The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language. — Michael

Then, as noted in my last, both languages could be right or wrong. There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "أخلاقي". @Bob Ross' predications have their meaning in light of the English word "good," not the Arabic word "أخلاقي". If your rejoinder is, "Well, X may be good, but it isn't necessarily أخلاقي," then Ross should respond, "True. I only called it good, I never called it أخلاقي."

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good. — Michael

And how do you propose that we determine the meaning of the word "good"?

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. Your Arabic case is just another example of this — Leontiskos

Hey dude :)

It seems to me disagreeing about what comes under the category 'good' can obviously be a particular disagreement.

I often (as a pretty centrist person) have discussions that begin with establishing what is considered 'good'. A case in point is transwomen in women's sport.

Generally, I establish that we both (the interlocutor's position doesn't matter to this idea) are after the same thing - reduction of suffering, and general respect for people with different views and presentations. So we have a categorical way to assess each of our claims, and whether they come under this agreed definition (in the particular case).

We then discuss the differing opinion, with recourse to the agreed 'Good'. In this case, I do no think transwomen should be competing in female sports (at elite levels), and the other, lets assume, does think they should.

They believe it is a method for achieving the Good we agreed on. But I disagree. It isn't. It's a bad method.

The details and positions are, again, not important. I don't think we could be wrong, because we already agreed on what 'Good' is. There's no daylight. The disagreement is what can come under that label. Not the X, not the Good... The categorisation.

When I say, "...disagreeing about what X is," what I primarily mean is, "whether X is or is not good." There is a subtle interplay of object specification, but that can be left to the side. So I am not disagreeing with what you say here.

There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "أخلاقي". — Leontiskos

But does it mean the same thing?

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient.

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "أخلاقي"). Comparing our moral values to their أخلاقي values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their أخلاقي values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "أخلاقي" isn't what we mean by "moral".

Fair enough - It certainly seemed like the implication was that a particular disagreement isn't possible and that it must be at a 'higher' level i.e what Good is, or what X is rather than whether its 1 or 2 (good, or bad). Sorry for misunderstanding.

But does it mean the same thing? — Michael

I have no idea. I don't speak Arabic.

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient. — Michael

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose.

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "أخلاقي"). Comparing our moral values to their أخلاقي values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their أخلاقي values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "أخلاقي" isn't what we mean by "moral". — Michael

This is the debate over whether there is legitimate "analogical" predication (or what Aristotle sometimes called "pros hen" predication). The Medievals argued about this for centuries, and the debate was never really resolved. In Heidegger's first dissertation he wrote on a (pseudo) Scotistic text that dealt with this question of univocity.

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize). If the Arabians had no concept for good, then some of these problems would arise. And it may be true that certain interlocutors, such as yourself, have no explicit concept of good or moral. This introduces the question of how genuine learning is able to take place, which is also a doozy of a topic. Granted, I think all of this gets much closer to the nub of the matter at hand for you.

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose. — Leontiskos

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "أخلاقي" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false.

If (1) is false then Bob Ross' explanation of the meaning of the word "good" fails.

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize). — Leontiskos

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of أخلاقي? Perhaps only if "أخلاقي" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "أخلاقي", then you probably don't have a concept of أخلاقي.

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral". Perhaps "أخلاقي". And so premise (2) above is true. Therefore premise (1) above is false, and Bob Ross' argument has failed.

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "أخلاقي" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false. — Michael

It is likely that (2) and (3) are partially true and partially false (and incidentally, (1) is also partially true and partially false). Consider

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "fast" and "rapido" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "fast" is used to describe are not the things the word "rapido" is used to describe

Neither of these claims are entirely true or entirely false. You seem to have a Scotistic idea that two concepts must either be entirely identical or entirely unidentical, with no in between.

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of أخلاقي? Perhaps only if "أخلاقي" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "أخلاقي", then you probably don't have a concept of أخلاقي. — Michael

It is different to say, "Good is different from أخلاقي," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem.

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral". — Michael

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of @Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word أخلاقي.

Weird - this was a post in response to Leontiskos which he has quoted below. I have no idea how i mucked up bad enough to delete it, but there we are.

This is, in fact, the case. Identity cannot be partial, by definition. — AmadeusD

Then communication is necessarily impossible, for no two word-conceptions are ever identical. When you say "cat" and I say "cat" we do not mean the exact same, identical thing. Apparently, then, we must be constantly talking past each other, endlessly misunderstanding each other. To be precise, even each time you use the word "cat" you will mean something slightly different. Apparently, then, you are using a different word each and every time you use the same token.

