However, the more I have thought about egoism, I would say that you are absolutely right that egoism and altruism blend together when properly understood; because being purely selfless is to just take advantage of oneself—to not see one’s own worth—and being purely selfish in a narcissistic way generally is incoherent. But being both egoistic and altruistic, in a balance, allows for optimal flourishing. — Bob Ross
Truly overcoming egoism, in all its forms, requires the individual to transcend their own good and do things for the sole sake of the good of something which is not themselves. If one does something for someone else for their own sake, then they are not doing for that person’s sake. — Bob Ross
Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.
…
I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality.
That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'.
So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality.
Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition
The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.
this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.
Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering
Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom
You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.
Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really
You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.
OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective.
it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you.
You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct.
Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective
Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.
You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.
Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross
(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).
Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.
Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.
…
I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality.
I am not arguing for moral subjectivism. This position (in my OP) is a form of moral realism. — Bob Ross
OK so now, the whole rest of this post will be you and me mostly agreeing. I was fairly sure you stated that you posted an argument for moral realism to DESTROY it with your 'real' argument.That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'.
Nope: we don’t define what flourishing is other than the word to semantically refer to it.
So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality.
Not at all. This moral realist theory posits that The Good is identical to flourishing, and The Good is analyzed within contexts; and the smaller the context the lower the Good, and the larger the context the higher the Good. — Bob Ross
Yes and that would be only 'meeting desires ends by attaining them.' In other words morality redefined as desire only.Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition
Flourishing is just the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think this is all that controversial.
What “second order issue” are you referring to? Normativity? — Bob Ross
Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.
The Good, in this view, is flourishing: it is not virtues. Virtues are habits of character that are good. — Bob Ross
But you miss a critical point that CANNOT be missed unless you are wrong (you are wrong):By ‘goal’, I just mean ‘purpose’; and I think I have been really open about that flourishing is sufficient fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think I am sweeping it under the rug at all. — Bob Ross
Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond. I have no idea. I dont want to back trace it. Please quote the WHOLE thing each time. Computers carry forward the cumbersome whole easily. That's their purpose.this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.
I am not following. — Bob Ross
Good, then we agree on this. Again, your earlier part is not included so I dont know what I was really commenting on.Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering
One can be flourishing in insufferable conditions; and I never said that we can’t use suffering to flourish more (in the long term). — Bob Ross
Wisdom is many things. It is a trait that as shown above is ALL, repeat ALL, bar none virtues combined, both in belief and in expression of belief as action. Wisdom is the know, do, want of GOOD.Also, wisdom is not The Good. This is a separate issue, but I am assuming you are also leveraging this critique against The Good as well. — Bob Ross
I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants. But because I know one must suffer to decide that it will act in alignment with objective moral aims and that one must also decide to want these aims, I will inflict necessary suffering on one. That one includes myself. What is necessary is not then rightly called torture. But it will be deemed torture by the weak.Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom
I do not necessarily agree with this, if you are implying we should torture people to give them “more wisdom”. — Bob Ross
I missed that admittedly and I apologize. No wonder at all then. I thought you were basically saying things that sounded like realism and that your intent was to say things that were subjectivism.You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.
I think you have misunderstood the OP: this is not a thread about moral subjectivism. I have a separate thread for that metaethical theory if you would like to discuss that there. If you are accusing this theory of truly being a form of moral subjectivism, then I am not seeing yet why that is the case. — Bob Ross
Beauty and accuracy are objective. That is part of the problem of subjectivism. It does not admit to this. In wanting what is immoral it decides that all wants are equal in 'goodness'. That is dangerous lie.Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really
Flourishing, being the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose, is not necessarily, in -itself, dependent on anything other than the purpose being fulfilled. That purpose can be anything. For most people, yes, personal growth is going to be a part of that. I am not sure to what extent beauty factors in for most people, and I am not sure what you mean by accuracy: accuracy of what? — Bob Ross
The which says NOTHING about morality at all. If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality. Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense. So, objective morality would claim that it matters not how well you flourish killing Asians, you missed the point of morality.You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.
The Good, as flourishing, is not dependent on a goal itself: it is the objective relation between a thing and its purpose such that it has been sufficiently fulfilled. — Bob Ross
Ok, as expected there will be a lot of me saying 'nevermind' because I thought you were saying here that the good is subjective. You are claiming that in another thread so these arguments are still valid for you to respond to.OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective.
