Hence ...

Other Minds (SEP)
Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds (IEP)
Solipsism (Wikipedia)
Solipsism (Uncyclopedia)

... because others' self-awarenesses are harder still to derive than the ground you walk on.

Anyway, maybe minds are parts of the world, not somehow apart therefrom. After all, mind can affect world, and world can affect mind, alike. Then self-knowledge is also knowledge of the world in part. The perceiver just doesn't have to become the perceived to perceive that.

Going by knowledge as justified true belief, one can know of things extra-self.

The skeptic assumes and asserts that we do not have the means by which we can have knowledge of the external world and, therefore, we can not have knowledge of the external world. Surely there’s something wrong with that argument. — Thales

Yes. Because "the external world" is at a bare minimum what is not us but matters to us. If the external world does not affect us then it does not matter to us. It can only matter to us to the extent that it does affect us. So even if our knowledge is only of our own affections, these affections are tested on a continuous basis. Such that our knowledge must be assumed really only to exist and advance consistent with external accuracy. That being one aspect of knowledge.

Is a fair, if rough-and-ready, way to say that I can't really disagree, but i see the degree of mediation(provided by the senses) as enough to say we don't have access to the External Objects. — AmadeusD

If you are saying we don't have access to external objects except insofar as we can sense them, then I would agree.

If you are saying we don't have access to external objects except insofar as we can sense them, then I would agree. — Janus

That, to me, does not constitute access to them - but, it sounds like we agree, just not on terminology.

That, to me, does not constitute access to them - but, it sounds like we agree, just not on terminology. — AmadeusD

If it doesn't constitute access to external objects, however limited, then what do you think it does gain access to?

If it doesn't constitute access to external objects, however limited, then what do you think it does gain access to? — Janus

Sense data. On my account, we do not have anything but. So, I can't really understand how, for an example, a shadow is access to it's object - or that the now-empty part of an ocean misplaced by some tidal activity elsewhere, gives us access to that activity elsewhere.

Sense data. — AmadeusD

To posit sense data you are relying on the idea that our senses give reliable access to the organs of sense, so it seems to me that your position entails a performative contradiction.

While I don't actually grasp any contradiction in what you've just said (likely because i don't understand it) it is plain to me there is absolutely no contradiction in positing the following:

1. We have sense data which is not the objects which is presents;
2. Those objects are inaccessible; and
3. The sense data initiates/induces/informs/whatevers our internally-derived externally-delusional experience.

I am not positing anywhere that the sense data we receive give us anything at all of their objects.

What I am a bit stuck on in your objection is this line:

our senses give reliable access to the organs of sense — Janus

I can't grok what you're trying, technically, ask of my position here - our 'sense' is the direct, unmitigated action of our sense organs in experience. I don't understand that quote line, other than to suggest that I want access to... eg my eyes? Is it to posit that somehow, our organs themselves are what we are relying on? If there's some disconnect between the 'initiation' and our 'sense data' then our organs are faulty, in that way, and that's allowable on my account - in fact, it explains it well.

On what basis do you conclude that we have sense-data?

It's part and parcel of why I expect there to be 'actual' external objects.

I don't understand that we could have experience without sense data. It is a perfect explanation for experience. It could be delusional, but its data from our senses. Our sense organs need not be of any particular kind, other than capable of relaying something to our brain/mind.

How do you know we have a brain or any organs of sense if you have no access to an external world?

I can't understand my experience under other circumstances. I don't know that it's open to me to do so, so 'Descartes Demon' and all that. So, the inference is strong enough for me to rest on it. I can't know for sure. I thought that was a given... lol

I can't understand my experience under other circumstances. — AmadeusD

So, you can't understand your experience unless you assume that you have access to external objects, and yet you deny that you have access to external objects? Seems like a performative contradiction to me.

Yeah, it might, but i've explained pretty clearly why its not even a claim. I don't have access to those organs. I have access to their work product. Unsure how you're inferring that claim you just made from my position that sense data exists, and we have no access to any external objects. I assume the organs of sense are producing the sense data. Thats it. I do not have access, and this doesn't infer I do.