Language is much like organisms in this way, and the identity of words is akin to the identity of living organisms. If identity requires a perfect, univocal copy, then you must have no persistent identity.

we do not mean the exact same, identical thing — Leontiskos

Correct. Unsure that it follows that communication is impossible. Its imprecise, for sure.

endlessly misunderstanding each other. — Leontiskos

Yep. And our efforts in communication are to minimize the misunderstanding.

If identity cannot be partial, then you must have no persistent identity. — Leontiskos

Correct. And this question (of personal identity, what it might mean, and how it might obtain/what it might consist in) is actually the exact mission of my (about to get underway) philosophical career. It's possible that some form of special pleading has to accepted for the term "personal identity" to have any meaning.

It is different to say, "Good is different from أخلاقي," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem. — Leontiskos

That's why I said if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as 'moral' then they might not have a conception of good.

Do you have a conception of أخلاقي?

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan. — Leontiskos

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word أخلاقي. — Leontiskos

If they have a concept of "flourishing", and if this concept is different to their concept of "أخلاقي", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "أخلاقي" and "good" don't mean the same thing.

(1) is also partially true and partially false — Leontiskos

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word أخلاقي. — Leontiskos

If their concept of "flourishing" is different to their concept of "أخلاقي", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "أخلاقي" and "good" don't mean the same thing. — Michael

But that in no way contradicts what I said. :chin:

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word. — Michael

Well that's what you said, and that's what your logic requires. Here is what you said, 'So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral".' All along you have been searching for this one-to-one correspondence between an English word and an Arabic word, and have been basing your arguments on this idea.

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient. — Michael

Sure, but I've addressed this sort of thing:

Thus to properly interact with an individual's predication or definition must involve bringing to bear either communal meaning or else your own counter-individual meaning (it's either "we don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for us" or "I don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for me" because...).

As I see it, your meta-error is that you attempt to disagree, yet without managing to properly interact in the way just set out. You are effectively doing something akin to saying, "But what if the token g-o-o-d doesn't mean 'promotes flourishing'?"

(Philosophers like Aristotle and Wittgenstein are right to pay attention to common use. It's just that common use isn't the be-all end-all for philosophical discussion.) — Leontiskos

Common use is a perfectly good starting point for a definition. Indeed it is the prima facie definition. So to object to defining a word according to common use, without providing a further objection to the definition in question, is a meta-error on your part. You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection.

@Michael, I sort of think you are laboring under a cousin of the thesis that J. L. Austin opposed, namely the idea that words can't do things. "If 'good' is that which conduces to flourishing, then 'good' is a word which moves, motivates, and acts upon us. But words are descriptive; they can't do that sort of thing. So 'good' can't mean that."

It's a strange mixture of the is-ought divorce, Moore's Open Question, and a purely descriptive understanding of language. You seem to hold, a priori, that words like 'good' and 'moral' cannot bear on action or motivation. You say things like, "I will act thus and such whether or not I deem my action to be good or moral. Whether it is good or moral makes no difference to the way I act."

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing — Leontiskos

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument falters. He argues that because we use the word "good" to describe acts which are conducive to flourishing then "good" means "conducive to flourishing". That just doesn't follow.

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument faulters. — Michael

Well that dovetails nicely with the point I made <just above>, but let me rephrase my statement:

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection.

Of course, it is possible that there are words you would never personally use, having no reason to ever affirm the meaning that the word conveys.

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection. — Leontiskos

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste".

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste". — Michael

Well in that case you are claiming that 'good' involves flourishing, but that flourishing does not exhaust goodness. This is precisely the sort of thing that requires an argument, as I have said repeatedly. You are obliged to give a reason for your claim that flourishing does not exhaust goodness if you are to partake in philosophical discussion.

Note that this is similar to the problem of induction. Meaning is induced from our experience of use. If you think that someone has not had sufficient experience to make an induction about meaning, and they must stop short at correlation, then you must either show them their mistake or at least give a reason for why you believe they have made a mistake in the first place. If @Bob Ross says, "Well I witnessed the word being used 7,390 times, and each time it was used in this manner, therefore it means thus and such," you can't merely say, "Ah, but 7,390 isn't sufficient. You're at the level of description or correlation, not meaning and knowledge." These would be claims without justification. It is dissent without substantive argument, like, "Nu-uh!"

