a temporal order per-se does not imply causation. For example, the orbits of the planets are describable by a differential equation that makes no appeal to cause and effect. The space-time manifold of General relativity makes no use of causation, nor does the evolution of a phase-space describing a dynamical system. More generally, a theory that sticks to describing actual phenomena, makes no mention of causality.

The concept of causation is actually a metaphysical interpretation of counterfactual logic, as extensively used in the design of double blind experiments. By definition, counterfactual outcomes aren't observed in experiments, so an interpretation of counterfactual logic that rests upon a speculated existence of non-realized experimental outcomes, cannot be verified through scientific experiments. But of course the social sciences do use counterfactual logic since they interpret the logic empirically, implying that the use-meaning of counterfactuals is in conflict with the traditional philosophical understanding of counterfactuals as literally referring to other possible worlds.


One of the ironies of the super-determinism interpretation of QM, is that it implies the non-existence of causality, since if reality is fully determined such that there are no counterfactual outcomes, then the resulting super-determined reality is merely a true story whose course of events is absurd.

I think of it in terms of potential and probability.

Potential doesn't require any prior existent. The ability to bring about existent things is a property of potential itself. Yet it doesn't require to exist at any time or in any dimension until its potentiates those things - time, space etc into being.

Therefore I'm replacing here the idea of "absolute nothingness" with "potential" - a single property that is not contingent on any other properties.

Then if you suppose that the probability of potential to potentiate is 1. Then it has no choice other than to "do stuff" (potential outcomes/possibilities). The first stuff being the dimensions of time and space in order to do more stuff within (matter and energy etc).

This issue I have encountered in this line of thinking is 1. Does potential have the potential to violate its own ability to be potential? Ie can it cancel itself out. I imagine not as it wouldn't be very potent if it immediately self annihilated.
2. Why does it seem to follow a logical stepwise emergence in a particular order or sequence?

You're still stuck in the Newtonian causality. While I agree with you, in fact I said this in my previous post that there was always something, and that the universe did not come from nothing, your train of thought is still the regularity of the laws of the universe. We are totally not on the same page. — L'éléphant

I wouldn't say Newtonian. I conceive spatiality and temporality as part of the thing to the extent that it is always in relationship. However, when talking about the order of coexistence and order of succession I am talking about something that all science implies when using the notions of space and time. Hence, taking the example of the theory of relativity, we represent things in planes and diagrams (such as Minkowski diagrams). Things, in this sense, are always constituted by the spatio-temporality in which their effects and relationships are expressed. In this sense the thing, its relationships, and its effects on other things are in a correlation that determines its being and existence. Therefore, it is not valid to think of an isolated absolute thing (absolved from all relationships) from which everything arises, nor nothingness from which something comes to existence.

You have created an interesting and highly literate thread, Count. :clap:

I do believe there need to be at least two 'pieces' of existence for time to occur as it would be the change relative to each other. — Philosophim

I don't see the need for these two existents. The change relative to each other requires the passing of time, so it is evidence to an observer that time has passed, but time could also pass without any change of these two, relative to each other. That time passing is required for observable change, and change is evidence of time passing, does not necessitate logically, that observable change is required for time to pass. And, we do observe that things may exist with no observable change relative to each other, yet time still may have passed. Therefore there is no reason two believe that a multitude of existents is required for time to be passing.

Since the change relative to each other, of two things, is the observable effect of time passing, yet it is not what time itself actually is, I still think you are, in a different way, making time observer-dependent. It is not that you make the passing of time require an actual observer, but you make the passing of time dependent on an observable effect. So you are basing it in principles of observation. This denies the possibility that the passing of time itself might be completely unobservable, and what we do observe is just the effects of the passing of time. That the passing of time itself, is something which is completely unobservable, is a very real and logical possibility, which we ought not exclude in the way that you do.

As Russell observed, a temporal order per-se does not imply causation. — sime

The point I was arguing is that cosmologists employ knowledge of causation to produce a temporal order. Since relativity theory provides no basic way to distinguish spatial separation from temporal separation, and therefore no way to create a proper temporal order for events which are separated, they need to refer to causation to produce a "proper time". In other words they know that A must have occurred before B, when creating their temporal order, because A is commonly known to be the cause of B.