I assume the organs of sense are producing the sense data. — AmadeusD

Since your assumption is based on the assumption or inference that you have access to your sense organs, then why would you not infer that you have access to external objects in general? I'm not claiming that you should be certain, I'm merely referring to 'inference to the best explanation'—are you certain that you don't have access to external objects?

Since your assumption is based on the assumption or inference that you have access to your sense organs — Janus

Unsure how you're inferring that claim you just made from my position that sense data exists, and we have no access to any external objects. — AmadeusD

:) Not trying to be 'cute'. But this is just a restating of the same misguided response from earlier. But I don't own the claim you're trying to make for me, so the follow-on doesn't seem relevant as it's not my position to defend.

I am certain I do not have access to external objects. There isn't a way for that to be the case, as best i can tell. Though, that's not a metaphysical claim.

I'm bemused by what I see as your inability to adequately explain and justify your position, or acknowledge your resultant inconsistency and confusion, but I'm happy to leave it there as we seem to be getting nowhere fast.

Fair enough. You've not presented anything to justify that position ... on my position. I can't even see you understanding what i'm saying in this exchange, if that's your conclusion because those things have patently not happened as I am not confused, my position is consistent and It's really easy to understand :P

I have literally, and repeatedly corrected your erroneous attempt at enumerating my position. It is wrong. Therefore your conclusions have nothing to do with my position. Note:

But I don't own the claim you're trying to make for me — AmadeusD

That claim is:

Since your assumption is based on the assumption or inference that you have access to your sense organs — Janus

It is wrong and is not described in my posts. The single, only thing I have posited I have access to is sense data. Not sense organs. Not external objects. Sense data. That is it. 100% of the position rests here. I am necessarily ignorant as to the process from Sense Organ to data-in-mind because I do not posit i have access to the organs and so am precluding from knowing/understanding that.

I reject that assumption you made entirely, and my position doesn't require it. If you could please point out exactly where you're not getting it, I'm always more than happy to clarify if you are willing to stick to what i have said, rather than your version of it.

The single, only thing I have posited I have access to is sense data. Not sense organs. Not external objects. Sense data. That is it. — AmadeusD

What I have been asking is on what basis do you conclude that you have access to sense data? I presume that you, as we all do, experience a world of things, animals, plants and people etc., that are external to our bodies; so, I'm asking how that common experience leads you to conclude that you have access only to sense data and not to the things, animals. plants and people, etc. If you are interested in continuing this conversation, then lay out the reasoning that leads you to your stated conclusion. If you are not interested that's fine, I don't care.

What I have been asking is on what basis do you conclude that you have access to sense data? — Janus

I know. And I have answered, many times, my friend: I have experience, and I cannot understand that I have experience, other than as a result of sense data, based on the empirical fact of my experience. It is 'sensed' regardless of any external objects. I infer, from the 'sense' that there must be objects initiating the data transfer.
The emphasis is the entire answer you are after - but find unsatisfactory, I guess.

I presume that you, as we all do, experience a world of things, animals, plants and people etc., that are external to our bodies — Janus

In(ie within) my experience, yes, but i refuse to make that claim without qualification. They appear to be external, in my mind, to my body.

I'm asking how that common experience leads you to conclude that you have access only to sense data and not to the things — Janus

I really can't tell what's being missed.

1. We have sense data which is not the objects which i*t presents(to the mind);
2. Those objects are inaccessible; and
3. The sense data initiates/induces/informs/whatevers our internally-derived externally-delusional experience. — AmadeusD

There is absolutely no reason to jump from "I can see a tree" to "what im seeing is what is actually there". You are literally not looking at anything but receiving sense data and watching a mind-created movie about it (shoddy term, but should be illustrative).
I've used the examples of tidal movements and shadows to illustrate this. You cannot access the object which causes a shadow from the shadow. You cannot access an empty bay by way of the tidal wave its emptying caused elsewhere.

So what's missing?

