Deacon makes it clear beyond doubt he endorses bottom-up causation from the material to the absentially material i.e., towards mind and its intentions. — ucarr

In that case, it sounds like the terminology "absential materialism" is incoherent.

I am more in the direction of a dualist. A dualist accepts both mind and matter as different substance, like from Descartes. Hence I acknowledge matter exists as material substance, and mind exists as mental substance. — Corvus

If I read you correctly, you say you’re in the direction of a Cartesian substance dualist; you say matter exists as material substance and mind exists as mental substance. Moreover, as I read your implication, you’re implying with your attacks upon absential materialism that, regarding material substance and mental substance, never the twain shall meet.

If I’m correctly reading the core of your counter to my thesis, you’re arguing that interweaving material substance with mental substance towards a non-local materialism that situates cognition and rational designs within material substance and yet with mental substance as an emergent, radically quasi-independent property is a stillborn thesis.

You have made an important declaration that establishes your stance in this conversation:

Please bear in mind that all meanings are mental, logical and conceptual, viz NON MATERIAL and NON PHYSICAL even if they are the product of the physical brain. — Corvus

Now I juxtapose your stance with your below declaration:

No I don't think I was going on sentiment at all. I was just letting the OP know why he was confused when he posts an addlepated questions like "
If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me?
— ucarr
, when I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind. — Corvus

I assert the last part of your declaration (in bold) shows your substance dualism at the point where the rubber meets the road and complexity enters the situation. I further assert that with advent of this complexity, you make a close approach to acknowledgement of the truth of Deacon’s core belief that mind emerged from matter.

The core issue of this conversation is articulation of the structure of connection linking mind with matter in the mode of Deacon’s theme: that mind emerged from matter. This clause declares the interweave connecting matter and mind.

In your stance, you declare a hard boundary between material substance and mental substance. Your job now is to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind, nonetheless inhabits a structure featuring a hard partitioning of brain from mind. Per your stance as a hard-boundary dualist, you must explain a structure wherein the hard-partitioning (like parallellism) of brain/mind at the same time features brain as a precondition for mind.

…when I talk about a metaphysical Causal Principle (e.g. Energy) producing changes in Matter, I place it in a philosophical category more like metaphysical Essence (identity ; meaning). That's because Potential/Energy/Essence has no material properties : mass, hardness, plasticity. Energy's primary property is Causation. So, I'm making a philosophical distinction, not a scientific classification. — Gnomon

Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal?

Under Deacon’s influence I’ve learned to speculate temporal direction in application to the mind/body problem might be significant rather than trivial. You talk of metaphysical principles being causal. Might it be more correct to say metaphysical principles describe causation?

When an elementary particle decays into two of its constituent particles, physicists don’t typically characterize this event as being metaphysics in action. No, this transformation is unambiguous as a physical process. On the other hand, sound reasoning within philosophy of science may very well describe particle decay in terms of a general structure governing all forms of particle decay. That would be a description of a type of patterned particle decay. If philosophy of science thinkers, digging deeper, discover that patterned particle decay bespeaks the essential nature of science across all of its disciplines, then perhaps that would be a metaphysical description of foundational scientific truth. To say metaphysical statements, in of themselves, cause physical processes mischaracterizes metaphysics. It’s a blurry confusion of language and its meaning with physical processes.

That self-organizing processes working through nested tiers of upwardly evolving dynamics lead a trail of interconnection from it to bit seems to me, per the brilliant analysis of Deacon, foundational truth.

The revelation is that physical processes and their grammar of existence I.e., metaphysics, are all of one piece temporally speaking. The metaphysical description of physical processes has no causal force whatsoever. Instead, physical processes transpire, brains and minds emerge and, eventually, grammatical descriptions of the physical processes instantiate as language.

Metaphysical understandings of physical truths are logically prior to physical processes as interpretive overviews of types of physical processes and their interrelations.

Energy's primary property is Causation. — Gnomon

Can you elaborate further your insightful characterization of energy as causation?

Mass-energy changing form under conservation - definitely a physical phenomenon - expresses as a transformation dynamo. What can you tell us about the QM version of causation?

Sidebar - Perhaps a particular analysis of this characterization can empower us to use $e = mc^2$ as a guide for building instead of destroying. Visualizing blockchains of causal sequences as a waveform with probability attached and statistically analyzable reads like global economics.

Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal? — ucarr

I'm not aware of any specific discussion of "Metaphysics" in Incomplete Nature ; that word is not in the index. Also, the unscientific word "spirit" is not in the index. Besides, Deacon --- as a scientist --- seems to deliberately avoid making specific philosophical conjectures, such as you mentioned, beyond a space-time context. But other people have referred to the book as a "metaphysics of incompleteness".