The concept of causation is actually a metaphysical interpretation of counterfactual logic, as extensively used in the design of double blind experiments. — sime

I've never seen the concept of causation described as being an interpretation of counterfactual logic. I've always seen it described as the product of inductive reasoning. You know "causation" extends to ancient Greece, and was discussed extensively by Aristotle. Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could explain this claim of yours, so I can understand what you are talking about.

One of the ironies of the super-determinism interpretation of QM, is that it implies the non-existence of causality, since if reality is fully determined such that there are no counterfactual outcomes, then the resulting super-determined reality is merely a true story whose course of events is absurd. — sime

There are some extraordinary interpretations of QM. However, since there are many interpretations, and none can be said to be the correct one, then whatever anyone of them says about reality, cannot be taken seriously as "reliable".

This issue I have encountered in this line of thinking is 1. Does potential have the potential to violate its own ability to be potential? Ie can it cancel itself out. I imagine not as it wouldn't be very potent if it immediately self annihilated.
2. Why does it seem to follow a logical stepwise emergence in a particular order or sequence? — Benj96

.The issue I've come across is Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument. He demonstrates why it is illogical to think that any sort of pure potential could actualize itself. Any sort of potential, requires an act, as cause to actualize it. So, "The ability to bring about existent things" is not a property of potential itself. Potential is always the potential for a multitude of possibilities, and whichever of the possibilities gets actualized is dependent on the efficient cause, which is an actuality. Therefore an efficient cause, something other than potential, something actual, is required to bring about an existent thing.

I don't see the need for these two existents. The change relative to each other requires the passing of time, so it is evidence to an observer that time has passed, but time could also pass without any change of these two, relative to each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me give you the thought experiment I'm thinking of so you can see what I mean. Lets say that only two particles exist in the entire universe. They stay exactly 1 meter away from each other for eternity. Is there time?

To me, if there is an observer, then there is a third existence that is changing. But we're talking about two particles that do not move relative to one another at all. Now, lets say that they move in one inch closer. Suddenly, we now have time, even without an observer. The thought experiment is that there has to be at least one change between two existences for time to exist. How would you approach it?

Lets say that only two particles exist in the entire universe. They stay exactly 1 meter away from each other for eternity. Is there time? — Philosophim

Are they moving in reference to something else, like revolving? I have brought this up earlier. It has seemed odd that Minkowski spacetime might imply the passage of time with no physical movement.

Are they moving in reference to something else, like revolving? I have brought this up earlier. It has seemed odd that Minkowski spacetime might imply the passage of time with no physical movement. — jgill

No, its just two particles. Lets say the particles are a little misshapen so its apparent they aren't even rotating around each other either. If they were rotating, even if both were smooth and we couldn't tell, time would be happening without an observer. So does time happen if both stand still and no change occurs within or between them?

They stay exactly 1 meter away from each other for eternity. Is there time? — Philosophim

Well, you said 'for eternity', which implies time. But I agree that there is no meaningful time without change of some sort. You speak of an observer, but observing at all cannot take place.

To further your example, the particles need not remain a fixed distance apart. In a 2-particle universe, the distance between them is meaningless, as is rotation, so there is no need to state that they remain a meter apart, or remain in a given orientation.

Lets say the particles are a little misshapen — Philosophim

Now you go too far. A misshapen particle is not just a particle, but a collection of them. A misshapen particle has extension, and if it has extension, the distance between the particles becomes a meaningful multiple of that extension.


As for the OP

It is still the case that, if the universe had a begining (Cosmic Inflation, the Big Bang) then there was a time T0 where things existed and did not exist in any prior state. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not necessarily the case since eternalism suggests no such thing, as your seem to realize:

As I understand it, this problem is one of the things that makes eternalism popular. It would seem to solve the problem by saying that only what exists, including all moments, exists without begining or end. I find eternalism as a whole problematic for reasons that would make this post too long, so this never appealed to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK, so it's a problem for your chosen interpretation of time. Einstein's relativity theory assumes eternalism by assuming the existence of spacetime. There are alternative theories that are more along the lines you suggest, but those theories took almost another century to be fleshed out, being in denial of the big bang, black holes, and other things that fall out of relativity theory.

So yes, even the eternalists have a problem if they assert that the universe is real. How does one explain the reality of whatever one declares to be real? It is sort of the 'why is there something and not nothing?' question. You have to answer that as well, even given your chosen interpretation of time.

