• Wolfgang
    65
    Epistemology is a central part of philosophy. It not only influences philosophical and scientific thinking, but also has a formative effect on the general worldview. However, there are countless directions and just as many of them, only a few of which manage to reach the light of day, and often the most successful are those that best match the spirit of the times.

    I'm trying to develop my own approach here, which has some similarities to others, but is not identical to them.

    The initial question is: What can we recognize and how do we do it? Undoubtedly, we do not perceive the world as a camera obscura, but rather we transform reality into a sensory neural reality.

    Let's take a virtual meta perspective for a moment and pretend that we are something similar to God. Then we see a world that turns into a second world. World 1 is the world that exists independently of humans, World 2 is the anthropic world. World 2 is a different, separate world for every living creature. If a neutrino could sense, there would also be a neutrino world.

    For us humans, however, only World 2 exists; a World 1, which Kant would call a thing in itself, does not exist for us. Therefore, there is no objective truth that we can know that can be located in World 1. There is an epistemological boundary between World 1 and World 2 that is insurmountable because we have no code for our mental transformation with which to infer World 1.

    All our philosophical concepts, knowledge, rationality, reason, but also all sciences, including mathematics, refer exclusively to World 2. Although World 1 does not exist for us, our anthropic World 2 is of course based on it, not as an image, but as a specific one Transformation. How a computer converts a numerical code made up of 0s and 1s into an executable program that can be used to draw pictures. The logic of World 1 is thus translated into a logic of World 2. Every species and - if this were possible - every inanimate particle has its own world 2.

    This means that there is a connection between World 1 and World 2, even if World 1 does not exist for us. Non-existence refers primarily to knowledge.

    Since our world 2 only exists for us and is relative, I call this view anthropic relativism.

    If we delete World 1 from our world view, since it doesn't exist for us anyway, World 2 appears to us as the one world we need to know.

    From this point of view, this idea resembles instrumentalism combined with constructivism. Both assume that the world is not absolutely knowable, but that we can achieve an ever better approximation to the truth through our epistemologies and technologies, although truth can also be understood in a relativistic way.

    Instrumentalism, for example, argues that epistemologies do not serve to describe the world in its absolute truth, but to make it comprehensible and manageable for us. Epistemologies are therefore to be understood as tools that we can use to understand and shape our environment. This position was mainly held by Pierre Duhem.

    Constructivism argues that we do not passively perceive the world, but actively construct it. Our epistemologies are therefore not simply representations of the world, but they determine how we perceive and understand the world. These ideas can also be found in the works of Jean Piaget.

    Both instrumentalism and constructivism are forms of relative realism. They assume that the world does exist, but that we can only know it insofar as we imagine it.

    This view is also held by many scientists.

    The difference between both theories of science and my approach is a metaphysical gap that cannot be filled in either. In both, the unknowability of an objective truth lies in a lack, whereas I justify the unknowability of a world 1 (which exists only from the point of view of a virtual meta-perspective) in a transformation whose code we do not know. The metaphysical gap is in tautology, what we cannot know, we cannot know. A reason is not given or lies in itself. This gap can only be closed by providing a reason, i.e. by introducing a third logical element, in the form of a quasi-reality.

    Hypothetical realism, as it exists in the context of evolutionary epistemology and is advocated by Gehard Vollmer, for example, is closer here. According to this, reality has a structure according to which causal relations (cause-and-effect relationships) exist objectively and can be partially recognized.

    However, the question also remains why reality can only be partially recognized. The gap remains.

    In my approach, there is no such thing as objective reality — unless it exists only from a meta-perspective, only by means of an auxiliary construction. Reality exists only as World 2, i.e. as a transformed reality, , as a neural transformat.

    Although we transform objects and relations into our world, we do not know whether they will be linearly and completely transformed.


    Transformation and retransformation
    The main difference, however, is that we not only transform World 1 into World 2, but also conversely change world 1 through our actions, even though it does not exist (for us). This retransformation is purely material and has no epistemological consequences. Consequences of our actions exist (for us) only in World 2. What impact it will have on World 1, we will never know.

