I would say the most compelling reason to be a physicalist is methodological and not ontological. We simply have only one valid methodological approach: naturalism.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. Likewise, it seems, historically speaking, that we assume something we don't understand is supernatural and then learn later it is perfectly natural--which I think counts in favor of methodological naturalism. — Bob Ross

But Berkeley paired empiricism and idealism. Augustine advised methodological naturalism in that he advised people to look first for natural causes before claiming miracles. Augustine was a hardcore idealist like most intellectuals of his day.

The Platonic concept of Body/Soul integrity, as a harmonious interaction, is new to me.

Just to clarify though, the body/soul - instrument/harmony analogy is Pythagorean, not Platonic. Plato has Socrates argue against the analogy in the Phaedo. It's in the context of Plato's arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. Plato doesn't like the analogy because it would imply that the soul (harmony) must disappear when the body (instrument) is destroyed.

I would say the most compelling reason to be a physicalist is methodological and not ontological. We simply have only one valid methodological approach: naturalism.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. Likewise, it seems, historically speaking, that we assume something we don't understand is supernatural and then learn later it is perfectly natural--which I think counts in favor of methodological naturalism. — Bob Ross

My thoughts exactly. Though Frank raises good counter-examples.

I don't think the direction this thread is headed is of much help in understanding physicalism, so I had walked away, but I will make a few comments by way of responding to you directly.

I don't think emergence can be well understood in either casual or evolutionary terms, but that rather it might better be understood as a different way of talking about something. See this post. — Banno

I saw that. I tend to agree with the general thrust. We can discuss that in greater detail if you want to.

Originally, I became interested in this thread by Christoffer's first post, which reminded me very much of the reasoning behind my own methodological naturalist bent. I adopted that underlying method a very long time ago, and it was key to me 'shedding' much of the beliefs and 'reasoning' behind them that I adopted between the age of 4 and teenage years... whew, talk about hard work!

However, if my own grasp of his subsequent posts was accurate enough to be indicative, it seems our agreement was limited to preferring methodological naturalism as a philosophical method of approach.

The argument that some things are physical, monism is true, and hence physicalism is true is enticing, but I do not believe all things are physical even though I find it most likely that those things are existentially dependent upon physical things.

But it's not clear to me from what you have said, whether you accept or reject a preference for monolithic explanations.

That makes two of us! :wink: It's not clear to me either.

SO I'm not at all sure where this leaves us.

Earlier you mentioned anomalous monism, which - if you're referring to Davidson - I have been wanting to understand his notion. Although I've watched and listened to several videos of Davidson regarding that, I do not have a good grasp of it at this time, although I do remember finding the notion very interesting, and a bit compelling. I want to review, listen, and watch again in the near future.

Searle's stuff seems relevant too... regarding emergent things(obligation for instance).

I'm not sure where this leaves us either, but if you have something in mind that you'd like to discuss, I'd be glad to join you.

Mahalo!

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. The main issue in the context of the discussion of physicalism is the emphasis on objects and objectivity, and also on what is measurable. The basis of scientific method is the identification of the measurable attributes of objects. That is what has been referred to as the 'supremacy of quantity'. Whereas states of being are qualitative by nature - they're characterised by feeling (among other things).That is the whole 'hard problem' issue in a nutshell. I don't think it is unclear. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I understand that that's how you talk about this stuff. I understand that I'm in the minority as well. So, sure... they are perfectly intelligible. People use them all the time. I'm just saying that it seems to me that the subject/object and subjective/objective distinctions, despite their popularity, look like a big part of the problem from my vantage point.

Not everything fits into one or the other category. Cognition, metacognition, meaning, truth, social institutions, and other things quite simply are neither one nor the other. Many things consist of and/or are existentially dependent upon both, and thus are neither. That is the problem I see with those language constructs, in a nutshell. The inherent inadequacy of the linguistic framework to be able to take proper account of such things.

Not everything fits into one or the other category. Cognition, metacognition, meaning, truth, social institutions, and other things quite simply are neither one nor the other. — creativesoul

Right! Agree with that also. They transcend the subject-object distinction.

I do not know what transcending a language construct could possibly mean.

If you reject the subjective/objective dichotomy the hard problem looks very different.