Let me give you the thought experiment I'm thinking of so you can see what I mean. Lets say that only two particles exist in the entire universe. They stay exactly 1 meter away from each other for eternity. Is there time?

To me, if there is an observer, then there is a third existence that is changing. But we're talking about two particles that do not move relative to one another at all. Now, lets say that they move in one inch closer. Suddenly, we now have time, even without an observer. The thought experiment is that there has to be at least one change between two existences for time to exist. How would you approach it? — Philosophim

The thought experiment is unhelpful, and that's the point I'm making. We don't know enough about time to answer the question. So the answer simply depends on what you mean by "eternity". If by "eternity", you mean time passing endlessly, then clearly time passes in the thought experiment. If by "eternity" you mean something completely outside of time, then no time passes. But both of these senses of "eternity" are arguably unreal and irrelevant to the real world, so the whole thought experiment is useless for understanding the real nature of time.

Furthermore, the second part is completely illogical from accepted self-evident premises. If there is only two particles unmoving relative to each other, in the entire universe, it is impossible that they could suddenly move closer to each other, because this would require a cause, meaning something else in existence is necessary.

So the proposed thought experiment is entirely useless for two distinct reasons. The first part uses an ambiguous word "eternity" for a key premise. The word can be used in a way which would mean that time passes endlessly, or in a way that time does not pass at all, implying outside of time. Both are unreal possibilities anyway, so disambiguation would not help. One would imply an infinite amount of time while the other would imply material objects without time. Then the second part proposes something unintelligible, illogical for the reasons I've already explained in earlier posts. Material objects beginning to move without a cause is contrary to fundamental laws of induction, self-evident principles.

I gave you a much better thought experiment already. Can you imagine two material objects not moving relative to each other, while some time passes? If so, then you ought to accept the proposition that movement of material objects relative to each other is not logically necessary for time to be passing.

As I explained, you are trying to base your conception of "time" in the observable effects of time passing (the movement of material objects), instead of looking directly at what time is, to produce a much more accurate understanding of it. As indicates, premises concerning what we know about the physical universe, in conjunction with good logical practise, indicates that time could pass without physical change. That is a completely logical possibility which we would be foolish to exclude.

This becomes very evident at the Planck scale. It has become clear that there is a limit to the amount of time required for observable physical change. This is the shortest period of time required for observable change. However, this restriction, this boundary of "shortest period of time", is the product of observation, and it dictates the shortest period of time required for observable change, not the shortest period of time logically possible. Since time in theory, is infinitely divisible (and we have found no real points of division in the continuity of time), then In theory we can still proceed to an even shorter period of time. Within that shorter period of time could occur unobservable change, immaterial change, which could act as the cause of the observable change, which requires the longer period of time. The obvious problem with this proposal is that physicalist tendencies incline people to disallow the possibility of unobservable change, and the entire immaterial realm.

I've never seen the concept of causation described as being an interpretation of counterfactual logic. I've always seen it described as the product of inductive reasoning. You know "causation" extends to ancient Greece, and was discussed extensively by Aristotle. Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could explain this claim of yours, so I can understand what you are talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

The modern understanding of causation as used by the sciences, might involve inductive reasoning, but isn't reducible to inductive reasoning. For example , if all ravens are black, then it must be the case that a sampled raven is black, but one wouldn't want to say that all ravens being black was the "cause" of a raven to be black. So induced hypotheses aren't causes per-se.

Inductive arguments are relevant to causation when one is reasoning about the type of an observed object when estimating how the object will behave , e.g when estimating whether an observed white ball is a snooker ball. But when deciding whether a particular relation between two particular events is a causal relation, induction cannot be applied if there isn't a general case to appeal to, yet the existence of a general case isn't said to be necessary for a particular causal relation to exist. So induced premises aren't necessarily causes, and causes aren't necessarily inducible.

Nowadays, an instance of a 'causal' relation between a particular cause A and a particular cause B, is understood to be relation which asserts that B occurs if and only if A occurs, assuming that nothing else could be the cause of B. This is what is meant by saying that causation involves "counterfactuals".

A scientist obviously cannot go back in time to test the truth of an alleged instance of a causal relation. Instead, he simulates his definition of the causal relation using model to see how simulated instances of that relation behave in comparison to simulated instances that aren't of that relation, and can at most conclude that if the alleged instance is of that relation, then the instance behaves in the same way as the other simulated instances. If the scientist always presents his conclusions as being conditionally true given the truth of the assumed hypotheses (induced or otherwise), then he avoids committing the fallacies of induction that routinely occur in the scientific literature.