Regarding temporal priority, he typically restricts his remarks to spatio-temporal settings. Therefore, I suppose you will have to make your own conjectures about the "co-eternal" interrelationship between "spirit" (immaterial potential?) and "nature (material actuality). What do you think? Is Potential temporally prior to Actual, or is Potential timeless and Actual time-bound? Is "spirit" an eternal changeless principle, and "nature" a temporal ever-changing system of matter & energy? On the other hand, his use of "teleology" is indeed a philosophical concept, that goes beyond the space-time constraints of Science. :smile:

Under Deacon’s influence I’ve learned to speculate temporal direction in application to the mind/body problem might be significant rather than trivial. You talk of metaphysical principles being causal. Might it be more correct to say metaphysical principles describe causation? — ucarr

Of course Time is an important factor for perishable material bodies, and minds are dependent on bodies. So yes, Time is significant for making sense of the Mind/Body problem. However, philosophical principles are imaginary concepts, and not subject to the ravages of Time. I suppose the "metaphysical principle" you referred to is Energy, as if it was a philosophical concept. But I would say that Energy is instead a practical physical concept, while EnFormAction is a theoretical philosophical conjecture. Yet both are referring to the invisible Cause behind the obvious Effects (changes) we see in nature. The names don't "describe" causation, but merely label a phenomenon that humans infer intuitively : that physical Change is somewhat mysterious. Which is why the ancients labelled "spiritual" phenomena in terms of causal agents, rather than natural forces. :cool:

When an elementary particle decays into two of its constituent particles, physicists don’t typically characterize this event as being metaphysics in action. — ucarr

Naturally! Physicists typically avoid any implication of Metaphysics in their descriptions of change. However, what you call "metaphysics in action" might be considered legitimate philosophical language. Since this is a Philosophy Forum, not a Physics Forum, the terminology would be expected to be different, and more focused on Ideas than Things. Deacon used the term "Absence" in lieu of more traditional philosophical appellations for immaterial (mental ; mathematical) notions. Scientists might prefer "statistical probability" to "absence" as the precursor of Actuality.

In a marginal note of Incomplete Nature, I said "Deacon missed the opportunity to summarize his "absence" and "aboutness" as metaphysical aspects of "Entention and Sentience". I suppose the absence of that philosophical term in a scientific work was intentional. :grin:

That self-organizing processes working through nested tiers of upwardly evolving dynamics lead a trail of interconnection from it to bit seems to me, per the brilliant analysis of Deacon, foundational truth. — ucarr

Yes, it was that "upward evolution" that Deacon labeled "Teleology", in contravention of scientific protocol that evolution is directionless. But the increase in complexity & integration & interconnection of systems over time is undeniable. So, he also described Evolution as "downward causation", as-if the program of physical form-change was directed from above. That teleological direction was also implicit in Wheeler's "it from bit" notion, where mental Information was prior to physical instances. Is such Teleology also a "foundational truth"? :wink:

The metaphysical description of physical processes has no causal force whatsoever. . . . Metaphysical understandings of physical truths are logically prior to physical processes as interpretive overviews of types of physical processes and their interrelations. — ucarr

Physical Truths are what philosophers refer to as Metaphysical Principles. Which are, by definition, logically prior to physical things and processes. So, the "causal force" of a Principle is in the before & after or if-then relationship. Traditionally, philosophers referred to Downward Causation as purposeful Teleology. But modern materialistic philosophers prefer to use the non-commital term Teleonomy. Personally, I find Teleology more descriptive, despite its implication of a Cosmic Mind as the First Cause. :nerd:

Is Potential temporally prior to Actual, or is Potential timeless and Actual time-bound?* — Gnomon

However, philosophical principles are imaginary concepts, and not subject to the ravages of Time. — Gnomon

This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them?

As I’ve suggestd already, I think metaphysics (as existential grammar) and nature are co-eternal. When a metaphysical description of a physical phenomenon frames it within a general structure, such as your claim energy has for its chief property causation, its an articulation of a conscious mind drawing upon what’s evidentially implied through the action of the phenomenon.

When science frames natural phenomena scientifically, viz. affords experimental statistics coupled with description of phenomena measurable, repeatable and public, it puts on a demonstration of abstractable principles co-temporal with the phenomena. Trying to claim abstract principles have independent existence from their grounding phenomena ignores the fact minds doing the abstracting are likewise grounded in brain phenomena.

I’m not charging you with making this erroneous claim of mental independence from brain because it’s not yet clear to me from your language whether you think that or not. Your staunch allegiance to shape-shifting between modes physical/non-physical, with the complication of in-betweenness distanced from both polarities, makes for a difficult stew of isms.

