We could all be puppets playing out a role given to us. But while we live in a world of puppets, we all remain real to each other, and so do our motivations, our "reason". — mentos987

In that case, "one's own reasons" would not actually be one's own reasons, but simply the reasons of the puppet master, as in my explanation.

It seems to me that in many ancient and medieval ethical systems it would be both. There is on the one hand man's telos, which is internal to man (plural), but determined prior to any individual man. On the other hand, there is free man's own reasons for doing what he does, being who he is etc. The whole reason ethics is difficult is that these two can vary from one another in practice. Man can fail to fulfill his telos and fail to flourish, through his own choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and I think that this is why the concept of "free will" was developed, as you describe, to fulfill the need produced by that gap between the prior telos and the individual's telos. The concept of free will allows that the individual's telos is in some way free from the prior telos.

The ideal situation is where man's free choice synchs up to mankind's telos. But there is a wrinkle here in that these thinkers were generally not free will libertarians. However, neither were they modern fatalists. Rather, they embrace a certain sort of "classical fatalism." "Character is destiny," Heraclitus says. They embrace the concepts of "fate" and "divine providence," and elucidate the ways in which man is a slave to circumstance, desire, and instinct, and yet allow that man, both individually and as a society, can manage to become more or less free / self-determining. Part of fulfilling man's telos is precisely becoming more self-determining and more "one's self," rather than being a mere effect of external causes. (Modern existentialism recapitulates part of this, while missing crucial elements) — Count Timothy von Icarus

This might appear to be the "ideal", but it would require having some access to, or some principles relating to, that prior telos, what you call "mankind's telos". But we have no access to that telos, so it's just a pie in the sky "what God wants". Then there is no way of knowing what constitutes "synching up", and individual human beings (following their own telos) will try to make their own determinations as to what constitutes the prior telos, making affirmations about whether or not a particular telos is in synch with the prior, based on nothing real.

Because the supposed "ideal" is left impotent in this way, it cannot be the true ideal. It's a fiction which cannot be obtained, and furthermore, we have no way of even knowing if we are coming close, or even headed in the right direction. Therefore this proposition cannot be accepted as a true representation of "the ideal".

This is why an overflowing love is important in Plato and the Patristics. To hate something to be controlled by it. To be indifferent to something is still to be defined by what one is not. Only love, the identification of the self in the other, allows one to avoid being determined by what is external to personal identity. This translates into a "love of fate," that must accompany the entity that will not be mere effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Based on what I said above, I would not accept this conclusion. Plato recognized the problem with this supposed "ideal", and exposed it in The Euthyphro. So Plato's designation of "love" as important is based on something other than an appeal to the prior telos, "mankind's telos", just like his designation of "just", "good", et.. Plato makes an extensive analysis of human emotions, feelings, terms described as virtues and vices, good and bad, and their relations with pleasure and pain, and makes suggestions based on this analysis of human beings within the context of human society. So he provides guidance for the telos of the individual from an analysis of the human being, within the condition of human society, and he does not pretend to access that prior telos which you call "mankind's telos".

I think the social view moves towards a climax in Eusebius, who has a proto-Hegelian view of how history can act as an engine spurring man on towards the greater fulfillment of human purpose at the world-historical scale. With the medievals, you also start to see the acknowledgement that, while human telos has certain unchanging elements, it is also shaped by the social-historical conditions man finds himself in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This idea, (that of an Ideal telos), what you call "mankind's telos" was propagated by the Church as God's intention, what is wanted by God. But this was a pretense developed by the Church in an effort to keep the subjects in line, and it strayed from the earlier teachings derived from Plato, which promoted the free will to decide as the highest faculty. Fundamental to the development of Christianity is the freedom of the individual to willfully join the movement. The turn around which involved telling people that they must conform to the will of God, was the beginning of the decline. St Thomas in particular obscured this principle by describing the will as subject to the intellect, but ultimately he had to admit that the free will is higher in the absolute sense. However, varying interpretations will lead some to believe that the will must be subject to the intellect.