It's that same question you never manage to answer:

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good. — Michael

And how do you propose that we determine the meaning of the word "good"? — Leontiskos

Well in that case you are claiming that 'good' involves flourishing, but that flourishing does not exhaust goodness. — Leontiskos

Nowhere in saying "some people use the word 'good' to describe chastity" am I saying anything about flourishing.

Nowhere in saying "some people use the word 'good' to describe chastity" am I saying anything about flourishing. — Michael

You have successfully evaded the question at hand yet again. Claim thy prize.

Given that I haven't said what you've accused me of saying, your questions are misplaced.

I appreciate your elaborate response! — Bob Ross

No worries! I am nothing if not pedantically elaborate. I know it can be a good thing, but not necessarily. I promise my intent is as good as I can make it currently.

Unfortunately, it is so long that I am having a hard time knowing where to start (and end), — Bob Ross

Quote entire response/post and copy the opening tag. Then when you read until you need to answer, close the quote with the ending tag and answer. Paste the opening tag from the copy buffer and on you go until you finish.

so let me just respond to the key points (that I was able to decipher from your post). You let me know if there is anything in particular you would like to discuss (that I may have perhaps overlooked). — Bob Ross

No worries! That is my general state of affairs. Sometimes I am life the Mask from the movie, 'Somebody stop me!'

Firstly, you seem to be still thinking that The Good requires “a second-order inclusion of meaning” (presumably a standard) which I am overlooking. I say to this, that it does not have any such thing. — Bob Ross

Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.

I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality. That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'. And if you believe that killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is likely immoral or a principle of only 'my morality'.

With behavior we must speak in terms of motivation or WHY someone does something. I do not mean with any idea of morality in mind. I mean just the simple act of doing something. A why is required. The why can often be boiled down to a single emotion, desire.

So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality. If you cannot or more to the point will not address this glaring error, it is not hard for me to know where to begin. It is imminently clear that self-indulgence is your guiding light, a very unwise point of view for a philosopher, a lover of wisdom. This digresses but, I hope you get my point. Moral subjectivism is what I refer to as chaos apology. It is only a shamed nod to desire as wisdom.

Due to perfection, this is actually true. But the path of desire alone is fraught with the peril, the immoral side, of self-indulgence. The basic pattern is either always true or never was true only. Desire -> Greed -> Wisdom? No. One case. Following desire can be bad. Self-indulgence subjectivity is 'wrong'/'unreal'/'immoral'. But this is not just a suggestion. It's the law of reality.

The truth is we must properly mix desire with other emotions to attain balance (wisdom). Subjectivism is a gross submission to desire.

Secondly, you ask what ‘flourishing’ is? I would say that it is the ‘optimal or sufficient actualization of goals’. — Bob Ross

Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition. Nope. It has to be more primal. And even the triangle one breaks down at a high enough filter level. The critic at higher detail says "This triangle is here! That one is there! You should say 'trianglehere' and 'trianglethere' and give rise to the German language. You are wrong! Blah blah blah."

There IS a second order trouble when you speak of the good. In fact its not even that easy. The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.

I use it very similarly to ‘happiness’, except that I think that ‘happiness’ has a certain connotation of ‘feeling pleasant’ that I wish to avoid. — Bob Ross

this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.

"Satisfaction = death" - me.

Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering. Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom. Unnecessary suffering is immorality defined. The only debate in the universe is where that line is between necessary and unnecessary.

Despite colloquial mainstream annoyances like all definitions, words really do need to conform to better meaning, consistent meaning. Ambiguity is acceptable. You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.

Being avoidant about what is, ... does not help at all. Confidence (anger) demands that fear recede. And desire demands we move towards truth and perfection. Avoidance is objectively immoral. :) Again, some of this is kidding, but, it's kidding on the square as Al Franken would say.

Flourishing is sufficient realization over time relative to a goal (or goals). — Bob Ross

Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really. And then you are forced as well to explicitly state an infinitude of cases because you must pin down the particulars. There is no over-arching category that applies. You are ... lost amid the infinite seas of chaos/desire. Subjectivity is disintegration, a lack of wisdom, finally.

You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.

Thirdly, you seem to also worry, subsequently, that flourishing may be subjective, which I deny. — Bob Ross

What? Eh ...

OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective. And we are not perfect/objective so we often fail and we fail in a myriad of ways. The only hope we have is that there is something in the universe that is flawless, perfect, and gives rise therefore to desire itself, the entire emotion in every sense. That is objective moral truth, the GOOD.

Experience is subjective. Morality is objective.
When you discuss yours and mine all you are discussing is errors. That is to say how far our choice vectors deviate from the actual objective direction emotionally to objective moral truth (the GOOD).

What is the guide?