*Do you think time separable from phenomena?

Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

I would turn the question around, and ask if 'the law of the excluded middle' or 'the Pythagorean theorem' came into existence when humans first grasped them. It seems to me the answer is 'obviously not', that they would be discovered by rational sentient beings in other worlds, were they to have evolved. Yet they are the kinds of primitive concepts which constitute the basic furniture of reason.

Albert Einstein said

I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

I think that is true, but that it's also true that while the theorem might exist independently of man, it can only be understood by humans. So it's mind-independent, on one hand, but only perceptible to a mind, on the other.

The next question I would ask, in what sense do such principles exist? Is the Pythagorean Theorem 'out there somewhere' - a popular expression for whatever is thought to be real. To which I'd respond in the negative - such principles are not situated in space and time, neither are arithmetical primitives or the other fundamental constituents of rational thought. But due to the influence of empiricism on philosophy, the nature of such principles must be relegated to the subjective or attributed to what you describe as 'brain phenomena'. But notice that 'phenomena' means 'what appears' but that whatever we ascribe to the neural domain can only be a matter of inference; nothing actually appears in a brain as object of neuroscientific analysis, save patterns of bio-electrical activity. But it seems to me that in support of your materialist thesis, you must insist on the connection between abstract principles and neural configuration, to maintain the connection with a material substrate, as an 'output' or 'result' of 'neural activities'.

I'll leave it at that for now, I'm up to Deacon's discussion of homuncular arguments, where I think I am beginning to detect a hint of scientism poking through the verbiage.

Although I will add that it is precisely at that point in cultural development where reason discerns unchangeable principles underpinning the flux of experience, that metaphysics proper emerged.

The next question I would ask, in what sense do such principles exist? Is the Pythagorean Theorem 'out there somewhere' - a popular expression for whatever is thought to be real. To which I'd respond in the negative - such principles are not situated in space and time, neither are arithmetical primitives or the other fundamental constituents of rational thought. But due to the influence of empiricism on philosophy, the nature of such principles must be relegated to the subjective or attributed to what you describe as 'brain phenomena'. — Wayfarer

How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement?

Can you elaborate further your insightful characterization of energy as causation? — ucarr

I didn't think of "energy as causation" as insightful. I thought it was obvious. Perhaps the dictionary definition of energy as "ability" is vague. But even the notion of "force" as a mathematical "vector quantity" is less than clear. But then, the notion of "Causality" or "Causation" is more of a general philosophical concept than a specific physical phenomenon, in that it implies both Agency (executive) and Efficacy (ability). Actually, I consider the equation of "Information" (power to inform) and "Causation" (energy) to be more philosophically insightful. That notion probably goes back to Quantum theory, but Deacon discussed not only the causal role of Absence, but notes that its not-yet-real Potential was mostly overlooked in physical Science. :smile:

Energy is defined as the “ability to do work, which is the ability to exert a force causing displacement of an object.” Despite this confusing definition, its meaning is very simple: energy is just the force that causes things to move.
https://ingeniumcanada.org/scitech/education/tell-me-about/physics-of-energy

Causality is an abstraction that indicates how the world progresses. As such a basic concept, it is more apt as an explanation of other concepts of progression than as something to be explained by others more basic. The concept is like those of agency and efficacy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality

Information is an abstract concept that refers to that which has the power to inform.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information

Causation is the transfer of information
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_18

The Logical Dynamics of Information :
In his Incomplete Nature, Deacon extends a thermodynamic concept of energy to yield a description of complex processes in which absence plays a critical role in their emergence and evolution. Starting from a quantum-mechanical picture of energy as an energy-matter duality, the critical role of potential as well as actual properties of processes is also described in the new extension of logic to real phenomena, Logic in Reality (LIR) . . . . Their conjunction constitutes a new conceptual structure for exploring the relationship of information to materiality, that is, to the matter-energy that constitutes it as its carrier and/or substrate.
https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/4/676

What can you tell us about the QM version of causation? — ucarr

The main contribution of Quantum Mechanics to Causation theory was its statistical nature. By that I mean quantum events are not absolute Cause >>> Effect, but mathematically subject to random interaction, hence probable. The chain of Cause & Effect has gaps or weak links or non-linear links. Philosophically, I attribute that non-linear behavior --- as defined in the Schrodinger equation --- to the Holistic effects of Entanglement. Randomness and non-linearity are the primary differences between Classical Newtonian physics and Non-classical Quantum physics. Like immaterial Absence, this random causal Probability has not been duly appreciated in pragmatic Physics. :nerd:

PS___ I'll leave it to you to elaborate on your notion of Blockchains and Economics.

