Over the course of the conflict, I have pointed out various times that the Russian operations surrounding Kiev were probably not what they were made to seem in Western media.

Given what we know now about the negotiations that took place in March/April 2022 in Istanbul, further questionmarks arise.

However, in the Tucker Carlson interview, Putin addressed this and said the following on the topic of the negotiations:

My counterparts in France and Germany said, ”How can you imagine them signing a treaty with a gun to their heads? The troops should be pulled back from Kiev. ‘I said, ‘All right.’ We withdrew the troops from Kiev.

As soon as we pulled back our troops from Kiev, our Ukrainian negotiators immediately threw all our agreements reached in Istanbul into the bin and got prepared for a longstanding armed confrontation with the help of the United States and its satellites in Europe. — Vladimir Putin

Even though Putin clearly isn't a source that can be trusted at face value, this story is congruent with much of the factual information known to us, namely the intentional boycotting of the Istanbul negotiations by the West. Therefore I find Putin's story plausible.

It appears that not only did the West block negotiations, but that those negotiations were used in bad faith to get a concession out of the Russians which could be subsequently spun as a "great Ukrainian victory".


If this is true, and in my opinion it likely is, the clown car that is the European leadership is in a worse state than I thought.

Scholz and Macron spun a 'crafty' scheme at the expense of, first of all, the Ukrainians, and secondly at the expense of their own nations' welfare.

I'm not sure what these clowns were thinking, sacrificing all their diplomatic credibility and the chance of a peaceful settlement for the sake of spinning some meaningless propaganda. I bet they got headpats from Washington, though.

It begs the question, why is the West so disinterested in peace? Or dare I say, interested in prolonged war? Who benefits? Surely not the Europeans, so whose interests do Scholz and Macron represent? Uncle Sam's perhaps?

It begs the question, why is the West so disinterested in peace? Or dare I say, interested in prolonged war? Who benefits? Surely not the Europeans, so whose interests do Scholz and Macron represent? Uncle Sam's perhaps? — Tzeentch

Dude, you made all this effort to flood this thread with your self-serving pro-Russian ruminations from the start till now, you might as well finish them by yourself.

↪neomac
According to your logic: A president under martial law does whatever he wants to keep him in power. He removes Zaluzhnyi from the cabinet because he disagreed with him briefly, and the latter is obtaining more respect from the Ukrainian people. It is a totalitarian act. — javi2541997

.

You misunderstood. I was simply pointing out that in Ukraine, as in other democratic countries, presidents are entitled to hire/fire commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, and to invoke martial laws (which in Ukraine must be approved by the Verkhovna Rada) constraining freedoms and democratic life in wartime. So firing Zaluzhnyi by president Zelensky is controversial given Zaluzhnyi's competence and popularity, but that doesn't qualify the decision as an act of totalitarianism or lack of democracy. So much so that the popular Zalushny himself before getting fired was pressing Zelensky to make an unpopular decision of mass mobilization (500k new troops) which Zalushny believed as necessary:
“We must acknowledge the significant advantage enjoyed by the enemy in mobilizing human resources and how that compares with the inability of state institutions in Ukraine to improve the manpower levels of our armed forces without the use of unpopular measures”.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/zaluzhny-zelensky-white-house/
In other words, unpopular decisions of establishing martial laws, mass mobilization or removing a popular commander-in-chief can’t reasonably be taken as acts incompatible with democratic regimes in wartimes.

According to information from Reuters, most of the Ukrainians are upset because of this. Do they have the right to discuss this issue in Parliament? Or is Zelensky unbeatable? — javi2541997

Maybe you missed my previous quote from wikipedia so I'll repost it again:
"The Armed Forces of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Збройні сили України (ЗСУ), romanized: Zbroini syly Ukrainy; abbreviated as ZSU or AFU) are the military forces of Ukraine. All military and security forces, including the Armed Forces, are under the command of the President of Ukraine and subject to oversight by a permanent Verkhovna Rada parliamentary commission. They trace their lineage to 1917, while the modern armed forces were formed after Ukrainian independence in 1991."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_Ukraine
In other words, until we hear Verkhovna Rada complaining about the legitimacy of Zelensky’s decision to fire Zaluzhnyi , we can safely assume that Zelensky’s decision was a legitimate exercise of the Ukrainian President’s powers in wartime still compatible with democratic standards.

If Putin had done this... Wow, all the press of the world would have gone mad against them — javi2541997

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If Putin replaced a competent and popular general while preventing the latter from obtaining a new mass mobilization to keep fighting the Ukrainians, pro-Ukrainians would more likely rejoice than get mad, of course.

You state we have to respect how the government acts towards the Armed Forces of Ukraine — javi2541997

That's false . Indeed, you can not quote me making such a claim.

The Putin interview. Just like Trump on Fox. Only that Putin is a smarter politician than Trump.

But do notice one important fact: where Putin starts. He starts from history from the creation of Rus, hence for the long term here is something really important for Putin. Westerners typically don't give a shit about history or anything that happened a decade ago, but for Putin history (and his role in Russian history) means a lot. He isn't focused much in the next elections, but the long run. Hence the importance to what for example Putin has written about Ukraine and Russia is very important in understanding this war. And that simply refutes any idea that this was just about NATO expansion (and if that hadn't happened, Russia/Putin wouldn't care about Ukraine).

But do notice one important fact: where Putin starts. He starts from history from the creation of Rus, hence for the long term here is something really important for Putin. Westerners typically don't give a shit about history or anything that happened a decade ago, but for Putin history (and his role in Russian history) means a lot. He isn't focused much in the next elections, but the long run. Hence the importance to what for example Putin has written about Ukraine and Russia is very important in understanding this war. And that simply refutes any idea that this was just about NATO expansion (and if that hadn't happened, Russia/Putin wouldn't care about Ukraine). — ssu

Yes, when Putin himself clearly denies Ukrainian statehood, declares he has right to shape Ukraine's borders and insists the war will not end until 'denazification', it is hard to argue that 'it was all about NATO'.

Exactly. But that's irrelevant for those who push the insane idea that this war could have been prevented if the West would have done things differently. NATO expansion is naturally one reason, but Crimea itself and the role that Ukraine has had in the Russian Empire is a greater reason. NATO membership would be off the table just by the show of force.

And this fact that Russia has been an Empire (if for some time called Soviet Union) is the basic reason just why the countries wanted so much into NATO. Even now Finland and Sweden too.

If this is true, and in my opinion it likely is, the clown car that is the European leadership is in a worse state than I thought.

Scholz and Macron spun a 'crafty' scheme at the expense of, first of all, the Ukrainians, and secondly at the expense of their own nations' welfare. — Tzeentch

So well said.

To outdo the Redzikowo base, you do not have to move ALL US ships into the Baltic. In fact, you do not need any US ships at all: ANY single German frigate would outfire the Redzikowo base. I know it can be a shock to you, but German military ships are regularly sailing the Baltic Sea and they are not blockaded each time by Russia (and so do the American ones and other NATO ships - USS Gravely - i.e. the equvalent of four Redzikowo bases, was recently in a Polish port, with no Russian blockades). To have an equivalent of the Aegis OFFENSIVE capability, all NATO has to do is literally put into service another frigate. I will tell you a military not-so-much-a-secret: they do that quite often, with no or little Russian protests. — Jabberwock

There's so much wrong with your reasoning here I'll put it in a nice list.

1. We're now far from your 1000 to 1 ratio here.

2. If political tensions were high Russia may very well start blockading US ships in the Baltic (not to mention that even now may have ships and aircraft closer to the ship you're talking about than an inland base; you simply fail to integrate the differences).

3. ABM itself is part of nuclear first strike capability.

4. The base may very well be not so significant at its current capabilities ... but its capabilities maybe augmented in the future covertly or overtly at any time.

5. Regardless of current or future capabilities, the base maybe one of many and even if each base was somehow kept at under-capacity to a frigate ... and so enough of them starts to add significantly to your 1001 points. Your "we only want one" logic just doesn't matter, everyone knows Americans are a gluttonous people.

6. Germany and the other Baltic states are non-nuclear powers, so nuclear shenanigans are far less likely coming from equipment under their command. American bases with American soldiers are de facto under American command.

7. Your whole argument is just dumb because if the bases add zero relevant military capability ... why build them in the first place? Even if what you said was true, an opponent would not conclude "well they're just wasting their money to create a provocation for nothing" but would assume the bases (especially considering the political costs they come at) must serve a critical purpose.