The guide is happiness as a scale.

Just like the GOOD is objective and we properly speak in terms of more or less GOOD only and not evil per say, this confuses subjectivists, we also then speak of the consequence of choosing more and more GOOD which is more and more happiness. You could also say they are less unhappy. That is what the other thread was about. Further, if one does understand the discrete virtue structure of morality, one can understand that this reward consequence mechanism can seem to be in error (but only because we do not perfectly understand it). Increasing behavioral strength returns virtue divided happiness. So, if one is smart one becomes over time immorally content (satisfaction = death) with getting only the smart virtue return on happiness. The difficulty to excel at what one is not ... good ... at becomes too much to face. It's easier just to press the known buttons.

This non flaw in reality which supports objective morality as a conclusion is the reason why a serial killer can be 'amazingly' happy. Its the most happy they have ever been but its not genuinely happy. This thing I call genuine happiness is a resonation with perfection, the desire source. If it is authentic it can only point in a singular direction of meaning, e.g. objective. If that serial killer were taught and could learn (structures and chemical states as a confluence of pre existing choices make such transitions super hard {moral choice is always the hardest}) This is observed in every way. It takes an EQ to sense it, to 'feel' it in a balanced way across all emotions.

The wise have this trait, this balance and can 'see beyond' exemplars of singular virtues. Inexactlyasmuch as people love to clap for physical things star athletes do, they do not usually do so with intelligence (because this is too threatening to the observer that realizes that they are out of their depth {avoidance}). That is one meta level difference, just like triangle would be say to kinds of triangles. But there is a worse, more, exponential shift. That shift is from any virtue to all virtues, e.g. between intelligence and wisdom. So people were too terrified to admit intellectual success even though it plays out right before them. They did not understand it. The guy just teleported! Arthur C Clark is spinning in his magical grave. But amplify that to a higher level. Intelligence recoils in every way when faced with wisdom if the observer of the exemplar is the one and not the other. This recoil is meta level worse than the int to str example. It is the source of the concept of Nihilism, denial of meaning, objective meaning.

To take your example, it is entirely possible that a society could be flourishing relative to their own goal of sacrificing babies (to whatever extent they want)—just like how a psychopath serial killer can be happy by torturing other people—but this is not the highest Good. — Bob Ross

I mean you as a subjectivist just said, '... it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you. If everything is possibly good finally, then nothing is good. Good vanishes. And you certainly cannot by your own stance forbid anyone else's radical nonsense as not good. You have no basis.

I suppose I should say: The existence of desire proves that there is one good. The failure of desire is hearing the signal of objective morality wrong because <choice error>. It takes effort to choose the good. Variations in intent are only errors except for one of them.

Here is the quintessential Pragmatic immoral failure writ small explained:
True Statement: 'Death is preferable to immorality.' - me
Pragmatic Delusion: 'No way! I matter! I am different in how I matter. I am not you. You are not me. You have to live as a positive. Survival #1'

The lowest Good, afterall, is, by my own concession, egoism — Bob Ross

No. A much better definition for the lowest good is 'nothing'. I'm not going to bother defending that because my ego is something. And that's better than nothing. Oh wait, I just defended it!

and some intermediate level is a society which has set out goals which make them fulfilled (pyschologically) by sacrificing some babies, — Bob Ross

Nope.

this 'fulfillment' is delusional. It partakes of the good because everything must. But its relative goodness is and will be measurable. And the relativity is to an objective standard as a referential frame, the only one that matters, unchanging, truth.

but the highest Good is the ultimate sight for the eyes of the moral, virtuous man. — Bob Ross

Yes perfection, one and only one thing, objective. You are arguing my point for me.

You seem to have forgotten that The Good, under this view, has levels. — Bob Ross

Yes, but, those levels only serve to inform us where the top is. Perfection, unique, one way.

Flourishing, as I have defined it, is relative to goals/purposes; and from this one can abstract the highest form of The Good, which is everything flourishing [relative to their own goals]. — Bob Ross

It great that you can selfishness, self-indulgence, and pretend it is wisdom. It is also terrifying and morally corrupt. It is pandering to chaos/desire.

Therefore, what that society is doing, in your example, is factually wrong (in light of the highest Good). — Bob Ross

i agree but you are arguing the objectivist point of view and just do not realize it. Ok call an apple and orange and we will all just walk around carefully remembering that to support your 'special' subjective reality. Nope. I don't have time. I don't have patience. And I am not just attacking you here, I am humoring the scenario as I show my point of view.

