The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross
The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross
Just like how I can separate triangles into one pile and squares into another, and more generally shapes into one pile and non-shapes into another, I, too, can put generous acts into one pile and respectful acts into another, and more generally good acts into one pile and bad acts into another. — Bob Ross
Does that take away from the plentiful evidence that the categories do exist? Certainly not. — Bob Ross
There being no formula of what is exactly wrong or right in any given situation does not make the categories empty. — Bob Ross
Am I going to sort each into each pile 100% accurately? Probably not. Does that take away from the plentiful evidence that the categories do exist? Certainly not. — Bob Ross
(yes, there's some incredulity in this question) Are you seriously comparing 'ethical views' to the reality of categories of triangle?
because this lack of formula does essentially mean you cannot predict 'which' category an act falls into at all, rather than imprecisely
Your moral intuitions only can do so. They are your categories.
My understanding is that realism entails that whether an act is good or bad can be established as a 'fact' in any given instance
I don’t see why this would be the case. We can induce what ‘the good’ is from its instances, just like how we induce what a triangle is from its instances; and we can use our current knowledge of ‘the good’ to make informed decisions about what can be classified as such. — Bob Ross
Non-moral intuitions are used to determine the category of ‘the good’, no different than how we non-morally intuit the concept or category of triangularity. — Bob Ross
Think of it this way, — Bob Ross
acts which care about life to the maximal extent possible; and 'the bad' as the negation of it. However, I freely admit that inductions are not necessarily true and that this method of inquiry is sort of scientific. — Bob Ross
This means, that this view affirms #2 only technically insofar as we are talking about non-normative moral judgments; which means that this view is a sort of hybrid between realism and anti-realism, whereof it does affirm that there are moral facts, but none of them are normative. I am not sure what to make of it yet: it definitely exposes my deep anti-realist sympathies. — Bob Ross
Take an example by analogy: Imagine I gave you a bucket of colored blocks and asked you separate them into piles by color. You pick up a red one, put it in the red pile; blue, in the blue pile; etc. — Bob Ross
Really enjoying this.
Doesn't this pre-supposes knowledge of the Good?
As best i can tell, unless you're going to employ Platonic Forms, you can't induce what the Good is from instances.
There is no concept for it to match to
Triangles, on the other hand, can be understood a priori and an instance matches the concept.
A: What is a woman? (What is the Good?)
B: Anyone who identifies as a woman (Whatever you identify as The Good)
A: What are they identifying as? (What are you identifying 'it' as?)
B: A woman. (The Good)
The concept of a triangle is prior to intuition, allowing us to perceive a triangle. Morality has no such basis.
So, I'm finding it hard to understand how rejecting 'good' behaviour while acknowledging it is 'good' is not a moral choice. I realise you're trying to say 'Good' is not a moral category, but using your analogous example, it seems to be so.
Though, in light of the objections i've laid out, I can't see any reason to suspect the induction to Good and Bad is even serviceable. As you say, its grey, and there's no one-size-fits-all. So, in this sense, where's the fact?
A fact is stance-independent right, but noting something is 'good' IS a stance
However, the idea that someone can reasonably say "I will actively avoid doing good* things" and on your account, that would be A-moral - seems a bit incongruous
The difference is, these categories do not inform me about color. I already have that understanding from some other source, in other words I already have a formula.
But imagine if you gave to this task to someone who has no understanding of what red or blue even meant, and you tell them "red means it belongs in the red pile, blue means means it belongs in the blue pile." The person would have no clue what to do, the categories do not help at all.
I can abstract out that this is what is ‘good — Bob Ross
I don’t see why this is the case: I don’t need to posit a platonic form of a triangle to induce a concept of a triangle. — Bob Ross
Sure it does, something like ‘any act which promotes harmony of alive beings with each other’. — Bob Ross
The good is a category of acts which is equivalent to something like ‘any act which promotes ...’. — Bob Ross
I don’t think the concept of a triangle is a priori itself — Bob Ross
That’s the interesting thing with this theory: the good is non-normative. I can tell you what is good, but not what you should do about it. — Bob Ross
(1) there are blue and red categories of piles and (2) the red belong in the red and the blue in the blue. — Bob Ross
Agree. And this precludes me from ever knowing whether something is Good or Bad, other than according to my own, internal, empirical-derived sense of them. There couldn't be a rule, other than one i make up. If what you mean here, is that everyone, individually, can find these categories and work from there - yes, i guess so. But that's plain and simple subjectivity. All of our biases will play into what falls into which category. Thought, again, I recognize this falls well short of imputing an 'ought'.we have to live, learn, experiment, fail, and keep trying. — Bob Ross
Since the good is non-normative, it is not a (normative) stance — Bob Ross
I would start off with the subjective moral judgment that “one ought to be good” and then the normative judgments will be synthesized with the moral facts (except for that one normative judgment). — Bob Ross
I deny this entirely. Without something to ground your conception of hte good outside of empirical sense perception, I cannot see how anything but bias or assumption could lead to judging acts as good or bad.