Suppose we have satisfactorily resolved all our questions about first causes and unmoved movers. We don't think we need either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what would such a state of mind even be like?

If we had satisfactorily resolved all our questions about first causes and unmoved movers, would we still wonder about things such as "spontaneous creation" (or much else, for that matter)?

Your thought experiment requires that we work out of a state of mind that we are simply not familiar with, and as such, is impossible to carry out.

The thought experiment is unhelpful, and that's the point I'm making. We don't know enough about time to answer the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's kind of the point. We're trying to come up with a reasonable explanation of time.

So the answer simply depends on what you mean by "eternity". If by "eternity", you mean time passing endlessly, then clearly time passes in the thought experiment. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just mean that they never move. There is no outside observer, there's no beginning, no end. Yes, if there was an observer there that would be a third existence monitoring change relative to themselves. But if there is no observer and no change in any existence, what's the difference between that and no time at all? This isn't a proof, its just a thought experiment to get us to think about the abstract nature of time without an observer. Is 'time' an actual thing?

Furthermore, the second part is completely illogical from accepted self-evident premises. If there is only two particles unmoving relative to each other, in the entire universe, it is impossible that they could suddenly move closer to each other, because this would require a cause, meaning something else in existence is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its just a thought experiment to get us to think. Its not a real life example. If you want to be realistic, its impossible to have the entire experiment as it is. There are obviously more than two particles in the universe. The idea of a thought experiment is to pair down variables to get to certain constants. The idea is simple. A universe where two thing exist that have no change, then suddenly there is change. Was there time before the change? Do we retroactively put time before the change? Can there be time if there is no change at all? These are the general questions we're thinking on.

So the proposed thought experiment is entirely useless for two distinct reasons. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, a thought experiment is about the key questions, not the reality of the experiment itself. If you get the key questions, that's all I'm asking you to answer in your own proposal for time.

Can you imagine two material objects not moving relative to each other, while some time passes? If so, then you ought to accept the proposition that movement of material objects relative to each other is not logically necessary for time to be passing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's what I'm pointing out. I can imagine time passing, but only because I'm observing it. If there is no observer and no change at all, is there time? Its not movement in particular, its change. Thinking is change. Observance is change. If there is no change, do we have time in reality, or is it a tool we invent from a world of change and retrofit it to a world without change?

As I explained, you are trying to base your conception of "time" in the observable effects of time passing (the movement of material objects), instead of looking directly at what time is, to produce a much more accurate understanding of it — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm trying to ask what time is beyond a tool. How do can you realistically measure time in a world without change? If you can't, does it exist? Is the nature of time something more fundamental than a tool of an observer and change? Is it its own existence?

As ↪jgill indicates, premises concerning what we know about the physical universe, in conjunction with good logical practise, indicates that time could pass without physical change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rotation is physical change. I'm not trying to say "I have this." This is not me proving anything. This is me asking you a simple question. How does time exist in a hypothetical world without any change?

Since time in theory, is infinitely divisible (and we have found no real points of division in the continuity of time), then In theory we can still proceed to an even shorter period of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as observers we can continue to cut down time as small as we want. But even 'plank' time is a measure of change right? We're inventing a half-plank length. And clearly though we can invent infinite time, infinite time doesn't happen in between plank tics.

The obvious problem with this proposal is that physicalist tendencies incline people to disallow the possibility of unobservable change, and the entire immaterial realm. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I'm not trying to disallow anything though. I'm just trying to understand what the fundamental of time is without an observer. If its not change, what is it?

I wouldn't say Newtonian. I conceive spatiality and temporality as part of the thing to the extent that it is always in relationship. However, when talking about the order of coexistence and order of succession I am talking about something that all science implies when using the notions of space and time. — JuanZu

And I'm saying that you can't. Gravitational singularity does not have spacetime.