Facts are only a subset of beliefs.
Wrong and right must be judged by a standard. You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct. Yeeesh! But if they are not always objectively correct then something external to 'fact' is superior. That something is objective truth.

The value weight of any relationship imaginable morally causes all order in the universe. Were this not the case the chaos would overwhelm the objective truth and disintegration, the consquence of imperfect desire, would rip the universe apart. In fact what is not understood and that is because its so hard to understand, that if subjective morals were how things are, then that disintegration of the universe would be instantaneous always. So those possible universes are by definition cancelled out. This one has existence! Thank you objective morality! Let get busy correcting everyone's errors (that they foolishly call 'their morality')

This form of the Good, as the form or relation of flourishing, is not subjective: — Bob Ross

Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective. The only thing that is not subjective is morality. The objective nature of morality ... provides for ... the fulcrum of choice, free will. This is why we ... cannot ... be objective. We can intend toward perfect objectivity, perfection, the GOOD, only. What we achieve ... will be ... subjective, not objective. Just ask any two people!

But the underlying system with the stability to allow for existence is objective morality. The orderly rule of the universe is that the chaos of free will is the only thing there is. This causes subjective experience and makes one prone to the foolishness of subjective morality.

what it means for a particular person to flourish is relative to their own goals, but what it means to flourish (in general) is not; — Bob Ross

Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.

and flourishing of all, as the highest Good, does not waver with opinion. So you are partially correct in inferring that what it means to flourish is going to have that subjective element of being relative to a goal, but that itself, in form, is objective. I do not get to choose what it means to flourish, but what it means for me to flourish is. — Bob Ross

No no, you are confusing being, current state, with meaning, which is timeless.
You again here basically stated that morality was objective, and then you say that what happened is objective. OK, if we say it's dead in the past then it was done and cannot be undone.

But what does that matter? We are discussing meaning here.

If twenty people can remember things differently, and they can, then what objectively happened would have no meaning anyway. The subjectivist MUST admit that any interpretation, however inaccurate, is acceptable. That is true unless accuracy is objectively good. What is this good thing? How do you define accurate without the good? You cannot.

Joke: I say accurate is to miss by 50% of the space of any aim, you know, keep things organic, Feng Shiu. Subjectivists must accept and defend that as not immoral by definition. That just 'their morality'. That is what good is to them. So, no, you're just comically wrong.

You cannot define accuracy itself without the good. No virtue can be defined.

Fourthly, you briefly asserted, without any real elaboration on any positive argument for it, a ‘brevity principle’: “As far as humanity can tell using all its resources to date that are widely known enough to be discussed, morality has to have been objective since at least the expected dawn of time.” I honestly did not understand why this would be the case nor why it is called the brevity principle. — Bob Ross

I named it and invented it. I can call pants pants if I want.

The infinity of time (possible) is much much less in units than it is back to when we think time began until now. Thus we are discussing an admittedly brief time in the history of the multiverse. Hence the name.

It would be the case that this is indeed a partial support for objective morality, because the laws of the universe so far seem consistent and stable from now back to then. That's all we 'know'. The future is unknown. So, since there has been stability enough for us to make these observations and communicate them, there ... is ... an objective scenario of meaning in the universe. At least for this brief amount of time between the start of time and now. If you are discussing subjective morality as an outer envelope, the 'way things are' for real, then you must wait until the end of a stable universe to demonstrate your point as this current reality shows quite the opposite.

Fifthly, I think you are misunderstanding, or perhaps we just disagree, on the implications of moral subjectivism; and, more importantly, the nature of desire. Just to briefly quote you:

What subjectvists do not understand is this short and simple: If morality were subjective all stability as 'good' is not something you can put forth or depend on. You have embraced pure chaos.

This is not true at all if moral subjectivism is true, nor is it true of the nature of desire. Desire—i.e., will—is subjective, but it is by-at-large very persistent, as opposed to whimsical: people are psychological motivated by the deepest depths of their psyche, which their ‘ego’ has no direct access to, and this evolves very slowly. People depend on their desires all the time and with quite impressive precision and for large lengths of time. The only kind of chaos that might occur due to moral subjectivism is people’s fundamental desires may not agree with other people’s. — Bob Ross

You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.

I should stop there because that is the whole truth but ...

The source of accurate desire is perfection, the objective moral GOOD. To say there is a source, to depend on it as you do, means you ARE a moral realist and you are just putting different window dressing on your religion. Christianity has fallen out of vogue, let's decorate with Islam this year!

NOTHING can pre-inform the desire a priori if you are trying to defend moral subjectivism.