    So the big transformer is our sensory and neural system. It is not really a system of realization, but a system of arousal. When we speak of realization in the philosophical sense, we really mean the logical and operational adaptation of our organism to an environment that presents itself to us as World 2.

    The transformation of the logic of World 1 results in our logic of World 2 and thus also that of mathematics. In this respect, mathematics indirectly represents a logic inherent in World 1. It therefore follows a phenomenal logic whose ontology we do not know.

    Epistemologically, we move on a surface whose “depth” we do not know, cannot know and do not have to know.

    And which philosophical school does this anthropic relativism belong to? There can be no doubt about the materialism of World 2, because it shows itself exclusively as a material world, without any metaphysical media being assumed. Since there is no World 1 for us, there is no reason for such speculation.

    As a consequence of this anthropic relativism it follows that the world is relativistic, not just our World 2 itself, but this world can be divided into different worlds, as is true for different species. Accordingly, there is no universal morality and ethics, but each culture has the right to its own identity.

    Excluding all metaphysical and transcendental ideas means focusing on this one world of ours and ensuring that it is preserved.

    The dilemma with epistemology is the concept of epistemology itself, because it suggests that there is a cognition machine in our head that is capable of knowing the world, and that in a transcendent sense.

    In reality, in our head there is a kilo and a half of flesh and blood interspersed with nerve cells. These have developed over the course of millions of years as a result of the influence of the environment and in confrontation with it and serve as orientation in the world.

    The fact that this nervous tissue has reached a level of complexity that allows us to think about transcendent things with the help of language is not synonymous with a knowledge in this regard.

    The concept of cognition, which, by the way, is a metatheoretical one here, omits the fact that the world in our head or our organism receives a neuronal modality by means of our nerves, i.e. is neuronally instantiated from the outset.

    Thus, the world that exists independently of us does not exist for us as such. It exists only as an abstract reality that we transform into a concrete world through our sensors.

    This metatheoretical concept of knowledge is all too often confused with a scientific, technical or everyday concept, which is about establishing rules that are conducive to the direct confrontation with the world.

    This also gives rise to the idea that one can gain transcendent knowledge with the help of science. Epistemology, however, is pure interpretation and is based only on findings from science and everyday life, but is not identical with them.

    This interpretation has been made by man in his own way in every epoch. Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Hegel interpreted the world as they were able to interpret it in their time.
    Neural instantiation not only brings with it a limit of knowledge for humans, but also for each individual. This is the reason why the individual cannot experience his neighbor in it. He can only observe it from the outside. And each individual spans his or her own, species-specific space-time. Space is created as a multidimensional space by fanning out by means of a highly complex neuronal structure, time is created by the organismic rhythm, especially by the heartbeat and, of course, triggered by environmental rhythms.
    This results in the relativity not only of individuals among themselves, but also of cultures and their political actions.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Always nice to see an attempt at epistemology. I would say in general your world 1 and world 2 viewpoints seem sound as an introduction. I don't know if you've proposed anything new enough to be a type of epistemology. An epistemology must not just be enough for its times, it must answer questions about knowledge that our current understanding cannot.

    For example: How do you solve the idea of belief vs knowledge? If world 2 is a mirror of world 1, how do we know if we're accurate to world 1? A description of how we assess the world at a high level does not inform us how we should properly assess the world to obtain knowledge. So while it is a nice start, I would keep going with it to see if you can properly tackle some of those issues that other epistemological theories have difficulty doing.

    If you are interested in reading other takes on epistemology, I have one here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a nice summary from the next poster that covers the topic nicely if you don't want to read the details.
  • Wayfarer
    22.2k
    The dilemma with epistemology is the concept of epistemology itself, because it suggests that there is a cognition machine in our head that is capable of knowing the world, and that in a transcendent sense.Wolfgang

    That would be what is referred to as metacognitive insight - knowing how we know. Kant was a signficant figure, in that regard but then so too was Plato.