That is irrelevant to what I said, which was that I deny that the Good is subjective. That our striving towards the good is subjective does not entail whatsoever that the good itself is subjective. — Bob Ross
Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either. You didn't say that before. Saying that is a meta level difference and I can almost agree. But no, people are often harmoniously evil together. So, wrong again. More is needed. That more is objective. It is all good virtues combined.it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you.
The highest Good is universal flourishing, which is the flourishing of everything harmonously (with one another). Again, I think you misunderstood the OP. Perhaps you were forwarded here from someone in the TFP that was asking you to analyze my other thread about moral subjectivism. This thread is about a moral realist position I have come up with. — Bob Ross
Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct.
A fact is a statement about reality that properly corresponds to it. Facts are objective insofar as their agreement with reality is mind-independent. — Bob Ross
Nope. Reality is subjective delusion. Truth is objective. Facts are only currently held as 'true' beliefs about truth. They never describe truth accurately. Their correctness is only scale of how wrong they are, often relative to one another.When I say ‘factually wrong’, I mean that there is a state-of-affairs or arrangement of entities in reality in virtue of which make it true that it is wrong. This is objective, not subjective. — Bob Ross
Truth is the only thing that is objective.Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective
You are conflating experience being subjective with everything being subjective. — Bob Ross
Agreed and admitted.Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.
I would like to ask, and I mean this with all due respect: did you read the OP? I usually give people the benefit of the doubt, but I am now suspecting you may have jumped into this thread from someone else who notified you of my moral subjectivist metaethical theory that I defended in a different thread (or actually multiple threads). Am I right? If not, then I apologize. If so, then I would suggest reading the OP: it is a pretty quick read and you will probably understand better what this moral realist position is (and what it isn’t); and, that way, we can hone-in on our conversation to the OP itself. — Bob Ross
Again, you are right. It was because I can only ever focus on the real. If you present a front, a fake realism, and I read before as I did that you are a subjectivist, I can't help but speak to you, the real you, that is a subjectivist. Also the sheer length of some of this made me lose my awareness of the former position as a stance only, a pretense. Again sincere apologies.You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.
I am still confused at why you think that this theory (I have presented) is purporting to be a moral anti-realist position; let alone moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross
It is not. It is a law of the universe. It is the only law, really. All else can be derived from it.Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross
(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).
My claim (that you quoted) never attempted to say that we invented free will. It is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross
That much is clear. We will meet again, when you are you. Luckily for you, morality is objective.Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.
It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, you are think that there is a natural law of morality which actually forms things, like a force. I don’t see why that is the case. — Bob Ross
Will do! Thanks for understanding!I will say that I disagree with most of what you said about moral subjectivism, but this thread isn’t meant to debate that; so if you want to discuss that then shoot me a message on the moral subjectivism thread of mine. — Bob Ross
Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself.
It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.
Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).
Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond.
I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants.
Beauty and accuracy are objective.
If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality
Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense.
Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either
Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.
The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic.
The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic. It is not impossible to do this, but it is difficult and rare, and such an idea should not form the basis of realistic ethics. I think that, more than anything, it has confused us. — Leontiskos
That's pretty close to how I think. — Moliere
Though I'd extend the range to include all forms of Christianity. — Moliere
It's a nice thought, but for the wrong species. — Moliere
Acting truly as if the two partners are one organism isn't how marriage usually works in practice. — Bob Ross
That is your assessment, not mine. Of course I mention them only because to me they are relevant in the case of my stance FOR moral realism. I suppose I could take the con to moral objectivity and argue that, but that is not my belief, and I prefer genuine argument meaning arguing only for that which one does actually believe.I think it might be best if I give a brief elaboration of this moral realist theory, and see what you disagree with. So far, it seems as though most of your critiques and points are irrelevant to the OP. — Bob Ross
I mean you did not answer my earlier critiques and instead retreated back into your 'jargon' I prefer to believe I refuted, actually answering your comments.This theory posits that morality is objective—i.e., that there are states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality that inform us of what is moral or immoral. It posits that what is good (viz., The Good, in the sense of an objective goodness) is flourishing—i.e., goodness is identical to flourishing. Flourishing is, at its core, the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. Flourishing is contextual and objective: it is contextual insofar as one must posit a context in which one is assessing flourishing (e.g., I am flourishing, you are flourishing, we are flourishing, society is flourishing, etc.) and objective insofar as it is a mind-independently existing relation between a purpose and fulfillment thereof (viz., one’s psychology has nothing to do with flourishing being identical to the fulfillment of purposes). — Bob Ross