[deleted]

It is the same question that is the Sphinx riddle from the great pyramid complex called "The Hall of 2 Truths". & I find that it boils down to the circularity of the 3 axioms, in pvsnp, in a materialism vs. idealism showdown. Just imagining the world initially involved as a field of "~" [tildas] helps me visualize these kinds of questions down to basic components. That can then be wrapped around intellectually into categories. Once you break down any category with chaos theory then you can think nothing. Once you build a category and ground it, then everything from common sense becomes true again, as common sense. I actually have this figured out secretly and the govt. spied on me and stole credit for my work.

The next question I would ask, in what sense do such principles exist? Is the Pythagorean Theorem 'out there somewhere' - a popular expression for whatever is thought to be real. To which I'd respond in the negative - such principles are not situated in space and time, neither are arithmetical primitives or the other fundamental constituents of rational thought. But due to the influence of empiricism on philosophy, the nature of such principles must be relegated to the subjective or attributed to what you describe as 'brain phenomena'. But notice that 'phenomena' means 'what appears' but that whatever we ascribe to the neural domain can only be a matter of inference; nothing actually appears in a brain as object of neuroscientific analysis, save patterns of bio-electrical activity. But it seems to me that in support of your materialist thesis, you must insist on the connection between abstract principles and neural configuration, to maintain the connection with a material substrate, as an 'output' or 'result' of 'neural activities'. — Wayfarer

That's an excellent example of the difference in how the Materialist and Metaphysical worldviews imagine Ontological Existence. Ironically, imagination of abstractions, such as Principles, is not explainable in physical/material terms, except as philosophical metaphors. How anything immaterial or inferred or imaginary can "appear" in a gelatinous lump of matter is the essence of the "hard problem".

But Materialists seem to take that "magical" manifestation for granted, because it's so "natural" to the human mind. Yet they attribute that mysterious ability, to see the invisible, to a "neural correlate" of a metaphorical homunculus in the material brain. Many, if not most, philosophical Principles (noumena) are describable only by analogies to physical phenomena.

One of those imaginary notions is Absence, imagined -- like Zero -- as-if a physical place-holder for something real, but not yet manifest. That's what we call statistical "Potential" : what could be, but is not yet. It's like a prayer : Lord, please fill-in the blank with something tangible. :pray:

How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus

Deductive truths are inferred from rational principles. That It is true of any triangle doesn’t need to validated by observing every particular .

But with deference to Deacon, he is certainly no lumpen materialist. He holds up Francis Crick’s neural materialism as an example of same. I am suspicious of the claim of the necessity of a ‘neural substrate’, that an idea is only real if it is instantiated in a physical brain, but I’m still considering Deacon’s book.

Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

I would turn the question around, and ask if 'the law of the excluded middle' or 'the Pythagorean theorem' came into existence when humans first grasped them. It seems to me the answer is 'obviously not', that they would be discovered by rational sentient beings in other worlds, were they to have evolved. Yet they are the kinds of primitive concepts which constitute the basic furniture of reason.

Albert Einstein said
I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

I think that is true, but that it's also true that while the theorem might exist independently of man, it can only be understood by humans. So it's mind-independent, on one hand, but only perceptible to a mind, on the other. — Wayfarer

Here’s how I turn the question around and then pair it with the first form of the question:

Do minds contemplating abstract concepts exist independent of their objects of contemplation?
AND
Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them?

Now we have a real doozy of an obverse couplet. My answer to the question observed in both configurations is no. The two are never independent of each other. Deacon’s central theme is the spacetimatical connection linking consciousness with its subjects and vice versa.

Imagine the race of Numerians exist a billion years before advent of humans. The Numerians become aware of the Pythagorean Theorem and then eventually go extinct. Does the Pythagorean Theorem exist before the advent of the Numerians? Depends. If another, still more antecedent race pre-dating the Numerians exists, then yes. If not, meaning no minds in existence anywhere, then no. After extinction of the Numerians, does the Pythagorean Theorem exist? Depends. If another conscious race intermediary to the Numerians and human exists, then yes. If not, meaning no minds in existence anywhere, then no. I trust you see the logical pattern I’m expressing here. It’s the bi-conditional, logical operator.

A <> B, with A = Mind and B = Pythagorean Theorem. A if and only if B (and vice versa).

Abstract truth as language is an emergent property of conscious minds. It’s the grammar of the structure of existence for conscious minds. As a structural overview, it holds logical priority over material things, albeit a logical priority constrained by the existential fact of the existence of said material things.

Abstract truth and material things are co-eternal, temporally speaking.