I know. And I have answered, many times, my friend: I have experience, and I cannot understand that I have experience, other than as a result of sense data, based on the empirical fact of my experience. — AmadeusD

The more immediate experience is that you sense things, not data. No one prior to the modern scientific era would have thought in terms of sense data, which means the idea is secondary and derivative. If your idea of sense data is derived from modern scientific understanding, the veracity of which in turn is based on the assumption that we have access to external objects, then your belief that you have access to sense data necessarily depends on the latter assumption.

As to your idea that there is no reason to believe the tree you can see is actually there: well, there obviously is, since other people with you will see the same tree and on questioning will confirm that they see the same unique details of the tree, and even animals present will show by their behavior that they also see the tree; e.g. the dog might pee on it and the cat climb it or the bird perch in it.

1. All knowledge comes either from sensory perception (e.g., visually perceiving a mountain) or reasoning (e.g., solving an algebraic equation).

2. Both perception and reasoning occur in our minds.

3. The external world is, by definition, “external,” which is outside our minds. — Thales

Fine.

Therefore:

4. Because everything we know exists in our minds, we can not have any knowledge about the external world. — Thales

That does not follow.

The argument seems to be more that "Everything that happens inside our minds relates exclusively to our minds".
So you would have:
P1 – Everything that happens inside our minds relates exclusively to our minds.
P2 – All of our knowledge are things that happen inside of our minds.
C – All of our knowledge relates exclusively to our minds (that is, not the outside world).

The argument is valid, the issue is that P1 is debatable. A silly counter example: I hit the billiard ball into the hole, everything that happens inside the billiard table relates exclusively to the table. Well, no, because how fast the ball goes through the hole depends on how strongly I hit the ball. It also depends on the gravity of the place (higher altitudes have slightly lower gravity than sea-level).

Likewise, perception does happen inside our brain, but perception is caused by outside factors — or so someone defends. If we believe that different causes have different consequences, each different perception we have is caused by a different outside object, so we do have information about the outside world — at the very least, that we are interacting with something different from the one before.

And if we take a tabula rasa view of knowledge, reasoning would also not just be something inside of our minds.

But all we know about our "external world" is through our senses and our experiences. Saying that we can't know anything because all we have is our senses is self-contradictory and makes no sense. — Alkis Piskas

I think OP is trying to argue for a brain-in-a-vat kind of thing, but more like mind-in-a-vat instead.

The more immediate experience is that you sense things, not data — Janus

I agree, that evolution has done an incredibly good job of making us think this is the case... maybe that's a distinction I'm making that you're not. In an "every day" sense, I'd agree with you - but this is not an every-day conversation. Fact is, our mind is in receipt of data only. The movie it puts together to play to our experiential faculties isn't actually relevant to that - its an illusion.

No one prior to the modern scientific era would have thought in terms of sense data, which means the idea is secondary and derivative. — Janus

This doesn't make too much sense to me, unless what you're trying to set-out is an intuitive 'take' on perception, without recourse to the actual processes going on in perception. In that case, I would agree, it doesn't make a lot of sense to be going around thinking everything is askance from your experience. But I do think that actually is the case, as will be clear. I would also say that the claim you make up-top seems a pretty broad stroke to brush. I'm sure i could find plenty of examples of thinkers relating experience to sense data (perhaps in other words) and carving out "actual objects", as it were, from the data. IN fact, that seems to be the entire thrust of Idealism (more specifically, Kant's Transcendental Idealism).

If your idea of sense data is derived from modern scientific understanding, the veracity of which in turn is based on the assumption that we have access to external objects, then your belief that you have access to sense data necessarily depends on the latter assumption. — Janus

1. It isn't. It's derived from the very clear fact that my mind is not actually in touch with any objects, yet my mind is the arena of my experience(the words here don't matter - what's being illustrated is beyond debate). They are necessarily not in touch
2. I can't see why that's the case. I fully agree science proceeds on a physicalist basis and essentially nothing more (until Panpsychism gets its day, anyhow) but I do not think it follows that, based on understanding a process by which we can assess claims empirically from first principles, that I must take on every idea that system has produced. Science itself isn't coherent enough-a-system to make that kind of leap, imo. Scientists disagree on their premises all the time. 'modern scientific understanding' isn't a dogma you can't diverge from. It is a method for understanding empirical data. Not sense data or metaphysics.

