I don't see what truth values have to do with coherency.

In logic...

Logic has nothing to do with coherency either (though I'm not really sure what you even mean by that term - it can mean different things in philosophy).

I'm a bit dumbfounded here Fafner.

Logic has nothing to do with coherency?

That is all logic concerns itself with. The rules of correct inference. Consistency. Coherency. Validity.

In any case, in logic (and philosophy of language in general), a truth value is simply an assignment of "true" or "false" to a sentence. So "Trump is the president of the US" has the truth value "true" while "Obama is the president" has the truth value "false". So talk about truth values simply means that sentences can be either true or false.

The rules of correct inference. Consistency. Coherency. Validity. — creativesoul

Consistency, Coherency and Validity are three different things. Logic indeed deals with consistency and validity, but coherency is an epistemic term, so it is unrelated to logic (unless of course you use it to mean "consistency"). But anyway, truth values are not defined either through coherency or consistency.

I'm ok with that. Just trying to be as clear as possible. Let's go from there then...

So, for our purposes here, a truth value is an assignment of "true" or "false" to a sentence. Again, I would only point out that truth value is not truth.

There's a difference between being true/false and being called so.

Agree?

There's a difference between being true/false and being called so. — creativesoul

I'm not quite sure what you mean by this.

Anyway, you are free to define truth in your own way. I don't claim that my definition is the only 'right' one, only that it suits my particular purpose.

I am quite curious to see an example of a valid conclusion that is either inconsistent or incoherent. Likewise, I am also quite curious to see an example of an invalid conclusion that is either coherent or consistent.

Someone can say that "X" is true when it is not. Being called "true" does not make something so.

Someone can say that "X" is true when it is not. Being called "true" does not make something so. — creativesoul

Ok, maybe 'assignment' was a misleading choice of words. I didn't mean to say that sentences are made true by calling them so. I simply meant that a sentence has the truth value "true" simply if it is true (and "false" if false).

In logic of course you can assign truth values when you are dealing with P's and Q's etc.

I am quite curious to see an example of a valid conclusion that is either inconsistent or incoherent. Likewise, I am also quite curious to see an example of an invalid conclusion that is either coherent or consistent. — creativesoul

Granted, coherency is usually defined through consistency, but it doesn't show that they are the same thing. It is just a terminological point about common philosophical usage, you are free of course to use "coherency" as equivalent with "consistency".

Though I would insist that validity and consistency mean different things in logic. Validity only applies to arguments, while consistency (or inconsistency) applies to any arbitrary bunch of sentences. Not everything that is consistent is valid (but the converse is true).

1. Cats fly.
2. Therefore, today is Sunday.

The two propositions are consistent (they don't contradict each other), but they don't form a valid argument together.

Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction goes like this: we all agree that what makes a statement true is in part a matter of what the words mean, and in part a matter of the way the world is, so we think we can separate those, but it turns out that's easier said than done. That's the argument anyway.

It seemed to me the point you & @Metaphysician Undercover had reached was related, in trying to link or unlink meaning, interpretation, truth conditions, and truth value. I thought it might be helpful to look at an actual utterance where there is a contrast between two subjects, and then decide whether that contrast turned out to be differences in word usage or something else.

Well put Fafner.

All valid arguments are consistent(coherent). Thus, validity requires coherence.

I agree. If we take Quine's argument seriously, it does complicate the story considerably. In particular, Quine would reject the idea that we can just fix the meaning of a sentence in isolation, because he thought that meaning only applies to large networks of sentences or theories (this is the meaning holism part).

But I think I can allow myself to ignore this for the purpose of my argument with MU (and anyway, I think that truth conditional semantics is consistent with meaning holism - after all, this was the view of his greatest student Davidson).

Truth value is not truth. Truth conditions are not truth. The conclusion introduces new terms, and as such it is invalid. — creativesoul

Actually, I was working off of Fafner's definition of "truth". Fafner defined "truth" as when the truth conditions expressed by a sentence, obtain. My argument was that truth, as defined, is dependent on there being truth conditions of the sentence, and this is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation. Then Fafner changed the terms, to talk about "truth value", claiming that a truth value was not dependent on interpretation, so I adjusted my argument to deal with that new terminology.

If you think that you have a definition of "truth" which does not succumb to this argument, then by all means, present it.

You're conflating being mistaken with being and/or becoming aware of that. — creativesoul

That's not so, because someone can judge you as being mistaken whether or not you are aware of it. This does not change the fact, which I am trying to impress upon you, that being mistaken requires a judgement.

I thought it might be helpful to look at an actual utterance where there is a contrast between two subjects, and then decide whether that contrast turned out to be differences in word usage or something else. — Srap Tasmaner

I prefer to deal with the easy cases first...

...a sentence has the truth value "true" simply if it is true (and "false" if false).

I don't see how this helps our understanding.