8. American does not even have a no-first-use doctrine, so you can't blame other powers for not taking America at it's word (when it comes to destructive violence); America has a first-use doctrine and therefore you should assume America prepares for first use-strike capability and even subtle military moves maybe critical in a first strike operation. You do realize "deception" is apart of warfare?

Some key concepts you clearly lack:

There's the whole issue of following orders to carry out a nuclear strike; the theory of the nuclear powers is that if you train people regularly to carry out a nuclear strike then enough of them (though unlikely all) will do so basically out of habit. You could also solve the problem by putting absolute off-the-wall psychopaths you are confident are frothing at the mouth to kill millions of people in charge of the nuclear keys, but then you might have nuclear war when you didn't want it, which is inconvenient at the best of times (the codes are supposed to mitigate this possibility, but in the past US set the codes to all zeros, totally legally as the order did not specify "codes that are hard to guess"; so maybe the code system works but you don't want to solely rely on it).

So, imagining a threat vector where US secretly orders German boats to fire nuclear weapons is very improbable, so improbable that it may not be actionable at all (but if it is, the plan would be to shoot them first if need be).

Likewise, the threat vector of seal team six being ordered to find a rusty fishing boat and take a covertly developed hypersonic ballistic missile and just sort of drift into Russia's shoreline and fire at Moscow for a totally out-of-the-blue decapitation strike, is not necessarily easy to pull off starting with the commanders currently in charge of the nuclear warheads wondering why you want a nuke again.

The likely result of the civilian authority ordering a totally out-of-the-blue nuclear first strike is some sort of military coup to hold elections on the topic.

Brining us to the next key concept you lack which is a threat model.

You can always imagine an opponent having so much greater capabilities and sophistication that anything you do does not help and is in fact counter productive. Which in the realm of ontological possibility things could really be that way (we could be in a simulation and I am an AI program with astronomical amounts of information and computing power sent to this forum just to thwart your every move and you have zero chance of scoring a single point; you know, that's totally possible, but you don't give up just because I maybe a super intelligence outside the universe as you know it basically toying with you; rather, what's more likely is that I am just a person capable of making human mistakes and that's your "threat model" you base your actions on).

The likely threat model of nuclear war is nuclear escalation.

One thing about ships is that they can move, relevant in both directions. If they are moving towards you and into position to fire, then you can blockade or even first strike them if you feel the need, as mentioned above.

But as critical ships can also move in the opposite direction thus deescalating the situation, a land base can't so easily move, so in a series of escalations involving ships the offensive side can easily back off at anytime (such as in the cuban missile crisis, Soviet ships backed away from America and the situation deescalated). Land bases can't do that, so in the same series of escalations you may see an ultimatum of moving these forward deployed bases backwards, which much more difficult both logistically and politically, so the ultimatum is rejected, now if the threat is not made good on you take a political hit as well as you may legitimately believe a first strike would start from these bases so taking them out would remove or reduce the threat of a full nuclear exchange (also demonstrates your weapons "work" in real world conditions, of which any doubt about supports the idea of a first strike).

In short, the bases change the strategic outlook and provoke a reaction.

As mentioned, I am not arguing the forward deployed missile bases are sufficient reason to invade Ukraine (in some absolute sense or then for Russia's military establishment, the Kremlin or Putin) but it is an additional reason to do so (prevent further forward deployment of these bases). If you simply had the bases but no NATO-Ukraine footsie, maybe Russia would just develop some new missiles and learn to live with this new threat (like all the previous threats).

Again, the major reason for a large war (in my view) was that there was already the war in the Donbas which Russia could not deescalate (despite 2 major diplomatic efforts the West later gloated was a bad faith move on their part and the part of Ukraine), would not play domestically to abandon the Russian speakers there even if Putin wanted to (which he definitely doesn't), leaving only one choice of completely demolishing Ukraine's military capability and economic viability over the long term. NATO-Ukraine footsie, forward deployed bases, resources, land-bridge to Crimea, are simply additional reasons to the inevitability of the war starting in 2014 escalating to a major conflict.

Some of the claims from Putin's interview relating to Poland debunked by the Polish MFA:

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/mfa-statement-on-president-vladimir-putins-10-lies-on-poland-and-ukraine-which-were-not-rectified-by-tucker-carlson-interview-of-8-february-2024

The historical claims are pretty easy to verify. In other words, Putin just openly lied to Carlson, completely unchallenged. In other words, when Putin says he was 'forced' to attack Ukraine, he is as believable as when he claims that Hitler was 'forced' to attack Poland in 1939.

'Surround Russia's shores'? You are so out of your element that it is comical. Trident II has the range of 7500 km. Tomahawk's range is 2500 km. That is, a SLBM submarine, to reach the same targets as the Redzikowo base, needs to be... in the middle of Atlantic. In fact, SLBMs can reach the exact same targets from the OTHER side - while sailing around Alaska. Not to mention the Mediterranean Sea... Your fundamental mistake is that you are repeatedly doing 'analyses' based on your very limited knowledge of the facts. — Jabberwock

I'm putting into practice your 1000 points of capability already exist greater than the base.

This is your reasoning.

To actually get these 1000 points of capability (missile frigates and submarines and so on) to a similar position as the base (which is close to Russia, that's why they don't like it) you have to sail these 1000 points of capability right up to Russias shores.

This is your scenario you propose in order to show that: Yes, you agree the base is additional capability added to that of the navy, but not significant enough additional capability to warrant mitigating action. It's just 1001 capability instead of 1000.

For your comparison to work, all those 1000 points of capability need to be as close to Russia as the base is.

ICBM's in silos and nuclear ballistic subs are second strike weapons, they are part of the MAD homeostasis.

If Russia has no plan to strike America then it has little fear of second strike capability.

What nuclear strategists worry about is a first strike.

To conduct a first strike you need different weapon systems, faster and closer to try to take out as much command and control and second strike capability as possible to then "fair better" in a post-nuclear exchange world. Sure, New York may still get hit ... but who cares about them anyways, is the logic of the first strike.

The consequences of a nuclear first strike is so high that reducing its probability any noticeable amount is almost always justifiable.

Therefore, if invading Ukraine reduces the probability of increasing vulnerability to a first strike (by reducing the probability of further forward deployment of US missile bases, and therefore reduces the probability of actual first strike occurring), then it is almost trivial exercise to conclude invading Ukraine is morally necessary.

As horrifying as the war in Ukraine is, it is morally and historically insignificant compared to a general nuclear exchange.

Now, what I am explaining above is how people paid to conduct this sort of analysis will go about things. Of course, they would have information I don't, they may also be smarter or then less smarter than me (especially if I'm a nearly eternal extra-your-universe AI sent here to the forum to frustrate you), so I am not saying my analysis matches their analysis but I am explaining the framework that would be used to evaluate nuclear strategy and military decisions.

Of course, developing new weapons is another approach, but Russia's economy is much smaller than that of the US so their worry is that they can be over-matched in nuclear capabilities and in conjunction to other strategic weaknesses (like a Ukraine in NATO and hosting several US missile bases) they would be vulnerable to a first strike in the future.

Furthermore, this entire process of nuclear escalation is unilaterally started and moved along by the US:

A. They sign non-proliferation treaties at the executive level but then don't ratify the treaties so it doesn't actually mean more than a gesture "we good bro?".

B. They drop out of these treaties they haven't even entered into, starting with the ABM treaty while rejecting to even discuss Putin's offer to jointly develop anti-rogue state ABM capability (an interesting part of the Tucker-Putin interview).

C. They then go ahead and actually develop new first strike nuclear ABM treaty as well as new warheads.

D. They forward deploy missiles bases that can be used in a nuclear first strike.

E. They have an official first-use policy.

F. They play footsie with Ukraine in a will-they-won't-they start WWIII somewhere down the line and have fun doing it, such as having a little sexy coup-play intermittent with their military copulation.

So, anyone who is not American would look at these sorts of things and say to themselves ... hmmm, maybe the US really is crazy enough to try to put in place a first strike capability.

Now, I get where you're coming from and empathize with your position. As the old saying goes, when all you have is bullshit everything seems like you're a complete idiot.