As to your idea that there is no reason to believe the tree you can see is actually there: well, there obviously is, since other people with you will see the same tree and on questioning will confirm that they see the same unique details of the tree, and even animals present will show by their behavior that they also see the tree; e.g. the dog might pee on it and the cat climb it or the bird perch in it. — Janus

Hmm, point taken, but also I disgree.. but I think you're a step back from the level of analysis i'm at in this discussion.

Yes, that is, superficially, a reason to think those things are 'out there'. Our experiences converge, as it were. But I have already noted that I assume there are things out there. But its an assumption that those people and their perceptions are also "real", so its somewhat tautological to rest on that, imo.

If it is the case that we don't directly interact with objects out in the world, we don't have access to them. Plain and simple.
If you're inferring we, in fact, do directly interact with objects out in the world, by all means elucidate that process. If its acceptable, My position will need to change.

I agree, that evolution has done an incredibly good job of making us think this is the case... — AmadeusD

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality, so your thinking here is in turn reliant on that assumption. That's what I've been trying to point out.

Fact is, our mind is in receipt of data only. The movie it puts together to play to our experiential faculties isn't actually relevant to that - its an illusion. — AmadeusD

How do you know that is the case? I don't deny that it might be an illusion, but I also think it might not be an illusion. How could we ever definitively tell, one way or the other? On the other hand, since we and the other animals seem to be very good at navigating and surviving in a complex and dangerous world, the evidence seems to point to our perceptions providing us with adequately reliable information about that world.

I'm sure i could find plenty of examples of thinkers relating experience to sense data (perhaps in other words) and carving out "actual objects", as it were, from the data. IN fact, that seems to be the entire thrust of Idealism (more specifically, Kant's Transcendental Idealism). — AmadeusD

Kant, as I read him, thinks that the objects of the senses are real things that are independent of human perception. How we see those things obviously is not independent of human perception, and that's why Kant talks about things in themselves. We have no access to the "in itself' nature of things, but of course we do have access to the 'for us' nature of things.

It isn't. It's derived from the very clear fact that my mind is not actually in touch with any objects, yet my mind is the arena of my experience — AmadeusD

The objects appear to you, how is that a case of "not being in touch with any objects"?

Hmm, point taken, but also I disgree.. but I think you're a step back from the level of analysis i'm at in this discussion.

Yes, that is, superficially, a reason to think those things are 'out there'. Our experiences converge, as it were. But I have already noted that I assume there are things out there. But it's an assumption that those people and their perceptions are also "real", so it's somewhat tautological to rest on that, imo. — AmadeusD

What you say here shows that your perspective converges on solipsism. Solipsism (like any other philosophical position) can neither be disproven nor proven, but its plausibility rating must be thought to be very close to zero.

You show by your action of posting on here with those who disagree with you that you don't believe in solipsism. As Peirce said “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.”

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality — Janus

I am fairly sure understand your position and am not missing it(that is obviously possibly wrong)... But, my position is still no, it isn't, and that this is the one of the cruxes. It can absolutely be restricted to evolution of our illusions. Direct access to the "outside world" isn't necessary to explain that illusion beyond inferring that those objects just must be there as brute fact. I suppose i take the Kantian position here that I am allowed to infer these Objects while not saying (nay, not able to say ) anything about them. Maybe that's a sidestep. Will need to think on it.

