Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself — Bob Ross
Secondly, you threw a curveball here because you posited !X as itself simply affirmed in M, so, of course, affirming M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction (in this case) — Bob Ross
However, it is important to note that the logical contradiction here does not lead to X being logically impossible, it leads us to X ^ !X being logically impossible — Bob Ross
No this is a logical contradiction, not a non-logical contradiction or incoherence — Bob Ross
This is because M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction which is only due to the fact that one also affirms M which leads to !X—so X is not logically impossible but, rather, it is logically impossible for it to be true that M ^ X in this case because it can be expanded to [M → !X] ^ X. — Bob Ross
Yes. Consider the logical touchstone of analytic truth. If x is red then x is coloured. Its analyticity derives from the metaphysical reality of the species-genus relationship. If you denude a proposition of all connection to this categorical content, you are left with a purely formal construct that has no meaning. — Pantagruel
Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong). — Bob Ross
When we choose a certain metaphysics M, a statement that goes against it, for me, would be a statement that goes against one of the theorems of that metaphysics (t.i. logical contradiction), and assuming that every theorem of M ultimately goes back to the axioms of M, we would have (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y) extending from (X ∧ M).
The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?
I don't think that makes sense. Under physicalism, it is axiomatic that only physical things exist. Any statement that entails a spiritual being is contradicted by that axiom.I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. — Bob Ross
While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.
I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction — Bob Ross
I agree.I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. — Bob Ross
Both work, but one needs to be clear what one means. Your approach is appropriate when comparing metaphysical systems, mine is appropriate when considering what is possible within a metaphysical system.That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work. — Bob Ross
I agree.my argument is that as soon as we choose a metaphysical system, which will have its own semantic system (such as equating "all that exists" and "physical things"), the metaphysical impossibility collapses with logical impossibility. Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible. — Lionino
This metaphysical system is incoherent because it entails a contradiction.let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have. — Bob Ross
I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory.
— Bob Ross
I agree. — Relativist
Anything that is broadly logically impossible, such as the existence of square circles or married bachelors.What would be an example of something that is metaphysically impossible but does not reference the axioms of the operating metaphysical system? — Lionino
Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible.
A spiritual being is logically possible. :up:
A spiritual being is metaphysically possible. :chin:
A spiritual being is physically possible. :down:
In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here. — Bob Ross
Which, what they would want to say in this case is that, !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. P, in this case, does not produce a logical contradiction with X such that X ^ !X but, rather, that X ‘violates’ the law of gravity, which Y, and posits if that is true than it is “incoherent”, albeit not logically contradictory, with X. It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that.
I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X. — Bob Ross
It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that. — Bob Ross
Metaphysical impossibility is any proposition which violates the presupposed metaphysical theory, no different than how actual/physical possibility is predicated on our scientific theories. — Bob Ross
In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here. — Bob Ross
1. X is logically possible and is logically possible relative to the axioms and inferences of P. — Bob Ross
3. X is actually possible, since you defined it as a “non-physical thing”, as it does not violate the laws of nature, being above nature itself. — Bob Ross
2. X is metaphysically impossible, because there is at least one proposition, Y, in P that is incoherent with X such that !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. — Bob Ross
it entails logical contradiction.If we then choose physicalism as a metaphysical system M, we are affirming M, which implies affirming all its axioms (A1, A2, A3... An) and consequently from the axioms its theorems (T1, T2, T3). Therefore, by choosing physicalism, we state A1 "there are only physical things", A1 due to the laws of logic can be rewritten to "there are no non-physical things". So, by stating P "there is a spiritual thing" — which due to the definition of these words can be rewritten to "there is a non-physical thing" — we are denying A1. We end up with A1 and notA1, or P and notP, which is a logical contradiction. — Lionino
a physicalistic theory, P, that demonstrates some incoherence with the theory and X such that !X — Bob Ross
The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines physical possibility as:X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, — Bob Ross
This is how one might discuss different theories of natural law. Under one theory, humans flying might be physically impossible, while under another theory -it's physically possible. But it seems pointless to even discuss physical modality in this sort of context.X is not logically impossible even relative to P — Bob Ross
No, I'm not conflating it - I just think the discussion context is what matters. There's often common ground about using known science to identify what is physically possible. Only then does it even make sense to discuss physical possibility. If there's not this common ground, then it's meaningless to reference physical possibility - it might only make sense to discuss what is entailed by one theory of laws vs another.I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X. — Bob Ross
Therefore, we are stating P. We are also stating X. Thus, we are stating P and X. As I demonstrated here:
…
it entails logical contradiction.
