Is rape bad? — Hanover

Does the word "bad" mean something that isn't already covered by words like "cruel", "harmful", "disgusting", "despicable", etc.?

Does the word "bad" mean something that isn't already covered by words like "cruel", "harmful", "disgusting", "despicable", etc.? — Michael

All those words are not synonymous.

We can all think of examples where something is harmful, disgusting, or despicable, but not immoral.

All those words are not synonymous.

We can all think of examples where something is harmful, disgusting, or despicable, but not immoral. — Hanover

Alright, because I know what "cruel", "harmful", "disgusting", and "despicable" mean. I don't know what "bad" means (if something else).

That contradicts the sources cited, so I will say for the final time, you are mistaken. — Wayfarer

It is unfortunate because you don't understand the sources you yourself quote despite being explained, or care to read what comes after: "Because someone teaches you how to use a word in a certain way, it does not mean that word comes from there.".

Or are you preoccupied with picking nits? — Wayfarer

I am preocuppied with defending Rome against the barbarian invasions. The weird part is that it is 2024.

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’. — Bob Ross

As you don't appear to be arguing for Platonism, in what sense is this category mind-independent?

suffice to say it’s difficult to know what you’re trying to say other than “I’m convinced rape is objectively bad”

So idk man. Maybe the reverse is the case - if you’re that convinced, you should be able to convince me. If not, maybe you’re not being honest

Also, in b4 the Dingi turn up: Yes, i have been rape. That is why I am not in the least bit troubled by having this conversation. — AmadeusD

So your position is that you don't know if rape is good or bad because you just don't know what good or bad means? Where you see the words "good" and "bad," you just see so much gibberish?

Let us suppose you're talking to someone and you wish to impart upon that person the principles that should govern their behavior when conducting any activity. And note the term "any." And should you be unable to find principles that always apply, then change "any" to "most any," and we can deal with those unusual circumstances where those princples need modification or perhaps just clarification.

Alright, let's choose some random activities: (1) playing poker, (2) posting here on TPF, and (3) going to eat lunch. Should I rape those around me in #1? #2? #3? What about lying to those I encounter, or cheating, stealing, or carving my initials in their head without their consent? Seems all those things are off limits. They appear to be universal rules.

Play that game in your head and get back with me and let me know what rules you arrive at like I did. Once you start describing those rules to me that you've located, we can put them under the heading "good" and then the blur that obscures that word will begin to focus. And then we can start to look at whether there is a formula or principle that enables us to understand which things are good and which not, and then we can arrive at a moral theory.

as far as I’m concerned those are practical questions.

I don’t know about any rules that I could apply to anyone else but me

as far as I’m concerned those are practical questions.

I don’t know about any rules that I could apply to anyone else but me — AmadeusD

If I push down your hand and see your cards, would you say I've violated a rule that applies to someone other than you, or are we always playing different games, free to do as we will, living in the fray of free expression?

That contradicts the sources cited, so I will say for the final time, you are mistaken.
— Wayfarer

It is unfortunate because you don't understand the sources you yourself quote despite being explained, or care to read what comes after: — Lionino

But the SEP entry says unequivocally 'The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia'. 'French' doesn't appear at all in the entry. And that Descartes published in Latin, using the term 'substantia'. Why are you being obstinate? Is it simply because you're loath to admit a mistake?

An abstraction of similar acts.

An abstraction of similar acts. — Bob Ross

I don't know what this means. How is it mind-independent?

@Lionino @Wayfarer

https://www.etymonline.com/word/substance

c. 1300, substaunce, "divine part or essence" common to the persons of the Trinity;" mid-14c. in philosophy and theology, "that which exists by itself; essential nature; type or kind of thing; real or essential part;" from Old French sustance, substance "goods, possessions; nature, composition" (12c.), from Latin substantia "being, essence, material." This is from substans, present participle of substare "stand firm, stand or be under, be present," from sub "up to, under" (see sub-) + stare "to stand" (from PIE root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm").

Latin substantia translates Greek ousia "that which is one's own, one's substance or property; the being, essence, or nature of anything."

The figurative and general meaning "any kind of corporeal matter, stuff," is attested from mid-14c. As "material wealth, property, goods," late 14c.

The sense of "the matter of a study, discourse, etc.; content of a speech or literary work" is recorded late 14c. That of "meaning expressed by a speech or writing," as distinguished from style, form, performance, is by 1780.

So Greek to Latin to French to English.

I don't get the relevance of this though.

It came from a remark I made in Lionino’s thread on Descartes’ Meditations, re the malign consequences of equivocating the philosophical and everyday meanings of ‘substance’. I didn’t intend it to turn into a multi-page dispute over the etymology of ‘substantia’ which as you have shown is quite clear cut.

In this thread, I asked Leontiskos about the term ‘substance’ in Thomist philosophy when Lionino for some reason decided to continue the dispute about the etymology which I thought was quite settied.

I have the view that the equivocation of the two meanings of ‘substantia’ and ‘substance’ is the source of an egregious error.

