Hegel remains (a) German. and (b) difficult. — unenlightened

But he keeps popping up all over the place, and he seems to be an influence on various people that are an influence on me, so by way of passively absorbing something of him with minimum effort, I have started listening to the podcast, The Cunning of Geist, by Gregory Novak. available wherever you source your podcasts. — unenlightened

I didn't study Hegel in my undergraduate days, because he was too woo for school. — unenlightened

Now I want immediately to deal with something that has become problematic here, because of the reification of individuality as the only manifestation of mind. The idea that mind is brain, and therefore there is my mind, your mind, and everyman's mind - and nothing else minded, has to be put in question to grasp even the title of the podcast. — unenlightened

And I'll just include a reference for McTaggart, on time. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/
and that's my introduction to the introduction. — unenlightened

The cunning of geist is that the mind/spirit of the age will use what you think of as your mind for its own grander purposes without you necessarily being aware of it or of its purposes. — unenlightened

The cunning of geist is that the mind/spirit of the age will use what you think of as your mind for its own grander purposes without you necessarily being aware of it or of its purposes. — unenlightened

I have not listened to the podcast, but based on what is said here, rather than putting the question of mind into question it sounds as if the question has been answered in favor of a universal mind with its own purposes. — Fooloso4

Please don't critique Hegel on the basis of my student beginner's crib-sheet. — unenlightened

But you do have me about right, in that I am looking for a philosophy that will sustain a view of psyche and consciousness and personal identity that at least leans somewhat in the direction of geist, because the individualism of today feels immiserating and false. — unenlightened

It is mentioned here that time is not in the logic as such, but as it is the 'science' of logic it immediately plunges into being and seems to imply time even though time is not a dimension of logic as such.

Hopefully that will become clearer as we go on, or someone here will clarify it for me? — unenlightened

...above all, [the student] must 'mark, learn, and inwardly digest' what Hegel himself has to say in his Prefaces and Introduction and, last but not least, in the chapter entitled "With What Must the Science Begin?'. This chapter is of great importance for understanding of the beginning of the Science of Logic, for in it Hegel has made it quite clear why he begins with pure being

In fact it's starting to look like the Laws of Form is pretty much a Hegelian calculus:
Make a distinction between being and nothing. Call it the first distinction... — unenlightened

But if I think about this as verbal mathematics constructing an abstract system, the arguments are only important to avoid contradiction, and what is more significant is definition and construction. Looked it in this light, there is as much woo here as there is in set theory. — unenlightened

I believe he is targeting Kant's philosophical arguments on the limitations of knowledge because they were influential, and certainly conflicts with his project of establishing knowledge in philosophy, including metaphysical knowledge. — Moliere

Hegel's target is the influence of Kant -- I believe he is targeting Kant's philosophical arguments on the limitations of knowledge because they were influential, and certainly conflicts with his project of establishing knowledge in philosophy, including metaphysical knowledge. — Moliere

Here is a paper on Marxist dialectic as the result of his "inversion" of Hegel.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21598282.2022.2054000

Looks like a total misunderstanding to me from my ignorance. — unenlightened

... this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. — Hegel-184

... its truth would be merely that its own individual existence for itself would be shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the notion of recognition, however, this is not possible, except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for self. — 186

To put it in a nutshell, to follow Freud’s image, the unconscious is a gap, and meaning is the stopgap. Meaning provides a narrative, which begins already in the work of “the unconscious philosopher”; the work of meaning is a counterpart to the workings of the unconscious. The unconscious and the philosopher are a couple in an odd division of labor: one makes the holes, the other fills them in. If there is a diagnosis of the philosophical endeavor as such at stake, then this business of philosophy starts already in the unconscious—the philosopher has an accomplice in the unconscious, which starts stopping the gaps even before philosophy starts filling them in. The unconscious is effaced at the same time that it is produced, and the one who effaces it is the unconscious philosopher struggling to make sense and provide a narrative account free of gaps. The philosophical illusion is structural, it has its basis in the unconscious itself as effacement.