But the goal of the thread was to find something logically possible and metaphysically impossible
metaphysically impossible relative to Znot — Bob Ross
P is a metaphysically possible statement — indeed it is, in the dualist doctrines of epiphenomenalism and interactivism.
So where is the metaphysical impossibility? Well, it can only arrive if we state M ∧ P, I don't see any other way. — Lionino
It is only when we state Z∧Znot that we end up with a metaphysically impossibility
Z ^ Znot cannot be determined, without clarifying the underlying metaphysical theory N being used — Bob Ross
Let’s take metaphysical theory, Znot, which posits that philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible — Bob Ross
By ‘relative to M’, I mean that this mode of modality is relative to the underlying metaphysical theory, M, being used — Bob Ross
Z being metaphysically impossible is that we posit Znot and that is incoherent, at the least, with Z — Bob Ross
---P is a metaphysically possible statement — indeed it is, in the dualist doctrines of epiphenomenalism and interactivism.
So where is the metaphysical impossibility? Well, it can only arrive if we state M ∧ P, I don't see any other way. But because M→(A∧B) and (A→T)∧(B→U) and T→¬P entail M→¬P, M ∧ P is a logical impossibility too. — Lionino
You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N. — Bob Ross
With the terms we are using here (I have thrown out "In M, P" in favour of "P and M"), I don't think that P relative to M means anything other than P and M.
Now I don't know whether you are using Znot as a theory or a proposition.
To avoid confusion, I am going to use capital letters for theories, and lowercase for propositions. — Bob Ross
My point is that ‘p is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p and M are metaphysically impossible’ != ‘p ^ M is metaphysically impossible’ != ‘!(p ^ M)’ — Bob Ross
You represent this as Z ^ Znot, but this is not accurate because you are conflating the proposition which is metaphysically impossible with the justification for it being such. Z is metaphysically impossible, and the justification is that !(Z ^ Znot) ^ Znot → {metaphysically impossible} . Saying ‘Z ^ Znot’ is metaphysically impossible shifts the focus to a different proposition, X, which would have to be evaluated relative to a specified metaphysical theory, N. — Bob Ross
There has to be a whole binding all the parts of something from the top-down for it to be coherent, you can't actually building anything by "combining parts" without that, despite what a pragmatic heuristic it is to think so. — Hallucinogen
It seems logically possible for syntax to be sufficient for semantics — Hallucinogen
It just turns out when we investigate with thought experiments like the Chinese room argument, that syntax is actually insufficient for semantics. But without knowing that beforehand, it appears possible that we might understand the meaning of some symbol purely by looking at the instructions of which it is a part. — Hallucinogen
Reflective analysis leads to a pluralistic understanding, that embraces the diverse truths of the various categorical modes of thought - aesthetic, religious, positivistic, scientific, historical. Culminating in a synthesis which is a categorical thinking founded on universal a priori propositions (as mentioned). He has a penchant for the "concrete universal" and the "concrete mind" where the historical fusion of thought and reality are transcendentally real. He says metaphysics is "the science of beliefs." — Pantagruel
He says that when people become absorbed in a viewpoint (e.g. Logic) then they make that their metaphysical-rational basis — Pantagruel
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