One wonders why. — Banno

Not this one.

And if it is not problematic, then please, set it out for us. — Banno

Essentialism is the idea that realities have determinate and knowable forms. — Leontiskos

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Added:

I mean, I spent a fair bit of time on this in past threads, including the thread containing the honey bee example given above ().

But we can ask a rather simple question. If someone believes that immorality pertains to the causing of suffering (), then must they not simultaneously hold that not-causing-suffering is part of the essence of morality? I think they must, and I think @Hanover would agree with me. It makes no sense to claim that morality has no essence and then to go on to claim that morality has to do with not causing suffering. You can call this an essential property of morality if you like.

So it would seem that not only are you an essentialist with respect to morality, but also that your essentialism is substantive insofar as Michael and Hanover (and Moore) disagree with you on precisely this point.

Essentialism is the idea that realities have determinate and knowable forms. — Leontiskos

Yeah. Not at all problematic.

must they not simultaneously hold that not-causing-suffering is part of the essence of morality? — Leontiskos

Why? As in, why must they consider the issue in terms of essence at all? What's the advantage?

Edit; meh. Too far off topic.

What's interesting here is that while @Hanover is an anti-essentialist and I am an essentialist, it seems to me that we would both agree that your position is essentialist (). It doesn't have to do with what you "consider the issue in terms of," but rather with what your position involves and entails. It strikes me as self-evident that someone can fall into a category without realizing that they fall into that category. Essentialism is a prime example, but another would be the folks around here who eschew metaphysics while simultaneously engaging in metaphysics.

I am curious to know whether @Hanover would see your position as essentialism, because there are various nuances to be had, but again, this is probably a topic for another thread. Something that we could come back to at a later date.

Perhaps you are wearing "essentialist" glasses, seeing everything only in those terms.

But we can ask a rather simple question. If someone believes that immorality pertains to the causing of suffering (↪Banno), then must they not simultaneously hold that not-causing-suffering is part of the essence of morality — Leontiskos

When you say "part of the essence of morality," are you envisioning (1) multiple essences that establish morality or are you envisioning (2) an essence having more elemental components. If #1, then you're saying that an evil act inherently includes causing-suffering and that it has additional inherent elements? If it does, what are they? If not, does it then just have accidental properties along with the essential properties? If #2, then you're arguing essences of essences, meaning if an evil act is essentially one that causes-harm, then we have to decide what the essence is of causes-harm is, right? Does this reduce to some sort of fundamental atomic essence that all things have? Would that be the pure form of morality we seek? If it is, then we need to stop talking about causes-harm as being the essence of morality, but we need to figure out what this deeply imbedded essence is that all moral acts have.

What I'm suggesting is that not-causing-harm is not the essence of morality. I can probably envision an instance where I must do harm to be moral, as in when self-defense becomes necessary. I'm also not committed to a consequentialism, which this line of thinking might entail, where you then complicate the matter by suggesting that morality is reducing-harm-to-the-greatest-number or some such.

By arguing essentialism, you just challenge my creativity, meaning you throw down a definition and then you ask me to come up with a counter-example to the definition. I (and you) can always find a counter-example, but that's not because we're so clever, but it's becasue essentialism is false. Words are just too flexible, and it is words that we're talking about. This says nothing about ontology or metaphysics. It just speaks about how we speak.

And don't get me wrong. I am a moral realist and have no difficulty talking metaphysics. I think an act is right or wrong, not subject to my subjective definitions or beliefs. What I don't think though, is that there is some special X that all moral acts must have to be moral. It's entirely possible that act A and act B are both moral, but they lack any similar ingredients.

As with my DSM psychological definition I provided, maybe to be moral we must have 25 of 8,000,000 possible ingredients. That would allow for thousands of moral acts to not share a single common ingredient, meaning we don't have any essential ingredient at all. And I'm not committed to 8,000,000. We may learn it's 8,000,001 upon further review.

Words are just too flexible — Hanover

Yep.

...but that's not because we're so clever, but it's becasue essentialism is false. — Hanover

I am asking whether you think Banno's claims commit him to essentialism, and secondarily, what you take essentialism to be.

What I don't think though, is that there is some special X that all moral acts must have to be moral. It's entirely possible that act A and act B are both moral, but they lack any similar ingredients.