I can agree that because I believe morality to be objective that to me flourishing is objective. But that merely means that subjective opinions on flourishing are all always wrong in some way. They simply can never be perfect.This relation, however, contains an element of subjectivity insofar as purposes are subjective (i.e., what it means for something [within a context] to fulfill its purpose is relative to the psychology of one or more subjects): this does not make flourishing itself subjective but, rather, merely that that very objective relation is that of (subjective) purposes being fulfilled. — Bob Ross
Yes, my system of belief is in alignment with that, except in one way that should be stated.Each context one could posit, for evaluating flourishing, which is infinite in amount, is hierarchical in the sense that larger contexts have more flourishing and smaller contexts have less flourishing (in total); and, consequently, the larger the context of flourishing, the greater the good (i.e., the greater the flourishing). Thusly, the highest good is universal flourishing, because it has the greatest amount of flourishing being the largest context. The highest good has the most good and is, therefore, the best good: it is the ultimate good. Therefore, if one is committed to being good, then they should strive for this best good, this highest good, this universal flourishing, instead of a lower one. — Bob Ross
I just stated why. I am a moral realist so I do not disagree with what I define that to be, in general. Any model that ends up supporting the tenets I defined as moral realism, because that is what I understand and believe it to be, is fine with me.With that being said, what do you disagree with in that theory? — Bob Ross
As mentioned, we should both be able to easily agree that all understanding is incorrect when compared to perfection. So, we do not have to harp on that.I would like to also disclaim that this position is not “fake”, as you implied multiple times in your response: by noting that I have a separate thread for moral subjectivism, I was not meaning to imply I am a moral subjectivist. Personally, I hold this theory instead; but I am more than happy to discuss moral subjectivism, as I think it gets a very bad wrap by most people who, quite frankly, do not fully understand the theory. — Bob Ross
And I never said that it did.Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself.
I don’t think removing normativity from the good makes moral subjectivism itself have merit. — Bob Ross
Indeed not. Normalizing to an imperfect standard is merely immoral. It is an error, just like moral subjectivism. There is no need even giving pretense to errors, finally.Instead, it just fixes a lot of problems with moral realist theories which posit the contrary and makes more realism more plausible. — Bob Ross
There is zero difference in these things you claim as partially different. No single choice is neutral. There is nothing in this universe but morality of state and accuracy of moral aim towards objective moral perfection. Those are the core tenets of objective morality.Another thing I would like to disclaim is that when I say flourishing has that subjective element of being the fulfillment of a (subjective) purpose: I am referring to the depths of the soul and not whimsical day-to-day opinions or desires a person has. — Bob Ross
The entire universe is evidence but I know that is a dodge.It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.
So, this is not something posited in my theory; and I don’t see any evidence to support the good being a natural law. — Bob Ross
And I did not say they were. They are however, as mentioned, parts of goodness. And the way they are arranged or add value to perfection is discrete meaning objective. But this is objective in multiple ways at the same time. People do not realize that virtues have discrete structure and value. People will often devalue one virtue compared to another. That is a moral error. All virtues that I am referring to, that can be properly named as such, have a discrete interaction between them. And they are all equal, precisely perfectly equal.Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).
I didn’t follow any of this: what is a ‘quantum discrete part of goodness’? Virtues are habits of character that are good: they are not identical to goodness. — Bob Ross
That is sad because it is just as easy to quote the whole thing and avoid this problem, facilitating all of our efforts at communication.Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond.
Correct. I am not going to quote everything you say, because there is too much. I only tag the portion relative to what I am responding to, and trust you will be able to navigate your own responses. — Bob Ross
And yet it is moral to inflict suffering on others to help them earn wisdom in a 'safer' setting. Otherwise there is no need to teach, ever. There is no need to communicate ever. This forum is purposeless without that tenet in place. Suffering the exposure to others ideas is the potential for communication/teaching/learning and the best incidence of those is the earning of wisdom.I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants.
It is immoral to torture someone (or torture them absent of this ‘negative intent’ you mentioned) for the sake of building their virtue. — Bob Ross
And I did not say it did. Any given beauty is a partial error and there would then be a perfect beauty that would then instantiate objective moral truth. The fact that imperfect beauty can still be quire moral and amazingly beautiful is included and fine. But no beauty we see except all is perfect and we cannot grasp all, ever. So, although we experience all, we sit within it, we cannot really perceive it yet. We are evolving to perceive it accurately.Beauty and accuracy are objective.
What do you mean by accuracy? Accuracy of what?