This is kind of my point - what criteria do these acts meet?
Because a triangle is analytical. It is a shape with three (tri) angles (angle). "the good" has no such grounding
X is good because of something further(its meeting a criteria/on for instance, held in the subject's mind), which makes it synthetic
In this case, I can't see how an a priori concept can be appealed to unless is some kind of Platonic Form-type thing assumed to be 'correct', as it were. We'd need an innate, defined concept of Good and Bad to accurately judge any act - and this would mean we can be wrong about it, empirically.
But from whence comes a reason to use that criterion? Given the criterion, I think you're off to the races - but I can't understand why I should accept it without an a priori concept for me to heed.
This seems to betray to concept of morality, and doesn't really answer my issue.
If something (an act) must be objectively noted as good, rejecting it is immoral. Whats the catch?
Then I see that these are made up and you're putting things in two bins based on a black/white fallacy instead of extending your system to accomodate things that patently don't fit in them. What if one of the blocks is purple??
If I only have two categories, I will put things in the best-suited category.
. If you KNOW the good, and reject it, how is that not Immoral?
Remember, this theory strips out normativity from the good and bad; and groups the good and bad based off of similarities between actions, just like how we determine other naturalistic conceptions—so this only needs empirical inquiry. — Bob Ross
Same with the good and bad: the good includes being kind, as well as other altuistic acts and what not, and the bad includes depravity, disrespect, meanness, etc. The serial killer can likewise acknowledge that what they are doing is bad, while maintaining they should keep doing it. — Bob Ross
The only way to synthesize the moral facts, being non-normative, with normative judgments is to subjectively affirm a normative moral judgment that implicates them in doing good; such “one ought to be good” — Bob Ross
Not if we are just abstracting categories of actions, and labelling them ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ in a sense that ties well into how we typically use the terms. — Bob Ross
The good is not a platonic form nor a priori under my view. — Bob Ross
Morality, under this view, is not solely about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; it is also about what is good and what is bad. — Bob Ross
I don’t think you are completely appreciating the severed connection between the good/bad and normativity in this theory yet. — Bob Ross
It was an analogy, and the point had nothing to do with how many colors there actually are. — Bob Ross
I am open to there being multiple categories; e.g., a neutral category whereof an action does not promote harmony nor disharmony. — Bob Ross
The term traditionally is both of these, I have severed them from each other. — Bob Ross
Good and Bad can only be deduced from empirical data.
But the concepts themselves have ipso facto moral valence. They necessarily lead to moral implications, although, i agree, there's no moral command as a result of acknowledging good and bad.
I think its a bit of a slick move to claim there's no normative implications for an (what appears to attempt at..) objective categorisation of acts into the same. It sounds more like a statistical analysis that would result in a really, really clear idea of where your morals lie. It's extremely hard to see how the move is open to you to act other than in accordance with the categories and not make an immoral move.
I don't think this is correct, per se. The psychopath can acknowledge that the act would fit this category, for someone else thus defeating the applicability of the categories beyond those who assent to them.
I don't understand how 'moral facts' don't have pretty direct normative implications. If we have a moral fact "x is wrong" then to act against that, would be immoral. I have no idea how you find daylight between the two.
But this betrays those being facts?
Similar to above. Happy to acknowledge i've misinterpreted you, but then I fall back into - then these aren't facts. They're just socially-common concepts
Are you able to explain what you're seeing stands between a moral fact, and it's normative implication?