As with my DSM psychological definition I provided, maybe to be moral we must have 25 of 8,000,000 possible ingredients. That would allow for thousands of moral acts to not share a single common ingredient, meaning we don't have any essential ingredient at all. And I'm not committed to 8,000,000. We may learn it's 8,000,001 upon further review. — Hanover

Okay thanks, that's clear enough. So you don't think there is anything that is a moral sine qua non. Presumably you also don't think moral or immoral acts necessarily have anything in common.

When you say "part of the essence of morality,"... — Hanover

What I meant is that apparently for @Banno if someone causes needless suffering then they are acting immorally. In thus establishing a sufficient condition for an immoral act, he has committed himself to a claim about what morality is, even if he has not defined morality in its entirety. He has a partial definition or a partial essence of morality.

When you say "part of the essence of morality," are you envisioning (1) multiple essences that establish morality or are you envisioning (2) an essence having more elemental components. — Hanover

Neither. If you were talking to Socrates you would give examples of immoral acts and he would complain that you need to instead give him the definition or account of morality, not mere examples. Banno, in giving a reason for his moral claim, involves himself in a particular account of morality. I am saying that, whether or not that account is complete or incomplete, it is an account.

Apparently you would tell Socrates that the things you call "moral" actually have nothing in common. "Moral" is just a word you use to group unlike things in a rather illogical way. Of course this isn't how language works. We don't group things under a single univocal concept if they do not have something in common.

By arguing essentialism, you just challenge my creativity, meaning you throw down a definition and then you ask me to come up with a counter-example to the definition. — Hanover

No, I think this misses it. For example:

What I'm suggesting is that not-causing-harm is not the essence of morality. I can probably envision an instance where I must do harm to be moral, as in when self-defense becomes necessary. — Hanover

In doing this you would merely be offering a counter-account, a counter-essence. In providing an alternative definition or understanding of morality you do not thereby sidestep essentialism. It is a strange caricature which says that essentialists don't argue about essences.

But the proximate question here is whether your idea of "25 of 8,000,000 possible ingredients" is essentialism. To be honest, I think the proportion is too miniscule to count as essentialism, but I also doubt that it captures morality. The other difficulty here is that properties are not necessarily discrete or quantitative, and if you actually attempted to follow such a program I think you would soon find significant commonalities among the 8,000,000 ingredients. You would find that Socrates was right after all.

Aquinas cites both the Digest of Justinian and Aristotle in defining morality (justice) as the rendering to each one his due (link). All such philosophers and jurists then go on to elaborate the implications of morality, but I think the definition is correct. So for example, if we treat someone in a way that they do not deserve to be treated, then we are acting immorally.

do not deserve — Leontiskos

On what basis, universally applicable, are we basing deserts on? Would this also apply to precluding a desert from a one?

We don't group things under a single univocal concept if they do not have something in common. — Leontiskos

Like "games"?

I think an act is right or wrong, not subject to my subjective definitions or beliefs. — Hanover

(not related to any foregoing discussion) Do you have a basis? Or is it more an intuition that there must be some basis, unknown or indescribable?

Hey Leontiskos, I perused the Thomist blog you linked to. I have a specific question on something I read there:

a person is "an individual substance of a rational nature" according to Boethius' classical definition. And an individual substance is a hypostasis or supposit. This is precisely what suppositum or hypostasis signifies: an individual substance.

I think the term 'individual substance' is rather odd, don't you? Shouldn't it be an individual being or an individual subject? This use of 'substance' is one of my gripes about philosophical terminology - I've often pointed out that it originates with the Latin translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia' as 'substantia', thence the English 'substance'. But 'substance' in ordinary usage means something utterly different to the philosophical 'substance'.

I'm sure those learned in Aquinas and philosophical terminology understand this distinction but it seems to me to result in a very unfortunate equivocation between the philosophical and ordinary meaning of the term, such that the meaning of the quoted passage really sounds decidedly odd.

Any thoughts on that?

I've often pointed out that it originates with the Latin translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia' as 'substantia', thence the English 'substance' — Wayfarer

For the 5th (fifth) time, English 'substance' comes from French 'substance'. You are not Greek or Latin, you will never be, that is not your history, you are French, monsieur.

Do you have a basis? Or is it more an intuition that there must be some basis, unknown or indescribable? — AmadeusD

This seems to be the generalized difficulty with moral theorizing. We take a number of examples of events, and we place them in either Column A - Moral or Column B- Immoral. We then try to figure out what principle distinguishes the two. Maybe you think utlitarianism or maybe you think Kantianism best explains why one goes into A and the other B. That theory then becomes helpful in deciding how to resolve an ethical dilemma where you don't know what to do. My guess is that few really do that, however. Most just go back to relying upon whatever instinct there was that caused the person to put events in A or B in the first place.