So, is philosophy very much invested in physics? Should it be? Is philosophy equipped, in general, to circumvent details and pull quantum tricks out of its big hat? — jgill

Physics is invested in philosophy. :cool:

I think you do not take into account that the gravitational singularity is defined according to space-time, although we are talking about an infinite curvature. If the value of curvature is taken to a limit, it does not imply that we stop talking about curvature, nor its need to represent it in space-time. I claim that the need to represent according to a space-time scheme tells us something about space-time time itself. At this point the philosophy of space-time can provide us with the general-ontological concept that is exercised in physics. We can ask ourselves: Does the gravitational singularity coexist with the current state of the universe? Should we differentiate them as two different moments? You could say: "In the gravitational singularity there is no before or after." Well, then there is an inadequacy of that space-time scheme that we use to represent the difference between one state of the universe and another state.

We can ask ourselves: Does the gravitational singularity coexist with the current state of the universe? Should we differentiate them as two different moments? You could say: "In the gravitational singularity there is no before or after." Well, then there is an inadequacy of that space-time scheme that we use to represent the difference between one state of the universe and another state. — JuanZu

This is your opinion. If you believe there are deficiencies in the conception of what existed prior to the big bang, or even in the blackhole, this is beyond the task of philosophy.

The modern understanding of causation as used by the sciences, might involve inductive reasoning, but isn't reducible to inductive reasoning. For example , if all ravens are black, then it must be the case that a sampled raven is black, but one wouldn't want to say that all ravens being black was the "cause" of a raven to be black. So induced hypotheses aren't causes per-se. — sime

What I'm talking about is when events follow each other in time, and the same types are observed to do so consistently, then through inductive reasoning we make a conclusion about a relationship, i.e. we infer causation. So for example, if we apply heat to water and then it boils, and we observe this many times, we make the inductive conclusion that the heat causes the water to boil.

Nowadays, an instance of a 'causal' relation between a particular cause A and a particular cause B, is understood to be relation which asserts that B occurs if and only if A occurs, assuming that nothing else could be the cause of B. This is what is meant by saying that causation involves "counterfactuals". — sime

This is not an acceptable explanation of causation. An assignment of causation does not exclude the possibility of other things having the same effect. So in the example above, saying that heat causes water to boil does not exclude the possibility that something else as well, such as a drop in pressure, could also cause water to boil. That A is judged to cause B does not exclude the possibility that something else might also cause B as well.

Your explanation seems to make a category mistake, switching from the particular to the general. In a particular instance, we will say that A caused B only if we think that other possibilities have been ruled out. So in a particular instance of water boiling we would say that the application of heat caused this, because we've ruled out other possibilities. But then you make A and B into something general, and you make the general statement "B occurs if and only if A occurs". That's a logical fallacy, because in other situations something else could cause B to occur. So in the example, when the application of heat is judged to be the cause of the water boiling in that particular instance, and even if we make the general statement that the application of heat causes water to boil, we do not have the required premise to say that only the application of heat could cause water to boil.

I just mean that they never move. There is no outside observer, there's no beginning, no end. Yes, if there was an observer there that would be a third existence monitoring change relative to themselves. But if there is no observer and no change in any existence, what's the difference between that and no time at all? This isn't a proof, its just a thought experiment to get us to think about the abstract nature of time without an observer. Is 'time' an actual thing? — Philosophim

As I said, the thought experiment is useless, because you have to stipulate whether or not time is passing, to get anywhere, but then you're begging the question. Look, you say that there is two particles, and they are not moving relative to each other. That's all you say. Time could be passing, or time might not be passing, we have no way, from the premises of the thought experiment to determine whether time is passing or not. Therefore it's useless as an effort to try and understand whether time could be passing without any physical change happening.

A universe where two thing exist that have no change, then suddenly there is change. Was there time before the change? Do we retroactively put time before the change? Can there be time if there is no change at all? These are the general questions we're thinking on. — Philosophim

Yes, by the way you phrased the question, there was time before the change. You say "then suddenly there is change". This implies that there is "before" the change, and there must be time for before to become after. Therefore there must have been time before the change, in order for there to have been a "before" the change, and a time when the two things were not moving. Otherwise you could not even talk about the two things existing before the change.

I can imagine time passing, but only because I'm observing it. — Philosophim

Now, I ask you to use logic, and see with your mind, logically, that it is possible for there to be time passing without change occurring.

I'm trying to ask what time is beyond a tool. How do can you realistically measure time in a world without change? If you can't, does it exist? Is the nature of time something more fundamental than a tool of an observer and change? Is it its own existence? — Philosophim

Things do not need to be measured by a human being, to exist.