I don’t think beauty necessarily instantiates objective moral truth. — Bob Ross
I disagree and for the reasons stated already and not refuted in any way.Being ugly has nothing to do with what is moral or immoral. There could be a reality with universal flourishing and every person therein is uglier than a bat. — Bob Ross
So, you are wrong here. So far, YOU are correct, and now you will say the incorrect part.If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality
The first sentence is in principle correct, the second is not implied from the first. In the smallest, or one of the smallest, contexts of flourishing, of good, if one has the purpose of killing asians, then they would thereby flourish if they are sufficiently killing asians. — Bob Ross
And THAT is the second order distinction I have been talking about.However, the buck does not stop here: the highest good is universal flourishing, and killing asians clearly violates that. So, colloquially, my theory would state “it is immoral to kill asians for the sole sake of fulfilling one’s own desire”. — Bob Ross
I do not claim to know moral cognitivism. It is not necessary to know it to assert what I refer to as my objective morality, perfection. The one true moral judgment is perfection, to me, so there is no need to say that either. Thus only item 2 pertains to me. And I contend that it is all that is needed.Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense.
No it does not. Objective morality (i.e., moral realism) is a three-pronged thesis:
1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism)
3. There is at least one true moral judgment. — Bob Ross
And I disagree.Moral realism itself does not entail that moral anti-realism is internally incoherent, although a particular theory may advertise that, nor that it is nonsense; but, rather, just that it is objectively wrong to do so. — Bob Ross
I covered that earlier. Flourish is from any state, a different vector but that differing does not support subjective morality.Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either
It is implied by the highest good: universal flourishing requires, nay presupposes, universal harmony. — Bob Ross
I agree the OP intends to be discussing objective morality, not subjective morality as I thought earlier.Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.
You cannot claim that moral is objective and turn around and deny that objectivity is ‘that which is mind-independent’.
I will stop here for now, so that we can hone in on our conversation to the OP. — Bob Ross
I mean you did not answer my earlier critiques and instead retreated back into your 'jargon' I prefer to believe I refuted, actually answering your comments
...
zI am not trying to derail the thread at all. I still intend to discuss it more, although I think I have made great points already that have been ignored because they do not fit the OP. But that is not correct, so, what am I to do?
Very well, from the start.Here is a new metaethical theory I am working on that is a form of moral realism, and, since I find it a worthy contender of my moral anti-realist position, I wanted to share it with the forum to see what people think. — Bob Ross
On we go, in good faith ...I do not have a name for it yet, so I will just explicate it. — Bob Ross
I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism. That applies here. To assert uselessness is useless.For the sake of brevity, and because I have already covered arguments in favor of them in my moral subjectivist paper, I am presupposing moral cognitivism and non-nihilism in this thread. — Bob Ross
Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.If anyone would like me to elaborate on them, then I certainly can; and I suggest anyone who is interested in that to read the relevant portions of my discussion board OP pertaining to moral subjectivism on those two metaethical positions. I will focus on a positive case for moral objectivism, which I deny in my moral subjectivist (anti-realist) view. — Bob Ross
There is so much wrong with this paragraph that it might take infinite time to detail it.The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. — Bob Ross
You are unclear here as to the 'categories'. I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories. That is confusing because we all know there is a continuum there. If one is dealing with a continuum one must/should specify the dividing line between them. So what precisely denotes good and what evil? What filter do I use to distinguish between them? How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross
This paragraph explains NOTHING OF USE about the former paragraph and yet that is what it purports to be doing. No help. Why?For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’. — Bob Ross
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.So, in light of this and in an attempt to contrast with my other moral anti-realist theory, I would like to point out the flaw, from the perspective of this theory, of my moral subjectivist argument; so let me outline it briefly again: — Bob Ross
Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:P1: The way reality is does not entail how it should be. — Bob Ross
No they are not.P2: Moral facts are statements about states-of-affairs which inform us of how reality should be. — Bob Ross
I do not know what you mean here. What is TF, true, false? By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises. You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist. Again, putting TF in front of this statement with no explanation is messy at best.C: TF, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross
I like that. It's not discrete but it says the right things to be considered in support of realism.Analyzing this argument from this theory, as opposed to moral subjectivism, P2 is false; because moral facts are not only about states-of-affairs, in the sense that they are made true in virtue of corresponding to some state-of-affairs in reality, but, rather, are made true in virtue of how the state-of-affairs sizes up to the abstract category of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’. — Bob Ross
Smaller sentences might help. This is hard to follow. You merely claim it is a misunderstanding and although this sentence is perhaps one of the longest in history it does not say why there even is a misunderstanding.So, the key misunderstanding of moral subjectivism, or so the argument goes (:, is that a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality and not solely states-of-affairs in reality—as abstract categories are still mind-independently true insofar as, although we can semantically disagree, the actions are subsumable under more general classifications and this is not stance-dependent—and thusly P2 is false. — Bob Ross
You do not say what this means. So what if P1 only refers to states and not truths? And this is wrong anyway.Likewise, P1, if taken as true, only refers by 'reality is' to states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality and not abstract categories of events or actions in that reality (nor what potentially could occur in that reality). — Bob Ross
Is that a sentence? Smaller is better. Discreet! You asked me to address ONE thing instead of a complex and interweaved response to you, but sentences like this are a tornado through a trailer park. Wreckage abounds.Although there is a lot I would like to say, I want to keep this brief—so I will say only one last thing: this is not a form of platonism. By abstract form or category I do not mean that there exists an abstract object, or a set of them, in reality that in virtue of which makes moral judgments (which express something objective) true—as this falls into the same trap that they are indeed states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality and this violates P1. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.
Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.
I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.
1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)
This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.
They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed
Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.
1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.
2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).
3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.
I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.
So what precisely denotes good and what evil?
How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?
It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?
For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.
Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology
No they are not.
Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.
Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.
What is TF, true, false?
By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises
You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.
Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.
It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone
It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'
So, you went right back to a requirement that I do not believe in. I suppose that's a hard thing to get past. If you want to HIDE behind an academic construct instead of addressing the issue, that is not going to help. It does not matter, by the way, if you are right. The fact that even everyone but me agrees that the above is true is irrelevant.So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.
Any theory can possibly “describe” moral realism. That it is a form of moral realism depends on if it is purporting at least the following thesis:
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism].
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross
And I am not convinced. I am not even convinced now that moral realism matters at all if it must answer the 3 propositions. I am trying to argue for objective moral truth. That has ramifications that disagree entirely in my opinion with those three propositions as stated. It does not help at all that you keep regurgitating them back to me. I will try to address your comments about why they are necessary below.Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.
I agree with this. Rhetorically, even if the theory is a form of moral realism, people will not be convinced if it seems counter to moral realism. — Bob Ross
Yes, I can. I just did. I do again. If that makes me incoherent, so be it. Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are propositional, which is a required position for moral realists to take. You cannot reject moral cognitivism and be a moral realist. — Bob Ross
Well, ok, so, I think that statement is true, so, that means I must be for what you call moral cognitivism, but, the idea of anti-cognitivism is then the issue. But you for some reason did not do the redefine of that one here.1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)
Beliefs being fallible does not entail that moral judgments are non-propositional. Saying moral judgments are propositional means that one can formulate them into statements which are truth-apt. If you reject moral cognitivism, then, for example, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is incapable of being true or false. — Bob Ross
OK, If I must decide, it does indeed seem that moral cognitivism is, within reason, acceptable. I know we will have to revisit that issue though. So, hopefully my objection is noted.This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.
They are defined such that they are foils to each other and, thusly, you have to either accept one or the other (or suspend judgment): you cannot sidestep the issue by claiming they have low practical utility—even if it is true. — Bob Ross
So, what is deemed a contradiction is often not. I understand you are saying that these are not interpreted phenomena that seem contradictory but that the negation was DERIVED from the opposite. Well, ok. But when in the history of mankind has the wording not been wrong on something? Never. I do not want to just digress into confusion either. On we go.They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed
That is logically impossible, because non-cognitivism is the negation of cognitivism. You are saying X and !X are both true, which is the definition of a logical contradiction. — Bob Ross
I can accept for now, with the objection in place.Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.
Correct. Moral cognitivism and non-nihilism are metaethical theories which are not themselves the same as the debate about realism vs. anti-realism; rather, they are subcomponents of the moral realist thesis, and, for the sake of brevity and because I have already outlined them in full in my moral subjectivism thread, I refer the reader there. This OP is about a moral naturalist theory that presupposes moral cognitivism and non-nihilism and ventures to prove objectivism. — Bob Ross
I consider myself both an idealist and a realist. So, about now you are shaking your head. Yes, I mean it. I am dedicated to balance. Balance and wisdom REQUIRE in my ethics that idealist is correct AND that pragmatism is correct at the same time. The contradiction is not there even though people erroneously believe that it is. Sounds familiar right?1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.
