Einstein used it — frank

How?

Special relativity is from a thought experiment that starts with a void. Then we put two people in it. One is you. You see another person who is apparently moving, either

A. toward you
B. or you're moving toward him

In the void, there is no difference between A and B.

never mind.

doesn't your argument presume that there will always be things? — Arne

I think if there's nothing there, there's no time.

I think if there's nothing there, there's no time. — frank

I agree.

Oh. I wonder if you had general relativity in mind.

I supose one might argue that the void disappeared when Newton introduced action at a distance. After that the void was never empty.

Oh. I wonder if you had general relativity in mind. — Banno

General relativity is about gravity and acceleration. Special relativity starts with a thought experiment that shows that in a void, with one object stationary and one object moving at a constant speed, there's no fact of the matter about which one is actually stationary and which one is moving.

Isn't that correct @SophistiCat ?

I supose one might argue that the void disappeared when Newton introduced action at a distance. After that the void was never empty. — Banno

There's no void.

General relativity is about gravity and acceleration. Special relativity starts with a thought experiment that shows that in a void, with one object stationary and one object moving at a constant speed, there's no fact of the matter about which one is actually stationary and which one is moving. — frank

On The Electrodynamics Of Moving Bodies? He talks about empty space. No mention of void in this English translation.

I'm not saying you are mistaken, just that it seems an odd translation/interpretation.

There's no void. — frank

There was before Newton.

"What is an example of absolute non existence?
Ans.: It is the absolute non-existence between two things for all time. This absence is eternal. For example, hare's horn is the non-existent in the past, present, and will be in the future. This kind of absence has neither a beginning nor an end.

What is the state of absolute nothingness?
Is absolute nothingness possible?
Absolute Nothingness is a status with no details — no space, no time, no dimension, no features. For Hegel, this status is identical to the status of Pure Being. Pure Being also has no details, no space, no time, no dimension, no features." - Google

Okay, absolute nothingness is either a thing or not. If it is a thing, it is self-contradictory, and thus cannot exist. If it is not a thing, it cannot exist (by my earlier definition). Thus, absolute nothingness cannot exist no matter what. So, something exists, right? — Ø implies everything

I think you need to recognize distinct uses for "thing". This makes "thing" have a much wider range of usage than that outlined by your definition when you say "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist". So we might recognize that as well as things which exist, there is also things which do not exist. Consequently we talk about all sorts of fictional (non-existent) "things", as well as concepts as "things, and so on. Now as much as it may be true that "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist", there are also many "things" which do not exist.

Therefore we can say that "absolute nothingness" is such a thing. It is a "thing" in the sense of being a concept. And whether or not it is self-contradictory cannot be judged in the way you propose, because it would be required to determine what "nothingness" means in that context of the qualifying term "absolute". So far, I see nothing to indicate that the concept of "absolutely no thing" is self-contradictory, unless we stipulate that all concepts are necessarily things.

And if this is the case, I think we'd be better off to describe it as a type of hypocrisy rather than as self-contradiction. We'd have the proposition of "all concept are things" as a premise, and also we'd have a concept of "absolutely no thing". By that premise, the concept itself is a thing, and this would prove that the proposed concept does not state something true about reality, but it could still present us with a possible situation. However, we could truthfully state that under no circumstances could the description of "absolutely no thing" be true under this premise, because this would be a case of trying to do what the stipulated premise makes impossible. Notice though, that such stipulations don't render the described action as impossible, they only stipulate that it ought not be done. And doing what is contrary to what we state that we ought to do, is hypocrisy.

The further problem though, is that hypocrisy is very real, and actually occurs regularly. Therefore concluding that it would be hypocritical to hold as true, the concept of "absolutely no thing", does not prove that the concept is false. It may simply be the case that the premises which produce this conclusion are false. So we'd have to revisit the premises to see why the stipulated rule could be broken in a hypocritical way. Then we'd see that "all concepts are things" is not at all sound, and we'd discover that the hypocrisy is allowed for by this false premise. We can actually produce a concept which is not a thing.

That's why this type of argument does absolutely nothing for us.

If there is something, absolute nothingness is impossible. Last I checked, there is a whole lot of something, in fact, a whole lot of a lot of things. That there is something is a necessary condition for speculating about nothingness.

That there is something is a necessary condition for speculating about nothingness. — Fooloso4

Not necessarily, because it depends on how you would conceive of, or define, "something". It's possible that all that is does not fit the criteria of "something".

, hmm, what other perspective is there than "from something"...? In absence of anything/everything, speaking of perspectives doesn't make much sense...

In absence of anything/everything, speaking of perspectives doesn't make much sense... — jorndoe

Ditto for the thread IMO. There has been a failure for something to have arisen out of nothing.