This is me asking you a simple question. How does time exist in a hypothetical world without any change? — Philosophim

And I'm telling you, it's very simple. Let me try your own thought experiment, maybe that will help. Imagine two things not moving relative to each other, and time is passing. Easy so far, right? Now add your special premise, these two things are the only things in the universe. Where's the difficulty? See, the concept of time passing does not require that anything is moving relative to each other.

We're inventing a half-plank length. And clearly though we can invent infinite time, infinite time doesn't happen in between plank tics. — Philosophim

Right, now you're catching own. We can "invent" half-Planck, quarter-Planck, one tenth-Planck, whatever we want. These are all logically possible. And, at these short time periods, it has been demonstrated that there cannot be any physical change. Therefore it's very easy, and also very logical to conceive of time passing with no physical change occurring.

Sure, I'm not trying to disallow anything though. I'm just trying to understand what the fundamental of time is without an observer. If its not change, what is it? — Philosophim

Notice that I am talking about "physical change", "observable change", and I say that time could pass without any of this occurring. However, I do not intend to exclude "change" in an absolute sense. I described time itself as a sort of change, the process of the future becoming past. The point though, is that this, itself. is not observable. We don't observe the future becoming the past, we observe particular, specific physical changes, and from this we can infer that time is passing. However, time passing, itself, is not observed. And, we must maintain this principle, that time passing is not any specific type of observable change, but a general type of change which encompasses all observable physical changes, in order that we will be able to measure all types of physical changes, through a theory which provides a non-physical, unobservable change, "time", to provide the measurement tool.

An assignment of causation does not exclude the possibility of other things having the same effect. So in the example above, saying that heat causes water to boil does not exclude the possibility that something else as well, such as a drop in pressure, could also cause water to boil. That A is judged to cause B does not exclude the possibility that something else might also cause B as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up:

Now, I ask you to use logic, and see with your mind, logically, that it is possible for there to be time passing without change occurring — Metaphysician Undercover

This reflects what Minkowski spacetime infers. This is referred to as being at rest in a particular frame of reference.

However, time passing, itself, is not observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

This reflects what Minkowski spacetime infers. This is referred to as being at rest in a particular frame of reference. — jgill

Rest frames are artificial creations. Scientists produce them as required, so they will have some degree of arbitrariness. However, they do demonstrate the logical possibility of time passing without any change occurring. Such a thing is not only logically possible, but as the use of rest frames demonstrates, also extremely useful. I would proceed one step further, to argue that since rest frames are actually necessary for scientists to produce a real model of anything real in the world of real time passage, then in order for the real world of time passage to be understood, we need to replicate, or represent the real rest frame. This implies pre-Einsteinian absolute time.

The issue is that conceiving of all motion as relative greatly facilitates the representation of motions. We can model distinct things as moving relative to each other, without worrying about how they are moving relative to other things, by arbitrarily producing the required rest frame. If the model were to be based on absolute time, then the true rest frame would be required as the ground for modeling all motions.

However, the universe is extremely complex, with all sorts of different motions, so we do not know the true rest frame of the universe. (As analogy, consider that the ancients did not know the sun as the rest frame for the solar system, so they modeled the sun and planets as orbiting the earth in a relativistic way.) Since we do not know the true rest frame of absolute time, special relativity uses the motion of light as a constant, for an alternative to true rest.

This alternative suffices for many applications, but its arbitrariness sets an artificial boundary which limits our capacity to understand. Any motions in the universe which are not consistent with the principles developed as general relativity, (such as spatial expansion, the effects of dark matter, dark energy, and wave/particle duality), fall outside that artificial boundary which the theory imposes on our understanding.

So, as I said in the preceding post, I believe the only way to provide a basis for understanding all types of motions, is to have a model of time passing with no physical change occurring. This would be the true rest frame, absolute time. The passing of time would be grounded in, or modeled according to changes which are not physical, or material changes. Then all physical changes could be plotted against this model of time which would serve as a backdrop.

As I said, the thought experiment is useless, because you have to stipulate whether or not time is passing, to get anywhere, but then you're begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am begging the question. What is time if not related to the change between objects? :D

Let me try your own thought experiment, maybe that will help. Imagine two things not moving relative to each other, and time is passing. Easy so far, right? Now add your special premise, these two things are the only things in the universe. Where's the difficulty? — Metaphysician Undercover

Its easy in the first case because time is change between entities. That's why it becomes more difficult in the second case. If time exists apart from the change between two entities, then what is it at its fundamental? If its not an observer, and everything exists without change, what is time?