What you describe as human beings recognizing the prior telos, "mankind's telos" as changing, evolving with the evolution of human society, is simply a recognition that this "ideal telos", the intent of God is faulty as a principle for the telos of individual human beings. The supposed "ideal telos" changes with changes in the societal context, and is therefore a reflection of the society, posterior, rather than the true prior telos.

So individual man's reasons are not identical with the the global telos of man. This is precisely because man is not free, and being enslaved to desire, ignorance, and circumstance , man lacks the knowledge and means of fulfilling his purpose. Even modern existentialists seem to recognize the need for some level of self-determination to make life meaningful, although they deny the global telos.

The shift to emotivism is important here. For the existenialist, moral freedom can't be the crowing achievement of man because moral freedom is simply reducible to desire. Due to their focus on the individual, they often lack the same focus on social freedom as well, but not always. Without these, the idea of a telos for mankind does indeed become incoherent and reduce to a single "internal" purpose defined only by the
individual. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The confusion represented in your conclusion here, is just a reflection of the fault in your premise. The fault is in trying to base the telos of the individual in some sort of "ideal" prior telos. The prior telos cannot be accessed by us, even if it is real, so we must base all the principles for the telos of the individual in the real needs of the real individual, here and now, and this is what must shape society. That's what Marx pointed to.

In that case, "one's own reasons" would not actually be one's own reasons, but simply the reasons of the puppet master, as in my explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

If everything one is, is given to one from someone else, does that not also give one the right to claim any of that as oneself?

Genetically you are half of your father and half of your mother (plus a little mutation), yet you are yourself.

f everything one is, is given to one from someone else, does that not also give one the right to claim any of that as oneself?

Genetically you are half of your father and half of your mother (plus a little mutation), yet you are yourself. — mentos987

By free will we give to ourselves something other than what was given to us.

And your free will was not given to you? Do you know that your will is not governed by something greater?

If free will is the one thing that is your own, does that not reinforce the argument that your own reasons are the purpose of your life?

You've lost me again. Free will is given to us. Through the use of free will we give ourselves something which was not given to us, we create for ourselves. There is something here prior, and something posterior. The reasons for our existence are prior to our existence, and the cause of us having free will. But our own reasons, as created by our free will, are posterior.

If our our creator intended for us to have free will and make our own purpose then us making our own purpose is also us fulfilling the creators purpose.

You can be fulfilling a primary purpose by only following your own self-made purpose, as long as they align.

That is a dismal thought. Aren’t we more special than that? Looking at the statements above, is number 4, Man is a sentient life form, sufficient to make man special. If it does then that suggest there is more to us. Why would evolution produce a thinking being if there was no purpose in it other than continuation of the species? Could we not have been as successful in the world as a very clever ape? Does our ability to reason contribute to our ability to adapt and thrive on the world in a critical way? That is an open question that I don’t think has been answered yet.

If we are an exception to the evolutionary path of life, why should we be? It does suggest that there is a higher purpose to our existence, but what could it be. It does suggest that there is some force in the universe that is, in very subtle ways, directing the evolution of life. I don’t want to call it intelligent design as that leads to all sorts of other philosophic problems, but what is happening here. — George Fisher

Interesting points. As human beings our ability to use language be it verbally or non-verbally to communicate and impact the overall thought of our species enables us to develop on a social and technological level beyond our limited 80 or so year lifespan. This means us humans can communicate ideas and knowledge to future generations and this is indeed special. So perhaps the meaning of life is to add to the sum of this knowledge.

As to whether life is guided by a higher power such as a god, well this idea can be dismissed by atheists and cannot be proven by theists, but there do appear tell tale signs of intelligence in the universe with human beings manifesting it best, as far as we know. This could have been by chance and the chances of not just us but life itself manifesting in an otherwise lifeless universe appeared to be slim yet here we are.