.

Plato has Socrates argue against the analogy in the Phaedo. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In order not to get too far off topic I will only say that Plato also gives us reason to doubt the argument provided.

Just to clarify though, the body/soul - instrument/harmony analogy is Pythagorean, not Platonic. Plato has Socrates argue against the analogy in the Phaedo. It's in the context of Plato's arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. Plato doesn't like the analogy because it would imply that the soul (harmony) must disappear when the body (instrument) is destroyed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks. But it's a useful metaphor anyway. I may have to disagree with Plato though, on the immortality of the Soul. I tend to think of it, not as a ghost, but as the immaterial (mental ; metaphorical) Self-Concept/Personality of a self-conscious being/body*1. Hence, they are harmonious in the sense of an abstract/concrete duet. But when the concrete aspect dies, the duet does not automatically become a perpetual solo, but perhaps could "exist" as a vague memory in another mind. Besides, how could that which was never visible "disappear", like the fictional Cheshire cat? On this topic, you could classify my compromised position as a Physicalist/Metaphysicalist or Realist/Idealist duet. Not exactly Strong Emergence, but co-existence.

On the other hand, I do agree with Plato that a hypothetical First Cause/Logos must have logically existed, in some abstract or metaphysical sense, outside of space-time and all secondary causes. Hence, eternal. That's because, according to expert cosmologists, our space-time world is not eternal, but somehow suddenly emerged from unreality into reality. Unfortunately, I have no way of knowing what ideal eternal existence would be like (Nagel).

As an amateur philosopher though, I can use mind-made words to represent unreal concepts such as Zero, Infinity, Eternity, and Soul. Likewise, words like "God" can point-toward an imaginary eternal Mind that continually imagines (sustains) our own Reality. Sadly, such self-reference boggles the mortal mind, and can lead to circular thinking.

The human intellect has imagined a variety of immaterial abstractions --- e.g. numbers ; metaphors --- that seem to be logically necessary or philosophically useful. Such non-things may be figments of imagination, but they are "persistent illusions" for philosophical thinkers. So I take them seriously, as challenges to any hardline physicalist worldview. :smile:


*1. Soul/Body and Mind/Body pairs "exist" in different senses. Life, Mind & Soul/Self are subjective processes/activities, not objective things. For example, when the engine of a car dies, its transportation function (process) dies with it. Yet, a physical machine can be repaired and restored to its proper function. But AFAIK, a "disappeared" Life/Mind has never been resurrected --- except of course as an ongoing metaphor/belief in other body/minds.

If your point is that people with views which do not impede some areas of their naturalistic investigations can still contribute to our knowledge even if those views cannot, then I totally agree.

If your point is that people with views which do not impede some areas of their naturalistic investigations can still contribute to our knowledge even if those views cannot, then I totally agree. — Bob Ross

My point was that physicalism isn't entailed by empiricism and naturalism.

The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter. — Fooloso4

A lyre that is not in tune cannot play a tune in tune. The harmony is not what is played on the lyre it is the condition of the lyre, the proper tension of the strings in ratio to each other that allow it to play in harmony. A body that is not in tune cannot function properly. When it is far enough out of tune it cannot function at all. — Fooloso4

Simmias says, 85e-86d:

One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed... — Plato, Phaedo

Socrates' refutation of 'the soul is a harmony' (92-94) consists of three distinct arguments. Each one argues a slightly different principle. Each argument is aimed against the idea that the soul is a composite thing, it is composed from the elements of the body coexisting in a specific tension, resulting in a "harmony". From the elements of the body, the harmony is composed last, and first destroyed in corruption of the instrument. In modern terms we might consider this "harmony" to be a balanced state of existence, or equilibrium, of the composite material parts.

The first and third argument attack the fact that the harmony is posterior to the bodily composition which produces it, yet common understanding of "the soul" puts the soul as prior to the bodily composition. These are simple arguments but rely on the common notion of "the soul" for their effectiveness. That is what Foolos4 rejects with "The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter." But this dismissal is unacceptable because proposing that the soul is a harmony, already in itself, as a primary proposition, assumes this body/soul separation, as "the harmony" is expressed as something distinct from the material body which produces it (described by Simmias above). So this rejection would only be acceptable if we remove the primary proposition 'the soul is a harmony', but then there is nothing to argue. The point to argue might then be 'there is no soul'. But Socrates' argument is against the Pythagorean position that 'the soul is a harmony'. So it is the Pythagoreans who have already framed the argument in this way.