It doesn't, it is just to give a name to something, so that anyone could immediately understand what exactly is being discussed (because as I said, just talking abut 'truth' is ambiguous, and sometimes there's a need for more precise distinctions).

I fear that you've begun to confuse the different conversations. Here is ours. Keeping it separate from the others is crucial...

You wrote:

Truth is dependent on meaning, and meaning is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

That is the original argument you offered.

I've since put it to you several times over that you've succumbed to inadequate quantification issues.

Not all truth is dependent upon meaning. Not all meaning is dependent upon interpretation.

The underlying issue here is clear. You've neglected to take an account of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief.

Try this...

Thought/belief is prior to language.
Some pre-linguistic thought/belief is true.
True thought/belief is existentially contingent upon truth.
Thus, some truth is prior to language.

But what does it mean for a sentence to have truth conditions? Well it is something that is relative to a language. So in English, the sentence 'cats fly' express one particular set of truth conditions, but it could've been otherwise (if English had a different history, for example if 'cat' meant what 'dog' means in our English, then 'cats fly' would have different truth conditions in that hypothetical English).

So let's imagine a world where 'cats fly' doesn't have any truth conditions, and that would be a world where English doesn't exist, or any other language (suppose that there are no humans in that world). But now, can the sentence 'cats fly' have a truth value in that world? It seems to me that it can. If cats fly in that world, then the sentence is true in that world, and if they don't then it would be false. So here you have a world where a sentence doesn't have truth conditions but has a truth value. So truth values don't depend on truth conditions, and hence they cannot depended on interpretation either — Fafner

This is the part I was looking at.

It looks like you're defining truth as satisfaction: "cats fly" is true in that world iff there is something in that world that is a cat and flies. You're effectively taking triples of <sentence, language, world> as what has truth conditions. It's completely irrelevant whether the language is spoken in the world, or the sentence is ever uttered in the world.

You wrote:

Truth is dependent on meaning, and meaning is dependent on interpretation, therefore truth is dependent on interpretation.

That is the original argument you offered. — creativesoul

Again, you've offered a dreadful representation of my argument. You even added quotations as if it's what I actually wrote. Here's what I actually wrote:

Being true requires being meaningful. Whether or not the statement is meaningful is contingent on interpretation. Therefore being true is contingent on interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was in response to your affirmation that being meaningful is required for the truth of a statement:

If it was further qualified by saying something like the truth of a statement is contingent upon it's being meaningful, I would agree. — creativesoul

Now you claim:

Not all truth is dependent upon meaning. — creativesoul

That something which is not meaningful could be true, is contrary to what you said earlier. So this new position of yours, "not all truth is dependent on meaning", is something you'll need to clarify. Obviously, we had agreement earlier that meaning is required for the truth of a statement. A sentence which is meaningless cannot be true. Are you rescinding your agreement?

I think I understand what you're trying to get at. You think that there is truth to things other than statements, and this truth does not require meaningfulness. How is this possible, that there could be truth to something which is not meaningful? If you come to respect the reality, that this is not a viable option, then we're back at my argument. For something to be meaningful requires that it is interpreted as such, and therefore truth requires interpretation.

The underlying issue here is clear. You've neglected to take an account of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief. — creativesoul

I don't see how non-linguistic thought/belief affects my argument. The truth of non-linguistic thought/belief is still dependent on interpretation even if you define "meaning" in such a way that only language has meaning, and insist that things without meaning could be true. Things other than language are interpreted.

Try this...

Thought/belief is prior to language.
Some pre-linguistic thought/belief is true.
True thought/belief is existentially contingent upon truth.
Thus, some truth is prior to language. — creativesoul

Well, I really don't know what you mean by "true thought/belief is existentially contingent on truth", or how you could apprehend this as a true premise. What is truth other than a concept? Are you claiming here, that if there is a true belief, then there must be an existing concept of "truth"? How is that a viable premise? If there was green plants on the earth prior to human beings, then the concept of "green" must have existed prior to human beings?

Let's say that there was green plants prior to language, why would these green plants be existentially contingent on the concept of greenness? Likewise, if there was true thought/belief prior to language, why would this be existentially contingent on truth (trueness)?

Now I have some doubts about this response for various reasons...

And I didn't mean that a triplet of <sentence, language, world> has truth conditions, because it only makes sense to speak about truth conditions of sentences.

I think the question, still, is whether truth is a semantic notion.

I've changed my mind about some things that I said in my latest reply to you. I want to argue instead for something simpler.

I'm ready to grant you your main claim, viz. that truth (in the sense of sentences having a truth value) is dependent on subjects in your sense. However, I want to reiterate something I already said, and that your argument doesn't prove a lot, because of the way that you've defined subjectivity. After all, your argument only proves that truth is dependent on subjects, but it doesn't prove that truth is dependent only on subjects. It is still possible that truth is dependent both on subjects and the objective reality, in which case sentences would be objectively true despite the dependence of this fact itself on subjective interpretation (and in my sense "objectively true" means dependent on the subject-independent reality).