This would be similar to creating two columns in any instance. We might take a number of examples of objects and we place them in either Column A - Cups or Column B - Not Cups. We then arrive at a principle to distinguish the two so that when we get an odd shaped thing we can then determine if it's an A or B. Maybe that's what we'd do, or maybe we'd just instinctively just put the new object in a particular column like we did with the initial objects.

Inherent in this problem is that the gold standard for determining which column an event or object goes is in your sensation and assessment of that object. That means we start with our putting things in columns and then after the fact, we tell ourselves why we did it, when in fact we did not perform that analysis.

If, for example, I arrive at a theory for why events are moral and then I apply that theory to a specific event X and the theory says X is moral, but I don't agree with it, then I refuse to call it moral and I go back and tinker with my theory so that Xs no longer are computed as moral. That is, I have this ability to know right for wrong. That is what I think we mean by having a conscience. My theory for why things are right and wrong is just a rule of thumb, but ultimately, I can sense the difference between the two.

As to cups, I'd say the same thing. If I look at my Cups and Not Cups columns and I arrive at a theory that describes what goes in what column, and then I find out the object X is determind to be a cup, yet I think it not to be a cup, I don't just put it in the cup column, but I tinker with my theory so that Xs no longer are considered cups. That is, I have this ability to recognize cups. That is what I think we mean by having the abilty to understand (which results in categorization of things).

This isn't to say that moral assessment isn't subject to significant reasoning and sorting out the interests of all involved and in being empathetic and compassionate, but offering a meta-explanation for why those considerations should predominate I don't think can be done. Certain fundamental bases (to now directly answer your question) must just be accepted. That is, I can tell you why I judged something wrong, but I can't tell you the basis for my basis, and if you show me that my conclusion is flawed based upon how I should have assessed it, I don't think I'd necessarily reconsider because my basis was post hac.

Hanover/Moore's position that morality has no essence and yet moral claims are nevertheless meaningful seems to make no sense. — Leontiskos

Moore doesn't say that morality "has no essence" (whatever that means). Moore says that moral terms like "good" are undefinable. This contrasts with naturalist theories that claim that moral terms like "good" can be defined in one or more other terms, such as "pleasurable" or "healthy".

Most just go back to relying upon whatever instinct there was that caused the person to put events in A or B in the first place. — Hanover

I think this is what @Bob Ross is inadvertently relying on for his categories.

If, for example, I arrive at a theory for why events are moral and then I apply that theory to a specific event X and the theory says X is moral, but I don't agree with it, then I refuse to call it moral and I go back and tinker with my theory so that Xs no longer are computed as moral. — Hanover

Do you think this is roughly the standard for Philosophical discussions of morality?

I tend to bite the bullet and sit with the discomfort or reject the system and start again. Currently, that's happening a lot LOL

Do you think this is roughly the standard for Philosophical discussions of morality? — AmadeusD

How do you know that something is good or bad?

How do you know that something is good or bad? — Hanover

I'm not quite understanding the question as response to - my question - But i don't think I can know. I can just know whether something is comfortable or not. I can't rightly think that would entail it being good or bad.

I'm not quite understanding the question as response to - my question - — AmadeusD

My response to your question was shorthand. The full response, to be more clear, would be:

Yes, I do, but if it's not, how do you know that something is good or bad?

But i don't think I can know. I can just know whether something is comfortable or not. I can't rightly think that would entail it being good or bad. — AmadeusD

If you equate morality to comfort level, then why can't you say those things you're comfortable with are good or bad? For example, I would assume you think rape is a bad thing, can you not tell me that it is bad? If your answer is that you're uncomfortable with rape (sounds like an example of British understatement), but you're not sure if it's bad, then you'll have to define "bad" so that I know why your discomfort is not evidence of it.

For the 5th (fifth) time, English 'substance' comes from French 'substance'. You are not Greek or Latin, you will never be, that is not your history, you are French, monsieur. — Lionino

And for the fifth time, you'd be wrong.