Also worth noting that there are a lot of laws in the universe, intelligent laws that keep planets steady in their orbit or even atoms. These laws would in my opinion point to a higher level intellect that created this universe.

But we have no access to that telos, so it's just a pie in the sky "what God wants". Then there is no way of knowing what constitutes "synching up", and individual human beings (following their own telos) will try to make their own determinations as to what constitutes the prior telos, making affirmations about whether or not a particular telos is in synch with the prior, based on nothing real.

Because the supposed "ideal" is left impotent in this way, it cannot be the true ideal. It's a fiction which cannot be obtained, and furthermore, we have no way of even knowing if we are coming close, or even headed in the right direction. Therefore this proposition cannot be accepted as a true representation of "the ideal".

This whole post goes to MacIntyre's thesis. The assumption that, if man has a telos, it must be defined in terms of some sort of divine command theory and exist as separate from culture, and the assumption that it is impossible to observe any such telos are fundementally at odds with ancient conceptions of the concept. A core point in the Euthypro is indeed that such a foundation for "the Good," is wholly inadequate, but this is just shooting down one simplistic avenue of thought.

Conceptions of divine command theory obviously go back to the ancient world, but they weren't popular until the Reformation, and they became popular precisely because of modern redefinitions or morality (and were more popular in Protestantism in any event). The more common formulation is that God has authority precisely because God is good, and what goodness is entails this sort of authority.

The mistake is to assume that, if mankind has any sort of telos, it must be defined by divine command, or that it can float free of the communities in which men live. In the ancient world, the community is prior to the individual.

Consider Timothy Chappelle's formulation of Platonic virtue ethics: "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good."

A key term that differentiates this from modern morality is "good agency," versus "right action." Good stands in place of ought/right, and a more holistic agency in the place of individual acts. Contemplation of the good is presupposed, but not any unified standard. In more modern views (e.g. Kant), we might think in terms "rules" that "any rational agent," can agree too (and indeed, recent ethics threads on the board assume this indeed must be what morality is).

This just doesn't make sense in the earlier context. If there were horses with intelligence on par with men we should still think that being a good horse is different from being a good man. Likewise, living as a "good knight," differs from living as a "good nun," or "good scholar," even if they are all untied in what is true more generally of the good life and "the Good."

The perfection of virtue doesn't sit outside the sphere of intersubjectivity and history. It does involve the contemplation of a good that transcends these, but can't be reduced to it.

So Plato's designation of "love" as important is based on something other than an appeal to the prior telos, "mankind's telos", just like his designation of "just", "good", et.. Plato makes an extensive analysis of human emotions, feelings, terms described as virtues and vices, good and bad, and their relations with pleasure and pain, and makes suggestions based on this analysis of human beings within the context of human society. So he provides guidance for the telos of the individual from an analysis of the human being, within the condition of human society, and he does not pretend to access that prior telos which you call "mankind's telos".

On the other hand, if a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp.And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality, he can in no way fail to achieve this: constantly caring for his divine part as he does, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives within him, he must indeed be supremely happy. (Timaeus 90a-c)

Plato definetly ties the good life back to things that are higher and prior to many. I tend to agree with Chappelle that Platonic virtue ethics is generally compatible with Aristotlean virtue ethics, which is why a synthesis of the two was so successful for so long.

I'd also say that any claims to the "Church" having had a unified purpose driving its moral philosophy is going to end up being overly reductive. Claims that the Church's ethical teaching reduces to Machiavellian social control have the same flavor as claims like: "they only let us vote so that we don't realize we're slaves to capitalism," etc.

There is this whole huge area of Catholic philosophy that sits sort of free floating from the rest of academic philosophy. It tends to be far more focused on ancient/ medieval philosophy, but unlike secular academic philosophy re ancient/medieval philosophy, it is also intent on updating these for modern times.