↪boethius, you're comparing that to Donbas...? Sure, there are some similarities, and then there are the differences. By the way, the Ukrainian separatists didn't get their way. Rather, by Kremlin decree, Donbas (and Crimea) swiftly swapped flags, UA → RU. (anyway, this stuff has come up a few times already, including whatever aspects/angles) — jorndoe

That is my point, there are some differences but even if you removed those differences and even if I accepted completely you're and others account of things (Russian spies and provocateurs and so on) and make the situation exactly the same (substituting France for Russia), I would not see English Canada waging war on French separatists as either justifiable nor having a military chance of any real success if the FLQ took over Quebec and was backed by France.

Of course, the dissimilates is why things didn't play out remotely the same way, but my point is that even if the situation was made the same I did not feel I had a right as an English Canadian to prevent by force the recognized government of Quebec separating from Canada (even if it was supported by French intelligence).

Borders change, countries expand and contract throughout history, it's not a moral imperative to keep borders the same (it's a complex moral, political and military issue to what extent and under what conditions is fighting over borders justifiable).

However, sometimes political subunits "get away" and, in particular if you have little hope of re-conquering them, that's "just how it is".

1. We're now far from your 1000 to 1 ratio here. — boethius

No, we are not. Add up all the missile tubes from just the non-US NATO ships and the Redzikowo tubes are still insignificant.

2. If political tensions were high Russia may very well start blockading US ships in the Baltic (not to mention that even now may have ships and aircraft closer to the ship you're talking about than an inland base; you simply fail to integrate the differences). — boethius

Oh, so you do not even know where Redzikowo is. Not that it surprises me. And you seem to miss what has already been written: with the NATO presence in the Baltic already, Redzikowo makes very little difference.

3. ABM itself is part of nuclear first strike capability. — boethius

Sure, ABMs are a factor in the first strike doctrine. The issue is that you got confused and you believe it is because of their offensive capabilities. That just shows how little you know about the things you discuss.

4. The base may very well be not so significant at its current capabilities ... but its capabilities maybe augmented in the future covertly or overtly at any time. — boethius

Well, if missile launchers can just be added 'covertly', then the whole discussion is pointless, as we do not know how many covert missile launchers Russia has put covertly in, say, Belarus. And, again, you clearly do not know what you are talking about.

5. Regardless of current or future capabilities, the base maybe one of many and even if each base was somehow kept at under-capacity to a frigate ... and so enough of them starts to add significantly to your 1001 points. Your "we only want one" logic just doesn't matter, everyone knows Americans are a gluttonous people. — boethius

It is not just a slippery slope, it is more of a rollecoaster. You can make the exact same argument to ANY weapon, from destroyers, through frigates to warheads themselves. 'If we allow them to have one warhead, they will have a million'. No, that is not how any arms race works.

6. Germany and the other Baltic states are non-nuclear powers, so nuclear shenanigans are far less likely coming from equipment under their command. American bases with American soldiers are de facto under American command. — boethius

Oh, so Americans will just smuggle nuclear warheads. Right. Your disconnect from reality makes this discussion rather absurd.

7. Your whole argument is just dumb because if the bases add zero relevant military capability ... why build them in the first place? Even if what you said was true, an opponent would not conclude "well they're just wasting their money to create a provocation for nothing" but would assume the bases (especially considering the political costs they come at) must serve a critical purpose. — boethius

I did not say that the bases add zero relevant military capability. They add a significant military capability - defensive one. That was the actual Russian concern - that their offensive capabilities will be diminished, even though US stated their are not the point of those. However, given that the argument 'you cannot defend yourself so well!' is somewhat harder to sell, they have also made the claims about the supposed offensive capabilities - which theoretically exists, but in fact are barely relevant. As can be seen, those more ignorant about those issues fell for it - like you and some journalists.

8. American does not even have a no-first-use doctrine, so you can't blame other powers for not taking America at it's word (when it comes to destructive violence); America has a first-use doctrine and therefore you should assume America prepares for first use-strike capability and even subtle military moves maybe critical in a first strike operation. You do realize "deception" is apart of warfare? — boethius

But I am not taking America at its word, I am just pointing out that, contrary to your claims, Aegis bases have negligible offensive potential compared to SLBMs and other shorter range launch platforms.

The rest of your fantasies is not really worth answering to... The idea of the first strike initiated from shorter range immobile platforms is beyond absurd. If you point a gun at someone who points a gun at you, you do not start the fight by kicking him in the shin.

Again, the major reason for a large war (in my view) was that there was already the war in the Donbas which Russia could not deescalate (despite 2 major diplomatic efforts the West later gloated was a bad faith move on their part and the part of Ukraine), would not play domestically to abandon the Russian speakers there even if Putin wanted to (which he definitely doesn't), leaving only one choice of completely demolishing Ukraine's military capability and economic viability over the long term. NATO-Ukraine footsie, forward deployed bases, resources, land-bridge to Crimea, are simply additional reasons to the inevitability of the war starting in 2014 escalating to a major conflict. — boethius

You forgot to mention that the war in Donbas was instigated and started by the Russian Federation, with significant participation of soldiers from the RF. Girkin clearly stated that locals were not interested in starting the hostilities. To 'deescalate' all Russia had to do was to withdraw its troops and support for separatists (or not start the war in the first place). Even then, the war mostly deescalated itself: 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2020 in the zone, so it was a typical Russian 'frozen conflict'. Further escalation was started with significant build-up of Russian forces in 2021. Thus your scenario, as usual, has little relation to reality.

It begs the question, why is the West so disinterested in peace? Or dare I say, interested in prolonged war? Who benefits? Surely not the Europeans, so whose interests do Scholz and Macron represent? Uncle Sam's perhaps? — Tzeentch

Basically yes, Macron and Scholz represent the US interest to:

1. Harm the Euro and remove that competition to the Dollar.
2. Create a permanent schism East-West in Eurasia and prevent Eurasian economic integration in which the US just becomes largely irrelevant to world affairs.
3. Sell LNG to Europe.
3. Create a new cold war in which the US arms industry is super relevant (and profitable).
4. More-or-less consolidate Europe as vassal states (satellites as Putin refers to them) in every economic, political and military dimension possible.

If China has BRICS, then the US will have North-America, Central America and Europe.

If you can't be any longer the top dog of the entire world, you want to at least carve out as big a piece as possible in which to continue to be top dog in.

One role US nuclear escalation has, that I describe above, is in provoking Russia into invading Ukraine. Accomplishing the above goals simply requires Russia to invade Ukraine, there's not really any other way to do it. You need a really big "new situation" to undo EU-Russia economic collaboration.

Why European leaders didn't stop the process (which they easily could have) is not that they take orders directly from the US.

Rather, from what I can see, the US has managed to weaponize humanist liberal values.

Neo-liberalism is essentially the ideology of US Imperialism in vassal states, it's the discursive framework in which the US Imperial core exchanges information with vassal satellite states (both in direct diplomatic exchange as well as cultural products).

Neo-conservatism is the ideology of the US Imperial core "kept for us" that operates behind this discursive surface exchange with vassals states within which how Neo-liberalism can be used to manipulate vassals can be understood and discussed and decisions taken.

"Culture" being just one dimension of "full spectrum dominance" that is the foundational principle of Neo-conservatism.

In more abstract terms, Neo-liberalism is a conceptual structure with its own internal logic (mostly delusional) and mode of operation, under which can operate a more realistic conceptual structure that can maintain and renew the upper level as well as manipulate it for the "actual goals".

"Prosperity for all" is the foundational principle of Neo-liberalism, so sounds good and if you're paid to believe it, why not?

One essentially permanent manifestation of this dynamic is invoking Neo-liberalism anytime it's desirable to remove trade barriers and then invoking "common sense US national interest" anytime you want to be protective. The conceptual contradiction between Neo-liberalism and "US national interest" is simply never addressed; it's basically "Neo-liberalism unless we say otherwise!".

In practice how this works is that the economic faculties of the prestigious Universities are jealously guarded by either true Neo-liberal believers or then closet Neo-conservatives who understand the need for a cast of what are essentially economic priests. So, when Neo-liberalism is what benefits the Imperial core then these economists appear in the media to talk about free trade and how much progress we've made and so on, and likewise whenever the Neo-liberal framework comes under attack as not delivering this promised prosperity for a vast amount of people, and destroying the environment and so on, they appear on TV and op-eds and so on to defend it.