Are you an idealist? I am a realist (ontologically), so I think that most events are mind-independent. — Bob Ross
And this is a retreat to jargon again.2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).
To clarify this a bit, another way of thinking about it is that the Good under this view is identical to flourishing, and flourishing is objective. The methodological approach to determining that is two-fold: (1) the analysis of acts such that they are conceptually subsumed under general categories and (2) the semantic labeling of a particular category as ‘the good’. — Bob Ross
You say it is not a law and that is not relevant at all. It depends entirely on law. Everything does. There is nothing in the universe but truth, and that is what philosophy is about discovering. We do not create truth. We can only discover it. If we make something, it is flawed. Same argument I used before. Perfection is a limit and we cannot arrive, only intend to make progress towards it by aiming directly at it the best we can.3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.
That which is mind-independent is not necessarily a law. A law is a force of nature that dictates particular behaviors of objects. The action of a cup smashing to pieces is a mind-independent state-of-affairs, but it is not itself a law. — Bob Ross
Holy lack of clarity batman! Pow! Ok! Well, I think you should state the list of categories and also mention that they are a single value on a sliding scale if they are. Because these things are all different conceptually, yes?I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.
At least those two, there could be more. Such as a neutral category. — Bob Ross
This can only be true if all definitions of flourishing are perfect, e.g. precisely the same. That is not to say that progressing towards what someone erroneously considers as good is acceptable. No, that that they consider as good must itself also be exactly the same. Otherwise, flourishing is not good. And perfection is quite demanding, I assure you.So what precisely denotes good and what evil?
The good is flourishing, and the bad is the negation of that. In action, what is good is progressing towards The Good (i.e., flourishing) at its highest level (i.e., universal flourishing) and evil is the regression from it. — Bob Ross
Yes, as long as the 'highest' Good, and I already warned you about the term 'highest', is the same for everyone. No two people can differ on what flourishing is, because that is subjective morality.How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?
It will be whether or not the action progresses or regresses from a world with universal flourishing—i.e., the highest Good. — Bob Ross
This is classic jargon and obfuscates understanding. It does not help in understanding.It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?
This has nothing to do with that quote of me, which was:
For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’ — Bob Ross
Well, I think you should realize by now what my issue with flourishing is. It does not work as an example for the reasons I have stated many times now. You have not addressed my concerns in that sense. You are still just repeating it. I do not know what else to do to get you to address it.I was referring to, here, is that, in simplified terms, normativity is not objective; but the good is. The good is flourishing—which is the abstract category I was referring to—and this is objective. I do grant that I need to refurbish the OP to be more clear. If it helps, then use my summary I gave a couple responses back instead of the OP itself. — Bob Ross
Which it isn't. Your flourishing is not the good as described. That is unless no two people can differ in any way on precisely the details of what flourishing is, not the fact that they are making progress towards their goals. That can be progress towards evil. It can be evil for one and less evil for another making the latter more objectively moral in their intents. Is that agreed?In the OP, I focused too much on the methodological approach to determining what goodness is and not in clarifying the end result (of it being identical to flourishing). — Bob Ross
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.
The problem with that is that you argued as if I was arguing for moral subjectivism, which is not what is happening in the OP. For those tracking my threads, of which many have been, I wanted to provide clarity on how I overcame my main argument for moral non-objectivism.[/.quote]
We are past that.
— Bob Ross
This is classic you so far. You just state these things and do not say why. That means I ignore you. I say it does negate P1 and it is tautological and round and round we go until you deign to explain WHY.Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology
P1 wasn’t supposed to be incredibly elaborate: it was meant to re-iterate the syllogism from my moral subjectivism thread. The elaboration of that premise is found there.
As for your ‘anti-P1’, it doesn’t negate P1 and it isn’t tautological. — Bob Ross
Yes, but, the twain shall meet. We are both within reality. One of us is onto a better set of assertions and beliefs. This is collaborative. But explanation is needed. If you just assume the work without showing it, we all lose. I admit I am trying to learn here. Are you?No they are not.
Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.
We have entirely different theories of truth and, subequently, of facticity. — Bob Ross
They are not. They never do. They cannot.Facts are statements that agree with reality. — Bob Ross
Said like a mind path only advocate for sure.Truth is the correspondence of thought with reality. — Bob Ross
I know that. I agree.By states-of-affairs, I do not just mean temporal processes: I also mean atemoral arrangements of entities in reality. — Bob Ross
There are no other facts apart from moral.Moral facts are morally signified statements which agree with reality. — Bob Ross
Why? You should not just say that and not explain.Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.
