"Yes, you could explicitly define "the actual world" as "this particular possibility-world." In fact, how I mean "actual" when I say that this world is actual to us because we're in it. And so that is a tautology when I say it." — Michael Ossipoff
So if it is a tautology, then there's nothing to explain, and that means that OP's question is confused. — Fafner
My contention was that it must be chance — Brayarb
Maybe try this: take the world that we're at (or any one of the possible worlds, for that matter). Let's say that a certain state of affairs S1 obtains contingently in that world. Now, for the sake of simplicity, let's say that if S1 had failed to obtain, then, necessarily, S2 would've obtained (which means there is a close possible world where S2 did obtain). That is to say that one or the other necessarily obtained in the particular world, but which obtained was contingent. Essentially I'm asking in the OP and here: what settled the matter that S1 obtained in this particular world instead of S2 when S2 was a state of affairs that this world could've included (was compatible with up until S1 obtained), alternatively? — Brayarb
So what settled the matter in the way that necessity settles that S3 obtains? My contention was that it must be chance as far as I can tell, which, as I mentioned to SophistiCat, just means that it just settled this way instead of that and there's nothing to point to that could account for why. — Brayarb
Nothing about/in w1 necessitated that S1 obtained. — Brayarb
It just so happened that S1 obtained there instead of S2 — Brayarb
..., even though, after S1 obtained, so to speak, we identify that world as w1
I pretty much agree with everything you're saying. So, when the abstractionist says that w1 obtains but the others don't, what do you take that to mean, Michael? You might be a concretist and reject it, but do you know what the abstractionist is meaning? — Brayarb
Why would you say that S1 obtained over S2? Are you saying that that question doesn't really make sense, or would you say that more information is needed to answer it? — Brayarb
I guess I don't see why one wouldn't say it was just by chance. — Brayarb
Well the idea is that if world-X obtained (or was actual in the way that the abstractionist uses the term) contingently, then your making it so would also be contingent. In other words, when you get to the root of why one possible state of affairs obtained over the others, you should arrive at chance (one just obtained over the others and there wasn't anything that necessitated that that be the case). — Brayarb
The way I put it is that world-X ultimatelyobtained by chance. As I just mentioned to MU, if we trace back to the root, we should arrive at chance, IFF the state of affairs obtained contingently. — Brayarb
I think that that is just what contingency entails. It seems that if God has a free (in the libertarian sense) choice, then we have something like the following two possible states of affairs, for instance: 'God choosing X' and 'God choosing -X.' Let's say that 'God choosing X' obtained. Since it obtained contingently, 'God choosing -X' could've obtained but simply failed to, by chance, I would say. — Brayarb
chance is just an opening/capability/space that allows for alternate outcomes — Brayarb
Well, I don't really see it or use it as another word for contingency. I generally say that contingency entails chance, so they're closely related, but I don't use the terms interchangeably, usually. — Brayarb
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