Sixthly and finally, you claimed that objective morality provides free will equally to subjects; which is not true at all. Firstly, it is clear that all animals of the animal kingdom (including humans) have varying degrees of free will, — Bob Ross

indeed. Amplitude of moral agency is not relevant to outcomes.
Intent is superior to consequence. It precedes it.
Consequence is not really relevant except to inform future intents. The basis of Consequentialism is delusional.

All you are saying is 'evolution, man' and I agree. The alive universe evolves moral agency only, the breadth of free will and the ability to enact it, empowerment. This process is ONLY the earning of wisdom at some level. Of course, there are varying degrees. That entirely misses the real point.

The real point is that this process of evolution may take many paths, but all of them are pulled by desire and that is sourced in perfection, in objective moral truth, the GOOD.

This is necessarily a convergence of meaning to a single perfect point.

From any moral current state, there is one and only one path to the final perfect and singular point. That path is the most good path or intent for that moral agent right now. If they move or change their moral state then the vector to the GOOD changes based NOT ON THE GOOD, but on their failure quality of choice only. In other words we are talking about ONLY their errors, not 'their morality', the term 'my morality' is incoherent. Subjective moral assertion is incoherent. Is it disintegration only, chaos.

Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross

(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).

No.

Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.

Ever more complex patterns evolve to express more and more emerging amplitude of power, e.g. moral agency. This is why a table is very limited in its choices. It's mostly table. Table, table. But then when we get to life which is a normal emergence, expected, obvious; we see a meta level 'leap' in moral agency from jellyfish to Republican to animal to human. (That was a joke people, even if in poor taste. I am sorry.) That is all because morality is objective. The direction to the GOOD is one way, brother-man. Step into the light Carol Anne!

Man's ability to cognize is arguably mildly better than the table. Yes. Table, table. Malkovich, Malkovich! But let's not get all puffed chest about it. let's assume the pattern is a resonance from something more fundamental. Why? Because nits make lice! Keep following the source question until its realize that meaning proceeds endlessly from meaning, but, that amid this circular logic, there is a pattern, and not just the circle. Amid that pattern there are many patterns. When we get to the highest dimension of meaning that we humans are currently capable of that I can swim in/on, we see that only one direction for each virtue and thus one integrated direction for all virtues is ... GOOD. There is no other more appropriate word for it.

To sully the term GOOD with subjective delusion is ... you guessed it ... immoral.

Don't worry we are all constantly immoral in infinite ways. So that is not a vile accusation. It's only a tautology. But accepting the obvious evidence that morality is objective despite a sea of subjective errors about it all being partially interesting only, is ... better ... than any other corresponding belief scenario.

Thirdly, if morality is objective, then it says nothing about what free will we may or may not have: it says what we should be doing or/and what is good to do. — Bob Ross

It does. You are precisely right. I could not have said it better myself. You are strong in moral realism, just not in correct labelling.

Opinions only, subjective guesses as to objective truth. Eh, I get shot anyway, despite just being a messenger.

That, I must say, was the most fabulously entertaining dissertation.

Having a long-standing inclination for analyzing perceived dialectical subtleties, I’ll be interested in Bob’s response.

'Mind-independent' is a fascinating rug to sweep things under as a term. That mind-independent state is natural law. But this correct observation of mind-independent absolutely does not mean differing from mind to mind as you are fooling yourself into believing.

You are mistaking the error(s) of subjective choice for signal error. There is no signal error. It is perfect. The error is from ... you, ... us ... choice. Repeat it with me now, 'free will'! Can I get an Amen! {I am not religious - this is only humor}

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real. As in error-independent, as in choice-independent. The signal, the form, is still perfect as a law of the universe. It seems unattainable and we should assume that from all choices the limit as x approaches perfect is ... (sorry math), perfect seeming but not really perfect. To anyone significantly lower in wisdom than the chooser that choice would seem perfect and be both insanely compelling and damnably hard to get to, so terrifying as a GOOD-aimed example. {C'mon Leroy! Lower those expectations! the rest of us are just trying to do the daily grind. We (don't want to be)/aren't angels (because that is too hard to choose).

The trouble is that that definition is in error (like all extant choice always is, such choices not being possibly perfect). So, how can this Chet guy, howling interloper, explain that bit of conjecture?

Let's see. {Brace for underwhelming impact}

What is love? {Baby don't hurt me ...}

Love is all, everything, the system that includes the GOOD as the unique point amid a realm of meaning of pure perfection in choice, thus clearly indicating objective moral truth.