Let me give you another example. In fiction, sometimes a character will have the ability to stop time for everyone but themselves. In such a scenario, nothing changes in relation to one another except for the character. Time itself didn't freeze, but only because there was something that was not frozen, the character. Imagine a universe as a completely frozen still shot where there is no comparative change. Do we not say its a universe frozen in time? I think you answer this in the next quotes I pull from you.

Things do not need to be measured by a human being, to exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice that I am talking about "physical change", "observable change", and I say that time could pass without any of this occurring. However, I do not intend to exclude "change" in an absolute sense. I described time itself as a sort of change, the process of the future becoming past. The point though, is that this, itself. is not observable. We don't observe the future becoming the past, we observe particular, specific physical changes, and from this we can infer that time is passing. However, time passing, itself, is not observed. And, we must maintain this principle, that time passing is not any specific type of observable change, but a general type of change which encompasses all observable physical changes, in order that we will be able to measure all types of physical changes, through a theory which provides a non-physical, unobservable change, "time", to provide the measurement tool. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if I understand it right, you believe time is a 'thing in itself'. And by this I mean it is something that exists which we attempt to capture in a meaningful way. For us, that meaningful way is change. But like all 'things-in-themselves' our attempt to grasp it is merely the most logical way we can understand it, not necessarily a full understanding of it as it exists in itself.

Thus if I understand it right, we measure and understand time through observance of change, but that measurement is an approximation and doesn't really capture the idea of 'the present becoming the future'. Change is a convenient way to measure time, but not necessary for it to exist, as time is its own unobservable entity.

This is what I was looking for in your answer. If I understand you correctly, its not a bad take. It leaves itself open to people who state, "How can we know what is unobservable/time is an illusion" people, but I think its acceptable for anyone else.

I am begging the question. What is time if not related to the change between objects? :D — Philosophim

From my perspective, time is related to change. It's just that we cannot say that time is change because we understand time as the means by which we relate one change to another. That is why no single change constitutes time, but a multitude of changes. And since all change requires time, we can see that time is logically prior to change as prerequisite. I might even go further to propose that the passing of time is the cause of the change we observe.

Its easy in the first case because time is change between entities. That's why it becomes more difficult in the second case. If time exists apart from the change between two entities, then what is it at its fundamental? If its not an observer, and everything exists without change, what is time? — Philosophim

I think this is wrong for a couple reasons. First, you neglect the internal changing of one object. You can describe internal change as parts moving relative to each other, but this results in the need to assume a fundamental immutable element, not composed of parts, as proposed by the atomists. The fundamental "atom" is required to avoid an infinite regress of divisibility, but I think modern physics shows that the fundamental element is not consistent with observation. This implies that the foundation is something other, like wave motion for example.

The second problem is that whenever an object changes place relative to another, there is nothing there which can be called "time". There is simply change. It is only when we have at least two different changes, that by comparing one to the other, we establish a rate of change, and this constitutes "time" as a measurement tool.

Let me give you another example. In fiction, sometimes a character will have the ability to stop time for everyone but themselves. In such a scenario, nothing changes in relation to one another except for the character. Time itself didn't freeze, but only because there was something that was not frozen, the character. Imagine a universe as a completely frozen still shot where there is no comparative change. Do we not say its a universe frozen in time? I think you answer this in the next quotes I pull from you. — Philosophim

The problem I see here is that we need to figure out a way to get outside of the universe, to see how it comes into being, if we want a complete understanding of it. When we look at what is prior to the universe, if there is no time, then your scenario works inversely, there is only things not moving, apparently frozen in time, because there is no time. But then there is no way to understand how things could suddenly start moving. If we allow that there is time outside our universe, then there could also be activity outside our universe, and this could cause the activity of things within our universe.

So if I understand it right, you believe time is a 'thing in itself'. And by this I mean it is something that exists which we attempt to capture in a meaningful way. For us, that meaningful way is change. But like all 'things-in-themselves' our attempt to grasp it is merely the most logical way we can understand it, not necessarily a full understanding of it as it exists in itself.

Thus if I understand it right, we measure and understand time through observance of change, but that measurement is an approximation and doesn't really capture the idea of 'the present becoming the future'. Change is a convenient way to measure time, but not necessary for it to exist, as time is its own unobservable entity.