This is a non-sequitur. — Bob Ross
I disagree. There is no way to define something that does not exist. To try is insane.What is TF, true, false?
Sorry, that is shorthand for ‘therefore’.
By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises
C follows logically from P2 and P1.
You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.
One can define something and in the next breath claim that something cannot exist: there’s no logical contradiction nor incoherence with that. — Bob Ross
Interesting. I do claim that everything comes into being from thoughts. But being is another path, just like intent and will is. The structure and order is thought.Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.
It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone
Categories are conceptual, and conceptualization is the process of subsuming things under more general concepts. I never claimed everything came into being from thoughts. — Bob Ross
The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'
That is not what the cogito argument means: it is not that “thinking is the one aspect of being”. It is the argument that one exists because they can think.
Bob — Bob Ross
Morality is objective. — Chet Hawkins
Morality is objective.
— Chet Hawkins
What does this mean if not "some moral propositions are objectively true"? — Michael
I mean, I agree. — Chet Hawkins
I am only in this thread like ... for ... moral objectivity. But if there is something called moral realism that is different for glossy technical reasons, I am trying to understand so that I can either agree or disagree there. — Chet Hawkins
Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.
Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.
I consider myself both an idealist and a realist
If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.
Moral objectivity is truth to me
Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure
1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.
2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.
3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.
There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.
There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.
There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality
I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.
The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:
I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.
This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.
It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.
You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is. — Bob Ross
Well, perhaps I need to detail more of my model, but, I agree that this is kind of derailing this thread because of the way everyone, including me of course, is choosing to discuss it. I am a free form theorist, but I can learn this way, I think; assuming it's not just repugnant once I do get more of it. For now I think I'll read more of what others say here on these forums and digest it. Maybe I can. Who knows.In terms of “hiding” behind moral realism, it cannot be hiding if the OP is an exposition of a moral realist theory. If you have disputes with moral realism, or the underlying framework within metaethics, then we can discuss that. — Bob Ross
Well, If I explain more of my model it would help. But I surmise that it would be rejected from start to finish here, although I think its way more useful to people in its verbiage and formulation than what I seem to need to do and say here to interact with you successfully.He seem to use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ very differently than me and the contemporary literature, which is fine; but I need more clarity from you on what you mean by them. I have already explained what I mean by them. — Bob Ross
Well, no. It does not change. So, to me you can also say, TF it is a law of the universe. It is truth or part of truth. And there are many such laws. But one can also say 'Morality is truth' or 'Morality is objective' or 'Objective morality is a law of the universe'. The 'rules' of morality do not change. Opinion is only error. Choice always contains error. Belief always contains error. Fact is just a certain type of belief, so, facts always contain error.Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.
By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’? — Bob Ross
That makes no sense to me at all. It's like you started talking about microscopic portions of the wall and their dimensions and such, but I am not allowed to discuss that same wall my way. It's ridiculous to me. Of course all opinions about the wall should be entertained when speaking about the wall. I mean moral objectivism is indeed what we are both talking about, just two apparently quite different models of that same thing. I do not mind leaping into such a discussion and saying, no, that's not what 'red' means to me. Here is what it means to me. I will tell you why and how I support my belief. I will not just say, 'Hey we are only discussing this way to moral objectivism.' I suppose if that is how it is, I need a new thread of my own.Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.
The purpose of this thread is to discuss the view outlined in the OP, not your ethical theory insofar as it doesn’t relate thereto. — Bob Ross
As discussed already in great detail I suppose I would have to be a cognitivist.My position is a form of moral realism, and a part that is the affirmation of moral cognitivism. Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist? — Bob Ross
Well then tradition is not so useful to me. I'm more fluid.I consider myself both an idealist and a realist
By ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, I was referring to metaphysical, specifically ontological, outlooks—not whether or not you like following ideals. Idealism, traditionally, is the position that reality is fundamentally made up of minds, and realism is the view that it is fundamentally made up of mind-independent parts. — Bob Ross
Everything in reality, all iota of matter and even dreams, all of it, yes, everything, partakes of fear. It cannot avoid it. It is objectively true. It is a law of the universe. But, yeah, assuming there is interest, I need another thread to discuss it it seems.I was thinking perhaps you are an idealist, and that would explain why you seem to think that nothing in reality is mind-independent. — Bob Ross
Ah, then we agree. Perfection is singular.If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.