Whenever a policy is in contradiction to Neo-liberalism you simply swap out the economists for serious looking military or intelligence serving or retired officers to explain the common sense truth that we gotta do whatever it is for obvious national security interests.

The scenes in which this theatre is played and the strings of these puppets are pulled by the Neo-conservative "core elite" who control the US military industrial complex (some of whom we know and certainly many we don't even know who they are).

However, the economic priestly cast is mostly a safeguard for the status quo, within the Neo-liberalist ideology you can also throw in whatever values you want when you want that then become moral imperatives.

For example, Neo-liberals have no problem truly believing gay and trans rights is super important, a moral imperative and thus self-sacrifice is justifiable to move forward these goals. "Main-stream media" essentially, for all practical purposes, a bunch of dials in which one value can be dialled up and others down to justify whatever policy is decided by the Neo-conservative core.

If we want to intervene in Africa, suddenly starving people there is a problem we need to deal with.

If we want to demonize Russia, suddenly their position on gay marriage and trans rights is abhorrent and we need to hate on them (suddenly we hear a lot about any gay or trans rights issue or protest in Russia).

You know it's theatre because Russia is not even close to having the worst gay-rights record, but those values in non-strategic locations are just footnotes in the news that "common sense realism" will inform us we can't do anything about when they are discussed, if at all.

So, once you see how it works, you can start to see how European politicians can be easily manipulated to act against their own self interest as well as any long-term realistic pathway to global prosperity.

In mathematics we have saying that anything can be proven from a single contradiction, which is not just a saying but a theorem, but we also just like to say it a bunch.

Applied to politics, probably it's less robust but the same theme holds that if you can make someone believe something false you can get them to do a great many things they otherwise wouldn't do.

How the Neo-liberal discursive political control framework works is not by promoting totally absurd false beliefs but simply exaggerating the importance of credibly true beliefs to deliver the desired outcome. If you can dial up and down what's important at any given time you can determine how people will react without needing to convince them of some simply false fact or change their values.

I.e. you can weaponize their values against them.

Macro and Scholz suddenly found themselves in a discursive framework where Ukrainian democracy and opposing Putin's authoritarian (but arguably democratically mandated) regime as the most important thing on the planet, more important than Ukrainian welfare, more important than European or global prosperity, more important than Africans eating, and so forth, and what follows from this belief is that war at any cost and rejection of any compromise is a moral imperative.

As important, the only time you truly feel "good" is when you aren't compromising.

The discursive framework also delivers these moral-feelings product to its clients.

Compromise is a morally ambiguous feeling, in the best of deals.

The greater the compromise the greater the feeling of moral ambiguity. Accepting a necessary evil is still a necessary evil and therefore a bad feeling. "Proving" something is in fact necessary is never easy nor certain, just a good guess at best.

If you can dial up certain values in importance compared with the rest then you can manipulate the subject of the experiment into rejecting compromise and doing what you want.

LOL, indeed... Kremlin censors Carlson:

https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1756051693358191055

No, we are not. Add up all the missile tubes from just the non-US NATO ships and the Redzikowo tubes are still insignificant. — Jabberwock

They are not "insignificant".

That's just dumb to say. Why would they be there is they were insignificant?

Oh, so you do not even know where Redzikowo is. Not that it surprises me. And you seem to miss what has already been written: with the NATO presence in the Baltic already, Redzikowo makes very little difference. — Jabberwock

Ships operate in the ocean where you can have your ships too as well as planes.

If you felt threatened enough you can much more easily sail to said threats and much more easily sail into other's territorial waters. You could go and blockade any port if you wanted to and this is less of an escalation than sending tanks and infantry to go surround a base on land.

land bases are also a lot cheaper and a lot faster to make, so if you "let the US make bases" then they could in short order create a lot of bases in a short amount of time.

That you don't get the differences between "land" and "water" is just dumb at this point.

Sure, ABMs are a factor in the first strike doctrine. The issue is that you got confused and you believe it is because of their offensive capabilities. That just shows how little you know about the things you discuss. — Jabberwock

I did not get confused, I said at the start of this conversation that ABM in itself is already a first strike provocation, but that, additionally, the Russians were concerned about the nuclear intermediate capability of these missile bases, to which you said there's no reason to be worried because they hold ABM missiles and not nuclear ballistic missile, to which I then cite the New York Times citing the Russians concerns about the nuclear capability of these missile bases (that they can be easily retrofitted to fire other kinds of missiles, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles was the example given).

I have mentioned several times the Russians are concerned about both capabilities, you focused on only the offensive capabilities because somehow you think citing the current technical specifications of weapons systems would or then should in the mind of a military analyst in Russia mean that such systems can simply not do anything beyond their current public specifications (which is just stupid).

It is not just a slippery slope, it is more of a rollecoaster. You can make the exact same argument to ANY weapon, from destroyers, through frigates to warheads themselves. 'If we allow them to have one warhead, they will have a million'. No, that is not how any arms race works. — Jabberwock

Ah yes, it's more of a rollercoaster ... and your point is?

Obviously you can and people do make the exact same argument about every other weapons system, why you end up in an arms race when one side (the US side in this case) decide to go down said rollercoaster ... weeeeeee !!! We're having so much fun.

And "if they have one now, they are likely to get more later" is exactly how arms races work.

You think anyone in the Kremlin was arguing at the end of WWII that "the US only has a few nuclear bombs! why would we expect them to get more, this whole nuke thing is nothing burger and nothing to worry about. Hundreds of nukes! Bah, fear mongering!!"

The Russians respond to escalation in plenty of other ways as well, such as improving their second strike capability against the US and improving their first strike capability against Europe.

But every course of action has diminishing returns so once you've invested in one area then other areas become more cost effective. Stopping the forward deployment of US missile bases is one of several areas you can invest in to reduce the overall threat level.

Oh, so Americans will just smuggle nuclear warheads. Right. Your disconnect from reality makes this discussion rather absurd. — Jabberwock

Your reading comprehension has reached rock bottom.

From the Russian perspective, covert deployment of nuclear weapons can be characterized as "smuggling". You could covertly deploy a nuclear missile to a fishing boat if you wanted, but it is much more likely, and so more to worry about, that you'd covertly deploy nuclear missiles to military bases you control than a fishing vessel; soldiers may not be onboard for the fishing-boat-nuke-plan, but moving military hardware between military bases is more banal, even nukes.

If something is more likely, then it is higher in priority on the threat spectrum.

I did not say that the bases add zero relevant military capability. They add a significant military capability - defensive one. That was the actual Russian concern - that their offensive capabilities will be diminished, even though US stated their are not the point of those. However, given that the argument 'you cannot defend yourself so well!' is somewhat harder to sell, they have also made the claims about the supposed offensive capabilities - which theoretically exists, but in fact are barely relevant. As can be seen, those more ignorant about those issues fell for it - like you and some journalists. — Jabberwock

So Russia's concern is about their own first strike capability against NATO being diminished?

Literally WTF are you talking about.

Furthermore, you just literally agreed (after simply ignoring the point as long as you could) that ABM is a nuclear first strike capability.

So, you really think these "insignificant bases" are more worrisome to the Russians in diminishing their ability to attack NATO in a first strike than they represent a first strike threat to Russia?

What's the Russian offensive scenario that is frustrated by these insignificant missile bases?

But I am not taking America at its word, I am just pointing out that, contrary to your claims, Aegis bases have negligible offensive potential compared to SLBMs and other shorter range launch platforms.

The rest of your fantasies is not really worth answering to... The idea of the first strike initiated from shorter range immobile platforms is beyond absurd. If you point a gun at someone who points a gun at you, you do not start the fight by kicking him in the shin. — Jabberwock

That's why the Russians point out as their major concern that these ABM systems can be easily converted to launch other missiles.

Your whole argument is based on the public specifications of a weapons systems the maximum extent of its capabilities ... while also accepting AMB in itself is anyways part of a first strike capability.

It's just stupid at this point.

You forgot to mention that the war in Donbas was instigated and started by the Russian Federation, with significant participation of soldiers from the RF. Girkin clearly stated that locals were not interested in starting the hostilities. To 'deescalate' all Russia had to do was to withdraw its troops and support for separatists (or not start the war in the first place). Even then, the war mostly deescalated itself: 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2020 in the zone, so it was a typical Russian 'frozen conflict'. Further escalation was started with significant build-up of Russian forces in 2021. Thus your scenario, as usual, has little relation to reality. — Jabberwock

First, my scenario is Quebec separatism with whatever modifications are necessary to make it comparable to the Donbas (so replace Russian intelligence with French intelligence, and put France beside Quebec and so on).