How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus

:up: :smile:

n your stance, you declare a hard boundary between material substance and mental substance. Your job now is to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind, nonetheless inhabits a structure featuring a hard partitioning of brain from mind. Per your stance as a hard-boundary dualist, you must explain a structure wherein the hard-partitioning (like parallellism) of brain/mind at the same time features brain as a precondition for mind. — ucarr

This is a thread for you to understand, explicate and defend "absential materialism". It is not for "to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind,"

I have mentioned "dualism" only because of your misunderstandings, in order to clarify that my position is not an idealism or immaterialism.

However, if it is the Cartesian dualism you are interested in, it is rather easy to defend. Since mind is different substance from matter, you can say, you simply have no mental capacity to perceive the mind itself.

By nature, mind is invisible entity with no extension, shape and weight, hence you cannot explain the connection between mind and body either in scientific terms. For you to conceive mind, you must be in possession of the super consciousness to be able to do so, but I suspect that you are.

If you are deeply interested in the Cartesian dualism, I would advise you to open a new thread for it.

The core issue of this conversation is articulation of the structure of connection linking mind with matter in the mode of Deacon’s theme: that mind emerged from matter. This clause declares the interweave connecting matter and mind. — ucarr

If you really asked me about this issue from my own perspectives, then mind is not something emerged from matter. You could say that, but then you will find much problem explicating further for the connection.

From my view, mind is a property of a living body. You seem to think that mind is a necessarily emerged existence from body. No that is not the case. A dead body has no mind. A chair has no mind. Waveform has no mind. A living human has mind.

Hence mind is a mental substance which is a property of a living intelligent agent with biological body. Then you might ask "Can A.I. Robot has mind?" No, they are designed to carry out certain tasks for human needs. They don't have mind as per se, but they can be intelligent because they are able to carry out the jobs humans do. Mind is a property of a living body with a totality of mental functions and events.

Can substance be a property? According to Bolzano in his Theory of Science, of course it can. A substance can be an object. An object can be a property of another object.

…the notion of "Causality" or "Causation" is more of a general philosophical concept than a specific physical phenomenon, in that it implies both Agency (executive) and Efficacy (ability). — Gnomon

Do you think causation as a concept separable from interactions between physical and material things?

Do you make your claim of causation being primarily philosophical in application to: a) chemistry; b) elementary particle physics?

I consider the equation of "Information" (power to inform) and "Causation" (energy) to be more philosophically insightful. — Gnomon

I understand this sentence as a reference to Wheeler’s “It from bit.” Do you think information: a) an agent of material things; b) a material aspect of material things?

This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

No. Why do you ask? Are you trying to determine if I am a Platonic Idealist, like Kastrup? He makes some good arguments for Idealism as prior to Real, but I'm not so sure. The term "to exist" has multiple meanings.

's answer to the same question indicates the ambiguity of the Either/Or distinction between Real & Ideal. The only thing we know for sure is our own ideas (solipsism paradox). But we can infer, and collectively agree as a convention, that there is a reality out there conforming to our individual imaginary concepts. Ironically, Materialist/Physicalist thinkers seem to reverse that certainty. They take the conventional position as a hard fact. But my inclusive philosophical position is not Either/Or but BothAnd. So, it serves my purposes, for philosophical argument, to assume as an axiom that perfect Ideality is the standard against which Reality is measured. :grin:

BothAnd philosophy :
Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ─ what’s true for you ─ depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

Do you make your claim of causation being primarily philosophical in application to: a) chemistry; b) elementary particle physics? — ucarr

No. My concept of Causation applies only to Philosophy. I don't do Chemistry or Physics. However, I do gain some philosophical insights from scientific enigmas, such as quantum paradoxes (wave/particle ; energy/mass). :nerd:

I understand this sentence as a reference to Wheeler’s “It from bit.” Do you think information: a) an agent of material things; b) a material aspect of material things? — ucarr

Your questions indicate that you still don't understand what Enformationism is all about. It's a philosophical model of reality, not a scientific description of materiality. As an alternative to Materialism and Idealism, it postulates that Generic Information (First Cause) is all-of-the above : agency, matter, etc. During physical evolution, from plasma to people, the Universal Power (potential) remains the same, and only the specific Form (actual instances) changes as the world evolves. Wheeler didn't use the term "generic information", but his "bit" refers to something general instead of specific. It's not a thing, but a principle. For example, Newton's Principia Mathematica refers to ideal abstractions, not to agents or material things. Of course, he believed in an absolute Agent who knows (imagines) such ideas into reality.

