My take on this time perception problem is to think of mental content in universal form.

Brain; (what the brain supports)

Brain; (time perception)
Brain; (past)
Brain; (present)
Brain; (future)

Looking at it this way we need to take a dualist view about the present.

The present is in two categories. The physical present that exists as physical matter and mental content that exists as a non-physical.

I suspect you would have a hard time finding physicists who agree with that assertion. — wonderer1

I think you'd be surprised by what some physicists believe about time. I happen to know a few.

In any case, do you have an argument for the claim? — wonderer1

It's very simple. No part of time, past, present, or future, nor the passing of time itself, is perceived by any of the senses. And physics does not describe time in any way, it is something which is taken for granted in that field.

The present is in two categories. The physical present that exists as physical matter and mental content that exists as a non-physical. — Mark Nyquist

I tend to look at mental content as consisting of two parts, our relations with the past (memories), and our relations with the future (anticipations). The brain, existing at the present, is what relates these two in the act of thinking.

The mind can understand past occurrences as memories, and future possibilities as anticipations, but the physical presence of the brain at the present is somewhat incomprehensible to it. It is incomprehensible because the mind does not know how to adequately represent the division between past and future. We tend to reduce this division to a point in time, for the practical purpose of measuring, but this leaves no time at the present. That creates a problem because nothing can be known to exist without temporal extension, so the physical presence of the brain at the present become incomprehensible.

To me, it seems amazing how brains manage in past, present and future. Present awareness being the most critical as it has physical consequences.

I think you'd be surprised by what some physicists believe about time. I happen to know a few. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know some physicists as well. This guy owes me a beer I never collected, for troubleshooting some problems in a Bose-Einstein condensate experiment of his, which wasn't working right.

And physics does not describe time in any way, it is something which is taken for granted in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

Einsteinian space-time is a concept which is well over 100 years old, and has been tested in all sorts of ways. Perhaps your physicist friends just don't consider challenging your closed-mindedness to be a good use of their time?

Einsteinian space-time is a concept which is well over 100 years old.. — wonderer1

Concepts do not have physical existence. And the fact that a concept is useful does not imply that there is anything physical which corresponds with the concept. In fact, the reverse is true. The more useful a concept is, the more general it is, and being general means that it is designed to relate to many different things. The more general the concept, the further it is from having any physical thing which corresponds with it. Take the numbers for example. The same is the case with Einsteinian space-time. It is a very general, and useful concept, "general relativity", but being "general" implies that there is nothing particular, i.e. a physical thing, which corresponds with it. The physicists I've spoken to about this issue completely acknowledge that "space-time" is a conceptual structure, and not a physical thing.

Einsteinian space-time is a concept which is well over 100 years old..
— wonderer1

Concepts do not have physical existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point was that the following statement of yours is false.

And physics does not describe time in any way, it is something which is taken for granted in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physics describes time as one of the dimensions of space-time. Furthermore, it is not merely taken for granted. As I said, the concept has been tested in all sorts of ways.

And of course you are merely begging the question against physicalism in saying, "Concepts do not have physical existence." You need to show that concepts can exist apart from any sort of physical instantiation. Good luck with that.

Whether you're a physicalist or not, what do you think the best arguments for it are? — frank

The argument that everything is or supervenes on the physical is arguably falsified by the fact that things have different modes of existing.

For example, abstract objects such as numbers and mathematical structures have a mode of existing that is different from the physical mode in which thought exists. Thought is supervenient on brain events, but numbers are not.

For example, abstract objects such as numbers and mathematical structures have a mode of existing that is different from the physical mode in which thought exists. — jkop

Is this something that you think you can demonstrate?

The idea of numbers gets to the core issues of physicalism. A physicalist can argue that numbers only exist as brain state. That would be my position and it's defendable.

Numbers existing outside of brain state?...does that have a defense?

Here is my model of numbers:

Physical brain; (one)
Physical brain; (two)
Physical brain; (three)

Is this something that you think you can demonstrate? — wonderer1

Perhaps, see below.

Numbers existing outside of brain state?...does that have a defense? — Mark Nyquist

We could start with the intentionality of conscious states. A thought is not just a thought, it is about something, which means that there is a reference relation between the thought and what is about. We can think about anything, regardless of the nature or ontological status of those things. We can construct fictions as well as facts, but we can also discover abstract things and facts.

Granted that some things are dependent on thought. Money, for instance, has a mode of existing that depends on our beliefs, and in this sense money supervenes on the physicality of out beliefs. Money is a human construct, but numbers are arguably discovered.

From the fact that thinking is physical it doesn't follow that all of the things we think about are physical.