The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things' — SEP- Substance

To hupokeimenon has an approximate Latin equivalent in substantia, “that which stands under.” Owing both to the close association of (prōtē) ousia and to hupokeimenon in Aristotle’s philosophy and to the absence of a suitable Latin equivalent of ousia (the closest analogue, essentia, a made-up Latin word formed in imitation of ousia, was used for another purpose), substantia became the customary Latin translation of the count noun (prōtē) ousia. — Encyc. Brittanica

Spinoza's Ethics, Latin edition, used the term 'substantia' in exactly this way. Descartes' texts were also originally published in Latin, prior to the French editions, and throughout them Descartes' use of the Latin term 'substantia' directly influenced the way his ideas were later translated and interpreted in other languages, including English. This term plays a critical role in understanding Descartes' philosophy, especially concerning his discussions on the nature of reality, existence, and the dualism of mind and body.

Which is where this whole discussion started in the first place, so with respect to your assertion that the philosophical term 'substance' originates with the French language and not the Latin, you are mistaken.

If you equate morality to comfort level — Hanover

I don't.

why can't you say those things you're comfortable with are good or bad? — Hanover

Because comfort is not a measure of good or bad unless achieving comfort is the aim. And, is it? Not for morality.

think rape is a bad thing — Hanover

I think it's very, very uncomfortable for me to consider.

you'll have to define "bad" so that I know why your discomfort is not evidence of it. — Hanover

No, I wouldn't. You'd need to define Bad in a way that includes someone's discomfort with an event being evidence of same. I simply don't see that as coherent.

Is rape bad?

If a person were raped, you couldn't tell them a bad thing happened to them?

Why is the word "bad" such a troubling word for you to define and why don't you (or do you) have such problems with other intangible concepts like justice, freedom, love, happiness, or things like that?

If a person were raped, you couldn't tell them a bad thing happened to them? — Hanover

I mean, I could, sure, and it would comport with a popular understanding. But, in a philosophical discussion I'm unsure how to note that rape is bad. It seems deontologically impermissible? But I'm not a deontologist. I don't think 'bad' has a definition. I don't think its possible, without already defining Bad per your choice of ethical system, for anything to be in that category - so, it's an apprehension not a rejection to be clear.

I have serious problems with all of those concepts. They are useful, and heuristically I use them (it would be pretty dishonest to claim otherwise) but they are approximations for every-day use. When it comes down to it, I simply don't know what constitutes those things in real-life, as it were.

I hear you. My own take is that we can say certain actions are 'bad' in a contingent sense - the flourishing of conscious creatures is important to most humans, particularly within intersubjective communities which share values and beliefs. We all tend to agree that killing babies or sexual assault is 'wrong' and this seems largely hard wired into us by experince as a social species (empathy) that seems to be born to nurture and teach. But we also know that killing children and sexual assault are some of the earliest actions which happen in wars and clashes between cultures. Someone is always expendable and not completely human if they are seen as not belonging to the tribe.

We went through this exact argument before, and I have to repeat it over and over.

Firstly, even though their claims are accurate, the SEP and Encyclopaedia Britannica are not authorities in either Greek or Latin, far from that.

The SEP quote you gave says "substance" corresponds in meaning to ousía, the meaning is transmitted through Latin because Latin adapted the word from Greek; it does not mean English comes from Latin, because it does not.

There is no word 'substance' in Latin, where does the word 'substance' exist? In French, because that is where it comes from.

Oxford Languages dictionary on Google shows the etymology. You are wrong:



It is from French just as much as the sky is blue and 2+2=4.

The point about hypokeimenon (not hupo-) is completely unrelated. Besides, Latin substantia is inspired off ὑπόστασις, not off ὑποκείμενον, ὑποκείμενον is a participial adjective, substantia and ὑπόστασις are deverbal nouns. That ὑποκείμενον matches substantia in meaning is tangential. You have no clue about any of this.

Which is where this whole discussion started in the first place, so with respect to your assertion that the philosophical term 'substance' originates with the French language and not the Latin, you are mistaken. — Wayfarer

That is most bizarre. You bring up Spinoza, a Portuguese Jew, and Descartes, a Frenchman, neither of whom knew English, to validate the categorically wrong claim that the word 'substance', pronounced sΛbstæns, comes from Latin. It is completely unrelated.

You understand that half of English's vocabulary is French, right? That Roman influence in Britain was negligible, right?

Romans conquered Britain, saw it as a mostly worthless colony, and retreated from it before they completed 400 years there, 200 years before any meaningful Germanic population settled there. There is no Roman heritage; and if any, it was transmitted by the Bretons (modern Welsh). There is plenty of French heritage however, because they ruled England for 200 years, and French rulers were on the English throne for longer than Romans in Britains (over 400 years).