Could you elaborate with a formal proof? If you want, I can try to formalize my proof as well. — Ø implies everything

I didn't need to get into the symbolic formal proof for this elaboration.  Just the plain English reasoning was enough.

The proposition has implied premises.
Everything exists, exists. (True)
Something exists. (True)

Therefore (OP's proposition) Absolute nothingness is impossible. (False), but it would not be impossible if it were not for the existence of something. (true) = inconsistent

Therefore I conclude that the OP's proposition is invalid and inconsistent, because it denies the possibility of absolute nothingness, then it accepts the possibility of nothingness at the same time.  Remember something always exists.  Everything exists, exists.

This was a very useful exercise.  It isn't about whether Absolute nothingness exists or not in the real world.  It is about how we could reason on some abstract concepts, and analyse them logically. 

Not necessarily, because it depends on how you would conceive of, or define, "something". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you conceive of, or define "you" and "we" as something?

Nothingness is not only possible, it can be scientifically and mathematically proof ... the zero!
Zero is the mathematical artifact that contains our concept of nothingness and it was a revolution when it was invented.
This is where we should start with when talking nothingness...

Do you conceive of, or define "you" and "we" as something? — Fooloso4

Not necessarily.

The basic question: Why is there something rather than nothing?

A relatively uncomplicated answer: Perhaps, because anyone who is able to ask and ponder this question is something. But who knows if, subsequent to anyone's death, there is nothing rather than something? Kind of like Schopenhauer trying to explain the Nothingness that results subsequent to a person's successful Denial of the Will to Live.

For what it's worth, like a mathematician, I see no difference between existence and logical consistency and so I regard both these concepts as one and the same. Then the sentence "No object exists" can be reformulated as "No object is logically consistent", which is evidently and necessarily false. There are plenty of logically consistent objects; every object that is identical to itself is logically consistent and therefore exists (as opposed to, for example, the famous "square circle", which is a circle that is not a circle, a logically inconsistent and therefore nonexistent object).

When you say you dont consider yourself to BE something "necessarily", are you speaking of anatman?



Do you know of Nishida Kitaro?

When you say you dont consider yourself to BE something "necessarily", are you speaking of anatman? — Gregory

I suppose that would be one possibility.

I recently started reading more about John Scottus Eriugena. For someone so well regarded among neoplatonist scholars, it is surprising how little "cred" he seems to have today. I've now seen a few different people describe him as the "apex" or "climax" or neoplatonism.

Anyhow, he makes a distinction between the "nothingness" of God and the nothingness of things without being (which, it turns out, is also God).

The "nothingness" of God is "nothingness through excellence” (nihil per excellentiam) or nihil per infinitatem (“nothingness on account of infinity"). This is "nothing" because nothing can be said of It; God transcends everything. Any positive statement is limiting and thus inappropriate. God is a true infinite, beyond all limitations, and thus the true "nothing" beyond any positive definiteness.

But then we also have the nothing of non-existence, “nothing through privation” (nihil per privationem). At first glance, it seems to me like you are dealing with the latter (privational nothingness) in the OP, but upon further consideration, it becomes hard to say.

Anyhow, Eriugena would say that this second nothing (through privation) is only defined by, and thus only has existence relative to things that do have existence. Thus, such nothing cannot exist "of itself." Rather, this "nothing through privation" emerges dialectically. It is, in fact, part of the larger infinite nothing, created being itself being a dialectical process of being and non-being.

Eriugena divides nature into four “species:"
1. That which creates and is not created (i.e., God - nothing);
2. That which creates and is created (i.e., Primary Causes or Ideas/Forms);
3. That which is created and does not create (i.e., Temporal Effects, created things);
4. That which is neither created nor creates (i.e., non-being, nothingness).

"The four divisions are not strictly a hierarchy in the usual Neoplatonic sense where there are higher and lower orders, rather, as Eriugena will explain, the first and fourth divisions both refer to God as the Beginning and End of all things, and the second and third divisions may also be thought to express the unity of the cause-effect relation. Finally, the division is an attempt to show that nature is a dialectical coming together of being and non-being. Creation is normally understood as coming into being from non-being. God as creator is then a kind of transcendent non-being above the being of creation. These themes are rigorously discussed and disentangled throughout the dialogue."

Fascinating stuff. Don't get how this guy flew below my radar so well, seems sort of like Hegel way ahead of his time. OFC, the opus is an 800-page dialogue, so who knows if I will ever get to it. It always shocks me though how dismissive my education was of medieval philosophy, but then how much of "groundbreaking" modern philosophy turns out just to be stuff that was already done, just with the overtly Christian content removed.