Second, I do not care much about Girkin and whatever covert actions Russia has taken in the Donbas.

Covert actions do not constitute starting an actual war. There's spies all over the place and we don't say that because the US has spies in China, Russia, Europe, everywhere else that therefore the US is at war with these countries. That covert action and spies can affect political results is just part of the status quo the world currently accepts. If the CIA never did anything similar, but have always been good little boys never interfering with anyone self determination, ok, then complain all you want.

As it stands in the real world, intelligence and covert actions are not considered acts of war but just part of the status quo everyone accepts: you are allowed to affect political processes with your spies and the legitimate counter-action is trying to catch those spies while deploying your own spies.

If the separation was 100% Russian intelligence operation, Ukraine should have had better counter-intelligence. You snooze you lose in the spy game.

The actual civil war was not started by the separatists. They declared independence and then Ukrainian militias invaded their territory and Donbas war from 2014 to 2022 occurred on Donbas territory. For the separatists to start the war they would have needed to attack Ukrainian forces outside their territory.

You can provide whatever account you want of the history of the separation, but at the end of the day you had a separatist government in control of territory and then attacked on their territory; aka. Russia certainly had a hand in causing the separation, but did not start the civil war.

Now, you'll obviously say that the separations wasn't "legitimate" and therefore Ukraine had a right to attack.

No separation ever is! All states condemn all revolutionary or seditionist action except for whatever revolutionary or seditionist action created the state in question, then we're in the realm of heroes and common sense violence that was obviously justified and brings tears to our eyes.

The bigger problem though is that Ukraine had no pathway to victory to reconquer the separated land, and therefore their military campaign was stupid at best and profoundly immoral at worst.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian side would shell civilians, so whether it was evil or stupid to begin with, we can be safe in concluding it quickly became evil in any case.

They are not "insignificant".

That's just dumb to say. Why would they be there is they were insignificant? — boethius

They are insignificant as far as the offensive potential is concerned. They are quite significant as a defensive measure.

Ships operate in the ocean where you can have your ships too as well as planes.

If you felt threatened enough you can much more easily sail to said threats and much more easily sail into other's territorial waters. You could go and blockade any port if you wanted to and this is less of an escalation than sending tanks and infantry to go surround a base on land. — boethius

What? Again, your fantasy scenarios are so divorced from reality that it is hard meaningfully engage with them. Ever heard of conventional surface-to-surface missiles? That what would be used to neutralize both ships and any land base. It is 300 km from Kaliningrad to Redzikowo... In fact, Russians declared that exactly that would happen.

land bases are also a lot cheaper and a lot faster to make, so if you "let the US make bases" then they could in short order create a lot of bases in a short amount of time.

Oh, the slippery slope again. If you let them build one base, you have to let them build a hundred. Because that is how international treaties always work. Really...

That you don't get the differences between "land" and "water" is just dumb at this point.

Oh, I do. The former are much less effective for offensive purposes. You said yourself that ships must be effectively tracked to be neutralized. The land base cannot go anywhere and you know much earlier if anything unusual is happening there. So yes, it is stupid, but not on my part.

First, my scenario is Quebec separatism with whatever modifications are necessary to make it comparable to the Donbas (so replace Russian intelligence with French intelligence, and put France beside Quebec and so on). — boethius

So if fifty Quebec separatists attack police stations and local government buildings and kill the policemen, they are in their rights? Even if the rest of Quebec citizens do not necessarily support such violent course of action? That is obviously absurd.

Second, I do not care much about Girkin and whatever covert actions Russia has taken in the Donbas.

Covert actions do not constitute starting an actual war. There's spies all over the place and we don't say that because the US has spies in China, Russia, Europe, everywhere else that therefore the US is at war with these countries. That covert action and spies can affect political results is just part of the status quo the world currently accepts. If the CIA never did anything similar, but have always been good little boys never interfering with anyone self determination, ok, then complain all you want.

As it stands in the real world, intelligence and covert actions are not considered acts of war but just part of the status quo everyone accepts: you are allowed to affect political processes with your spies and the legitimate counter-action is trying to catch those spies while deploying your own spies.

If the separation was 100% Russian intelligence operation, Ukraine should have had better counter-intelligence. You snooze you lose in the spy game. — boethius

Actually, you simply do not KNOW much about Girkin and his obviously non-covert actions in Donbas. And based on that ignorance you produce so many paragraphs, which are completely irrelevant, because they have nothing to do with reality. The issue that repeats oh so often in our discussion.

The actual civil war was not started by the separatists. They declared independence and then Ukrainian militias invaded their territory and Donbas war from 2014 to 2022 occurred on Donbas territory. For the separatists to start the war they would have needed to attack Ukrainian forces outside their territory. — boethius

No, that is not what happened at all, which you could check in five minutes. But you just abhor the facts.

If you do not believe the Western sources, at least you could read what Russians, such as Girkin, have to say about it. 'I'm the one who pulled the trigger of war. If our unit hadn't crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out, like in Kharkiv, like in Odesa', he said. His unit has crossed the border and started the hostilities, most of the unit was not even the separatists, but regular Russian soldiers. He then complained that the locals are very reluctant to join the rebellion. Then they have executed the local government officials and policemen, taken the weapons cache. Modern cities are not prepared for local defense, any larger bunch could take one in a day. Claiming that doing so would immediately give them any rights and the intervenening force would be 'invading their territory' is clearly absurd.

No separation ever is! All states condemn all revolutionary or seditionist action except for whatever revolutionary or seditionist action created the state in question, then we're in the realm of heroes and common sense violence that was obviously justified and brings tears to our eyes. — boethius

Sure, but the issue is that if a foreign government actively provides troops and weapons to fuel such actions, it is rather hard to tell whether the right of the people to self-determine has been preserved. Possibly, the people of Donbas would like to be a separate republic or to join Russia, the issue is that nobody asked them, as you cannot seriously treat the referenda organized under the separatists' guns as valid. By the way, that would be exactly the case with Quebec: what if the separatists were in minority - would they still have the right to declare independence just because they have rebelled? You just treat all Quebecans and all Donbass citizens as homogeneous group with the exact same views, which is certainly convenient, but as unrealistic as most of your other arguments.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian side would shell civilians, so whether it was evil or stupid to begin with, we can be safe in concluding it quickly became evil in any case. — boethius

The claims of indiscriminate shelling of civilians have not been confirmed by OECD. The number of civilians killed in 2021 was 110. Even if we attribute all of those to Ukrainians, the argument that Russia just had to kill 10000 civilians and raze numerous cities to the ground to stop that is rather questionable.

They are insignificant as far as the offensive potential is concerned. They are quite significant as a defensive measure. — Jabberwock

So let me get this straight, your process is:

1. Ignore ABM as itself a first strike system
2. Trivialize the missile bases as 10001 compared to 1000 capacity of US ships (and also German ships for some reason).
3. Insist they are insignificant even if you then laugh at you own "1000" ship points scenario of all these ships literally being on Russia's shore at the same time.
4. Agree that ABM is itself a first strike weapon ... but that's somehow not part of "offence"
5. Agree the bases are significant, just not offensively even though on step 4 you agreed anyways ABM was an offensive first strike system.

You're literally a walking clown face meme.

But the result of your idiocy is that you clearly agree even in your own analysis that the ABM bases are a significant increase in first strike capability.

Add to that the fact people can put nuclear strike systems in those bases, make the bases bigger, make more bases and so on, and the threat is even more significant.

What? Again, your fantasy scenarios are so divorced from reality that it is hard meaningfully engage with them. — Jabberwock

What fantasy scenario?

This is literally what happened in the Cuban missile crisis. US felt threatened by ground bases in Cuba (even though the Soviet had ships!) and started a blockade of Soviet ships. The situation was deescalated when the Soviets withdrew.

Now, Soviets had been sending ships to Cuba anyways, and have nuclear submarines and so on ... why did the US react to missile bases in Cuba? Because it significantly increases the threat, enough to react to it.

Oh, the slippery slope again. If you let them build one base, you have to let them build a hundred. Because that is how international treaties always work. Really... — Jabberwock

I thought it was a rollercoaster?