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Finding a murder suspects DNA at a crime scene is often evidence that they committed that crime. However, finding that DNA is still COMPATIBLE with the idea that they did not commit the crime. A bayesian understanding of evidence clears this up quite cleanly.

I agree that thoughts must form to subject matter. I don't see how the subject matter must preexist. It's more of a mental discovery process.

Must an unknown number preexist in the same sense that, say, an unknown galaxy preexists before its discovery? The galaxy is actual, the number is potential. Both are objects that we can discover, but they have different modes of existing.

Good point. Our brains handle things that are physical and non-physical by the same mental process.

You mentioned we construct fictions which is an area of interest for me.

Disorders like psychosis can be modeled in this universal form I like to use:

Brain; (secret messages)
Brain; (code)
Brain; (language manipulation)
Brain; (use of multiple languages)
Brain; (numerology)
Brain; (pattern recognition)
Brain; (pattern manipulation)
Brain; (conspiracy theories)
Brain; (false beliefs)
Brain; (religious delusions)
Brain; (political delusions)

And what accompanies these is racing thoughts that amplify the problem followed by emotional reactions often seen as symptoms..

So in trouble shooting psychosis cases the professions should be looking at this relation between physical brain and mental content. Just by looking at the symptoms listed as mental content we should suspect that most psychosis cases are mental content driven.

That's not the case. The treating professions are biology oriented and drug treatment oriented and often do horribly at treating these patients.

On the subject of physicalism, I take this as an example of physicalism gone wrong. The training given...many years of medical school...engrains a biological cause to these psychosis cases because of the odd behavior patterns with no concideration of the role of mental content. Mental content is always present in these cases. I've mentioned the Dan Markingson case here in Minnesota where Mr Markingson was coerced into a drug study and months into it died by suicide.

Physics describes time as one of the dimensions of space-time. — wonderer1

That is not a description.

Finding a murder suspects DNA at a crime scene is often evidence that they committed that crime. However, finding that DNA is still COMPATIBLE with the idea that they did not commit the crime. A bayesian understanding of evidence clears this up quite cleanly. — flannel jesus

You are not providing the relevant information in your example. That the DNA is evidence of the person committing the crime is dependent on context, where and how it was found for example. The context of the item (the DNA) is what is relevant, and either supports or does not support (constitutes evidence for or against) the suspect. It cannot be evidence for both without contradiction. You simply make it appear to be evidence of both by removing the relevant context, thereby making it evidence of neither. In this case it is not evidence at all.

If you think that the Bayesian method provides for the very same thing to be evidence for two contradicting hypotheses, then please explain how you arrive at this conclusion.

It cannot be evidence for both without contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say it was evidence for both. You decided to say that. I said it was evidence for one, and COMPATIBLE with both. I even put compatible in all caps so you would be more likely to take special note of it.

The treating professions are biology oriented and drug treatment oriented and often do horribly at treating these patients.

On the subject of physicalism, I take this as an example of physicalism gone wrong.

So in trouble shooting psychosis cases the professions should be looking at this relation between physical brain and mental content. ... — Mark Nyquist

Are mental content oriented treatments doing any better? I'm asking, because I don't know psychiatry.

I scrolled through this article at SEP. Seems that committment to an underlying physical structure is not so important after all. And why would it be important? Treatment of mental illness is a practical matter, no?

Regarding the relation between brain and mental content, the term 'mental content' is, arguably, misleading, because far from all content is mental.

For example, when you see a tree, there is a brain event in your head that really is the seeing, but the tree that you see is not inside your head. Your brain is not constructing a mental replica of the tree. Nor is the brain event sufficient for seeing the tree. There has to be a tree, and from its appearance in your visual field arises the conscious mental state of seeing it. The brain event is constitutive for having that mental state, but it is not constitutive for what happens to appear in your visual field.

The assumption that your brain would somehow construct mental replicas of every single thing that happens to pass by the visual field is obviously false, yet surprisingly common. Perhaps because there are other kinds of things that the brain does construct, such as imagined trees, or fictions composed of memories or fantasies or hallucinations.

One more thing regarding numbers and mathematical structures. As potential things they're arguably not physical. But when they actualise in thought and application, they appear not so unlike the actual things that pass by one's visual field.

The point though is that physicalism, by definition denies the possibility that non-physicalism is correct. That's the point of physicalism. Therefore contrary to what you claim, if the evidence is compatible with non-physicalism, it is not evidence for physicalism. Compatible means that the two can coexist without conflict. If there is no conflict between the evidence and non-physicalism then this is clearly evidence against physicalism.