In other words, proving that truth depends on subjects is not the same as proving that there's no objective truth. And this is for the simple reason that something can both depend on subjects and depend on the objective world (there's no logical inconsistency in this). So even if your argument is sound (and I grant you that), you still need to work harder to prove what you want to prove (that sentences cannot be objectively true).

I think the question, still, is whether truth is a semantic notion. — Srap Tasmaner

Hmmmmm....

This is a good question. In some sense yes, if you analyze the meaning of sentences via truth (that is, truth conditions). But there's a sense in which it isn't, but I find it difficult to spell this out. I'll have to think this over.

It is still possible that truth is dependent both on subjects and the objective reality, in which case sentences would be objectively true despite the dependence of this fact itself on subjective interpretation (and in my sense "objectively true" means dependent on the subject-independent reality). — Fafner

I believe that this position, that truth is dependent on both a subject, and on an objective reality, is a common one. It excludes the extreme realist position, which doesn't require subjects for truth, but still assumes an objective reality independent of human existence. This position would allow that truth is a property of knowledge, and even that truth is exclusively found in knowledge because it recognizes the role of the subject in truth, and the subject's role in knowledge is evident and compatible with this.

The issue which arises is the nature of the assumed independent objective reality. Are you acquainted with Kant's claims concerning the distinction between phenomena and noumena? How the assumed objective reality appears to us, is what he calls phenomena, and this is what our knowledge is based in. This is what I call one's interpretation of the objective reality, what is produced by one's senses, and brain, and is how the objective reality appears to the individual. I call that interpretation. When a sentence is said to be "objectively true", the interpretation of the sentence is judged as corresponding with the interpretation of the objective reality (how the objective reality appears to us). So we cannot say that the sentence is "objectively true", in the sense of implying that the meaning of the sentence actually corresponds with the assumed objective reality, but that it corresponds with how the objective reality appears to us, our interpretation of it.

In other words, proving that truth depends on subjects is not the same as proving that there's no objective truth. — Fafner

According to what I just argued, the real object, the thing in itself, the objective reality does not play a part in what you call "objective truth". There is the interpretation of the sentence, carried out by the subject, and the interpretation of the objective reality (how the objective reality appears), carried out by the subject, and the judgement of "true", carried out by the subject. So every aspect of truth is subjective as I defined it. We have no objectivity here.

Now, there is still the assumption of an objective reality, which must be dealt with. Where this assumption plays a role in truth, and it is a pivotal role, is in the trust and faith that we have in ourselves. We have faith, and trust, that our human bodies are giving us an interpretation of the objective reality which is an accurate interpretation. That is to say that we believe that the way that the objective reality appears to us, is a fair representation of how the objective reality actually is. Also, we trust that we have provided ourselves with a proper interpretation of the sentence.

This trust which we have in ourselves, trust in our own capacities, is crucial to truth. It is crucial because we do not define truth as a correspondence between the meaning of the sentence and how the world appears to us, but we define it more as you say, as correspondence between the sentence and the objective reality. So there are two forms of trust in our own capacities, which are involved with truth. We trust our capacity to interpret the sentence, and we trust our capacity to make the objective reality (through sensation and apprehension) appear as it really is. Therefore we define true as "the sentence corresponds with reality", when we really mean that the interpretation of the sentence corresponds with how reality appears to us. That we have interpreted the sentence properly, and that reality appears as it really is, we tend to take for granted because we have confidence, "trust" in our own capacities. This trust, or confidence, is implied within the concept of truth, because without this assumed correspondence between the interpretation and the reality, truth is meaningless.

That argument was yours Meta. I actually clicked on your avatar and scrolled through your comments to find it. Anyone else could do the same, assuming you've not changed it in the meantime. It's back on page 15, about halfway down the page.

:-}

For you to call it "a dreadful representation of your argument" is a bit self-contradictory, to say the least...

Therefore we define true as "the sentence corresponds with reality", when we really mean that the interpretation of the sentence corresponds with how reality appears to us. That we have interpreted the sentence properly, and that reality appears as it really is, we tend to take for granted because we have confidence, "trust" in our own capacities. This trust, or confidence, is implied within the concept of truth, because without this assumed correspondence between the interpretation and the reality, truth is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just a note on Kant: because he always used noumenon in connection with Wissenschaft (science), it's arguably clear that Kant meant that the thing in itself as it is in itself, ding an sicht selbst is not knowable in terms of science. Practical knowledge has no such limitation. This foreshadows Heidegger's as structure. For example, science might well struggle with (a) chair; but if you ask, "What is a chair as a chair, then a reasonable answer is that a chair is something you sit in, to relax strain on you feet, and so forth.

I endorse your account here of what true signifies. Question: when you say, "[T]rust... is implied within the concept of truth..," can you give a larger account of truth? Assuming, as represented multiple times above, that "truth" differs in some significant way from "true."

I take it that true nails down the particulars of the particular. What does truth do? .