I liked Tegmark's book, but I don't think his speculation actually resolves the Fine Tuning Problem the way he thinks it does. It seems like there would be many, many more ways for a computable universe to create our perceptions, and the illusion that we live in the type of universe we think live in, then worlds that are actually like the world we think our sciences describe. This is a more general undetermination problem that is like, and includes the Boltzmann Brain problem.

And the supposition that the universe must be computable is just a supposition.

The statement you quoted said, "or at the very least it is the order, event A is prior to event B". Does that not already answer your question about causal order? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It described a necessary aspect, by causal law.
It has nothign to do with how those changes occur, or in what medium.

The other features which make up the description of the physical change are the material elements and their spatial description. — Metaphysician Undercover

I find this unhelpful. This would seem an intuitive truism, but it explains nought about what's actually happening between A and B, other than the changes. What is the actually difference between point A and point B? If it's merely the changes in any given object, then we have infinite 'times' to deal with.
It's just observational stringency as best I can tell. The answer may be that we don't know or have the language though.

Therefore something must happen between A and C, and between C and B, to account for these differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this is what I'm asking about...

I find this unhelpful. This would seem an intuitive truism, but it explains nought about what's actually happening between A and B, other than the changes. — AmadeusD

Yes, it is a generalization, that it is unhelpful is regretful. The specifics of what "A" and "B" signify has not been stated, they simply stand for the general notion of two different states, and what occurs between these two is described by the general notion of "change". To even begin describing "what's actually happening between A and B" would require a description of the specific features of these two states.

And this is what I'm asking about... — AmadeusD

Yes, as I said it's called "change", and in the ancient days, "becoming". We might use other temporally based terms like "activity" "motion", "transformation of energy", etc..

To even begin describing "what's actually happening between A and B" would require a description of the specific features of these two states. — Metaphysician Undercover

I dont see that this the case. Using both your exposition, and my prior understand of 'change', its a notation of observation and nothing like an explanation of what actually takes place.
I agree, that a complete answer would require data about hte object/s changing and the change which has/will take place. But what is happening when a change takes place is totally missed in these descriptions. How do properties of objects change? And i do not mean, 'by what cause', i mean by why 'mechanism', metaphysically, could change occur... How can there be difference between two states?

This is not an acceptable explanation of causation. An assignment of causation does not exclude the possibility of other things having the same effect. So in the example above, saying that heat causes water to boil does not exclude the possibility that something else as well, such as a drop in pressure, could also cause water to boil. That A is judged to cause B does not exclude the possibility that something else might also cause B as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've misunderstood me. Yes, there can be multiple causes for an effect, but when testing for the existence of a causal relation in a series of repeated trials that check that consequents of type B allows follow after antecedents of type A, then it must be assumed as a working hypothesis that there are no other possible causes of B other than events of type A. For otherwise a successful test might only indicate correlation between As and Bs.

You presumably agree that each video frame of a movie isn't the cause of the next video frame in the movie. So even if video frames of type A are seen to always occur before video frames of type B, such that they are in perfect correlation, then you would not want to identify that relation as causation. No?

Which is the reason why counterfactuals come into play. For causation isn't supposed to merely refer to perfect correlation. At least, that isn't how the concept of causation is used by the sciences, in which causes refer to conditional propositions in which the output of the conditional is a function of the input.

How do properties of objects change? And i do not mean, 'by what cause', i mean by why 'mechanism', metaphysically, could change occur... How can there be difference between two states? — AmadeusD

This is what I answer with "the passage of time". That has been stipulated to be the requirement for two contradictory states, that they are at a different time, and it has to my mind, been satisfactorily demonstrated. But, we don't know much more about time than that, so many people like Philosophim will argue that time is nothing other than physical change, producing an equality, Time is necessary for change, and change is necessary for time. However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change".

But, we don't know much more about time than that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what i was looking for. Not as a gotcha, but I now understand I'm looking for answer that isn't there. Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake.

However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is where I just scratch me head. What other change? And I'm intuitively connecting hte first quote to this one. We just dont know :)

Thank you mate.

Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake. — AmadeusD

You ought to see that if the passage of time was something that only exists in the mind, and that since this is what defines "the present", then there would be no "present" independent of minds, and this premise would create all sorts of logical problems for how we understand the reality of the universe. First, the whole temporal extension of the universe, as we know it, would exist all at once, and that makes no sense. Also, when we date things, as having happened millions or billions of years ago, before there were human minds, this would be totally invalidated if time wasn't passing to account for that time which we conclude had passed between now and then.

