That without mind, matter is not scattered about in space in any way at all.

Or maybe in your version, that reality is so bound up with subjectivity that there is nothing we can say about the matter?

Either way, these don't seem to correspond to the Pinter quote, which you nevertheless cite as an exemplar of your position. Hence my feeling that you vacillate.

That without mind, matter is not scattered about in space in any way at all. — hypericin

So, you're saying that according to idealism, if there were no mind, then matter would not exist? (Sorry for being picky but really want to clarify this point.)

I think that is one version, which I call "strong". Which is not your version, as I pointed out.

Well, the point is, I am at pains to differentiate myself from that iteration of idealism, as I say at the outset. I also suspect that it is rather a straw man version of what idealist philosophy really means.

In any case, thanks for you comments, appreciated.

I also suspect that it is rather a straw man version of what idealist philosophy really means. — Wayfarer

Very possibly

In any case, thanks for you comments, appreciated. — Wayfarer

:up:

Weirdly apt - currently listening to this exact discussion between Josh Rasmussen and Alex O'Connor right now. Material from mind.

These ideas are very much in the air. I've been listening to Bernardo Kastrup's lectures, he's all in on analytic idealism (mind you, I'm not all in on Kastrup, although favourably inclined toward him.) The whole 'mind creates reality' meme is pretty much alive and well on the Internet.

I've been listening to Bernardo Kastrup's lectures, he's all in on analytic idealism — Wayfarer

Indeed i took a spot of advice and listened to five hours of Kastrup late last week. Id say my attitude is the same.

We agree that appearance is mind-created. Here we also seem to agree that the appearance is a perspective on mind-independent reality. — hypericin

I don’t think it’s indirect realism, as the external world can’t be said to exist outside of or independently of the mind. But neither does it not exist. — Wayfarer

:roll: :monkey:

In context it is as follows:

...There is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object....

A corollary of this is that ‘existence’ is a compound or complex idea. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. This is why the criticism of idealism that ‘particular things must go in and out of existence depending on whether they’re perceived’ is mistaken. It is based on a fallacious idea of what it means for something to exist. The idea that things ‘go out of existence’ when not perceived is really their ‘imagined non-existence’– your imagining them going out of existence. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

There's a supporting quotation for this point in the original essay that the OP links to, from the Pali Buddhist texts.

‘By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one.’ — The Buddha, Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

IN that respect, I acknowledge my indebtedness to Buddhist philosophy, and also a book which was crucial in my early philosophical education, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T R V Murti, which has extensive comparisons between Kant and the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy of Nagarjuna. That passage is one of the sources of Madhyamaka.

Basically, I'm simply arguing that whatever exists, always exists for some mind. The sense in which it exists without reference to a mind is simply unintelligible and incoherent. That is the mistake that creeps in for mistaking the assumption of mind-independence, which is all very well within the context of science, for a metaphysical principle, which it is not.

Basically, I'm simply arguing that whatever exists, always exists for some mind. — Wayfarer

And this 'idea' is incoherent because it implies either (A) a Matryoshka doll-like infinite regress of minds-which-exist within minds-which-exist within ... ad infinitum (i.e. 'it's turtles all the way down) or (B) that "some mind" which "whatever exists for" is not ultimately "whatever exists". :sparkle: :eyes:

So tell me, according to current science, what does ultimately exist?

So tell me, according to current science, what does ultimately exist? — Wayfarer

Well which "current science" is your non-scientific question referring to, Wayf?

I think you are giving idealism a realist interpretation, by interpreting " the mind" as a speculated theoretical object or posit, with your infinite-regress arguments resembling those used to attack indirect realism. Ironically, Berkeley's arguments against representationalist materialism were that he found it to be incoherent for reasons which are very similar to yours.

There is no "mind" posited in Berkeley's arguments for subjective idealism in the literal sense you assume, but only ideas referring to the thoughts and observations of the individual.

Nevertheless, Berkeley apparently remained uncommitted to the solipsism which many consider subjective idealism to imply, for although his arguments for idealism were based only on ideas, he was apparently open-minded with regards to the truth of the rationalist doctrines of causality and the external world. Like Malebranche and Hume, Berkeley didn't consider causality to be reducible to observations, for he understood observations in themselves to be inert, like the video frames of a movie. So if causality and externality were to exist, he argued that they must exist in some other mind that exists apart from one's ideas, namely in the mind of god, which ironically leads back to realism.

(I consider Berkeley to have shown that realism is ultimately a theological notion - the speculated existence of external reality in physicalism doesn't seem any less theological to me than Berkeley's mind of god)

What do you make of this?

Love Penrose. Watched that interview yesterday. He's a hero of mine. Mind you, I bought his book Emperor's New Mind, and whilst I completely agreed with the jacket blurb, I can't understand his mathematically-based arguments, and a lot of what he says is over my head.

I can't understand his mathematically-based arguments, and a lot of what he says is over my head. — Wayfarer

My understanding of Penrose, as influenced by Gödel, says that Incompleteness Theorem tells the mathematician that math proofs exemplify the consistency achievable within math-as-language morphology (math grammar), but that such internal consistency is not the whole story. Since a foundational set of axioms for a particular math will generate equations unprovable by their axioms, beyond consistent morphology, there lies the experience of understanding these changes of form by a person. Even in the face of math proofs there is judgment of computational consistency not itself computational. Generalizing from this insight, there is a consistent POV that is concerned with the aboutness of things rooted in the absence of its own aboutness.

I don’t yet, however, go so far as to totally deny all objectivity of the self. This I say because, obviously, the self is aware of itself.