    Excluding all metaphysical and transcendental ideas means focusing on this one world of ours and ensuring that it is preserved.Wolfgang

    Metaphysics is inextricably associated with religion in western culture, which can be misleading. That arose because of the assimilation of Platonism by theology in the early Christian era. But the origin of metaphysics proper was in my opinion with Parmenides and Heraclitus, subsequently interpreted by Plato and then Aristotle. They were not expllicitly religious in today's sense but deeply questioned the nature of knowledge and the meaning of being. I think that they would say that 'this world of ours' actually lacks any inherent reality, due to its transitory nature, and that what reality it possesses is imputed by us on the basis of reason, and that they were engaged in interrogating what that means. In particular, they were struck by the power of reason to penetrate beyond the sensible domain so as to reveal a realm of unchanging truths. Your reflection on 'worlds 1 and 2' is similar, but obviously Aristotle doesn't reject metaphysics in the peremptory way that you do. Perhaps yours is a consequence of its association with religion and the generally empiricist cast of modern culture.

    Epistemologically, we move on a surface whose “depth” we do not know, cannot know and do not have to know.Wolfgang

    You may not have to know it, but you suspect it's there!

    Like a long-legged fly upon the stream
    His mind moves upon silence.
    — W B Yeats

    Epistemologies are therefore to be understood as tools that we can use to understand and shape our environment. This position was mainly held by Pierre Duhem.Wolfgang

    Duhem was an instrumentalist in some respects but it is not what he was known for. Duhem argued that scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation, and they are always interconnected with auxiliary hypotheses. This means that when an experiment or observation contradicts a theory, it's not always clear whether the theory itself is false or if some auxiliary hypothesis is at fault. This idea has important implications for the philosophy of science and the interpretation of scientific theories. His work was precursor to Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn.

    Every species and - if this were possible - every inanimate particle has its own world 2.Wolfgang

    That's similar to panpsychism, isn't it? But Inanimate objects don't exhibit the drive towards homeostasis and self-maintenance - the will to survive - that is characteristic of even the most basic life-forms. So I can see the case as far as organisms are concerned, but not on the level of inorganic matter.

    A final point - take a good look at the abstracts for Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles C. Pinter. He was a mathematics professor, deceased July 2022. He had an interest in neurological modelling, cognitive science and philosophy, quite relevant to the concerns you're expressing. Most interesting book I've read in this space in the last several years.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    I only used the photon example to illustrate how relative our existence is. Panpsychism is completely far from my mind.
    You have probably understood that World 1 is only an auxiliary mental construct. World 1 as such does not exist (for us).
    What I mean to say is that what we call cognition refers to this bubble in which we live as neural beings. Flammarion's wood engraving symbolizes this bubble, from which we cannot escape.
    What is the consequence of my epistemology? Instrumentalism, constructivism, genetic epistemology and rejection of everything esoteric and religious. Long live the bubble and we should take care of it.
  • Wayfarer
    22.2k
    Instrumentalism, constructivism, genetic epistemology and rejection of everything esoteric and religious.Wolfgang

    I can deduce that from this and also your previous posts. I ascribe that to the fear of religion.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    World 1 is the world that exists independently of humans, World 2 is the anthropic worldWolfgang
    You cannot escape metaphysics, with all of its problems, just by acknowledging an unknown World 1. You have already built a metaphysical view, because you have built a system of ideas. As such, it is exposed to all criticism that metaphysics is exposed to.
  • Mww
    4.8k
    a World 1, which Kant would call a thing in itself, does not exist for us.Wolfgang

    In fact, it does, and necessarily. From which follows, conclusions drawn on false premises, is invalid.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    Not at all, while others say that one can know the world or not, I provide a justification, and that is: Every existent is instantiated in the world with its modality and interacts with it by means of this modality.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    Every existent is instantiated in the world with its modality and interacts with it by means of this modalityWolfgang
    This is a metaphysical statement. As such, it is exposed to the problems and criticism that metaphysics is exposed to.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    I provide an explanation for the fact that metaphysics does not exist
  • Angelo Cannata
    354