It is a Kantian conception of time, and i do not believe it results in any of these logical issues. Do absolutely feel free to set me right, if that Kantian thought has been dealt with over the centuries. It almost certainly has, and I am, as I try to make clear, very naive :)

:up:

It is a Kantian conception of time, and i do not believe it results in any of these logical issues. Do absolutely feel free to set me right, if that Kantian thought has been dealt with over the centuries. It almost certainly has, and I am, as I try to make clear, very naive :) — AmadeusD

You don't see how the premise "time only exists in the mind" leads to the conclusion that time could not have been passing before there was minds? I don't see how I need to say more.

"Time" as described by Kant is the abstract notion, not the thing itself. I discussed the difference in this reply to Philosophim a couple days ago:

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is. — Metaphysician Undercover

time could not have been passing before there was minds? — Metaphysician Undercover

If time consists in either the changes described, or the relation between them, I don't see how that couldn't be happening prior to humans conceiving time in a particular order, to unify perceptions. Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects.

I tend to think i'm missing a trick, but i conceive that the universe, as a whole, does not undergo 'time'. Sentient beings do, as a facility of relation between objects of change, to ensure a logical causal relationship in extended space to avoid the delusional mess we noted earlier.
So, prior to sentient minds, there would be the continually changing material of the universe, but no perspective to relate those changes to any prior or future state - just the entirety of hte universe changing in 'one place' as it were. I tend to think that without a mind to relate these changes to one another, 'time' does not obtain. Just changes, with no necessary relation to each other. Very counter-intuitive, and probably wrong.

If time consists in either the changes described, or the relation between them, I don't see how that couldn't be happening prior to humans conceiving time in a particular order, to unify perceptions. Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects. — AmadeusD

I was replying to the following statement you made: "I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway,". So if time only exists in the mind, how could you think that it would be happening prior to humans conceiving it?

i conceive that the universe, as a whole, does not undergo 'time'.
...
So, prior to sentient minds, there would be the continually changing material of the universe, — AmadeusD

How can there be consistency between these two statements? If the universe does not undergo time, how can anything change?

Well, i guess this is what im trying to sort out for myself.

'time', best i can tell, is a mere relation in perception. So, without perceiving beings, time does not obtain.

Changes, however, do, in the absence of mind, but there's no perceptual relation that requires cause-before-effect in extended space, for an eg. Bear in mind, I may be contradicting myself due to not developing these ideas anywhere else.

Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects — AmadeusD

I agree with MU here. If it were not for Minkowski spacetime allowing rest frames and thus the "passage" of time with no physical changes I would think time required change.

I agree with MU here. If it were not for Minkowski spacetime allowing rest frames and thus the "passage" of time with no physical changes I would think time required change — jgill

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? Im not seeing any necessity beyond trying to support the idea that time doesn't require change, which im not on board with quite yet. Would love to see something about that concept of whcih i have no knowledge :)

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? — AmadeusD

I wish. Time dilation shows that the passage of time is relative to motion, so in a way time is linked to change.

Time dilation shows that the passage of time is relative to motion, so in a way time is linked to change. — jgill

Ah. Fu... LOL

In physics, isn't time just clock-time? Kind of a practical use, rather than a discussion of what it is?

In physics, isn't time just clock-time? Kind of a practical use, rather than a discussion of what it is? — AmadeusD

Seems that way to me. I use time as t, a non-negative real number, in my math. I think most have given up on what time is. But arguments about whether points in time exist or time is durations or intervals persist. See Bergson vs Einstein and Peter Lynds.

If this is the case, and things can start to exist, for no prior reason (they are uncaused), then why don't we see more things starting to exist at different times? — Count Timothy von Icarus

They're called virtual particles. — Philosophim

A mathematical convenience that cannot be observed through instruments. — jgill

Virtual Particles don't exist physically, but theoretically, as a mathematical definition*1. For such existential mysteries, Aristotle defined "Potential" under the heading of Causation. It's a creative power, not a physical thing. So, if a new thing is observed to "start to exist, for no prior {observable} reason", Aristotle would say that Causal Potential of some unknown etiology, must logically exist in some meta-physical sense, prior to the creative event.

But he would have to admit that the Potential itself is never observable by the senses, but only detectable by rational (if-then) inference from its Actual physical effects. For example, if a book suddenly jumped off a shelf and flew across the room, some would infer that an invisible Ghost had pushed it. Other, more practical minds would look for a more plausible physical explanation. And some, more theoretical, would have to be satisfied with a metaphysical philosophical solution : "X" (unknown -- to be determined).