How do you know that is the case? I don't deny that it might be an illusion, but I also think it might not be an illusion. — Janus

Sure - but it seems highly, highly unlikely that a mitigated data stream is going to result in a 1:1 match when decoded by wetware into an experience. You're right to try to pin me down here though - I do not 'know'. But, my response (as it has been) would be to ask by what method/mechanics would you posit we are literally in touch with those objects? I cannot see one.

the 'for us' nature of things — Janus

is sense-data (on my account, and I believe Kant's). This is confusing terminology though. The "nature of things" is different for phenomena versus things in themselves. Its not like its one thing with two natures, applicable to different arenas. They are two separate sets of objects, interrelated we know not how, other than the inference that one causes the other.

the "in itself' nature of things — Janus

Hmm..I think this is a little misleading. Kant's position (I think) is that we have no access whatsoever to those objects. No nature, no object, no nothing. It is unspeakaboutable. We can't even conceptualise them because we have absolutely zero phenomena on which to ascertain anything about them whatsoever. But, as noted, I do think this is a little bit of a cop-out in the sense that it just ends up saying "Well, idk, but it sure looks like it!". I just can't see a better answer :sweat:

Kant does not, anywhere I've seen, intimate we have any access whatsoever to the things-in-themselves. The objects he discusses are those of the mind, as a result of perception and understanding arranging sense-data into a lil movie for us to watch via the internal projection system of the visual cortex. It seems fairly clear to me he uses this basic conception

1.Thing in itself: unknowable ->
2. Noumena: knowable, but not to human sense->
3. Phenomena: the internal representations of sense data necessarily imparted by interaction with (1.)

May have that wrong, and would be very much open to any passages you feel either disagree with, or elucidate this in another direction.

What you say here shows that your perspective converges on solipsism. — Janus

This seems to betray a basic understanding of what i've said...

I assume there are things out there. — AmadeusD

That includes people. But I also said:

so it's somewhat tautological to rest on that, imo. — AmadeusD

Which it is. If the position is that other people's subjective experience is evidence that they exist, that's a big ole circle of reasoning. But again, i assume there are actually people (read: objects) out there. My point was merely that the reasoning of such is always going to be based on inference. The fact that another person claims to be seeing the same tree as me doesn't prove that that's the case. It proves that I'm having that experience.

So my position is not even close to solipsism - I am convinced I am not the only person, and that there are external 'real objects - but as far as proving this, appeal to other minds is weak. That's my point there. Its tautological because those other minds suffer the exact same uncertainty mine does, in that same respect.

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality
— Janus

I am fairly sure understand your position and am not missing it(that is obviously possibly wrong)... But, my position is still no, it isn't, and that this is the one of the cruxes. — AmadeusD

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere.

Yeah, good, very good question.

Correlation, I suppose, would be the only way. Do the things we're experiencing correlate with the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits?

But, I get the feeling I am committed to basically say "its an inference" and im fairly comfortable with that.

Correlation, I suppose, would be the only way. Do the things we're experiencing correlate with the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits?

But, I get the feeling I am committed to basically say "its an inference" and im fairly comfortable with that. — AmadeusD

The problem with what you say here as I see it is that the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits are based on the assumption that the evidence for evolution, the fossil record, Carbon dating, DNA testing and so on consists in accurate information about the external world, about the world before humanity even existed.

So, any correlation with those expectations would be baseless without that assumption. You say, "it's an inference", but inferences about the external world, the prehuman world, and the present world must all be based on the assumption that the data they are based upon is accurate, that is to say that we do have access to the external world, or else the inferences would be completely groundless. I don't see how this has anything to do with your subjective feelings of being comfortable; it is well-known that many people may be comfortable with contradicting themselves or making groundless claims.

For if one is unable to know anything about the external world, then one can not make any claims about it at all – even claiming that knowledge about it is impossible, because that too is knowing something about the external world – namely, that it is unknowable.

In fact, wouldn’t you need to bypass your own perceptions and go outside your own mind in order to make such a claim? After all, according to the argument, your own perceptions and mind are unable to determine anything about the external world. Given that argument, you would need to employ some means – other than your own perceptions and mind – to be able to verify whether or not an external world can be accessed by your internal perceptions and mind.

Because isn’t it possible that our perceptions are a dependable means of obtaining knowledge of the external world?

If we are to know anything, then don’t we need to (somehow) have access to that object of knowledge? And to have access, don’t we need a means by which we access it?...