…the Creative nature permits nothing outside itself because outside it nothing can be, yet everything which it has created and creates it contains within itself, but in such a way that it itself is other, because it is superessential, than what it creates within itself..

It follows that we ought not to understand God and the creature as two things distinct from one another, but as one and the same. For both the creature, by subsisting, is in God; and God, by manifesting himself, in a marvelous and ineffable manner creates himself in the creature….

Okay, my vacation from this thread has lasted long enough. Time to dive in. Takes a slurp of nothing. (Just kidding, I'm drinking Pepsi Max, and will defend this choice of beverage over any other with passion)

Therefore I conclude that the OP's proposition is invalid and inconsistent, because it denies the possibility of absolute nothingness, then it accepts the possibility of nothingness at the same time. — Corvus

I don't quite get your argument, but what you wrote in the quote is wrong. Absolute nothingness is oxymoronic because of the existence of something. Remove everything, and suddenly absolute nothingness is no longer oxymoronic, because absolute nothingness is nothing. There must be something to give absolute nothingness its oxyomoronic character. Furthermore, any proof of why absolute nothingness is impossible, must have content; thus, the proof is already presupposing the existence of the negation of what it is trying to prove could never be. It is just begging the question.

So, it is time I formalized all of this.
___________________________________________________________________________________

A thing is something that can be referred to, by whatever means, be they perceptual, emotive or conceptual. A conceptual reference is defining something. Therefore, the state that is absolute nothingness is a thing, by virtue of being referred to by its definition. Its definition is formalized further down.

$E$ is the set of all propositions true for some corresponding state; a complete description of that state. If a proposition $P$ is true in $E$, we have that $[P] \in E$.

$A$ is the set corresponding to the state of absolute nothingness. The definition of $A$ is as follows: $A = \varnothing$. That means for all propositions $P$, we have that $P \notin A$.

Contradiction:

$\biggr( A = \varnothing \biggr) \land \biggr( [A = \varnothing] \in A \biggr)$

So, done deal? We have proved why something must exist, right? Well, look above you; what do you see? Something. Let's denote that something as $C$; that is, $C$ denotes the proposition above.

Now, we know that $C$ is true, by virtue of simple logic. However, if $A$ truly was instantiated... Well:

$C \notin A$

Now, the irony of absolute nothingness is that what you see above is itself a proposition that would not be present in $A$, along with all other propositions. Reasoning with absolute nothingness will get you nothing! Which is why trying to prove there necessarily had to be something by virtue of the impossibility of absolute nothingness is wrongfully assuming that the impossibility of absolute nothingness would stop it from being the case. If $A$ was the case, it would not have an oxymoronic identity, because it would not have anything, do anything or be anything.

Okay, your message was long and I am afraid my reply will be longer. When I replied the first time, I could not reply to a lot of what you said, for I had to read up on Hegel. I want to thank you for pointing me in that direction, it has been very fruitful (though I have much to learn and will be looking for the right resources to get into Hegel going forward).

But what Hegel finds is that this sheer being is now totally contentless. It describes nothing, collapses into nothing. So, pure being turns out to be nothing. But nothing is itself unstable. We're thinking of it, so it's something, like you say. And so nothing turns out to collapse back into sheer being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My very undeveloped reading of Hegel would disagree slightly. Pure being is indeterminate, that is, logically indistinguishable from anything else. That’s what indeterminate, and its negation, determinate, means in Hegel’s terminology. Now, pure being is obviously distinguishable from other things. We can define pure being in various ways, you already hinted at one. This definition is distinct from e.g. the definition of a square. However, pure being does not exist right now. Something specific exists. So, when talking about an instance of pure being, it is indeterminate, by virtue of the inexistence of any specific things to which it can be distinguished. And by inexistence, I mean complete inexistence; these things are not even conceivable in this state of pure being.

So, pure being is, when existent, indeterminate. Now, pure nothing (or absolute nothingness as referred to in this thread) is also indeterminate. It also does not have any definition, by virtue of having no details, no components. We now have two distinct states that are both indeterminate, and thus logically (definitionally) indistinguishable from each other. That is, by virtue of both states having no definition, one cannot define their difference. Yet, nonetheless, they are different, since pure nothing is currently, by definition, the negation of pure being. I say currently, because pure being and pure nothing only have definitions in a determinate reality. I refer to these temporary definitions by convenience; you see, these definitions reveal that pure being and pure nothing are indeed different. However, despite that, their definitions (and thus the definition of their difference) disappears if pure being was ever instantiated.

This does not mean pure being is pure nothing whenever pure being is instantiated. Instead, the difference between them is itself indeterminate “during” this instantiation. The difference is indeterminate, but it is still existent. In fact, it is absolutely crucial that they are different, for if not, the becoming does not happen. You see, all of this has been leading up to one fact; pure being would be related to pure nothing. This quirk, this relationship, gives them both an essence; a relational essence. Thus, determinacy arises from indeterminacy.