However, my Enformationism uses the term "Information" in a dual sense : both mathematical computer data and personal mental meaning. And, for my own philosophical conjectures, I imagine the universe as a mathematical Program --- a la Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis --- running on a material computer with physical registers. So the hypothetical First Cause (original agent) is metaphorically designated as the Cosmic Programmer. Remember that scientists often use figurative language to indicate complex abstract systems that are otherwise hard to describe. For example, Darwin's metaphorical "tree of life". and later biologist's analogy of chemical DNA to an informative algorithmic "code". :smile:

Information :
Knowledge and the ability to know. Technically, it's the ratio of order to disorder, of positive to negative, of knowledge to ignorance. It's measured in degrees of uncertainty. Those ratios are also called "differences". So Gregory Bateson* defined Information as "the difference that makes a difference". The latter distinction refers to "value" or "meaning". Babbage called his prototype computer a "difference engine". Difference is the cause or agent of Change. In Physics it’s called "Thermodynamics" or "Energy". In Sociology it’s called "Conflict".
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

↪Gnomon
But with deference to Deacon, he is certainly no lumpen materialist. He holds up Francis Crick’s neural materialism as an example of same. I am suspicious of the claim of the necessity of a ‘neural substrate’, that an idea is only real if it is instantiated in a physical brain, but I’m still considering Deacon’s book. — Wayfarer

Good! Deacon is one a handful of practicing scientists who are not afraid to think outside the Reductionist box about Holistic concepts. Although he skirts the taboo line between empirical Science and theoretical Philosophy, he provides tasty fodder for philosophical rumination. For empirical purposes, Absence is non-nutritious. But for theoretical models, it is filling. :smile:

This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr

No. Why do you ask? Are you trying to determine if I am a Platonic Idealist, like Kastrup? He makes some good arguments for Idealism as prior to Real, but I'm not so sure. The term "to exist" has multiple meanings. — Gnomon

Since you agree concepts do not exist independent of the minds contemplating them, I now know we agree on something important to both of us. My use of “exist” simply means “dwell in a real state of being” public, measurable and repeatable.

The only thing we know for sure is our own ideas (solipsism paradox). But we can infer, and collectively agree as a convention, that there is a reality out there conforming to our individual imaginary concepts. — Gnomon

Perhaps I’m mis-reading your answer to my question up top. I thought you were agreeing that “out there” for concepts is the mind contemplating them. If you think your own ideas get their confirmation from inference and social convention, and if you think concepts are mental constructs only credible from suppositions they have independent referents outside the mind contemplating them, then I ask you to name the extra-mental, supposed loci for your concepts.

My concept of Causation applies only to Philosophy. I don't do Chemistry or Physics. — Gnomon

Chemistry and physics are a part of life in general. How does you philosophy have value without application to life in general?

Your questions indicate that you still don't understand what Enformationism is all about. It's a philosophical model of reality, not a scientific description of materiality. — Gnomon

Newton's Principia Mathematica refers to ideal abstractions, not to agents or material things. — Gnomon

The above quotes show the extreme difference between your work and Newton’s. Newton’s mathematical abstractions notwithstanding, his corpus of work in physics has many useful applications to the everyday world of life in general. Can you say the same about your work? I ask this question because philosophy, in order to be useful, guides applied science with grammatical precepts that inform the objectives and methodologies of applied science. For example, Cartesian substance dualism by circuitous route lead to the Turing test which, in turn, guided the computational approach to both solid state computing and neuro-science mapping of brain functions.

You continue to blockade and avoid the hard work of rigorous scientific scholarship and practice by artificially partitioning philosophy from the sciences. Legitimate philosophy doesn’t hold itself aloof from science.

I know you disagree with my assessment and believe your voluminous quotations from scientific ideas and concepts prove me wrong. I know you won’t change your method of procedure.

I’m writing these words as instruction to myself. Do my philosophical claims participate in the work of science? Do they show any promise as guides to scientific practice? Well, I know the interaction of two gravitational fields can be measured scientifically. I also know Penrose and Hammerof are exploring the collapse of the wave function within neuronal cells and surmising this collapse is the inflection point wherein subjectivity emerges. Does the graviton participate in the wave function and thus also in its collapse? Quantum gravity might have something instructive to say in response to this question. I, in distancing myself from your method of procedure, must not artificially partition my work from the work of scientists. I must not claim the status of metaphysical inquiries as cover to protect me from scientific facts that seem to contradict my claims.

Deductive truths are inferred from rational principles. That It is true of any triangle doesn’t need to validated by observing every particular . — Wayfarer

This is hand-waving. I asked how it was discovered and confirmed that the sum of the squares on the two sides of a right-angle triangle are equal to the square of the hypotenuse. Once discovered, that it applies to all triangles is no different, in principle, than that 2+2=4.

How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus

So, there is no category of apriori facts? The only facts are those 'confirmable by observation'? How does that apply to mathematical theorems, and other 'truths of reason'? Even in the case of triangles, simple observation would not suffice to establish the facts.