The second argument is more complex and difficult, involving the difference between "equilibrium" (as the harmonized state), and "equality", as what all equilibriums might have in common. The argument seems to be that a harmony is an equilibrium, and all physically existing equilibriums partake of varying degrees of equality. That would dictate their stability. The soul on the other hand is more like "equality" itself, that which all equilibriums have in common, as an order state of being.

So in the first argument, Socrates appeals to another principle, 'knowledge is recollection' and shows how this is inconsistent with 'the soul is a harmony'. Knowledge is a property of the soul, so if the knowledge which an individual will have, pre-exists the person's bodily existence, then so does the soul. This is inconsistent with the soul being a harmony which arises from the well-tuned elements of the body. In modern terms we can think of the preexisting knowledge as innate knowledge, intuition and instinct, knowledge which is supported by genetics and DNA. If this is a type of knowledge which an individual has, and knowledge is the property of a person's soul, then the person's soul must precede the person's body.


The second argument concerns the various degrees of tuning which are possible. We can say that an instrument is better tuned or worse tuned depending on the amount of dissonance inherent within the harmony produced. Each bit of dissonance which exists within the harmony is a degree of unharmony. Since a harmony is never absolutely perfect, there is always various degrees of dissonance within the occurring harmony itself, and this is a case of the opposite of the thing, occurring, or inherent within, the named thing, Due to a lack of perfection, there is always some degree of 'not-harmony' within the harmony. As analogy we could consider instances of "hot". Each hot thing still has some degree of cold inherent within it, unless it is the absolute hottest possible thing.

If the soul was like this, admitting to various degrees of "soulness", harmony and dissonance, then we'd have to say that an evil person has less of a soul than a good person. But this is not the case, we say that all souls are equal, as souls, and the evil person has no less of a soul than the good person. Furthermore, all the living creatures are equal in the sense of having "a soul", and despite the vast variety of difference that we notice amongst the living creatures, one is not more in tune than the other, as is the case with the difference between harmonies, one having more dissonance than another. All the souls of living creatures are equal, as souls.

The third point is that the soul is said to rule the various part of the body, making them do, at times, what is contrary to their very nature. If a man is hot and thirsty yet the water is known to be bad, the soul prevents the man from drinking. Likewise with food. If the soul was a harmony, it could do nothing but follow the plucking of the strings, the soul would be directed by the affections of the body, following them, never being in opposition. But this is not the case, we see that men, with the power of will, are capable of inflicting all sorts of punishments on their bodies in many different ways, directing the parts in ways very contrary to the nature of the part. It is impossible that a harmony could do this, directing the activities of the composite parts of the lyre, as this would alter the tuning, corrupting the harmony which is "the harmony"'s very existence.

In order not to get too far off topic I will only say that Plato also gives us reason to doubt the argument provided. — Fooloso4

Can you show me the reasons given by Plato, to doubt the arguments presented by Socrates, as paraphrased above.

Can you show me the reasons given by Plato, to doubt the arguments presented by Socrates, as paraphrased above. — Metaphysician Undercover

Short answer begins here

A more adequate long answer here

It is clear from that thread that you disagree with my interpretation. If you wish to pursue this further please reopen that thread or begin a new one.

Phaedo is one of my favorite philosophical works. I also disagree with your interpretation, and indeed your whole take on Plato. But there's always room for diverse views. It creates dynamism in discussions.

But there's always room for diverse views. It creates dynamism in discussions. — frank

Yes, it does. But out of respect for your present thread on physicalism I am trying to not veer too far off topic with a discussion of Phaedo and the problem of interpreting Plato in this thread.

Yes, it does. But out of respect for your present thread on physicalism I am trying to not veer too far off topic with a discussion of Phaedo and the problem of interpreting Plato in this thread. — Fooloso4

Thank you.

Agreed. I never meant to the contrary. My original post was supporting methodological naturalism, not physicalism.