This camp does produce a lot of good philosophy. E.g., Nathan Lyons "Signs in the Dust," is the best theory of pansemiosis I've found, and is far more grounded in the natural sciences and much less "heavily continental," than anything else I've seen attempt this sort of thing. Sokolowski's "Phenomenology of the Human Person," a blend of Aristotle and Husserl, that also takes the natural sciences and modern linguistics seriously is another example. It's one of the better articulations of a "(more) direct realism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for those tips. I've been delving into some the neo-Thomists. They both look excellent books but I have no more space in the backlog presently. In any case, I'm very much in agreement that classical philosophy conceives of the telos of mankind in cosmic, rather than social, terms.

That every philosophy scrub must try to answer this damn question only serves as an example of hubris. — Vaskane

The meaning of philosophy scrub's lives is to answer the question "What is the meaning of life?". :chin:

Conceptions of divine command theory obviously go back to the ancient world, but they weren't popular until the Reformation, and they became popular precisely because of modern redefinitions or morality (and were more popular in Protestantism in any event). The more common formulation is that God has authority precisely because God is good, and what goodness is entails this sort of authority. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is exactly the problem I was talking about. It's nothing but a vicious circle. There is nothing there to provide any principles for judgement as to what is good or bad in human actions. God has authority because God is good, and what goodness is, is that God has authority. Anytime someone says "God wants X and God is the authority therefore we must do X", this is just a human judgement, not a judgement from God, and we have no way of knowing what God really thinks about X.

There is a disconnect, a gap, between the human judgement of "good", and any true divine judgement of "good" which cannot be bridged because we appear to have no way to ask God. Therefore it is a mistake to base "good" in the authority of God because this denies us of the capacity to determine what is "good".

The mistake is to assume that, if mankind has any sort of telos, it must be defined by divine command, or that it can float free of the communities in which men live. In the ancient world, the community is prior to the individual.

Consider Timothy Chappelle's formulation of Platonic virtue ethics: "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see how you bring in "the community" as a source of telos. We know that individuals have their own very distinct intentions, and God is often assumed to have intention in a similar way. But what justifies a claim that a community has any sort of intention or telos. A community is a group of individuals who work together on agreement toward common goals which have been stipulated by various individuals, and are sometimes voted on. The source of the goals is the individuals, not the community. It is true that goals are adopted and passed on from generation to generation through the form of "the community", but the goals are passed from individual to individual, in the same way that a father might pass a goal to a son. "The community" is never a source of goals, nor can any telos be said to be proper to the community, they are the goals of the members of the community..

The quote "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." does not imply a community at all. It implies an individual in contemplation of "Good".

In more modern views (e.g. Kant), we might think in terms "rules" that "any rational agent," can agree too (and indeed, recent ethics threads on the board assume this indeed must be what morality is). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is simply one proposal, and I do not see any reason to accept it as "what morality is". Remember Plato's Republic, and the cave allegory in particular. Only the philosopher gets a glimpse at "the good", while the vast majority suffer from the mistake of thinking that the shadows on the wall are real things. This majority consists of "rational agents" but the philosopher is unable to convince the majority of them, upon return to the cave, because they are victims of that habit. In fact, Plato often implied that "the good" is not what the majority would agree to. The vast majority of men are like children who want candy, totally ignorant of what is truly good for them. We cannot say that these men are not rational agents, but they would never agree on "the good" like you or Kant would suggest. Their ideas and thoughts are directed toward supporting their childish wants, and the term we use for this is "to rationalize". They are still rational agents, but are hopeless in the sense of agreeing to the good.

The perfection of virtue doesn't sit outside the sphere of intersubjectivity and history. It does involve the contemplation of a good that transcends these, but can't be reduced to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where you and I seem to disagree, the role of "intersubjectivity". If it is the individual who engages in the contemplation of good, then it must be the individual who determines what is good. Therefore the individual leads the community in demonstrating what is good, not vise versa. If the average person is unable to understand the complexities of "the good", as indicated in Plato\s Republic, and only the philosopher who contemplates good, can even get a glimpse of understanding, then this person who contemplates good needs some power of authority over the community, as having the rightful capacity to lead it. Where could this person turn, to obtain that authority other than to God?