Immoral only insofar as it is a non-normative moral violation. I can say “you did something (morally) bad, but I cannot thereby affirm you did something you shouldn’t have”. — Bob Ross
Sure, I was not trying to imply that a psychopath will always acknowledge nor recognize the categories. — Bob Ross
Technically speaking, under this theory there is a gap between normative and non-normative moral judgments, which can only be bridged by affirming a subjective moral judgment that implicates one to the other (e.g., “one ought to be good”). — Bob Ross
I was talking about semantics there, not moral facticity. It is a moral fact that “torturing babies for fun is bad” because this action can be objectively categorized as under ‘being bad’. — Bob Ross
They are facts because the categorization is objective, insofar as the said action is either promoting depravity, disunity, and disharmony or sovereignty, unity, and harmony (or perhaps neither) and this is not subject to our opinions. — Bob Ross
I don’t think the way reality is entails how it ought to be; so I am going to deny the existence of normative facts. — Bob Ross
I would say we can induce 'the good' as, most generally, acts which care about life to the maximal extent possible; and 'the bad' as the negation of it. — Bob Ross
I suppose what i'm pointing out here, is that each set of 'categorised acts' for want of a better term, would be peculiar to each person. There is no 'shared' Good or Bad ..Which lands me at 8billion individual 'moralities'. I'm unsure this is workable? But I could be missing a trick, as usual.
I understand the categories are non-normative, but I still cannot see any gap between what is good, and how one should act. If an act is objectively a Good act, I understand this doesn't mean "one should be Good" but I can't understand how it doesn't imply this, without much wiggle room
I just don't see how. Per the psychopath example above. Perhaps i get the concept, but reject that it's workable?
Fair enough. But that does seem to be picking an arbitrary set of conditions to relate metaethical categories to.
Ok. That's fair. I don't understand why you would want moral facts, if they don't inform normative expressions.
I don't really have a problem with noting the essences of things, as I view it as a useful abstraction of entities in reality for the sole sake of analysis. — Bob Ross
I see the good as simply acts which promote sovereignty, unity, and harmony; and I acquire this by induction or perhaps abduction of acts themselves. So, sure, it is the essence of 'the good'. — Bob Ross
Non-essentialism doesn't suggest words have no meaning.It's sort of interesting how modern philosophy has attempted to do without essences, but really you can't do without them. Linguistically, words need to have meaning. — Leontiskos
Let’s tackle this by analogy — Bob Ross
There’s only one distinction which is valid. — Bob Ross
a much more reasonable moral realist approach would be to equate normative judgments with our ability to choose and let the moral facts be the categories of the good and bad — Bob Ross
Historically, it seems like humanities efforts at ‘the good’ converges at promoting harmony, sovereignty, and unity. Semantically, I think this is what “the good” is implying. — Bob Ross
Because I see the good, and I want to do good. I am not just, in this theory, projecting my own psychology onto others: I am striving towards the good. — Bob Ross
Non-essentialism doesn't suggest words have no meaning. — Hanover
I have fatigue and loss of energy? Am I depressed? — Hanover
Could this prescriptive definition not be universal? Might the way it's used vary by context, where I say I'm depressed just because I'm mildly upset, yet I don't meet this definition? — Hanover
The point is, use varies by context and users don't even require a single consistent attribute of a term to anchor its meaning. — Hanover
We talk about what things are like, not what they are, which is what an essence is. — Hanover
Okay, and I think the meaning of 'essence' has become confused or brittle, so that may be part of the problem. — Leontiskos
If something exists and is knowable, then it has a determinate form and, therefore, it has an essence. We can know essences to a greater or lesser degree. If clinical depression exists and is knowable, then it has an essence, and the definition from the DSM is attempting to set out that essence. The idea that some words have equivocal senses is an ignoratio elenchi, unrelated to the question of essentialism. — Leontiskos
Suppose that rather than things having essences, our minds recognize certain 'signatures' in things. Is there a good reasons to think that 'there are essences' is a better way of understanding things than, "our minds recognize patterns'? — wonderer1
I'm impressed to see ↪Bob Ross doing such a re-think of his ideas, this present version is quite an improvement on previous renditions. — Banno
And I'm not sure how it fits in with the topic. — Banno
It seems close to Moore's intuitionism. I don't see how induction could fit int he way Bob suggests; he seems to want a notion of evidential support, while rejecting naturalism, which I can't see working. — Banno
Trouble is, it's remarkably unclear what an essence might be; which is odd, considering every thing supposedly has one, and moreover it is in virtue of having one that each thing is what it is... — Banno
You probably want to ask how we know it is true, and my own answer is that it's a consequence of the hinge proposition that one ought so far as one can avoid causing suffering. — Banno
I see the good as simply acts which promote sovereignty, unity, and harmony; and I acquire this by induction or perhaps abduction of acts themselves. So, sure, it is the essence of 'the good'. — Bob Ross
It's a bit hard to get moderns to see what is meant by essences — Leontiskos
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