So, there is no category of apriori facts? — Wayfarer

"A priori facts" as far as I can tell are generalizations derived from experience. They cannot be discovered in the first place without concrete experience.

Since you agree concepts do not exist independent of the minds contemplating them, I now know we agree on something important to both of us. My use of “exist” simply means “dwell in a real state of being” public, measurable and repeatable. — ucarr

By your empirical definition of "exist", Abstract concepts do not exist. That's because they are in an ideal state : private, knowable, and fleeting. So, they do not come under the purview of empirical Science. Yet, in a different meaning of "exist", abstractions (metaphors) are the substance of Philosophy. :smile:

then I ask you to name the extra-mental, supposed loci for your concepts. — ucarr

Everything we say about ideas is metaphorical. That's because abstractions are bereft of material substance, leaving only the logical skeleton of an idea. So, we manipulate such non-things rationally, not empirically. If you can't accept that distinction, you shouldn't attempt to do philosophy, and stick to physics.

Here's a metaphorical account of "out there", with Big Bang physics as an exemplar : In the 20th century, using astronomical data gained from observation of stars (matter/energy) --- currently billions of light years in the past --- cosmologists traced their formation back to a hypothetical origin point. That point of no-yesterday faded away into abstract mathematical infinities. But the logical implication of a Before-the-Bang was so compelling that some cosmologists couldn't resist asking non-empirical philosophical questions about what was "out there" in the Big Before. Yet, the absence of empirical space-time coordinates eliminates a particular locus as the "where" of the symbolic Place-for-Ideas.

Lacking empirical evidence, there were only two logical answers to the Big Absence : a> infinite regress of familiar stuff (multiverse)*1 or b> some unknown self-existent creative power (EnFormAction?)*2. But their cosmological models indicated that the physics of the Bang was unlike anything we know today, but can only imagine : not lumps of matter, but a plasma field of imaginary (non empirical) sub-atomic elements (quarks & gluons). So, these questions remain : a> where did those invisible entities come from, or b> do they "exist" eternally? And the scientific response is that we don't know. But that absence of facts doesn't stop us philosophers from seeking an honest answer, like homeless-hobo Diogenes and his lamp of logic. :nerd:


*1. Why the Multiverse is a “God-of-the-gaps” theory :
the Multiverse is in no way falsifiable, and the arguments in its support are nearly identical to the arguments for God.
https://bigthink.com/13-8/multiverse-religion/

*2. Enformationism :
As a novel philosophical paradigm, the thesis of Enformationism is intended to be an update to the obsolete 19th century paradigm of Materialism. Since the recent advent of Quantum Physics, the materiality of reality has been watered down. Now we know that matter is a form of energy, and that energy is a form of Information.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

The above quotes show the extreme difference between your work and Newton’s. Newton’s mathematical abstractions notwithstanding, his corpus of work in physics has many useful applications to the everyday world of life in general. — ucarr

Yes, but my eccentric worldview accepts Newton's physics as applicable to the tangible stuff of the macro world. However, quantum physics undermined the determinism of his logic,and the certainty of his mathematics on the fuzzy foundations of reality. Both theories may be true in their respective realms, but there is an "extreme difference" in their philosophical interpretation. While quantum theory is "useful" for cell phones & computers*3, it is also applicable to 21st century philosophy*4. :wink:

*3. Quantum Usefulness :
Applications of quantum mechanics include explaining phenomena found in nature as well as developing technologies that rely upon quantum effects, like integrated circuits and lasers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Applications_of_quantum_mechanics

*4. Quantum Philosophy :
One of the world’s leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations?
https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691095516/quantum-philosophy

You continue to blockade and avoid the hard work of rigorous scientific scholarship and practice by artificially partitioning philosophy from the sciences. Legitimate philosophy doesn’t hold itself aloof from science. — ucarr

Why do you hold me accountable for the "hard work" of scientific scholarship? I'm not a science scholar, so why should I do that kind of "hard work"? You may be doing Science on a philosophy forum, but I'm not. Responding to your critical reviews is hard enough for me. I do however link to science sites for those who want to see the results of the professionals' hard work. And to see that some science scholars, such as Deacon, are not "hard" Newtonian materialists. Scientific paradigms come & go. Which paradigm do you subscribe to?*5

2500 years ago, there was no distinction between Physics and Metaphysics. But around the 17th century Science began to separate itself from its non-empirical roots. So, I would turn your accusation around, to say that modern Science, with its technical tools, "holds itself aloof" from Philosophy. Meanwhile, philosophers plod along with their ancient tools of Logic & Reason. But, I don't claim to be a physicist ; do you claim to be a philosopher? Which is superior to the other, and in what field of comparison? Please don't hold me accountable for outdated Classical physics. But you can expect me to take modern Quantum physics seriously. :cool:

*5. Scientific Paradigms :
A paradigm shift—or paradigm change—happens when scientific activity and experimentation begins to contradict premises that experts previously considered unshakable. As a result, a new and different paradigm replaces the dominant paradigm of its day.
https://www.masterclass.com/articles/paradigm-shift-explained

Since mind is different substance from matter, you can say, you simply have no mental capacity to perceive the mind itself. — Corvus

You’re claiming the mind cannot perceive itself?

