However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls — Michael
What about the factor I mentioned though (…), recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? — Metaphysician Undercover
So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John. — Metaphysician Undercover
As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case it is John, or negating it, in which case it isn’t. — Mww
You said your evidence was that you saw a guy who looks like John approaching — flannel jesus
I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't have to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the minutiae of the philosophy of judgement... — flannel jesus
Strawman. I said: — Metaphysician Undercover
You have demonstrated that you have no interest in discussing the judgement by which something is labeled as evidence, not even agreeing with me that a judgement is required to label something as evidence. Discussion is pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover
…..one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. — Metaphysician Undercover
Notice what I've done. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yep. The autonomous workings of the mind are often neglected here in this forum, as are considerations/accounts of how simple thought begins and complex thought becomes autonomous. — creativesoul
It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt.So this is the doubt which flannel jesus is obsessed with. Flannel seems to think that the doubt created by all that "incidental evidence" implies that when I judge my experience of the empirical object, either "evidence of John", or "not evidence of John", I am assuming that the one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
...But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are physical, or at least bear an important relation to (or supervene on) the physical.
-SEP
That is what I'm disputing. But it doesn't mean that I believe that evolution or the Big Bang didn't occur, or that the Universe is not as science describes it, or other empirical facts. There's no need for me to do that. — Wayfarer
There is no scientific evidence for physicalism. — Wayfarer
Go there! It's more interesting than most stuff on here currently. — creativesoul
So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course. — Mww
I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible. — Mww
It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt. — Bylaw
The parts of the experience that might lead you to think John is approaching
are hard to consider evidence that John is not approaching.
But in in a situation where you are not sure John is approaching, but you think he is, the overall experience you are having contains evidence that he is not approaching. There is something about the entire experience that leads to doubt. — Bylaw
So, there must be elements of the experience that FIT with it not being John approaching.
(and for what it's worth, it seems to me FJ has been fairly patiently trying to get his point across and felt it was important that you come up with the scenario and also that the scenario had specific features. I certainly could have missed things, but it seemed like your reactions included some negative assumptions about his attitudes and intentions which did not help the discussion. ) — Bylaw
I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. — Metaphysician Undercover
In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because you're not getting the distinction between an empirical theory and a metaphysical stance. — Wayfarer
It's taught me that you have little insight into or knowledge of the subject matter of this forum.a lot of time spent in these sorts of dicussions has taught me — wonderer1
User: I've made the claim that a distinction can be made between an empirical theory and a metaphysical stance. That could be illustrated with reference to Karl Popper's criterion of 'falsifiability', could it not?
ChatGPT: Yes, your claim can indeed be illustrated by referring to Karl Popper's criterion of 'falsifiability'. Popper introduced the concept of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion to distinguish between what he considered to be scientific theories and non-scientific theories, including metaphysical stances.
Empirical Theory
An empirical theory, in the context of Popper's philosophy, is one that is testable and falsifiable through observation or experiment. For Popper, the hallmark of scientific theories is their openness to being proven wrong by empirical evidence. A theory is empirical if it makes predictions that can be tested and potentially refuted by observation or experimentation. The possibility of falsification is crucial; it means that a theory can be tested against the real world and discarded if it does not hold up. This does not mean the theory is true but that it has yet to be proven false, maintaining a provisional status.
Metaphysical Stance
On the other hand, a metaphysical stance refers to a position or theory that addresses questions beyond the physical realm, often dealing with the fundamental nature of reality, existence, or the universe that are not subject to empirical testing or falsification in the same way as scientific theories. These stances or theories are not necessarily concerned with empirical evidence and cannot be tested through empirical means. As such, they do not meet Popper's criterion of falsifiability.
User Right! But 'physicalism', the metaphysical claim that 'everything is ultimately physical', would *not* be an empirical theory, according to this criterion, would it?
ChatGPT: Indeed, 'physicalism'—the metaphysical claim that everything is ultimately physical in nature—would not qualify as an empirical theory according to Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability. Popper's criterion suggests that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must be testable and falsifiable; that is, it must be possible in principle to refute it through observation or experiment.
Physicalism, as a metaphysical stance, posits a broad claim about the nature of reality that is not directly amenable to empirical testing or falsification. It makes a general assertion about what exists or what everything is made of, rather than proposing specific, testable hypotheses about the physical world. While physicalist views may be compatible with empirical sciences and can inspire scientific research, the claim itself—'everything is ultimately physical'—does not offer a way to be proven false through empirical means. It operates more as a foundational assumption or a lens through which one interprets empirical data rather than an empirical theory in its own right.
Thus, according to Popper's criteria, physicalism would be categorized outside the realm of empirical science and instead within the domain of metaphysics. This distinction highlights the difference between what can be empirically tested and what constitutes a broader philosophical or conceptual framework for understanding the nature of reality.
….metaphysical principle which allow for thereality(validity) of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation. — Metaphysician Undercover
You do get it that reality, like a feral black cat in the middle of a dark night, slipped by you here, yes?Sound principles are derived from the way that we "experience" reality. Principles consistent with experience are considered to be sound. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is that what non physicalist generally believe? That there's no possible test or experimental data to demonstrate non physical phenomena? — flannel jesus
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