And so, having reformed the army quite in the manner of a monarch, he (Hadrian) set out for Britain, and there he corrected many abuses and was the first to construct a wall, eighty miles in length, which was to separate the barbarians from the Romans. — Historia Augusta

:ok:

I am more than happy to note my position is fairly counterintuitive, and it is supposed to be. I do act my intuitions in real life (such as "rape is wrong" .. which is even stronger than "rape is bad"). I just can't really justify them to myself very well except by way of "im uncomfortable, adn I don't like that".

I stand by the sources I quoted. I am talking specifically of the philosophical use of 'substance'. Spinoza and Descartes initially published in Latin, and 'substantia', as the Encyclopedia Brittanica notes, was a neologism coined to translated 'ouisia'. The use of 'substance' to denote 'any kind of corporeal matter of stuff' is attested from 14th c (source) It too is originally derived from the Latin. Sure it might have also come in via French but as noted Latin was the lingua franca of philosophy up until and including Descartes. The historical roots of English have nothing to do it.

Your continued bluster misses the point of the egregious conflation between the philosophical and everyday use of the term. The passage I asked @Leontiskos to comment on was from a learned blog he linked to on Thomist philosophy.

a person is "an individual substance of a rational nature" according to Boethius' classical definition. And an individual substance is a hypostasis or supposit. This is precisely what suppositum or hypostasis signifies: an individual substance.

I've always felt that this use of 'substance' is the source of confusion in philosophy. If it is re-written like so:

a person is "an individual being of a rational nature" according to Boethius' classical definition. And an individual being is a hypostasis or supposit. This is precisely what suppositum or hypostasis signifies: an individual being.

Which is not right, either, but nevertheless conveys the original idea of 'ousia' better than 'substance'. After all, we have learned an astonishing number of things about material substance: the periodic table, the standard model of physics, the list is endless. What do we know of 'spiritual substance?' Why, it's a mere fiction, a hangover from medieval theology, the ghost in the machine. That's the substantive point. ;-)

Spinoza and Descartes initially published in Latin, and 'substantia', as the Encyclopedia Brittanica notes, was a neologism coined to translated 'ouisia' — Wayfarer

These two are separated by 1500 years, and Descartes published his works in French too, which word did he use? Substance.

The use of 'substance' to denote 'any kind of corporeal matter of stuff' is attested from 14th c (source) It too is originally derived from the Latin. — Wayfarer

1 – Etymonline is not a reliable source.
2 – Etymonline itself says the word comes from Old French (like most non-basic English words).
3 — Even etymonline itself points that the word already had the philosophical meaning in Old French, it was not coined in the 14th century. What it is saying is that the word substance in English is first seen with that meaning in the 14th century.

The word substantia already had the philosophical meaning and the "matter" meaning you are talking about since Augustinian times. Old French substance also had the philosophical meaning.

Sure it might have also come in via French but as noted Latin was the lingua franca of philosophy up until and including Descartes. The historical roots of English have nothing to do it. — Wayfarer

There is no "also" and there is no "via". It comes from French, it is a French word.
That was also addressed before:

English substance comes from French and it matches usía in meaning likely because of the way the equivalent word in other languages has been used in European philosophy. — Lionino

Because someone teaches you to use a word in a certain way, it does not mean that word comes from there.

That's the substantive point. — Wayfarer

Wonderful French word, mon Seigneur français.

English substance comes from French and it matches usía in meaning likely because of the way the equivalent word in other languages has been used in European philosophy. — Lionino

That contradicts the sources cited, so I will say for the final time, you are mistaken.

anything to contribute about the actual question? The reification of Being? Or are you preoccupied with picking nits?

But, in a philosophical discussion I'm unsure how to note that rape is bad. I/quote] If you can't say that rape is bad in a philosophical discussion, it would seem you would want to steer clear of philosophical discussion and reside in places where that is unequivocally bad. — AmadeusD

suffice to say it’s difficult to know what you’re trying to say other than “I’m convinced rape is objectively bad”

So idk man. Maybe the reverse is the case - if you’re that convinced, you should be able to convince me. If not, maybe you’re not being honest


Also, in b4 the Dingi turn up: Yes, i have been rape. That is why I am not in the least bit troubled by having this conversation.