Must I conclude you’ve never examined your own thoughts?

If you counter by saying, “I’m talking about the mind that’s doing the perceiving, not the thoughts it perceives.” then you can’t make any claims about the mind being material, immaterial, etc.

So, if the mind can perceive its thoughts but not itself, then you also can’t make any claims about thoughts being material, immaterial, etc.

Alas, if you don’t know the nature of a cause, then you don’t know the nature of its effect.

If a mind can know neither itself nor its thoughts, how can you call it a mind?

So, there is no category of apriori facts?
— @Wayfarer

"A priori facts" as far as I can tell are generalizations derived from experience. They cannot be discovered in the first place without concrete experience — Janus

:up:

(i.e. ideality is merely abstracted from materiality)

If a mind can know neither itself nor its thoughts, how can you call it a mind? — ucarr

:smirk:

Interesting JSTOR review of Deacon from a process-theology oriented academic:
Is Terrence Deacon's Metaphysics of Incompleteness Still Incomplete? (free but requires registration.)

I'm going to call it a day with Deacon, I have other fish to fry.

You’re claiming the mind cannot perceive itself?

Must I conclude you’ve never examined your own thoughts? — ucarr

So, you are claiming that you can perceive the mind.
What is the shape and colour of your mind?

Actually I will provide more of a reason for the section in Deacon's book that turned me off it. it's the discussion about the homuncular fallacy, and in particular passages like this:

Why should ententional explanations tend to get eliminated with the advance of technological sophistication? The simple answer is that they are necessarily incomplete accounts. They are more like promissory notes standing in for currently inaccessible explanations, or suggestive shortcuts for cases that at present elude complete analysis. It has sometimes been remarked that teleological explanations are more like accusations or assignments of responsibility rather than accounts of causal processes. Teleological explanations point to a locus or origin but leave the mechanism of causal efficacy incompletely described. Even with respect to persons, explaining their actions in terms of motives or purposes is effectively independent of explaining these same events in terms of neurological or physiological processes and irrespective of any physical objects or forces.

...Like an inscrutable person, an ententional process presents us with a point at which causal inquiry is forced to stop and completely change its terms of analysis. At this point, the inquiry is forced to abandon the mechanistic logic of masses in motion and can proceed only in terms of functions and adaptations, purposes and intentions, motives and meanings, desires and beliefs. The problem with these sorts of explanatory principles is not just that they are “incomplete, but that they are incomplete in a particularly troubling way. It is difficult to ascribe energy, materiality, or even physical extension to them.

In this age of hard-nosed materialism, there seems to be little official doubt that life is “just chemistry” and mind is “just computation.” But the origins of life and the explanation of conscious experience remain troublingly difficult problems, despite the availability of what should be more than adequate biochemical and neuroscientific tools to expose the details. So, although scientific theories of physical causality are expected to rigorously avoid all hints of homuncular explanations, the assumption that our current theories have fully succeeded at this task is premature.

But I take it from what follows, is that he hopes and believes that physical theories will succeed, once they incorporate and understand his particular conceptual vocabulary with its absentials, teleodynamics, autogens, and so.

But what occurs to me, is the sense in which science seeks to subordinate the issues that it investigates to its methods and vocabulary. To explain something, in scientific terms, is to provide a full account of why it is the way it is. But when the subject is the nature life and mind, then we're really considering questions about the meaning of being, as such. And can such questions really be subordinated to scientific explanation? Isn't that more than a little hubristic?

(By way of contrast, for example, Buddhist philosophy seeks to provide an account of why life is the way it is, through its structure of the four truths, the eightfold path, and liberation from Saṃsāra. But it is not seeking a scientific explanation, that is, one that is third-person in the sense that scientific explanation is.)

Yes, Deacon sees through the (to me) obvious flaws and shortcomings of mechanistic materialism, but he's still first and foremost scientific in orientation, seeking, I think, instrumental explanations rather than philosophical insight for its own sake. I can see he's obviously a very clever academic and his work has its merits, but I don't think I'm going to invest the time required to fully absorb the book.