I do not know what transcending a language construct could possibly mean. — creativesoul

I can't speak for , but I doubt he means to go beyond human limits into the realm of divine omniscience. Instead, perhaps we can "transcend" a common dictionary meaning of a word, simply by looking at its context from a different perspective. Philosophers do that all the time. For example, Nagel transcended the commonsense notion of human-animal differences (ensoulment) by asking us to imagine that we see the world from that animal's perspective. That's how we can "know" the mind of a bat. It's called a subjective "thought experiment" as contrasted with an objective "empirical" experience. :smile:

If you reject the subjective/objective dichotomy the hard problem looks very different. — creativesoul

Yes, but. Gods are supposed to be above the subjective/objective limitations of humans. So, for omniscient-objective divine beings there is no "hard problem" of the relationship between body & mind. Therefore, to be completely objective, you would have to "know the mind of god"*1.

Empirical Science aspires to complete objectivity, by "rejecting" personal values & opinions in favor of directly observed & recorded Facts. Unfortunately, it's not that easy. A double-blind experiment would, in theory, reveal the "mind of god" on the problem in question. Yet, in practice, one man's Fact is another man's opinion*2.

Consequently, Empirical Science gets the "easy" questions, that have simple singular factual answers : it is or it ain't. But, it leaves the messy, value-laden questions to argumentative Philosophy : says who?. Hence, science may be the court of last resort for questions of objective Facts, but not for Subjective Meanings.The worldview of Physicalism is not a "hard" physical fact, but a "moot" metaphysical opinion*3. Hence, this thread. :cool:


*1.a. A. Einstein :
"I want to know how God created this world. I'm not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts; the rest are just details."
*1.b. S. Hawking :
" If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we would know the mind of God."

*2. Why science isn’t objective :
We think of science as being an objective account of the world, free from the influence of political and other biases. But things aren’t that simple. Evidence alone doesn’t tell you when you’ve had enough evidence to support a claim, so scientists sometimes have to make judgements that rely on ethical and political values. This realisation shatters our understanding of scientific objectivity as value-free.
https://iai.tv/articles/why-science-isnt-objective-auid-1846

*3. Metaphysical Physicalism :
In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism
Note --- Only God would know "everything". Which is why religions turn to their gods, instead of to scientists, for answers to "hard" questions about universal facts & absolute values. Yet, philosophers put their trust in human reasoning to obtain approximate answers to "value" questions.

Agreed. I never meant to the contrary. My original post was supporting methodological naturalism, not physicalism. — Bob Ross

Oh, I see. I thought you were saying they're the same.

Short answer begins here

A more adequate long answer here

It is clear from that thread that you disagree with my interpretation. If you wish to pursue this further please reopen that thread or begin a new one. — Fooloso4

Your quoted passages in the "short answer" are all before 92 in the text, which is where the argument against 'the soul is a harmony begins'. The issue I am addressing here is not whether Socrates provides a good argument for the immortality of the soul, as presented in the The Phaedo. Neither is the issue whether Plato believes that he or Socrates has provided a good argument for the immortality of the soul. The issue discussed here is whether or not Socrates provides a good argument against the theory 'the soul is a harmony'.

This position, 'the soul is a harmony' is very much similar to the modern physicalist position which apprehends ideas, concepts, mind and consciousness in general, as something distinct from the physical body (as the harmony is distinct from the lyre), but insists that these are dependent on the physical body as properties of it, or emergent from it, like the harmony is dependent on the lyre.

I believe Plato provides a very good refutation of this theory 'the soul is a harmony'. Regardless of what you think abut Socrates' arguments for the immortality of the soul, do you agree with me that the refutation of this theory is a sound one? If not, why not?

Your quoted passages in the "short answer" are all before 92 in the text, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where it begins. Reading Plato as if the dialogues are reasoned arguments surrounded by extraneous filler is a mistake. Most recent scholars have come to this conclusion.

Once again:

If you wish to pursue this further please reopen that thread or begin a new one. — Fooloso4

I think this too clean.

I'm uncertain about essential rocks, properties of universal -isms, and processes by which we come to think of universals.