    It depends on your definition of metaphysics. There isn't a simple and universally agreed definition, so I will give you my definition: metaphysics is whenever we build a system of ideas. As a consequence, we cannot escape doing metaphysics, because, as soon as we think, we automatically build some organisation of ideas, so we do metaphysics. What can make a difference is how we deal with it. If we consider our constructions of idea as just hypotheses, acknowledging that they can never be true, then it's fine, we are recognising our human limits. The problem is when we think that our construction is true or might be true. Then we are putting ourselves in an anthropocentric mentality, thinking that reality is, or at least might be, the way we imagine it.
    I agree that this scheme subjectivity/objectivity needs to be criticized, but how? What I see is just people building and rebuilding new or more complex metaphysics, pretending that this way they have done something different, something beyond. But I can't see where the difference is.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    I base myself on the fact that we are transforming the world and therefore there cannot be another (for us).
    For me, metaphysics is that other world 1 that does not exist for us and therefore there is and cannot be any metaphysics. We have to come to terms with the fact that we can only ever act neurally instantiated, so that every argument is ultimately always tautological. The only question is, can you justify it or just assert it?
  • Angelo Cannata
    354

    What is supposed to be non metaphysical in your reasoning, what makes it non metaphysical? Saying that you don't want to be metaphysical, or that you want to criticize metaphysics, doesn't make it automatically non metaphysical.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    I argue purely logically by saying that we are neuronally established in this world and act here exclusively in this modality. That means we sit in this neural bubble. There is nothing else for us, otherwise we could perhaps switch back and forth between two or more modalities.
    If there is no other 'world' for us, then there is nothing behind this world of ours, so there is no meta-physics.
    I understand that this argument destroys all dreams of a better, otherworldly world.
  • Corvus
    3.1k
    It would be a matter of drawing the boundaries for one's perception. Some folks thinks that grammar and meanings are all there is in the world, and they reject and deny all other existence on the basis of linguistic criteria. In that case, their perceptual ability would be confined in the boundary they set.

    Some folks only accept what they see and hear in the physical world, saying nothing else exist. Then that is their boundary of the perception.

    But some folks extend their perceptual scope beyond what they see and hear, and using language and grammar only as tools for their reasoning and understanding the world beyond the vista and physical sensibility looking for the abstract truths, then their perceptual capability extends to metaphysics from epistemology.

    People have different epistemology for their own perception, and it is categorised by the boundaries of the perceptual possibility they set for themselves.
  • Angelo Cannata
    354
    If there is no other 'world' for us, then there is nothing behind this world of ours, so there is no meta-physicsWolfgang
    Metaphysics in philosophy is not when you refer to some other world; you can be fully metaphysical even without any reference to any other world.
    Therefore I think my question is still without an answer. We can refer it to your latest message: what is supposed to make it non metaphysical? Are you able to say something that is obviously non metaphysical and not just because you say that it is non metaphysical?
  • Corvus
    3.1k
    If there is no other 'world' for us, then there is nothing behind this world of ours, so there is no meta-physics
    — Wolfgang
    Metaphysics in philosophy is not when you refer to some other world; you can be fully metaphysical even without any reference to any other world.
    Angelo Cannata
    :up:
    Metaphysics is a methodology i.e. the way to look at the world and object, which is "beyond", not apparent and obvious. Metaphysics is not some possible world itself.
  • Wolfgang
    65
    If you just label my arguments but don't address them further, further discussion makes no sense.
  • Corvus
    3.1k
    It is up to them whatever boundary they set for their perceptual capabilities. But you do notice often, they are in deep confusion with the world, and objects they try to understand, when they get a little abstract.
  • Ciceronianus
    3k
    I wonder whether any of this amounts to more than the not very profound claim that we're human beings, and interact with our environment as human beings do.
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