Anyways, slip-and-slide or rollercoaster, this is literally what an arms race is.

Slippery slope is not a fallacy. You have to demonstrate that the slippery slope doesn't exist to call it a fallacy. For example, you have to demonstrate that allowing gay rights won't result in beastiality and child rape and sexual abuse (which I hope we agree are bad things). This can be done by pointing out gay and beastiality and child rape are different categories, one does not imply the others.

However, "arms" and "more arms" are the same category, and depending on the situation, definitely the precedes of some arms build up maybe a predicator of more arms buildup, resulting in an arms race.

Arms races also include military action. The US didn't respond to the Soviet Union placing missiles in Cuba (a military action to get an advantage in the arms race) by just building more arms, but by a naval blockade (a military action to directly mitigate the Soviet's military action).

Again, your points are just dumb and I'm pretty sure it's intentional at this point, but if you insist you are just that stupid then I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. You're owed that much.

Oh, I do. The former are much less effective for offensive purposes. You said yourself that ships must be effectively tracked to be neutralized. The land base cannot go anywhere and you know much earlier if anything unusual is happening there. So yes, it is stupid, but not on my part. — Jabberwock

I also said you cannot only track ships you can go and intercept them.

In any realistic scenario (what analysts actually worry about) some political tension already exists and escalation already exists, so at some point in your escalation scenario you make an ultimatum that any ship or submarine X Km from your coast will be fired upon: that they stay on their side and you'll say on your side.

At this point in an escalation scenario you've deployed counters to close-threats (first strike threats), if you don't plan to conduct a first strike yourself then you aren't concerned about second strike capability further away.

Additionally, at this point in an escalation scenario the opponent can also deescalate. It's not much military or political cost to just withdraw your ships from an area.

Yes, you know where the bases are, but the worry is they fire their weapons before you blow them up, they can't as easily militarily or politically be withdrawn (why the Cuban missile crisis was a crisis, as the Soviets now have to pay a political cost in withdrawing equipment from Cuba; it's totally legal, states have "rights" as we've all recently learned, so it's a loss of face to withdraw the land assets; mores than ships).

Actually, you simply do not KNOW much about Girkin and his obviously non-covert actions in Donbas. And based on that ignorance you produce so many paragraphs, which are completely irrelevant, because they have nothing to do with reality. The issue that repeats oh so often in our discussion. — Jabberwock

I really don't care about Girkin.

End of the story is that the legitimately recognized local-government there declared independence, the locals that "didn't want hostility" didn't stop it happening either, and then Ukraine attacked the separatists thus starting the civil war.

A declaration of Independence is not in itself starting a way.

Ukraine started the civil war. If somehow their justification does make some sense in some political theory, then they were just stupid. If they had no argument that wouldn't also work against Ukraine's own declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, then the war is just evil.

Either way shelling civilians is evil and either way picking a fight you know Russia will respond to is stupid.

No, that is not what happened at all, which you could check in five minutes. But you just abhor the facts.

If you do not believe the Western sources, at least you could read what Russians, such as Girkin, have to say about it. 'I'm the one who pulled the trigger of war. If our unit hadn't crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out, like in Kharkiv, like in Odesa', he said. His unit has crossed the border and started the hostilities, most of the unit was not even the separatists, but regular Russian soldiers. He then complained that the locals are very reluctant to join the rebellion. Then they have executed the local government officials and policemen, taken the weapons cache. Modern cities are not prepared for local defense, any larger bunch could take one in a day. Claiming that doing so would immediately give them any rights and the intervenening force would be 'invading their territory' is clearly absurd. — Jabberwock

He's talking abbot crossing the border into Ukraine, not crossing the border and attacking the rest of Ukraine.

But again, I do not care about how things played out (as I've made clear with my analogy to Quebec separatists and making it clear that if the situation was France did in Quebec whatever you want to claim Russia did in Donbas, don't care).

At the end of whatever process happened you had a separatist government in control of territory that Ukraine attacked and continued to do so, including war crimes like shelling civilians, for 8 years.

Most, if not all, political entities come into existence without any right to do so.

The US had no "right" in the previous legal system to secede from the British empire and fight the British.

Secession is an extra-legal issue as nearly all countries that exist today seceded or then conquered (sometimes several such events) at some point tracing out their state lineage. Ok, so the states we have now get together and say "secession is totally bad". Who gives a shit?

The more important question is do you have the force strength to successfully secede if you feel in whatever system you care about you have a right to do so?

If you do have the power and the allies then whoever you secede from complaining about it doesn't mean jack shit.

The separatists obviously had the power to secede as they do so. If alliance with Russia is part of that power then that's just being politically astute. If Girkin was a problem and "the key to everything" then Ukrainian counter-intelligence should have dealt with him sooner.

Sessions and revolutions always attract extremist foreigners.

I do not care about Girkin because Ukraine could not win the fight they picked, and if you pick fights you can't win why expect any sympathy?

Sure, but the issue is that if a foreign government actively provides troops and weapons to fuel such actions, it is rather hard to tell whether the right of the people to self-determine has been preserved. — Jabberwock

Again, wish it wasn't so, but the current international status quo is that supplying weapons is not an act of war.

All the great powers want to sell weapons and affect political outcomes (US most of all) so they all accept that is just how the game is played.

US has armed all sorts of groups, I don't see you whining about it.

Right, because you're as hypocritical as you are purposefully stupid.

Now, if the question is whether the world should have a different international status quo where there's greater cost for intelligence and arms supply interference? Sure, yeah, great, get on that, I'll vote for it.

I don't really like spies. Mainly because they're often the worst kind of dumb: people who think they are smart.

You'd fit right in though.

The claims of indiscriminate shelling of civilians have not been confirmed by OECD. The number of civilians killed in 2021 was 110. Even if we attribute all of those to Ukrainians, the argument that Russia just had to kill 10000 civilians and raze numerous cities to the ground to stop that is rather questionable. — Jabberwock

The West hasn't confirmed that their "friend" they supply arms to hasn't been committing war crimes? Oh. My. God. Stop the presses!!!

It doesn't really seem to be disputed the shelling of civilians by Ukraine, even recently there was the cluster munitions used on a market.

However, again, it's not so important to me because my main view is that picking a fight with Russia is stupid. If you want to believe the Azov guys have been perfect rules-of-war angels since 2014, be my guest. Believe what you want.

What I provide here is a framework of risk-analysis and political-analysis.

So if you're not disputing the framework just arguing the facts are that 2014 was already some sort of "Russian invasion proper", not covert and arms supplying actions that are not considered acts of war in the current framework, or then you're not disputing that Ukraine is indeed stupid to pick a fight they can't win but they haven't committed any war crimes since 2014!!! No shelling of civilians, none whatsoever! Then, again, feel free to believe that.

Doesn't seem plausible to me, but then again I am a super intelligent AI, of which you have no hope in defeating in verbal fisticuffs, sent specifically to mess with you from what is essentially another dimension, and perhaps I haven't picked up yet on all the subtleties of our simulated subjects and their secessionist shenanigans.

1. Ignore ABM as itself a first strike system
2. Trivialize the missile bases as 10001 compared to 1000 capacity of US ships (and also German ships for some reason).
3. Insist they are insignificant even if you then laugh at you own "1000" ship points scenario of all these ships literally being on Russia's shore at the same time.
4. Agree that ABM is itself a first strike weapon ... but that's somehow not part of "offence"
5. Agree the bases are significant, just no offensively even though on step 4 you agreed anyways ABM was an offensive first strike system. — boethius

No, if you had read anything with understanding, you might get a better idea what I think.

1. Ignore ABM as itself a first strike system

Here is the article on the first strike strategy, it also lists the weapon used for it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy)

Can you point out all the ABMs from that list?

2. Trivialize the missile bases as 10001 compared to 1000 capacity of US ships (and also German ships for some reason).
3. Insist they are insignificant even if you then laugh at you own "1000" ship points scenario of all these ships literally being on Russia's shore at the same time.

If add all short range platforms that NATO has in the Baltic Sea, 24 tubes ARE insignificant. As I wrote, you can get the same effect by commissioning another frigate, which Russians do not protest. For this you have no answer beside 'land bases are not ships', but the reasons you give are utterly silly, not mentioning all the reasons why this particular base is much worse for offense than a ship-based platform.