Scientism, at least in a useful expression, should be understood as a mistake. Not many would say they are scientistic, though they exist. What it really means isn't clear, and so we can't reduce it to a notion of empiricism vs. philosophical knowledge. It's not that easy. Where it is easy is in saying things like science makes philosophy or religion or art or whatever no longer relevant -- scientism is more of a chauvinism than it is a proper philosophic position.

So I suppose I mean to say that it's worth noting as a bad way to go about arguing for physicalism.

This position, 'the soul is a harmony' is very much similar to the modern physicalist position which apprehends ideas, concepts, mind and consciousness in general, as something distinct from the physical body (as the harmony is distinct from the lyre), but insists that these are dependent on the physical body as properties of it, or emergent from it, like the harmony is dependent on the lyre. — Metaphysician Undercover

Beautifully said! :pray:

I'll add this:

Neuroscientists usually investigate one brain at a time. They observe how neurons fire as a person reads certain words, for example, or plays a video game. As social animals, however, those same scientists do much of their work together—brainstorming hypotheses, puzzling over problems and fine-tuning experimental designs. Increasingly, researchers are bringing that reality into how they study brains.

Collective neuroscience, as some practitioners call it, is a rapidly growing field of research. An early, consistent finding is that when people converse or share an experience, their brain waves synchronize. Neurons in corresponding locations of the different brains fire at the same time, creating matching patterns, like dancers moving together. Auditory and visual areas respond to shape, sound and movement in similar ways, whereas higher-order brain areas seem to behave similarly during more challenging tasks such as making meaning out of something seen or heard. The experience of “being on the same wavelength” as another person is real, and it is visible in the activity of the brain.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-waves-synchronize-when-people-interact

Since you did not answer the question, I take it you agree with me then. The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.

My apologies for the continued derailment, but since MU is insistent and refuses to move this to another thread I will respond here.

The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that the argument that begins:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.

(92a)

and goes on to ask:

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.

(92c)

provides the foundation for "a very good refutation".

But you want to ignore this:

Regardless of what you think abut Socrates' arguments for the immortality of the soul — Metaphysician Undercover

and evaluate the arguments by ignoring the premise on which they rest.

The first refutation:

“So it is natural for an attunement not to lead the elements it is composed of, but to follow them.” (93a)

An attunement does not lead or follow the elements. The attunement is the condition of those elements. For the lyre this means the proper tension of the strings. For a person this means being healthy. The limits of the analogy are obvious, a lyre cannot tune itself. But we can act to maintain or improve our mental and physical health.

Socrates then resorts to a bit of sophistry:

“Now does this also apply to the soul so that, however slightly, one soul is more what it is than another? Is it more and to a greater extent, or less and to a lesser extent, a soul?”

(93b)

A lesser attunement is still an attunement. One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul.

“Now, what will any of those who assert that the soul is an attunement say that these things, virtue and the vice, in our souls are?

(93c)

They are like health and sickness, well tuned or poorly tuned, and in harmony or out of harmony.

And, being neither more nor less an attunement, it is neither more nor less attuned. Is this the case?

(93d)

No, that is not the case. It is well tuned or poorly tuned, and this allows for degrees.

What about this?” he asked. “Of all the elements in a person, is there anything else that rules, according to you, except soul, especially if it also possesses understanding?

(94b)

This is deliberately misleading. On the premise that the soul is an attunement then it is not one element of the attunement that rules, but rather the relation between those elements, the ratio and harmony of those elements that rules. When the person is well tuned, balanced and in harmony, he or she will rule themselves well, and if not then poorly.

Now, do you think he [Homer] wrote this in the belief that soul is an attunement, the sort of thing which is led by the affections of the body, rather than leading them and dominating them, as it is a far more divine entity than any attunement?

(94e)

This begs the question. Socrates treats the soul and body as two separate and different things, the very thing the attunement argument denies. The passage from Homer is about Odysseus controlling his anger. Where is anger located within this separation? Is it an affection of the body or the soul? According to the division set in the Republic the source is the spirited part of the soul not the body.
If Odysseus is his soul then the example is not about being led by the affections of the body.

The arguments fail. In the middle of them, and in fact at the numerical center or heart of the dialogue Socrates raises the problem of misologic, that is, a hatred of reasoned argument that arises from an excessive love and unreasonable expectation of what reason can accomplish (89d). This is prefaced by Echecrates:

What argument shall we ever trust now?