Likewise, if the DNA evidence is COMPATIBLE with the person person being not-guilty, then it is not evidence of the person's guilt. Evidence must support the thing which it is supposed to be evidence of, and nothing relevant can be COMPATIBLE with both of two opposing statements.. If the supposed evidence is COMPATIBLE with the opposite of the thing which it is meant to support, then it is faulty and therefore not evidence for that thing, but evidence against it. This is why I said that it is the context of the found DNA which determines whether it is evidence or not. Whether the DNA is COMPATIBLE with the person being guilty or not-guilty is determined by the context. If the context of the DNA is COMPATIBLE with both then it is irrelevant, evidence of neither.

Physics describes time as one of the dimensions of space-time.
— wonderer1

That is not a description. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a useful description for a lot of people. I'm not sure there is much I could do about it not being a useful description for you.

It is useful, but It's not a description. Spatial concepts, geometry, dimensions and such, are all like this, very useful, as mathematical axioms are, but they are not descriptions. These postulates are a priori, while descriptions are a posteriori. There is no physical thing being described.

There is no physical thing being described. — Metaphysician Undercover

From my perspective, "thing" seems like a strange category to try to put time into. So I'm not really seeing a problem with not describing time as a thing.

Exactly, that's what i said, time is not physical.

Exactly, that's what i said, time is not physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not exactly. "Not a thing" isn't equivalent to non-physical. For example, a process doesn't need to be a thing, in order to be physical.

You can elect to define words in such a way that physicalism can't be coherent under your usage of the words. However, that doesn't allow for you to make any cogent argument against physicalism. It just keeps you from understanding what you are arguing against.

My understanding is psychiatric treatment is standardized within countries. Generally the patient would be diagnosed then prescribed medication based on the diagnosis. So the assumption is drugs can correct something that is physically wrong with the brain. Or if not that, that drugs might do better than nothing.

I don't think considering mental content is even done other than to document symptoms.

I looked at the SEP reference you gave and I think the issue for me is the psychiatric medical model which is basically physicalist. I don't think they know the causes of psychosis or even claim to know. It's like they are sure it must be physical but they can't show the mechanism.

On the philosophy of physicalism, we should look at how physical brains extend into this area of mental content.

you have a lot of misunderstanding about evidence. Either you're using the word in a way the majority of other people don't use it, or you haven't thought about it very deeply.

Very simply, can you imagine a scenario where you have evidence for X being true, while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false? Can you imagine any scenario at all like that? If yes, what is it?

Not exactly. "Not a thing" isn't equivalent to non-physical. For example, a process doesn't need to be a thing, in order to be physical. — wonderer1

I see there is a need to distinguish between "process" as a particular process, a particular event which is happening to a particular physical object, or objects, and "process" in the sense of a generalized, or universal, type of event which may happen with objects. The former is a physical event, the latter is not, being conceptual and applicable to many different physical events, in a descriptive way. If "time" is said to be a sort of process, it is the latter, a generalized or universal conception, and therefore not physical.

Very simply, can you imagine a scenario where you have evidence for X being true, while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false? Can you imagine any scenario at all like that? If yes, what is it? — flannel jesus

In that scenario, whatever is "unbeknownst" to me, is irrelevant to my judgement. Do you recognize that whether or not something is "evidence" is a judgement? I judge the object, as evidence for X, therefore I judge it as incompatible with not--X. Whether X is actually true or false is irrelevant to my judgement, my judgement is based on the things I apprehend as evidence, and I do not ever apprehend the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X because that would be contradictory.

Therefore your example is simple trickery. You add "while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false" as if it is relevant to my judgement of whether or not the mentioned thing is evidence for X. But it cannot be relevant at all because it is stipulated as |unbeknownst". If I knew X was actually false, I would not consider the thing as evidence for not-X. I would have to be skeptical first, but this would negate my knowing.

It appears to me. like you do not understand the nature of "evidence". You seem to want to make it a property of the thing being judged, rather than accept that it is a judgement. When you come around to understand the true nature of evidence, that "evidence" is a judgement, then you might understand that it is inconsistent, contradictory, to judge the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X. In this case we'd have to dismiss the thing as non-evidence.

So I'll ask you in a straight forward way, do you understand that "evidence" is a judgement?

You're waffling too much for me. It seems like you're deliberately trying not to understand, but it's possible this is really just all too much for you. Since you can't answer my straight forward question, I'm going to bow out of this conversation with you. I don't see it going further if you cannot give a simple answer to my simple question.

Very simply, can you imagine a scenario where you have evidence for X being true, while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false? Can you imagine any scenario at all like that? If yes, what is it? — flannel jesus

Gettier case?

Sure, but one not need delve into the deep jargon of philosophy to think of simple examples where you have evidence for something that's nevertheless incorrect.