So, the "spontaneous creation" of a whole functional evolving machine (universe) for "no prior reason" would imply either a> a timeless, but intentional, ghostly Creator ; or b> an un-observable prior pre-space-time chain of cycling self-existent physical universes ; or c> perhaps just some un-observable non-physical timeless Potential for creation of novelty from nothing. The first possibility is traditionally labeled "G*D", the second is typically called "Multiverse", and the third could be categorized as mere un-grounded Philosophical Conjecture. In the absence of plausible a> or b> options though, can we --- like quantum physicists --- be satisfied with an empty definition c> with no known referent? :smile:

*1. Virtual Potential (symbol Ue) where "U" stands for unknown, and "e" for Energy.

I love it when philosophers dabble in physics and math. Especially quantum physics. :cool: — jgill

Unfair. Keep in mind that there are precious few philosophers hereabouts. :wink:

My favorite source on time is Arthur's "The Reality of Time Flow: Local Becoming in Modern Physics." It's fair to its sources and even funny at times, but does more poking holes in "definitive" answers to the question that have been advanced than providing one itself.

I wasn't aware of the concept of causal diamonds before it either.

Fantastic; thanks very much for the rec!

Superficially related, the "D" in my name stands for Diamond :)

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? Im not seeing any necessity beyond trying to support the idea that time doesn't require change, which im not on board with quite yet. Would love to see something about that concept of whcih i have no knowledge — AmadeusD

The issue, as I described, is that time without physical change is logically possible, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. How could there be?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/869814
Further, we find that if we do not posit a principle, "an Ideal" which is outside of, and capable of encompassing all physical change, then physical change will be inherently unintelligible. The primary intuition is to posit space as the Ideal outside of physical change, and this produces the idea of physical objects existing in a static 'absolute' space. However, physical evidence (wave-function, space-time activity, spatial expansion etc.) has shown that this idea is incorrect, because it cannot properly account for the reality of moving objects. Therefore, to fully understand the reality of physical change we need to turn to another principle which could be outside of it, and this logically is time.

If this is the case, and things can start to exist, for no prior reason (they are uncaused), then why don't we see more things starting to exist at different times? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not comparable. An initial state did not "begin to exist" within a state of affairs in which it previously did not exist. An initial state simply implies there is no prior state of affairs.

An initial state did not "begin to exist" within a state of affairs in which it previously did not exist. An initial state simply implies there is no prior state of affairs. — Relativist

In other words, "initial state" is a fictitious ideal.

By "start to exist," I simply mean:
1. Is uncaused / has no prior causal history.
2. Is not eternal, without beginning or end.

The English language is not particularly good at this sort of thing, which is why I use the 3D visualization language for a 4D manifold earlier.

No. It is a very real possibility, consistent with some interpretations of quantum mechanics. Some cosmologists have proposed models based on this.

Under such models, nothing "begins to exist" in a sense that implies popping into existence, because there is no earlier state of affairs into which something pops. Rather, it entails an initiation of change, which "creates" time - as a relation between states of affairs.

From an external perspective, yes, but I don't see how this solves the problem that if it is possible for an uncaused event to "create" time, then such events should be multiply realizable

From an internal perspective, the time dimension is nonetheless bounded in at least one direction.

I don't think claims that it is "meaningless" to talk about the external frame cash out. No one is confused about what Black Hole Cosmology is saying; the theory isn't contentless. There are some neat empirical findings that make it plausible to some degree as well, although it is still highly speculative. But such a theory would entail that there is something causally prior to the singularity bounding time that we observe, and this proposition is not contentless or incoherent. I don't see how this is prima facie unreasonable either, as we can clearly observe events that are causally prior to other singularities that form in our universe.

One of the motivations I've heard for eternal inflation is precisely that it avoids this problem by having inflation occur without begining or end. This is also partly the motivation for Platonist views like Tegmark's.

Pop science keeps pushing the notion, but I suppose a physicist might also. This is strange territory where philosophy can't seem to abstain trespassing.

It's a two way street. "Virtuality" is a philosophical concept that existed prior to the idea of "virtual particles," (how they get their name). But now philosophers will point back to the successful idea of virtual particles when describing other "virtual" phenomena (e.g. Floridi and D'Agistino with "virtual information," working in philosophy of mathematics/information).

As well as I understand the history of the debate, which is not all that well, I believe it has generally been the philosophers who have been more against the "reality" of virtual particles (e.g. Oliver Passon). But I don't know if philosopher/physicist is that useful of a distinction in philosophy of physics proper. People often have degrees in both, work in both, collaborate, etc. The silo is probably more relevant in terms of how people who work primarily in metaphysics interact with physics proper (and of course people in less relevant fields also sometimes have to appeal to physics, e.g. physics becomes relevant to biology through reductionism, to ethics via "free will" debates, etc.)