Plato often implied that "the good" is not what the majority would agree to. The vast majority of men are like children who want candy, totally ignorant of what is truly good for them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Plato is not the only source for that idea. The parable of the burning house from the Lotus Sutra concerns a wealthy man with a magnificent house full of valuable toys. The house catches fire, and the man wants to save his three beloved children who are inside, playing with the toys and unaware of the danger. He entices them to leave the burning house by offering even better toys outside. Once they are safe, he gives them the ultimate treasure, a precious carriage (representing the Mahayana teaching). The parable teaches that the Buddha skillfully leads people to enlightenment, using various means to guide them from the cycle of suffering to ultimate liberation.

I believe the issue here is the force of habit. "Habit" was first described by Aristotle, as a sort of property (in Latin, "to have") of an active being. When a being has the propensity to act in a specific way, we say that it has a habit. And the habit is a way of avoiding the need for conscious decision making, and employment of the will, for every little act which the being makes.

Aquinas analyzed "habit" quite extensively, questioning amongst other things, where does the habit reside. He determined that the habit must be a property of the potential to act, not the act itself, therefore it is proper to the material or bodily aspect of the being. This is a difficult principle to understand because properties are generally formal, actual, so to assign a property to potential is to say that the potential already has inherent within it, some sort of form, which is not evident as "formal" in the description of the act. I conclude that this is why the habitual act is often contrary to what is "reasonable" as decided by the agent who acts.

The difficulty becomes more apparent when Aquinas considers habits of the intellect. We observe that the activities of the intellect follow patterns of habit, so we need to assume a material aspect to account for the residence of these habits. This results in a very complex Thomistic structure of appetites. The lower appetites (of the senses) are divided in two, concupiscible and irascible, meaning roughly inclined toward and inclined away from an apprehended particular. The intellect however, specifically the will, being inclined toward the general notion of "good", cannot be divided into concupiscible and irascible in that way. However, in the way that the will directs us toward "good" in the general sense, and it exercises will power over the concupiscible and irascible appetites of the senses, there is still a resemblance of that division within the intellectual appetite (will).

A thorough reading of Aquinas' exposé is recommended because it is very well thought out, and revealing of the underlying complexities in the activities of living creatures. Modern, science based descriptions, tend to be deterministically modeled, and these models ignore the role of the free will in the creation, evolution, and destruction of habits. We tend to think of the being as having in-grown, internal inclinations and avoidances consisting of structures like defense mechanisms and control structures. These are understood to interact with the environment in a deterministic (scientific) way, effecting change on both sides. However, this type of modeling, by removing the role of choice by the agent, is an over-simplification which ignores a hugely important, and greatly complicating aspect of the activities of life. It takes the pre-existence of the internal mechanisms for granted, and neglects the role of choice, selection by the being as agent, in the interaction between internal structure and external conditions.

In light of this need, the need to include the role of choice by the being, as agent, on the effects of internal mechanisms, principles of Lamarckian theory become a requirement for a better understanding of the process of evolution. As Aquinas explained, habits must have a real material base. And the habit comes into existence as than effect of choice. And choice may also be active in the maintenance or removal of the habit. Therefore choice of the being as agent, must have a real effect on the evolving material bodies. And of course this is very evident in the role of choice by the being, in reproduction, within Darwinian evolutionary theory.

The relevant point now is that something more than simple "guidance" is required to lead individual human beings toward the good. It becomes obvious that the person to be guided must possess the will to be guided. We can call this inspiration, passion, spirit, ambition, or something like that. Therefore the first step to "guidance" is not an act of guidance at all, but kind of an inversion of this. It is to instill this special quality within the person to be guided, the inspiration required, as the wealthy man did for the children with the offer of toys in your parable. And that is to empower the individual as a real "self", a spirited and ambitious person who will make the break from one's past in order to better the future. This is to make the person a leader rather than a follower. As it turns out, to guide a person in this sense, is not to show them the way, but to inspire them to find the way.

the meaning of life is to do whatever the fuck you want with yours — Vaskane

Which as I read it means accepting absolute responsibility for the consequences of your thoughts and deeds, which raises philosophical questions. Raising the additional philosophical question of subjectivity and interpretation.