So, I reiterated my definition of GOOD there in text without specifically calling it out. So I am now, just to hit the nail again (everything IS a nail).

New premise/hypothesis: Nothing in the universe does not partake of mind. Oops! That would mean there is no such thing possible in existence as mind-independent states. Just so, I'm afraid.

The only thing you can say properly is this: The mind is always there. Its a singular field in reality. It emerges differently depending on the person, the body. But if we then relate that separate part of mind to that body only, we can delude ourselves. What we say when we think we are saying 'mind-independent' is really 'this-mind-independent', just another reductionist failure. You did not get particular enough. And even if you demand petulantly that minds are separate, that is only your belief (in error I might add).

What Ken Wilbur would call the Noosphere in his 'A Brief History of Everything' is nothing but mind. But if we can even remotely assume that the universe is consciousness, and I do, so we can, all Noosphere elements are ... linked ... in some way. What is that linkage that allows for your then magical clumping of related things into 'flourish'? That linkage is consciousness itself, a unified field. NOTHING is independent finally of that state, all. Therefore, the Noosphere, is part of ALL, part of everything. There is no person, no Malkovich, no table, that can claim to be dispossessed of a connection to mind. Mind is finally only one thing, 'the' mind. So, speaking of mind-independent states is speaking of delusion only.

If you want to say one person's mind, or the mind of each person, you still err. That is because these separations YOU prefer deny you then the ability to group the patterns because we retreat to German here and say thismindmorality and thatmindmorality and grouping is not possible. If you admit to the possibility then you are left with a continuum of Noosphere like mind/mind(s). The delusional separation of ego and identity are properly shed, the sub-part of consciousness 'belongs' in the continuum and the connection IS NOT independent in any way. There is in fact no way to separate this and that mind. Emergent mind is only plugged into consciousness of all. It is a part. It is connected. The body antennae is confusing you as a separation. But it's just a conduit, as mentioned, an antennae, for the pervasive signal of love which includes the GOOD as a part.

{As an aside I will add that only rising moral agency allows us the power to utilize what is already there in the signal of love, the GOOD, by, you guessed it, choosing it as a direction in intent. The fact that minds seem to even the observant to be disconnected is only an error in observation giving rise to the error in belief. This demonstrates the point I am making in another way. In time, with inevitable evolution, the body/mind instantiation will be empowered to clearly see that no mind was ever in the history of the universe independent from the 'all mind', wu, wu, wu (true, true, true). Where have you gone, old quaint error of choice? You were so delusionally fun (because you were easy to choose), true true true {sung to the tune of Mrs Robinson by Simon and Garfunkel. }

It is the GOOD within love that originates desire and shows us all a singular direction. And it is the flaws in choice, in all choices that misinterpret this direction and thus intend or aim in the wrong direction, perhaps still convinced they alone see the right path (when they are wrong). But this plethora of errors and directions do converge throughout reality and amid groups with no contact. Over time they converge infinitely. The converge upon a single point. That is the perfect GOOD. That shows the proof for moral realism, objective morality, singular, not dependent upon errors in choice and belief is only a choice set.

{No Germans were hurt in the making of this post. Any proximity real or imagined to actual Germans is fully intended and as humor only. No negative intent was intentionally intended. Pax! Agape! Anal nathrak uthvas bethod dohiel tienveh! Void in California (obviously)}

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real. — Chet Hawkins

Yeah, but you've totally avoided ever (I mean, over multiple threads now) letting us know what your formulation for objective morality is.
What's it grounded in? How is it measured (Happiness, already having been rejected by you as a measure)?

and I do, so we can — Chet Hawkins

Ah. Feel free to not respond to me if I seem too combative :P I'm unsure we can get anywhere.

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real.
— Chet Hawkins

Yeah, but you've totally avoided ever (I mean, over multiple threads now) letting us know what your formulation for objective morality is. — AmadeusD

I suspect objective morality only. It is a theory for me. I cannot prove anything. No one can really. My arguments are to support my suspicion.

What's it grounded in? How is it measured (Happiness, already having been rejected by you as a measure)? — AmadeusD

This is precisely incorrect.

I asserted that happiness is a measure. But care must be taken. Disingenuous or partial happiness is often claimed as genuine happiness. This confuses the unwise.

One virtue may be extremely high in a moral agent and their expression of that virtue, so high, will return a high happiness result that blinds them to lower happiness returns from other virtues.

But and still, the other virtues, all virtues, are required for wisdom. So there is much more work to be done.

Still, measuring happiness is one correct approach to understanding objective moral truth.