And no, they do not have to be 'on Russia's shore', just like Redzikowo is not on 'Russian shore'. If you had any idea about what you are talking about, you would know it is closer to Germany than to Russia... But you just abhor the facts, as is already well known.

4. Agree that ABM is itself a first strike weapon ... but that's somehow not part of "offence"

That is your original confusion, which might be somewhat understandable. However, your clinging to it despite all the times I have tried to correct you is inexplicable. Yes, ABMs can be a part of the first strike because they can PREVENT the enemy from making a successful first strike or weaken it.

5. Agree the bases are significant, just no offensively even though on step 4 you agreed anyways ABM was an offensive first strike system.[

No, I did not agree to that, it is just your reading comprehension that is so frighteningly low.

But the result of your idiocy is that you clearly agree even in your own analysis that the ABM bases are a significant increase in first strike capability.

Add to that the fact people can put nuclear strike systems in those bases, make the bases bigger, make more bases and so on, and the threat is even more significant. — boethius

No, they are significant for their ability to neutralize first strike capability. Their offensive capability is still limited for all the reasons I have listed several times already.

This is literally what happened in the Cuban missile crisis. US felt threatened by ground bases in Cuba (even though the Soviet had ships!) and started a blockade of Soviet ships. The situation was deescalated when the Soviets withdrew.

Now, Soviets had been sending ships to Cuba anyways, and have nuclear submarines and so on ... why did the US react to missile bases in Cuba? Because it significantly increases the threat, enough to react to it. — boethius

The difference is that the potential launch platfoms (both ABMs and SLBMs) has significantly changed since that time. You did not have anything even close to Aegis that could be used on a frigate. Now Russia can send to Cuba a ship that significantly outfires the would-be Cuban bases, US can send Gravely to Gdynia. And somehow there are no blockades and no protests.

However, "arms" and "more arms" are the same category, and depending on the situation, definitely the precedes of some arms build up maybe a predicator of more arms buildup, resulting in an arms race. — boethius

The slippery slope is your seeming view that if you allow one side to have certain armaments, then you have to agree to anything else. That is obviously false: US and Russia has agreed that they can arm themselves in certain weapons and protest against other weapons. Thus Russia can allow one base in Poland and protest in the exact same way against the second one or the third one, whichever threshold it considers to be significant, exactly as it happened with all other armaments in the past.

Again, your points are just dumb and I'm pretty sure it's intentional at this point, but if you insist you are just that stupid then I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. You're owed that much. — boethius

Make sure that you also stick out our tongue... I thought I was discussing with an adult, though that belief was indeed strained at some points.

In any realistic scenario (what analysts actually worry about) some political tension already exists and escalation already exists, so at some point in your escalation scenario you make an ultimatum that any ship or submarine X Km from your coast will be fired upon: that they stay on their side and you'll say on your side. — boethius

There is this wonderful site called Google Maps. I suggest you look at it and check where is Rostock, where is Redzikowo, where is Gdynia, where is Kaliningrad and where is Moscow. Then check the ranges of the missiles in question. Maybe then you will understand why your 'X km from' scenario is simply nonsensical, but I do not have high hopes.

End of the story is that the legitimately recognized local-government there declared independence, the locals that "didn't want hostility" didn't stop it happening either, and then Ukraine attacked the separatists thus starting the civil war. — boethius

Lol. Legitimately recognized by whom exactly? And locals might not want to attack armed militants, they might prefer for the military to show up. And if they did not care, it is not much of an argument for forcing their independence.

It is Russians that started the killing. That is what Russians themselves are saying. If you close your eyes and shout 'I do not care about Girkin', it does not change that fact.

Ukraine started the civil war. If somehow their justification does make some sense in some political theory, then they were just stupid. If they had no argument that wouldn't also work against Ukraine's own declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, then the war is just evil. — boethius

No, Ukraine did not start it. Girkin's unit of mostly Russians has crossed the border and started the hostilities.

The obvious difference is that the Ukraine's referendum was not made under the guns and threat from regular military forces of the neighbor. But I suppose you do not care about such details.

The separatists obviously had the power to secede as they do so. If alliance with Russia is part of that power then that's just being politically astute. If Girkin was a problem and "the key to everything" then Ukrainian counter-intelligence should have dealt with him sooner.

Sessions and revolutions always attract extremist foreigners.

I do not care about Girkin because Ukraine could not win the fight they picked, and if you pick fights you can't win why expect any sympathy? — boethius

They did not pick the fight, a foreign power has instigated an armed rebellion on their territory to destabilize them. If you believe that might makes right, then sure, it is not a problem. Not everyone does, though.

Again, wish it wasn't so, but the current international status quo is that supplying weapons is not an act of war. — boethius

They supplied troops. Girkin himself (and most of his unit) were Russians. If you read obituaries of some Russian combatants of the war, you might see that the list of their accomplishments starts in 2014.

However, again, it's not so important to me because my main view is that picking a fight with Russia is stupid. If you want to believe the Azov guys have been perfect rules-of-war angels since 2014, be my guest. Believe what you want. — boethius

So Ukraine should just let Donbas secede, because a band of armed thugs has said so. Then the same band would appear In Zaporozhia. And then Ukraine should let them secede, too, because you do not pick fights with Russia. But Odessa has always been Russian, Putin says. Then send some 'separatists' there, too. Is there any country that would allow that?

Doesn't seem plausible to me, but then again I am a super intelligent AI, of which you have no hope in defeating in verbal fisticuffs, sent specifically to mess with you from what is essentially another dimension, and perhaps I haven't picked up yet on all the subtleties of our simulated subjects and their secessionist shenanigans. — boethius

I would appreciate that you post your answers when you are sober. It would facilitate the discussion a lot.

Turkey is a very important country in this

You misunderstood. I was simply pointing out that in Ukraine, as in other democratic countries... — neomac

Honestly, I stopped reading the rest of your argument when you state that Ukraine is a 'democratic' country. No, it isn't. This is why I would like to point out your double standards and hypocrisy. It is one of the main objectives of West media but, mate, I will not cross through that door...

You start with a false premise: Ukraine is a democratic country, which follows with another false middle premise: 'The Ukrainian Forces are dependent upon the President' and then with a false conclusion: Zelensky is entitled to remove him.

Well, in the real democratic world it doesn't happen as you state...

I agree that my country is not the best example. To remove a special chief or commander here, they have the right to be heard by a special commission and then conclude if the subject deserves being removed or not.

If a person unilaterally removes others without back up, it is totalitarian. I think the West is failing in defending Zelensky under all circumstances.

“Of course, if the situation at the war front worsens, Zelenskyy will get the blame. People will say, everything was good when Zaluzhny ruled the army,”

https://www.politico.eu/article/oleksandr-syrskyi-ukraine-commander-in-chief-butcher-volodymyr-zelenskyy-war-russia/

Honestly, I stopped reading the rest of your argument when you state that Ukraine is a 'democratic' country. — javi2541997

So I'll stop reading the rest of your post.

Ah, OK. Fine. We are like kids in a kindergarten now. At least I explained why I refused to take your post seriously. I will make it easier for you so you don't have to read a long post.

Do you really consider Ukraine as a democratic nation? Yes/No. Explain why.

Does Zelensky act like a totalitarian? Yes/No. Explain why.

More good news ;)
Trump 'encourages' Russia to attack NATO states not paying 'bills'
https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/11/trump-encourages-russia-to-attack-nato-states-not-paying-bills

Girkin's unit of mostly Russians has crossed the border and started the hostilities. — Jabberwock

Not just Girkin. Anyway, Surkov was reportedly one of the godfathers running covert Donbas operations.

I stopped reading the rest of your argument when you state that Ukraine is a 'democratic' country. No, it isn't. — javi2541997

There have been quality elections in Ukraine since 2014 — Nov 28, 2023

... whereas Russia has gone in the other direction, despite their wartime situation. (← more repetitions in the thread) Dismissing their efforts with a handwave, reeks of bias prejudice discrimination or something like that. But, maybe you're right, maybe they ought to look into legislative amendments on appointing military leaders.

But, maybe you're right, maybe they ought to look into legislative amendments on appointing military leaders — jorndoe

Thank you for understanding what I attempt to say to @neomac.

↪neomac
Ah, OK. Fine. We are like kids in a kindergarten now. At least I explained why I refused to take your post seriously. I will make it easier for you so you don't have to read a long post.