Does this question even belong in philosophy any more? Ffs, the meaning of life is to do whatever the fuck you want with yours. That every philosophy scrub must try to answer this damn question only serves as an example of hubris. — Vaskane

:rofl:

What do We Mean By “The Meaning of Life”? — George Fisher

Does it mean anything at all? I don't mean life, I mean the question itself.

What's being asked? How best to live? That isn't the same question, though, is it? Is it being asked what the purpose of life is? Why we're here? What will happen to us? What God has planned for us? Why, or if, we matter?

How best to live might be determined, or at least the ancients thought so, in some cases at least without reference to "the meaning of life" as we understand the question, if we do. So, the best way to live is to obtain tranquility, or happiness. The other questions can't be with any certainty, I think. Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are.

What do We Mean By “The Meaning of Life”? — George Fisher

I think a more significant question (or challenge) is Do you have the courage to live – thrive – despite Life having no discernible or agreed upon meaning?

Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are. — Ciceronianus

:up:

You’re right. In some sense, it is a question without meaning. And even if we assign a meaning to it, is it important. What is truly important is how you live your life. The meaning of an individual life is determined by the quality of that lived life. The only hazard to this question is whether it causes you to doubt your belief in the principles that guide your life.

For myself, I have always been a doubter. This is unexpected as I attended a private religious high school and college. I should be steeped in religious thinking. Some of the people who have commented on my post are very knowledgeable in theology. I can hold my own in discussions on theology. However, the older I get though the more I have trouble accepting the various dogmas that religion presents. It all seems created somehow. It is as if someone took a few facts and built an entire structure of thought from them.

So, how does this relate to your question? The reason I pursue questions of the meaning of life is that I need something to hang my way of life on. If my life is going to be of value, there has to be meaning in it. I think we are all trying to grab onto meaning so that we can feel confident that we are on the right path. However, it is possible to determine from observation what a proper way of life is. This can happen even without a God. This could be why so many religions focus on a common set of behaviors for mankind. The only question then is “Is there an afterlife?” A few decades ago, I came up with a statement that I still think is true. It is impossible for a sentient being to conceive of not being. This statement does not mean there is an afterlife or not, it is just about how sentient beings think. You will immediately say, we all know we are going to die, but nearly every religion offers the hope of some kind of afterlife.

I have probably wandered into territory that you did not intend and I hope I did not offend you but I do think these thoughts do relate to The Meaning of Life.

What is truly important is how you live your life. The meaning of an individual life is determined by the quality of that lived life. — George Fisher

You generate a lot more questions with this.

These are not givens. They are expressing assumptions - values and a set of preferences. It may be that it is better to be indifferent.

Whose definition of 'quality' do we use as a basis to make this assessment?

The only hazard to this question is whether it causes you to doubt your belief in the principles that guide your life. — George Fisher

This is surely the job of philosophy - to examine one's flawed ideas and presuppositions, many of which might be unreasonable or harmful. Just because one has principles does not mean they are the right ones. I suspect philosophical inquiry should often be discomforting.

I can hold my own in discussions on theology. However, the older I get though the more I have trouble accepting the various dogmas that religion presents. — George Fisher

Various dogmas or various religions? There are hundreds.

The reason I pursue questions of the meaning of life is that I need something to hang my way of life on. — George Fisher

This sounds like putting the cart before the horse, or is this just the words you have used? Sounds like you have a way of life and are now seeking, perhaps, some ad hoc justification for some value system?