In fact part of the original argument for subjective morality here in Bobs OP was that existence is good or more existence is better. I agree. Why is that though? It is because more leads to a higher value on some virtue axis.

But wisdom is pursuing higher values on ALL virtue axes at the same time. And wisdom is realizing that the lowest virtue value of all virtues is the limit to wisdom. Failures show more strongly than the strengths. In fact, due to the interaction among virtues, being very high on one or just a few is an impediment to earning wisdom, because that high happiness return gets in the way of earning more wisdom. It becomes lazily easy to just accept what one can muster.

But subjective morality would literally require that from one day to the next there could be a defendable 180 degree shift in what is good. The reason that does not happen realistically is because morality is much more stable than that. It's objective.

But examples abound in the real world where people fight for immorality or a set of immoral desires against others that have similar immoral desires. But amid that fight there is always or usually a pretense towards some ideal. Why? Why bother if morality is subjective? It's because happiness is being returned to those that believe they fight for the GOOD.

and I do, so we can
— Chet Hawkins

Ah. Feel free to not respond to me if I seem too combative :P I'm unsure we can get anywhere. — AmadeusD

In general I respond. I am an anger type person. Combat is acceptable.

given your response here I’m not interested in discussing further. Take care and see you around the forum :)

Might be way late on this, but as noted in the other thread, practice! Hoping it makes per....sort of good. LOL.

Absolutely no worries! I appreciate your responses.

We know what a triangle is because its conditions are contained in its concept.

One only knows what is contained in a concept after abducing/inducing that very concept. Prior to learning what a triangle is, with your faculty of reason, you did not know anything about it; so it doesn’t help to know, generically, that a concept, by definition, contains the essence of its referent.

My point starting from the particulars to the universals, is methodological: our faculty of reason only obtains concepts fundamentally from abduction/induction and not deduction. Deduction comes in after we already have abduced/induced something.

We can't do that with 'good'. There is no a priori conception. It must be derived from particulars.. Imo

Firstly, when I am talking about abducing/inducing concepts, I am not talking about our faculty of understanding (i.e., our cognition responsible for producing our conscious experience) but, rather, our faculty of reason (i.e., our cognition responsible for self-reflectively analyzing our conscious experience). We do not come to know what a triangle is a priori with our faculty of reason; albeit our faculty of understanding already is familiar with it a priori. E.g., a newborn baby can immediately represent to themselves a triangle within their conscious experience but they cannot represent abstractly, over-and-above their conscious experience, what the concept of a triangle is: I am interested in the latter, for all intents and purposes.

The Good is not normative. — Bob Ross

Agreed. That which may or may not be good, as in instances of, is.

I would say that the instances of good are also non-normative.

The metaphysical argument being, one cannot know (appreciate, consider, allow….whatever) a thing as good, without the quality itself being resident in consciousness somewhere, somehow, over and above mere experience. Same with beauty, justice, and so on.

I didn’t follow this part: can you please elaborate?

On the other hand, your triangle example doesn’t work the same as the ideal of The Good, in that it is impossible to think a triangle in general, for each though of one is immediately a particular instance of the conception. The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

I would say that The Good is not an ideal: is an conception; and, consequently, can be applied to every particular just like a triangle. The Good is identical to flourishing. An ideal that one could formulate from The Good is striving towards a reality with the highest form of Good, which is universal flourishing in a universally harmonious way.

So a fairly basic way to overcome the egoist's objection is to recognize that there are common goods, the benefit of which is in our private interest. Think of the mother who nourishes her child and sees the good of her child as her own good; or the father who finds his own good in the good of his family, or the soldier who makes sacrifices for the good of his nation, which is his own good. A bright dividing line between "my good" and "others' good" does not exist in reality. People regularly (and without intellectual recognition) come to recognize others' good as their own good

This is a good way, indeed, to get people to generally care, to some extent, about others; but it does not overcome egoism: it merely explicates the incoherence of basic, standard egoism that the stereotypical narcissist is going adhere to. They don’t recognize that, actually, if they only care about their own flourishing then this entails they should, to some extent, care about others.

Truly overcoming egoism, in all its forms, requires the individual to transcend their own good and do things for the sole sake of the good of something which is not themselves. If one does something for someone else for their own sake, then they are not doing for that person’s sake.

However, the more I have thought about egoism, I would say that you are absolutely right that egoism and altruism blend together when properly understood; because being purely selfless is to just take advantage of oneself—to not see one’s own worth—and being purely selfish in a narcissistic way generally is incoherent. But being both egoistic and altruistic, in a balance, allows for optimal flourishing.






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