…I think? I have no fucking clue what I am talking about. Pass the bong, would you? I would like your thoughts on this, as I am now really intrigued by Hegel’s philosophy, and you blessed me with the introduction.

We have an oscillation, an unstable contradiction. But what if being subsumes/sublates nothing, incorporating parts of nothing into it? Then we reach the becoming of our world, where each moment of being is continually passing away into the nothing on non-being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is the intuition (minus the temporal-extendedness implied by oscilattion) that I have gained from reading Hegel. The relationship is somewhat asymmetric in favor of being, which makes sense; it is the positive that fills the negative. I like how you tie it into the passage of time and change; though I’d like an elaboration on the exact mechanics of it all.

And this makes sense to me from the perspective of what we can say about time. Why do we have a four dimensional manifold? Because we use the time dimension to mark when events have occurred. As Godel noted, eternalist responses to seeming "paradoxes" in relativity miss the mark. What can it mean to say "all times exist at all times?" Times exist at the point along the time dimension where they exist. Events occur when they occur. They do not occur at other times.

"Existence" is a complex word that leads to trouble here. When people say "all times exist" I think they generally want to say "all times are real." And this I agree with. But that doesn't mean that events don't occur (exist) at just the times that they exist. The time dimension becomes meaningless if it doesn't tell us when things occur. That becoming is local is confusing, and open to many interpretations, but also not all that relevant here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I completely agree. Eternalism does miss the mark. You point to the nonsensical breed of eternalism above. Then there’s the spotlight eternalists who forget they’re reintroducing change by having the spotlight move (duh…). A third breed would be the frozen omphalists, and I would like to ask them some questions, but I fear they would have no time to answer.

This seems to beg the question somewhat. It assumes that nothing exists necessarily. If there are necessary things, then they exist by necessity, and they are something. Which would seem to entail for you that "absolute nothingness is [not] most definitely possible," if anything exists of necessity. And then of course, there are many arguments for things which do exist of necessity, although not all senses of "of necessity" have bearing here. We really mean "cannot not exist," in this sense. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don’t quite understand how your comment relates to the sentence you quoted me from. All I’m saying is that any proof of the impossibility of absolute nothingness presupposes there is something, and would thus be of no consequence to a state of nothingness. Therefore, if there ever was a state of absolute nothingness, something would not arise by virtue of these proofs (since those proofs would be invalid and more damningly, inexistent). So, these attempted proofs do not prove something like “that’s why absolute nothingness necessarily could not have been”. This fact is something you ask about later in your comment, actually, so I will touch on it there.

There is a strong tradition of seeing the world as "blown into being by contradiction," by "the principle of explosion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don’t believe in ex falso because if there ever was a contradiction, the disjunctive syllogism would not be valid.

But is proving that nothing necessarily doesn't exist the same thing as proving the necessity of existence? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. Such a proof is itself something. So, you are just saying, “because of [something], nothing is impossible”. If nothing truly were, the proof would not be; the logical/metaphysical problems of absolutely nothing would be non-existent. See my reply to Corvus.

Is nothing one or many? Can there be several nothings? — Gregory

I assume you are asking if there are multiple instances of nothing. Well, there are multiple instances of specific nothingness, like the nothingness of a book on my bed right now, or like the nothingness of a non-zero balance in my bank account, for example. These are absences in a larger environment of presence (like the presence of my crushing debt). Absolute nothingness is the absence of everything, “in an environment” of only absence.

For Spinoza this ground is one and the concept should accord to one. Being and nothingness have aspects in common such that a painting paint brush has to the canvas; it takes what is potential and makes it something. — Gregory

This canvas of nothing sounds a little like something. I don’t think you can unify being and non-being, but I would like to hear more about this idea.

I am not familiar with that notation, though I think I know what it means, except for the lambda expression. What does it denote?

I find your comment highly interesting, but I want to reserve my reply until I understand your notation and thus exactly what you are saying.

What there is nothing of is decided by what is absent.

Absolute nothing is a non-starter. — Banno

Are you saying that one cannot have an absence of everything, for that would also be an absence of the absence of everything? If so, I tend to agree, but as I’ve argued for in this thread, any contradictions regarding absolute nothingness are irrelevant to the question of cosmogony.

The basic question: Why is there something rather than nothing?

A relatively uncomplicated answer: Perhaps, because anyone who is able to ask and ponder this question is something. — charles ferraro

As has been mentioned elsewhere in the thread, I am not arguing that we lack proof for the existence of something. I am simply saying the lack proof for the necessity of the existence of something; that is, we lack proof that reality is not a brute fact.