If my life is going to be of value, there has to be meaning in it. I think we are all trying to grab onto meaning so that we can feel confident that we are on the right path. However, it is possible to determine from observation what a proper way of life is. T — George Fisher

I think perhaps the best way is to give up on 'proper' ways of life since this sounds the religion you say you have moved on from.

How do we determine from observation what the proper way of life is?

This can happen even without a God. — George Fisher

The problem with belief in gods is that they do not provide the anchor some think they do. Beliefs in gods do not provide objective ways to live. Since all religions, their sects and individual believers make subjective choices about how they interpret god's will, we can really say that religious meaning is pluralistic and far from certain. Even within the one religion, moral positions vary considerably. It is created like any other meaning, an expression of personal preferences.

It would be very helpful in your replies if you might indicate who you're responding to. Have a look at How to Quote.

Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are. — Ciceronianus

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias.

I agree - but it’s also because at least some of what was truly worth preserving was written down and carried forward. Those around Plato, for example, obviously realised that what he wrote had to be preserved whilst there must have been many another self-styled philosopher that left no legacy.

Another thing that might be mentioned is the idea of the Axial Age.

‘The Axial Age, a term coined by the philosopher Karl Jaspers, refers to a pivotal period in human history, roughly between 800 and 200 BCE. This era was remarkable for its profound and simultaneous intellectual, philosophical, and religious transformations across various civilizations, including those in Greece, Persia, India, and China.

During the Axial Age, there was a significant shift in thought patterns, moving away from mythological frameworks towards more rational and abstract reasoning. This period saw the rise of some of the world's most enduring philosophies and religions: in Greece, the emergence of classical philosophy with figures like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; in Persia, the rise of Zoroastrianism; in India, the development of Buddhism and Jainism, as well as critical developments in Hinduism; and in China, the foundational teachings of Confucianism and Taoism.

The Axial Age is considered crucial in the history of humanity as it laid the foundational structures of thought and belief systems that continue to shape cultures and societies around the world.’

Most of what is considered ‘ancient wisdom’ is rooted in this period. And it endures.

I agree - but it’s also because at least some of what was truly worth preserving was written down and carried forward. Those around Plato, for example, obviously realised that what he wrote had to be preserved whilst there must have been many another self-styled philosopher that left no legacy. — Wayfarer

On the other hand, where is this generation's Leibniz, Descartes, Caesar, Bohr, Peano? We had Stephen Hawking, and look how that turned out. Some might argue that we simply don't know about them yet, because often geniuses are recognised posthumously, but I think that is only true to a certain extent. We have thousands of genius experts in all sorts of fields across the world, Biochemistry, Aerospace Engineering, Philosophy, Quantum Physics, Robotics; and yet if you were to ask a history question to most of those forementioned...

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Yes, i think there definitely is a "survivorship bias". Consider that only the best really got preserved. Most ancient Greek principles, from the Ionians, the Eleatics, the atomists etc., were preserved only through the criticism of it, in Plato and Aristotle. So really, what was preserved was the dismissal of the ancient ideas, the refutations found in Plato and Aristotle which demonstrated the faults. Then skepticism, as demonstrated by Socrates, became very important because it was necessary to rid the mind of the ancient foundations which were being demonstrated as faulty. We ought not downplay the importance of this movement, to rid the mind of ancient ideas which were being refuted (the downfall of Alexandria for example).

Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are.
— Ciceronianus

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Perhaps. But I think that "what is the meaning of life?" is a question which wasn't asked antiquity in the sense it's asked now because it arises in the modern sense due to the "triumph" of Christianity, which effectively (though not immediately) extinguished the ancient world. With Christianity (and perhaps monotheism in general) came the belief that we're made for a particular purpose, associated with God/Christ. Thus, the old Baltimore Catechism of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, on which I was raised, provided a simple answer:

Q. Why did God make you?
A. God made me to know Him, to love Him, and to serve Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in heaven.
Q. What must we do to save our souls?
A. To save our souls, we must worship God by faith, hope, and charity; that is, we must believe in Him, hope in
Him, and love Him with all our heart.