....

.... Aren’t sensory perceptions the means by which we gain access to – and knowledge about – the external world? Skeptics misrepresent their critics as identifying perception with the world itself. Rather, aren’t skeptics the ones conflating process with result; confusing the road with the destination; and identifying addition, subtraction, multiplying and dividing with the solutions of algebraic problems?

And one final observation: It seems to me that the skeptic is rigging the game from the start – taking away the means by which we can have knowledge of the external world in order to prove it is impossible to know anything about it. Which actually reveals another logical issue – that of assuming what is to be proven and then “proving” it (the fallacy of begging the question):

The skeptic assumes and asserts that we do not have the means by which we can have knowledge of the external world and, therefore, we can not have knowledge of the external world... — Thales

The issue is in the definition the "external world", as you point out. External is usually taken to mean, something outside our minds. So how it that we can go outside our minds (or perceptions that arise in persons with minds) to a completely external world?

In theory I suppose, it would be nice to be able to go outside one's own body to compare if our perceptions are getting something right or wrong about the world as we perceive it. But of course, this is impossible, for a view outside ourselves - and hence outside a framework of understanding - there would be nothing at all to experience.

The issue of correctness or incorrectness of our perceptions is not relevant about the external world, they are relevant in relation to our conceptions of our perceptions about the mind-dependent world: is that flower I am seeing white or grey? Is that the sound of a train or a concert?, etc.

A big issue, to my mind, is what exactly is meant by external here? People often speaking about external and internal, as if that distinction is very clear, I don't think it is. It would be replied that this sofa I am seeing is external to me, that is, it is not in my mind, so it is external in that sense.

But is that a substantial point? For the sofa I was seeing mere seconds ago tells me about how it looks to me, how it feels to me and how I conceive of and understand objects, always in relation to the being in question, in this case, a human being. So by this metric, the sofa I am seeing is not external to me, it is a representation, and representations are internal.

Perhaps a better distinction would be internal internal/ internal external, the former being ideas in my head absent an immediate object, and the latter would be objects as they appear to my senses and how my mind interprets them.

All this leaves aside the issue of the sciences, specifically physics, which is the star of the sciences, there we have good reason to believe that we are studying aspects of the mind-independent world, which is different from an "external world", because, at the end of the day, physics has to make sense to us in some manner, or it wouldn't matter at all, nothing would register.

It is in this area, in which we may come closest to something like the external world, but still with some caveats, which in fact make the science possible at all. Aspects of cosmology and classical physics seem to indicate some abstract properties of the mind independent world, which is fascinating, but structural, as in epistemic structural realism, which may be the best we can do. But, I could be wrong.

I think the knowledge you are discussing as veridical in hopes of showing that true perceptions tell us something about the external world, is more of an issue of accurateness of our perceptions given what many people report experiencing: if everybody sees the sky as blue, but I see it as yellow, then I may have some liver problems, or problems with my eye. But it doesn't reach the external world defined as, something outside our minds.

A big issue, to my mind, is what exactly is meant by external here? People often speaking about external and internal, as if that distinction is very clear, I don't think it is. It would be replied that this sofa I am seeing is external to me, that is, it is not in my mind, so it is external in that sense. — Manuel

This raises an interesting counterpoint. I said a couple posts back

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere. — Janus

I didn't want to say 'minds' because that would be to reduce us to a kind of "dimensionless point observer", but 'bodies' can't be quite right either since parts of them at least (and all of them if viewed in the mirror) can be external objects (at least visually speaking).

On the other hand, we feel our bodies "from the inside" so to speak; I don't just look at my arm as an external object, but I feel the sensation within it, its movements, its straining and ease, and I feel its continuity with the rest of the body,

On the basis of this "internal sense" we differentiate our bodies from external objects, feeling them to be part and parcel with ourselves. I think we have good reason to think that external objects are real and that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions.

I think it fair and plausible to count this as "having access to external objects" although I go along with Kant in thinking that we have access only to their perceptible qualities as conditioned by the nature of our own bodies and organs of sense.