Ironically, Berkeley's arguments against... — sime

Non sequitur. My critique of @Wayfarer's Buddhist idea (re: subjectivity) has nothing to do with "Berkeley's argument".

So tell me, according to current science, what does ultimately exist? — Wayfarer
Well which "current science" is your non-scientific question referring to, Wayf? — 180 Proof

Objection, your honor, the defense is being evasive. The question was not asking about any particular genre of science, but merely about a scientific rather than philosophical position. Please direct the defense to answer the question about Ultimate Existence.

A possible answer -- though not scientific -- would be "No Ultimate Existence, only Proximate" : right here, right now. Not acceptable, because the questioner requested an empirical scientific fact to ground whatever opinion is offered. And a scientific answer would have to account for the un-resolved state of knowledge about the origin of the physical universe. It is observed to exist, but how or why did everything emerge from the unknown? Thus, addressing the creation/existence problem raised in the OP.

Aside : At this point, a scientist would probably just punt, but a philosopher would go for it on fourth down. Pardon the American hand/football metaphor. :joke:

Stipulation
Ultimate : being or happening at the beginning or end of a process
Existence : the state of being real or participating in reality.

The question was not asking about any particular genre of science, ... — Gnomon

... which is why I asked for specificity.

... but merely about a scientific rather than philosophical position.

I've no idea what you mean, sir, by "a scientific rather than a philosophical position".

what does ultimately exist?

(From my member profile) Existence is a brute fact – radically contingent – so whatever exists is contingent as well. No thing is "ultimate".

That explains a lot.

And this 'idea' is incoherent because it implies either (A) a Matryoshka doll-like infinite regress of minds-which-exist within minds-which-exist within ... ad infinitum (i.e. 'it's turtles all the way down) or (B) that "some mind" which "whatever exists for" is not ultimately "whatever exists". — 180 Proof

So you know things exist and you don't need a mind for knowing that?

Sometimes I feel you vacillate between a kind of (weak?) idealism and indirect realism. — hypericin

Indeed. A proper idealist wouldn't care about politics or science, but Wayfarer clearly does.

So you know things exist and you don't need a mind for knowing that? — baker

:roll:

The point is this: being a mind that is 'aware of being-a-mind-among-other-minds' (ergo finitude) presupposes 'mind-independent nonmind'. In other words, to say that 'existence is mind-dependent' entails 'the nonexistence of mind' (via infinite regress: mind dependent on mind dependent on mind dependent on ...) which is self-refuting.

A proper idealist wouldn't care about politics or science, but Wayfarer clearly does. — baker

Wayfarer is a property-owning householder with material possessions and family responsibilities. So I probably don't fit into your stereotyped image of what 'an idealist' must be, whatever that is.

(via infinite regress: mind dependent on mind dependent on mind dependent on ...) which is self-refuting. — 180 Proof

Nevertheless, there seems at least some resemblance between this, and your

Existence is a brute fact – radically contingent – so whatever exists is contingent as well. — 180 Proof

How does mind dependent on mind....not conform to your description of it being 'radically contingent'?

(leaving aside the fact that if everything is contingent, then it is impossible to avoid nihilism.)

How does mind dependent on mind....not conform to your description of it being 'radically contingent'? — Wayfarer

As I pointed out, "mind dependent on mind dependent on ..." is incoherent, thus meaningless and doesn't "conform" to anything.

... if everything is contingent, then it is impossible to avoid nihilism

"Nihilism" in what sense?

Answer the first question first. On the one hand, you're accusing me of 'infinite regress'. But on the other hand, you say that 'existence is radically contingent'. But if 'existence is radically contingent', then how does that claim avoid 'infinite regress'? Aren't they the same?

if 'existence is radically contingent', then how does that claim avoid 'infinite regress'? Aren't they the same? — Wayfarer

No. Existence just is the case (constituted, but not exhausted, by "the totality of the facts" ~Witty, TLP). An infinite regress precipates from a claim that some unjustified yet noncontingent Y justifies X; however, 'existence is contingent', that is, not necessary, or is unjustifiable – literally nothing constrains existence (i.e continuing to be) from becoming nonexistence (i.e. ceasing to be) and therefore, in this sense, existence is also unbounded. By all means, Wayfarer, feel free to refute me by proposing a 'constraint on existence' that isn't also ... existence itself (ergo also not a constraint :smirk:).

And, again ...

... if everything is contingent, then it is impossible to avoid nihilism
— Wayfarer

"Nihilism" in what sense? — 180 Proof

:chin:

Some philosophical sources:
• Laozi (re: yinyang)
• Epicurus (re: swirling atoms in void).
• Spinoza (re: natura naturans).
• Q. Meillassoux (re: hyperchaos).

:up: :strong:

How does mind dependent on mind....not conform to your description of it being 'radically contingent'?

(leaving aside the fact that if everything is contingent, then it is impossible to avoid nihilism.) — Wayfarer

Everything we know points to mind (as an activity) being dependent on non-mind, on material existence/ existents. There are two understandings of nihilism: Nietzsche understood Christianity, and any notion of revelation, of received or imposed meaning, as being nihilistic in the sense that it nihilates the radical human capacity for creating meaning.

On the other hand, nihilism in the positive sense is simply the lack of received/ imposed meaning which grants to humanity a great freedom and creativity, The world itself, even apart from humanity, is replete with local contingent meanings, and there is no evidence for the reality of any global absolute meaning; a fact for which we ought to be most grateful, else we would be nought but slaves.

It is the fact that humanity has been mesmerized by a futile search for absolute meaning that arguably has led to the appalling neglect of this local world we share with all the other beasts and a functional sensible rational understanding of its needs.