Beyond that Etymonline is not a reliable source, as is quite known in linguistics circles, the information in the fragment you quoted is generally correct.

I don't get the relevance of this though. — Michael

The paradoxical claim that English has Roman roots, which was made several times.
Some woke folks would call that "cultural appropriation".

This view is that the good is an abstraction of similar acts such that it turns out to the be equivalent to essentially 'flourishing'. Just like how we can infer the general conception of a triangle from particular triangles, we can infer the general conception of the good from particular examples (e.g., helping the sick, being kind, respectful, truthful, etc.). This conception is objective just as much as the conception of a triangle.

Just like how we can infer the general conception of a triangle from particular triangles, we can infer the general conception of the good from particular examples (e.g., helping the sick, being kind, respectful, truthful, etc.). This conception is objective just as much as the conception of a triangle. — Bob Ross

This isn’t very clear.

Is helping the sick good just because we use the word “good” to describe things like helping the sick? Or is helping the sick good because it satisfies the criteria of “being good”?

If the former then it doesn’t quite seem like realism. If the latter then you need to explain what that criteria is.

Hey Leontiskos, I perused the Thomist blog you linked to. I have a specific question on something I read there: — Wayfarer

Sure, but what blog are you thinking of? I want to make sure I understand the context of that quote.

(Of course Michael is right that the term substance goes back to the Greek and not merely to the French, but a Greek context is a bit different from a Latin context for understanding such utterances.)

Moore doesn't say that morality "has no essence" (whatever that means). Moore says that moral terms like "good" are undefinable. This contrasts with naturalist theories that claim that moral terms like "good" can be defined in one or more other terms, such as "pleasurable" or "healthy". — Michael

It's the same thing, and my point of departure here is @Hanover's interpretation:

It relates to ↪Hanover's opinions about Moore's Open Question. — Leontiskos

The issue here is that Hanover (and others) seem to think that using an undefined term poses no problems. I think it poses enormous problems, and that it is directly related to these intractable problems of metaethics. If terms like 'goodness' or 'morality' are indefinable then your objections must be granted a fair bit of weight.

This view is that the good is an abstraction of similar acts such that it turns out to the be equivalent to essentially 'flourishing'. — Bob Ross

In large part, yes. The difficulty is that when we get to fundamental words and concepts they become more difficult to understand. "Being" is the grand-daddy example. Understanding what such words mean requires a highly competent philosopher, and I'm afraid Moore and Wittgenstein are far from that. Point being: these are difficult questions which must be approached with a large dose of humility. The fact that so many on TPF approach them arrogantly explains why their answers are so confused and superficial.

Now the first difficulty to note with the notion of goodness is that it is neither act-centric nor human-centric. There can be good acts and good humans, but there can also be good dogs, and good bridges, and good airplanes, and good sunshine. So we must first avoid the conflation of 'good' with 'moral' or even 'prudent'/'skillful'.

I think it poses enormous problems, and that it is directly related to these intractable problems of metaethics. — Leontiskos

I agree with that. But then there's also a problem with many of the proposed definitions. If we take hedonism as an example, if "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" then the proposition "pleasure is good" would be a tautology and so the question "is pleasure good?" would be a confused one, much like the question "are bachelors unmarried men?".

But the question "is pleasure good?" does seem to be a reasonable one, which suggests that "this is good" doesn't just mean "this is pleasurable". And so too for many (all?) other similar questions.

So if "good" being undefinable doesn't work and if "good" being defined in some natural term like "pleasurable" doesn't work then it seems that morality just doesn't work.

There are different places where I believe Moore's Open Question has been adequately addressed. One is, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson.

<Here> is a link to a thread dedicated to the topic.

what blog are you thinking of? — Leontiskos

It is here. I only wanted to footnote the point about the changing use of 'substance' between those texts, and how it becomes interpreted after Descartes. My claim is that it leads to the reification of being, treating being as if it were something objective.

Is helping the sick good just because we use the word “good” to describe things like helping the sick? Or is helping the sick good because it satisfies the criteria of “being good”?

It is because it “satisfies the criteria ...”; but we only gain knowledge of that criteria by abducing it from the particulars.

I don’t immediately know what the concept of a triangle is, but particular triangles are triangles because they meet the criteria of that concept of a triangle. I gain knowledge of the concept of a triangle by abstraction of particular triangles.

In large part, yes. The difficulty is that when we get to fundamental words and concepts they become more difficult to understand. "Being" is the grand-daddy example. Understanding what such words mean requires a highly competent philosopher, and I'm afraid Moore and Wittgenstein are far from that. Point being: these are difficult questions which must be approached with a large dose of humility. The fact that so many on TPF approach them arrogantly explains why their answers are so confused and superficial.

I am not following what your point is here? Are you implying that I am being arrogant in my definition of the good?