(88d)

Earlier Socrates warned:

Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently.

(84c)

Certainly, when one goes through the arguments sufficiently, it becomes clear why we should not accept them.

Your entire argument seems to be centered around a misinterpretation of the theory, "the soul is a harmony". Clearly, the "harmony", or what you are calling "attunement" is something distinct from the material instrument itself. That is very clearly expressed by Simmias in the passage I quoted.

Simmias says, 85e-86d:
One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed...
— Plato, Phaedo — Metaphysician Undercover

You might continue to insist that the "attunement" is not something distinct from the instrument, but clearly Plato's arguments are directed against the idea of a "harmony" as such. And, the harmony exists as something separate from the instrument, as produced from the instrument. This is clearly the idea that Plato argues against, and is more consistent with modern physicalism. Your use of "attunement" only creates ambiguity between "attunement" as the general principles by which an instrument is tuned, and "attunement" as a specific condition of a particular instrument.

My apologies for the continued derailment, but since MU is insistent and refuses to move this to another thread I will respond here.

The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that the argument that begins:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.
(92a)

and goes on to ask:

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.
(92c)

provides the foundation for "a very good refutation". — Fooloso4

OK, so you dismiss the first of the three arguments, because you do not believe in the theory of recollection. This theory is meant to account for the reality of the innate knowledge which a person is born with, the capacity to learn, intuition, and instinct.

Are you saying that this type of know-how does not qualify as "knowledge", or does not even exist? Or what is the basis of your rejection of the knowledge that a person is born with, knowledge which a person has, which precedes the existence of one's body, so that the person is born with it?

An attunement does not lead or follow the elements. The attunement is the condition of those elements. For the lyre this means the proper tension of the strings. For a person this means being healthy. The limits of the analogy are obvious, a lyre cannot tune itself. But we can act to maintain or improve our mental and physical health. — Fooloso4

Clearly, the lyre exists prior to being tuned, therefore the attunement follows the elements of the physical composition. And' the harmony follows from the attunement. The very fact which you cite, that a person can act to improve one's health, or improve the attunement, demonstrates that the attunement is posterior to the physical body. That the attunement of the instrument, and therefore the harmony, is most readily changed is the reason why it is last coming into being in generation of the instrument, and the first thing lost in the corruption of the instrument.

The theory, "the soul is a harmony", as expressed by Simmias, very explicitly states that the harmony is something distinct from the physical instrument, strings and wood. And, the harmony, as something distinct, is produced from the instrument.

Socrates then resorts to a bit of sophistry:

“Now does this also apply to the soul so that, however slightly, one soul is more what it is than another? Is it more and to a greater extent, or less and to a lesser extent, a soul?”
(93b)

A lesser attunement is still an attunement. One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul.

“Now, what will any of those who assert that the soul is an attunement say that these things, virtue and the vice, in our souls are?
(93c)

They are like health and sickness, well tuned or poorly tuned, and in harmony or out of harmony.

And, being neither more nor less an attunement, it is neither more nor less attuned. Is this the case?
(93d)

No, that is not the case. It is well tuned or poorly tuned, and this allows for degrees. — Fooloso4

Plato's argument is not sophistry, it is just complex and difficult to grasp. You demonstrate a misunderstanding of it, and that's why you call it sophistry. Your dismissal of it is what is really sophistry. Look.

First, do you recognize that it is the bodily instrument which is either well tuned or poorly tuned? Therefore you cannot say "both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul" to be consistent with the argument, because the body is analogous to the instrument, and is what is tuned; it is not the soul which is tuned. That is your bit of sophistry. In the theory "the soul is a harmony", the soul follows from the body, like harmony follows from the instrument according to the attunement. This is just like in modern physicalism, mind follows from body, and concepts follow from the mind. Remember the statement by Simmias which expresses the theory that the soul, is a harmony. The harmony itself is invisible, without body.

Next, do you agree that if the instrument is not well tuned there will be some degree of dissonance, and that dissonance is inconsistent with harmony? And, since there is a multitude of strings, some may be in harmony and others dissonant. Therefore the same instrument may produce some harmony and also some dissonance at the same time, depending on the tuning. But "soul" by the theory, can only be harmony, it cannot be dissonance.