It cannot be defined by two different cultures in the sense that they are both correct about what flourishing is while simultaneously having contradictory accounts. There is only one way there is to be flourishing. — Bob Ross
No, because you will now go off into state changes that do not matter to truth at all.Moral objectivity is truth to me
So this would entail that what is true is equivocal to what is moral, which seems very implausible. — Bob Ross
Again, truth does not apply to states. I would even use another word and clear up logic itself on that basis. A true state is a goofy thing to say/discuss. States can change.If it is true that Gary raped that woman, then is it thereby moral? Of course not. If it is true that 1+1=2, then is it moral? Of course not. — Bob Ross
Yes it is, to me. To me there is nothing but morality in the universe and that is synonymous with truth, or God, or Love; choose your delusion.Truth is correspondence of reality, or perhaps the whole, or what is, but certainly not equivalent to what is moral. — Bob Ross
Yes, I agree. I am discussing objective morality as I understand and believe it to be. But that should be useful to you. If I have even some shred of a point, at all, you can use my model and assertions to fuel thought and discussion on yours. Clearly I was confused at the examples you gave and admittedly I thought you were on the track of subjective morality and then what you were saying sounded like objective morality.Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure
You are importing your own views and then simply demonstrating mine are incompatible with them; instead of analyzing my position on its own merits. This ‘perfectness’ being ‘goodness’ doesn’t exist in my theory: should it? I don’t think so. — Bob Ross
Well it's not hard to imagine, is it?1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.
I don’t know why morality is ‘represented by a perfect intent’, or what that means. — Bob Ross
And again, that is precisely correct. I assert that is true. They are the same thing.2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.
Again, this just equivocates truth with morality. — Bob Ross
We need as choosers, as moral agents, some capacity to judge the error level of a choice or state. Due to the nature of the limiting force and the seeming impossibility of perfection, this 3rd contention becomes true and interesting. It means if we have a morality meter no two choices or beliefs could ever be precisely equal in moral value, goodness value. This all depends on, you guessed it, moral objectivism.3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.
Why would this be a part of the thesis? — Bob Ross
The physical reality we think we know, is not known. It is delusion. It is just emotion, just consciousness. The model I am getting to is a theoretical 'proof' for this truth.There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.
Hence why I thought you may be an idealist. Anyways, you are confusing ontology with epistemology: our knowledge of the world is always mind dependent, but that does not entail that what fundamentally exists is mind-dependent. — Bob Ross
Not in my model, I am not.There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.
Ok, so you are an idealist. — Bob Ross
I agree. That is only because I am not saying it quite right. But, unlike logicians I am more comfortable with that. So, I need your help actually.There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality
That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is. — Bob Ross
And of course, I disagree entirely. I would say there is precious little reason, the limit as x approaches none, to suspect that. It is in fact a horrid suspicion, and groundless. It is much more likely that all seeds of emotive capacity were part of natural law. We only see discrete breakpoints because we are still deeply deluded. We do not have enough awareness yet. We are going there.I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.
I mean that it seems as though, and we have good reasons to believe that, our minds are emergent from mind-independent parts and that the universe is fundamentally mind-independent. — Bob Ross
Whereas Descartes fits my model well and indeed my model would allude to the other statements I made as equivalent and necessary as a full closed set.The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:
I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.
This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.
It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.
I never was, nor will I be, arguing for the cogito argument. I don’t see the relevance of this to my moral realist position. I do not hold cogito ergo sum: I don’t buy the descartes argument for it. ‘I’ do not exist simply because something thinks. — Bob Ross
I mean, I think I get you. I am not at all sure you get me. I would like to discuss the whole topic of objective morality.For the sake of brevity, I am going to stop there for now; and see if that helps. — Bob Ross
Well. ok, yes.a) Moral propositions are truth-apt
b) Some moral propositions are true
c) Some moral propositions are objectively true.
(c) entails (b) entails (a).
If you reject (a) then you are a moral non-cognitivist. If you reject (b) then you are an error theorist. If you reject (c) then you are a non-objectivist.
Some say that you must accept (c) to be a realist, others say that you need only accept (b) to be a realist, and that to accept (c) is to be a "robust" realist.
Although I wouldn't get too caught up in labels, they're just pragmatic tools with no real philosophical significance. What matters is whether or not (a), (b), and (c) are true. — Michael
Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt? — Chet Hawkins
Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt? — Chet Hawkins
Moral non-cognitivists will say that a sentence such as "this is wrong" actually means something like "don't do this", and that the sentence "don't do this" isn't truth-apt. — Michael
Possibly because moral propositional statements can have a predictable effect on people, and this predictability is useful somehow.Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt? — Chet Hawkins
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