This is what I was looking for in your answer. If I understand you correctly, its not a bad take. It leaves itself open to people who state, "How can we know what is unobservable/time is an illusion" people, but I think its acceptable for anyone else. — Philosophim

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is.

That is why no single change constitutes time — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely, even a single change represents the same as many.. It still has to 'traverse' from state A to state B - which is, as i take it, what constitutes time here..

I don't think so. Time is the rate at which state A changes to state B, or at the very least it is the order, state A is prior to state. It is a feature of the change, but not the change itself.

Time is the rate at which state A changes to state B, or at the very least it is the order, state A is prior to state. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. If 'time' is the rate, what is the medium of change? As in, what actually represents the change (given the causal order requirement, such as 'cause' can be used here), as opposed to it's ratio compared to ...other changes?

To say something happens 'more quickly' than something else seems to infer that there's a ratio OF something.. 'change' isn't an actual thing, so just wondering what is being referred to there.

And since all change requires time — Metaphysician Undercover

This depends on the meaning of the word "change". Most usages do require time to complete, but if one thinks of "to change" is "to differ", then time need not be a factor.

dy/dx = 10 vs. dy/dt =0 if x is not a function of time.

I see. If 'time' is the rate, what is the medium of change? As in, what actually represents the change (given the causal order requirement, such as 'cause' can be used here), as opposed to it's ratio compared to ...other changes? — AmadeusD

The statement you quoted said, "or at the very least it is the order, event A is prior to event B". Does that not already answer your question about causal order?

You asked me about the "traverse" between A and B, so I described the measurement of that traversal, and the temporal aspect provides for the rate of traversal. But if we ignore the traversal, and reduce the change to simply A is before B, which is generally what the concept of "causation" does, then we are simply not interested in the time between A and B, the traversal or change itself. However, time is still essential to the description in the sense of before and after.

To say something happens 'more quickly' than something else seems to infer that there's a ratio OF something.. 'change' isn't an actual thing, so just wondering what is being referred to there. — AmadeusD

Exactly, "time" in its conceptual form, abstract form, the tool for measurement, as distinct from time itself (the difference described above), is a sort of ratio. Simple order of before and after does not suffice to account for the change itself, as what occurs between state A and state B. So to measure the temporal aspect of the change we compare it to a standardized change (the traditional standard being the motion of the earth relative to the sun as years, days, hours, and minutes, etc., the modern standard being the vibration of an atom or something like that). The ratio is expressed as a description of the physical change "over time", where "over time" means the standardized change. The other features which make up the description of the physical change are the material elements and their spatial description.

Most usages do require time to complete, but if one thinks of "to change" is "to differ", then time need not be a factor. — jgill

This equates "change" with "difference", which is a mistaken notion. Change is commonly understood as the intermediary between two different things, as how one state becomes another. The standard definition is "the act or an instance of making or becoming different". If we define "change" simply as different, then we have no word, or concept to refer to the act of becoming different, i.e. what happens between two distinct describable states, and this produces a serious logical problem described by Aristotle.

The problem is the incompatibility between being and becoming which was elucidated by Plato, after learning from Socrates' discussions of the riddles of the Eleatics who include Zeno. Here's a brief explanation and simplification of what Aristotle showed. If a state of being "B", is different from a prior state of being "A", then something must happened in between, to account for this difference. What happens in between is known as "change" or "becoming". If we explain this change or becoming, with another descriptive state of being, "C", then a becomes B by passing through C. Now we have state A which is different from state C which is different from state B. Therefore something must happen between A and C, and between C and B, to account for these differences. We could proceed in that form of description, and assume a state of being in between each, such that we would have a series of states like A,D,C,E,B. Since each of these states is different, we need something between each of them to account for the change.

As you can see, this is heading for an infinite regress, where we never get a true understanding of what happens between two different describable states of being. What happens in between, is becoming, or change. This indicates a fundamental incompatibility between static states of being, as represented by unchanging descriptions at a point in time, and the activity, becoming, which occurs between these assumed points in time.

You might like Max Tegmark's idea that "All possible mathematical structures have a physical existence, and collectively, give a multiverse that subsumes all others."
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Mathematical_Universe)

Or Stephen Wolfram's Ruliad : "Think of it as the entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of following all possible computational rules in all possible ways."
(https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/11/the-concept-of-the-ruliad/)