Now, the problem which Plato elucidates. The same soul can have degrees of both goodness and evilness at the same time due to the various elements within, just like the tuned instrument can have harmony and dissonance at the same time. However, according to the theory, the soul can only be harmony. Dissonance is contrary to harmony which is, "soul", and the soul cannot consist of aspects of 'nonsoul'. Therefore the theory must be wrong, the soul is not like a harmony, it also has dissonance as well.

This is deliberately misleading. On the premise that the soul is an attunement then it is not one element of the attunement that rules, but rather the relation between those elements, the ratio and harmony of those elements that rules. When the person is well tuned, balanced and in harmony, he or she will rule themselves well, and if not then poorly. — Fooloso4

You seem to misunderstand this argument too. The premise "the soul rules" is proposed as a true proposition, validated by the evidence explained. And, it is specifically proposed as inconsistent with "the soul is a harmony". There is nothing deliberately misleading here.

So you point out the inconsistency between the two ("the soul rules" and "the soul is a harmony"). However, since "the soul rules" is demonstrated to be a true premise by the evidence given, then logically we must reject the inconsistent premise "the soul is a harmony", which is proposed as an hypothesis rather than supported by evidence.

This begs the question. Socrates treats the soul and body as two separate and different things, the very thing the attunement argument denies. — Fooloso4

This is not true, it's clearly misinterpretation. The "harmony", or what you call the "attunement", is explicitly stated as something distinct from the instrument. Refer to the passage quoted above, what is stated by Simmias.

The passage from Homer is about Odysseus controlling his anger. Where is anger located within this separation? Is it an affection of the body or the soul? According to the division set in the Republic the source is the spirited part of the soul not the body.
If Odysseus is his soul then the example is not about being led by the affections of the body. — Fooloso4

The "spirited part" is the third part, the medium between body and mind. It is not the source of anything, only the medium between, which may act with one or the other. Either the the source is the mind, if the soul is healthy, or the body is the source if the mind is ill. So "anger" is good and healthy when the mind is exercising control over the body, and "anger" is bad and unhealthy when the body has affected the mind. Therefore your objection here has no relevance.

Certainly, when one goes through the arguments sufficiently, it becomes clear why we should not accept them. — Fooloso4

It has become very clear why you reject the arguments. You straw man them. You do not represent "harmony" as something invisible without body, which follows form the attuned instrument, as clearly stated in the text. Instead, you claim that the "attunement" is a part of the body of the instrument.

If we were discussing the "attunement", then we'd have to consider the intentions involved in the act of tuning, which produces the attunement. This would involve the complete design and manufacture of the instrument to ensure proper tuning. All that intention involved is prior to the manufacture of the instrument, and the tuning of it. If we were to represent "the soul" as the creator of the instrument, in this way, then the argument would be completely different. However, it is very clear that Plato is arguing against "the soul" as hypothesized to be something which follows from the body, as "the harmony" follows from the instrument.

A thought in support of physicalism with respect to the mind-body problem: there are physical processes which relate with mind, at least with respect to an individual. Sugar is an ever-present need for a functioning brain, and it has to be in the right amounts or a person begins to lose awareness in various ways whether it's too much or too little. Our individual capacity to engage in minded activities seems to have so many bodily fragilities that the connection between them is hard to deny. I think it's for this reason that we are tempted to believe in physicalism of the mind: just what else would the mind be other than physical if we already know of all these other processes which we'd call physical which have causal relationships to what we'd call mind?

I like that, although it's not a slam dunk for physicalism. It's an excellent expression of the physicalist vibe.

I guess I particularly appreciate it because I've gone back to reading Nietzsche. He has to be taken the same way. None of it amounts to a rigorous argument, but it's more like the truth you find in poetry or maybe even music.

Right. It's the rigorous argument part that makes physicalism difficult, and I erased many paragraphs which had all the caveats expressed because I wanted to hone the thought down to something that was actually in support and not hedged. That seems to be the reason I'm tempted, but it's the part where you try to be rigorous that makes me begin to doubt physicalism.