I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse. — Walter

The intention to do A is not necessary, it is a freely made choice. We've been through this already. God's will, is a necessary part of God, but the particular choice, "the intention to do A" is not necessary from God's perspective.

I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A. — Walter

Why not? It's actually very simple. Do you agree that human beings have a capacity called will, and this allows them to choose? Do you also recognize that no specific choice is necessitated by that capacity, it is free to make different choices as required according to differing circumstance. So the capacity to choose (the will) and the choice made, the intention to do A, are not the same thing. They must be separate and different types of thing, or else the person would have to always choose the exact same thing when using one's will, and that's not what is the case, we make many different choices. Therefore we must conclude that the capacity to choose, as a property of a human being (or God in this case), which is called "the will", is distinct and different from any particular thing willed, the will to do A, or the will to do B, etc..

Since "The will to do A" is a contingent property of me as a human being, it is not necessitated by my capacity, but it is still a property of me. Hence "the will to do A" is also a property of God , which, is distinct from God's will simpliciter. But that is the problem. If "the inetention to do A" is not necessary, then it is a contingent property of God, but God, unlike me, cannot have any contingent properties.

Ok I see the problem clearly now. From God's perspective, to do A is necessary, needed as good, and God cannot be wrong. From our perspective. we do not know the premises which produced the necessity for the decision, therefore it appears to be contingent, as is the case for us, our choices are contingent. In the case of human beings, we can see what is good, yet choose not to do it for some reason, but God must do only what is good. So God really did not have any choice at all, being omniscient He had to choose one thing, the good, and He could not choose otherwise, not be mistaken, therefore "the will to do A" was necessary. Does that look correct?

I disagree. Instead it is because God is Simple and Uncaused that He is Free. Consider this. God is like a "container". This container in itself is necessary. Yet the content of that container is not necessary. Thus God as Being Himself is necessary, yet what He does cannot possibly be necessary as He is uncaused.

Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A.
Then God should be able to do B. But that would be a contingent choice.

If there is something in the container, it is not simple.

Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A. — Walter

Ever read Plato's Euthyphro? The question would be whether an act is good because it is what God chooses, or whether God chooses it because it is good. The former implies that intrinsically A is no better than B, but God choosing it is what makes it good. The latter would imply that one act is intrinsically better that the other, and that is why God chooses it. Which do you think would be the case?

If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B.

If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B. — Walter

Hmm, I see things in the opposite way. Since God has the most knowledge possible, if there is supposed to be something beyond God which determines "good", then "good" would be meaningless as absolutely indefinite, or undeterminable, impossible to know.

And, since two acts are distinct and unique, each having a different effect, (and the two possible acts we are talking about are necessarily so, having been stipulated as incompatible), and if all things are taken into account by the supreme knower, it is impossible that two such acts are judged as equally good.

This leaves your final statement meaningless. God, of necessity would choose one or the other, A or B, knowing the effects that each would have, and knowing which is the better choice.

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist.

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist. — Walter

Could you not argue that these things were decided by God in the 'actual' design of the world? I.e he designed/invoked a world in which those things are true?

But could He have designed a world where 1 + 1 = 3?

Im unsure if this is a claim outside of 'Well, this is what adherents claim' but yes, sure. Why not?

God could have invoked a world where if you put 1 thing next to 1 thing you perceive 3 things so our only empirical data show that 1+1=3 in all cases. . Don't see how that is outside of God's power.

Okay then.
But most theists don't agree with you.

In principle, they do. They acknowledge God has all-encompassing power. Why would deluding us or merely providing odd empirical data to our minds be outside that? Although, in this case it wouldn't be Odd. It would be the case, and nothing more.

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist. — Walter

I think most theologians would argue that God does decide what is good. They clearly claim that human actions are good only insofar as they are consistent with what God wants. So God is above humans in the decision of good. And, if it wasn't God who determines what is good, we'd have to look for a principle higher than God to validate whether a human action is truly good or not, because the higher principle might be inconsistent with what God wants. But theologians would not accept this. So I think it must be God who decides what is good. Why don't you think that God would decide 1+1=2, and that square circles do not exist. Isn't that exactly what God's job is, to ensure that the world is consistent with logic? Otherwise God would not see it as good, and not create it in that way.

I think this conversation needs to distinguish between God's will and reason. If we can only conceptualize this separation because of our present empirical condition, we have to say that the will causes a change in the intellect. To act free is to be unbounded but to know in that case is to do something *new*. If God is his thoughts and his thought is new in any way we then have a God who has always been changed! Or which comes first, simplicity orb thought?

In principle, they do. They acknowledge God has all-encompassing power. Why would deluding us or merely providing odd empirical data to our minds be outside that? Although, in this case it wouldn't be Odd. It would be the case, and nothing more. — AmadeusD

Christians typically think that God, being good, wouldn't mislead us.

Christians typically think that God, being good, wouldn't mislead us. — wonderer1

Although, in this case it wouldn't be Odd. It would be the case, and nothing more. — AmadeusD

:) :) "God works in mysterious ways" and all that... No misleading to be had here, though. Otherwise, we're assuming that 1+1 IS 2, and God is contravening...something. But if God is the almighty Creator of all, that's not what's happening there. It just is the case that 1+1=3.

God works in mysterious ways" and all that... — AmadeusD

That may be, but it is harder to convince people to worship the god of baffling with bullshit.

That may be, but it is harder to convince people to worship the god of baffling with bullshit. — wonderer1

This may be the greatest feat Logic has ever achieved :)

Then again, if you had no other frame of reference, its a bit incoherent to think it would be baffling. It just is

No, I don't think it's God's job to make sure the world is consistent with logic. If He truly decides what is logical and what is not, every world is consistent with logic.
In that case, there can be no logical arguments for the existence of God.

When Aquinas says God is in all things as cause, as presence, and also in things in His essence, how is this different from panentheism? Also, if the Ideas are in the mind of God, this seems to be a mutiplicity unless there is one single Idea, one Concept, that includes all truth within it. Like the greatest number that B. Russell talked about in Logic and Mystcism. The infinity that can't be thought of except as complete and one with all reality.