Now the first difficulty to note with the notion of goodness is that it is neither act-centric nor human-centric. There can be good acts and good humans, but there can also be good dogs, and good bridges, and good airplanes, and good sunshine. So we must first avoid the conflation of 'good' with 'moral' or even 'prudent'/'skillful'.

I think it is act-centric: a good airplane/bridge is an airplane/bridge whereof its parts act in harmony and unity to perform its function.

I don’t think a sunshine is itself good or bad; but, if it were, then I would imagine it is good if it is performing its function correctly.

Likewise, the universal, or highest good, is when everything in reality is acting in harmony and unity to flourish; so that could make something bad, in a universalized context, but still functionally good.

I've read that but I can't see where it's actually explained what "good" means. It only seems to say that good is a "transcendental" and so not reducible to some natural property. There is mention of "desires", but it clarifies that it's not that something is good because we desire it but that we desire it because it is good.

So all I get from this is that "good" is supervenient and desirable. It still seems that "good" is undefined. How am I to distinguish "good" from some other supervenient and desirable property? Even if it's the only supervenient and desirable property, unless "good" means "supervenient and desirable" it is as-of-yet undefined.

Am I just misreading or misunderstanding the paper?

It is because it “satisfies the criteria ...”; but we only gain knowledge of that criteria by abducing it from the particulars. — Bob Ross

You seem to be saying that we learn what it means to be good by looking at what all good things have in common? But how do we determine that something is good in the first place?

You say helping the sick is good. I say helping the sick isn't good. Where do we go from there?

I don’t immediately know what the concept of a triangle is, but particular triangles are triangles because they meet the criteria of that concept of a triangle. I gain knowledge of the concept of a triangle by abstraction of particular triangles. — Bob Ross

Surely being a triangle is a mind-independent state of affairs? Some object either is or isn't a three-sided shape, regardless of what we believe or say. But in your OP you say that being good isn't a mind-independent state of affairs?

So I don't see how your example of triangles explains what it means for being good to not be a mind-independent state of affairs but to be some "non-Platonic objective abstract category".

The issue here is that Hanover (and others) seem to think that using an undefined term poses no problems — Leontiskos

My position isn't that words have no meaning. My position is that the have no essences. If my position was that words have no meaning, why would I be arguing with words?

Your criticism here has nothing in particular to do with moral terms, but it has to do with all terms. That is, you're not just saying I can't define good and bad, but I can't define anything, including "define."

It is here. — Wayfarer

Ah, yes. So the context is abstruse Medieval Christological debates, lol. Of course, I think your question is more general:

I think the term 'individual substance' is rather odd, don't you? Shouldn't it be an individual being or an individual subject? This use of 'substance' is one of my gripes about philosophical terminology - I've often pointed out that it originates with the Latin translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia' as 'substantia', thence the English 'substance'. But 'substance' in ordinary usage means something utterly different to the philosophical 'substance'.

I'm sure those learned in Aquinas and philosophical terminology understand this distinction but it seems to me to result in a very unfortunate equivocation between the philosophical and ordinary meaning of the term, such that the meaning of the quoted passage really sounds decidedly odd.

Any thoughts on that? — Wayfarer

If my memory serves, a substance is a kind of standalone thing in which properties can inhere. An individual substance (supposit) is a real particular substance, as opposed to a species (e.g. this monkey as opposed to the universal species monkey).

As far as I can tell, ordinary English usage is not altogether different, and only shifted along the lines of a particular, common metaphysic (of materialism). See: Merriam-Webster, substance.

Regarding your question about 'being' or 'subject', I suppose I would want to know what a non-individual being and a non-individual subject are supposed to be. The universal sense of 'substance' is clearly non-individual, but it's not clear that we have non-individual senses of these other terms you want to substitute.

Which is not right, either, but nevertheless conveys the original idea of 'ousia' better than 'substance'. After all, we have learned an astonishing number of things about material substance: the periodic table, the standard model of physics, the list is endless. What do we know of 'spiritual substance?' Why, it's a mere fiction, a hangover from medieval theology, the ghost in the machine. That's the substantive point. ;-) — Wayfarer

Ousia/substance is not inherently spiritual. Elements, plants, and animals are equally substances. Aristotle's starting point is always material things.

I am not following what your point is here? Are you implying that I am being arrogant in my definition of the good? — Bob Ross

No, the very fact that you revise your ideas and write long posts is evidence that you are not approaching these topics glibly.

Likewise, the universal, or highest good, is when everything in reality is acting in harmony and unity to flourish; — Bob Ross

Okay, so you think goodness is act-centric, but you are thinking beyond human acts.

My position isn't that words have no meaning. My position is that the have no essences. If my position was that words have no meaning, why would I be arguing with words?

Your criticism here has nothing in particular to do with moral terms, but it has to do with all terms. That is, you're not just saying I can't define good and bad, but I can't define anything, including "define." — Hanover

You are quite forward about being unable to define good and bad, and so I am focusing on those. Usually someone who cannot define good or bad does not go on to depend on those words in their philosophical or moral theories.