There you have it. The meaning of life is clear. What happens, though, when that God no longer serves, as began to be the case for many from roughly the 17th century and continues for many now? There must be some other "meaning of life" to take its place, and so we seek an answer to the question,

This of course relates to the history Europe and where Christianity and monotheism extended, not to the East, of which I know very little.

‘The Axial Age, a term coined by the philosopher Karl Jaspers, refers to a pivotal period in human history, roughly between 800 and 200 BCE. This era was remarkable for its profound and simultaneous intellectual, philosophical, and religious transformations across various civilizations, including those in Greece, Persia, India, and China.

During the Axial Age, there was a significant shift in thought patterns, moving away from mythological frameworks towards more rational and abstract reasoning. This period saw the rise of some of the world's most enduring philosophies and religions: in Greece, the emergence of classical philosophy with figures like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; in Persia, the rise of Zoroastrianism; in India, the development of Buddhism and Jainism, as well as critical developments in Hinduism; and in China, the foundational teachings of Confucianism and Taoism.

The Axial Age is considered crucial in the history of humanity as it laid the foundational structures of thought and belief systems that continue to shape cultures and societies around the world.’

Most of what is considered ‘ancient wisdom’ is rooted in this period. And it endures. — Wayfarer

:up:

A good bulk of the Hebrew Bible is written and *nearly* completed in this period. We see the spread and transformation of monotheism in this period away from more anthropomorphized conceptions of God to more abstract ones. Judaism is really born in this period, although the history of the Israelites surely extends further back. And from Judaism comes Jesus who will repeatedly quote texts and reference ideas and events from this period to present his worldview.

Sure. What was that aphorism - when Chinese Premier Zhou Enla was asked about the impact of the French Revolution, he reportedly replied that it was "too soon to tell."

And from Judaism comes Jesus who will repeatedly quote texts and reference ideas and events from this period to present his worldview. — BitconnectCarlos

The synthesis of Semitic religion and Greek philosophy provided the foundation of Western civilization (even despite the objection 'what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?')

There must be some other "meaning of life" to take its place, and so we seek an answer to the question, — Ciceronianus

We know better now. Or so it is thought. Maybe the problem is that society has its religious roots. After all the great bulk of them were addressed to an early agrarian and semi-nomadic peoples, replete with images of sheep and wheat fields. And the meaning of sacrifice, which was universal in those ancient cultures, which the Crucifiction was supposed to put an end to by being the final sacrifice, but which means nothing to a consumerist culture.

incidentally, and mentioned previously, an excellent series from Princeton on ancient wisdom for modern readers.

Here are some of my thoughts on this, for what they are worth. (They may be worthless, but in the slight hope that they are worth something, here they are)

(...Or maybe, if I am the only person in the universe, then they are worth EVERYTHING! Who the hell knows?)

So, for me, it all comes down to the Big Bang. This, as a theory, makes sense to me. We can actually measure distances in space, and therefore, we know that celestial bodies are moving away from us. If we simply rewind, then everything in this universe at one point was in the same place at the same time. This means that if just one atom that was present then, was not present right now, then the universe, as we know it, would not exist. Now, considering how many atoms just one person consists of, then it makes sense to me HOW MUCH JUST ONE SINGLE PERSON MATTERS. Of course, you could say, well, does it matter if the universe exists or not? But, I would say that most people would answer: yes.

I'm unsure it makes sense to say that the universe matters. Sure, for it to matter, as it is, it would need to matter to something/one outside of it. I'm stumped there..

it would need to matter to something/one outside of it. — AmadeusD

Why can't it matter to the people inside it? Am I just being dense or something? I can't figure out why it only has to matter to someone/thing outside of it. Just the same as the world matters to us, if the world is in the universe, doesn't that matter too? I'm sure I'm probably missing something really obvious here, but right now, I can't for the life of me figure out what it is. Lol