Do you really consider Ukraine as a democratic nation? Yes/No. Explain why. — javi2541997

To my understanding this is not a yes/no answer. According to some index, Ukraine is considered a hybrid/transitional regime (so neither a consolidated democracy, nor a flawed democracy) given the levels of corruption, civil unrest, and the war. Not surprisingly so since Ukraine is struggling to survive as an independent state out of the influence of Soviet legacy and Russia’s interference (having Russia a consolidated authoritarian regime and hegemonic ambitions). But Ukraine has also shown a certain degree of political representation (free political competition, free elections and referenda), freedom of press/media, in addition to democratic institutions (constitution, division of powers, human rights), and openness to Westernisation (NATO/EU which can be also external factors of further democratization) which look promising to me. Another aspect is that Ukraine is considered semi-presidential so the president is directly elected and has normally more powers than a president would have in a parliamentary democracy.

Anyways, the point I was making has less to do with Ukraine and more to do with your understanding of democracy vs totalitarianism. Replacing a top general (popular or unpopular) from leading the armed forces in wartime is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. Making unpopular decisions in wartime like imposing martial law, mass mobilization, and replacing a popular&competent top general is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL.

Does Zelensky act like a totalitarian? Yes/No. Explain why. — javi2541997

Not sure what act you are referring to. If you take the removal of Zaluzhny as a totalitarian act (and by "totalitarian" you mean the opposite of democracy), I don’t and explained why.

:D gave me a good chuckle

Strangelove limb control (1964 · 28s)


Putin limb control (2024 · 12s)

No, if you had read anything with understanding, you might get a better idea what I think. — Jabberwock

Oh really?

Hmm, let's see.

Here is the article on the first strike strategy, it also lists the weapon used for it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy)

Can you point out all the ABMs from that list? — Jabberwock

Let's put aside you're already admitting ABM is a first strike capacity and just directly answer your question.

On the page you link to, there's a section literally called:

First-strike enabling weapons systems —

Of which the very first sentence of this "First-strike enabling weapons" is:

Any missile defense system capable of wide-area (e.g., continental) coverage, and especially those enabling destruction of missiles in the boost phase, is a first-strike-enabling weapon because it allows for a nuclear strike to be launched with reduced fear of mutual assured destruction. —

To continue to do your reading for you, the very next sentence is:

Such a system has never been deployed, although a limited continental missile defense capability has been deployed by the U.S., but it is capable of defending against only a handful of missiles. —

Which is exactly what I describe: The bases increase first strike capability, and so something to worry about, especially if the trend is allowed to continue and you end up with 100s of "limited continental missile defense".

That is your original confusion, which might be somewhat understandable. However, your clinging to it despite all the times I have tried to correct you is inexplicable. Yes, ABMs can be a part of the first strike because they can PREVENT the enemy from making a successful first strike or weaken it. — Jabberwock

Ok ... yes ABM is a first strike capability, you now agree again with this obvious fact.

However, it is not a first strike capability in that it defends against a first strike, that makes no sense. If you've been struck first then you are not carrying out a first strike.

You literally don't know how sentences and words work at this point in the conversation.

ABM is a first strike capability, fulfilling the role of an "enabling weapons system", because it can reduce the effectiveness of the second strike of your opponent, thus increasing the desirability of a first strike.

If you can intercept some or even most of your opponents counter-strike while striking first, then you can expect to suffer significantly less damage in the exchange.

This is extremely basic stuff, which you would have understood by now if you had either common sense understanding of how "stuff works" or then simply read your own sources.

The point of a first strike is to neutralize (as much as you can) your opponents ability to strike back

... so ...

No, they are significant for their ability to neutralize first strike capability. Their offensive capability is still limited for all the reasons I have listed several times already. — Jabberwock

If a system can neutralize part of your opponents strike capability then it is by definition part of a first strike capability.

The whole point of the AMB treaty was to reduce the need for further buildup of nuclear weapons by reducing first strike capability (and thus building more weapons to ensure both survivability and delivery of a counter-strike).

In the words of the Arms Control Association:

The treaty, from which the United States withdrew on June 13, 2002, barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. In the treaty preamble, the two sides asserted that effective limits on anti-missile systems would be a "substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms." — Arms Control Association

And notice how the US withdraws from the ABM treaty and then starts building ABM bases.

Make sure that you also stick out our tongue... I thought I was discussing with an adult, though that belief was indeed strained at some points. — Jabberwock

Your points are so idiotic that what strains belief is that I'm dealing with a good faith interlocutor.

It is a grave mistake, in my disposition, to give respect to someone who deserves none. That would just be insulting to people who have actually earned some respect by being of good faith.

You are obviously aware that forward deployed or continental coverage ABM is a first strike capability.

You are obviously aware that you can also bring in (covertly or overtly) and deploy nuclear missiles from an ABM battery.

You are obviously aware that if you build one forward deployed base maybe you start building more, and therefore an opponent is going to try to frustrate that process and impose costs to doing so.

Therefore, forward deploying ABM is a provocative move that your opponents is going to react to.

Your trying to argue that it's not obviously provocative—first "insignificant" then when that was demonstrated to be completely idiotic argument, now the trope "it's only for defence against a first strike!!" which is equally idiotic—is all clearly bad faith.

Your debate strategy is just to go in circles around your bad faith and idiotic arguments.

Forward deploying ABM obviously increases first strike capability which an opponent is going to react to ... which, in this case Russia, has clearly said is a primary concern of their that they are going to react to.

The slippery slope is your seeming view that if you allow one side to have certain armaments, then you have to agree to anything else. That is obviously false: US and Russia has agreed that they can arm themselves in certain weapons and protest against other weapons. Thus Russia can allow one base in Poland and protest in the exact same way against the second one or the third one, whichever threshold it considers to be significant, exactly as it happened with all other armaments in the past. — Jabberwock

Again, just dumb.

First, Russia didn't "agree" to the bases, but disagreed, the US then deployed them anyways despite Russia disagreeing.

The slippery slope is that if action does not backup said disagreement, to impose a cost on the US for forward deploying the bases, then the US would just make more bases. Therefore, even if one bases isn't "so significant" it is anyways the start of a likely trend.

There was a status quo of not forward deploying missile bases, the US breaks this status quo, why would they stop there? No reason to expect them to stop there and so you come up with a strategy to counter those moves.

Yes, missile the bases are not literally in Ukraine right now right next to the Russian, but would't that be the case if Ukraine is in NATO. Therefore, one way (the ultimate way) to prevent the US continuing its police of NATO expansion and forward deployment of missile bases following that expansion is to invade Ukraine.

Now, are the bases themselves sufficient cause for the invasion? I would argue no, but it's a contributing factor.

That is obviously false: US and Russia has agreed that they can arm themselves in certain weapons and protest against other weapons. — Jabberwock

I want to highlight this as particularly stupid since the US has withdrawn from ABM and INF (which weren't real treaties anyways, since the US didn't ratify them).

In the case of ABM the reasoning was:

[Arms Control Association;https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty]On December 13, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush, who argued that Washington and Moscow no longer needed to base their relationship on their ability to destroy each other, announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, claiming that it prevented U.S. development of defenses against possible terrorist or "rogue-state" ballistic missile attacks. During his presidential campaign, Bush said he would offer amendments on the treaty to Russia and would withdraw the United States from the accord if Russia rejected the proposed changes. However, the Bush administration never proposed amendments to the treaty in its talks with Russia on the subject.[/quote]

Which is just an insulting way to go about diplomacy.

In the case of INF, the US blamed Russia, and even has a page about it:

"Russia has failed to comply with its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and as such, the United States has withdrawn from the INF Treaty effective today, Aug. 2, 2019," Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper said in a statement today. "This withdrawal is a direct result of Russia's sustained and repeated violations of the treaty over many years and multiple presidential administrations." — U.S. Withdraws From Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, US Defense Department

Now, whether you blame the US or Russia, what is clear is that there isn't much agreement at the moment on what the US and Russia "can arm themselves in certain weapons".

And what the hell is the "protest against other weapons" about?

You think the US and Russia are non-violent hippies that if against a policy of the other is going to just go and protest with some signs or something?

They can do a lot more than protest if they don't like what the other side is doing, up to and including invading countries.

Your whole position seems to be that the US can do whatever it wants, place missile bases where it wants, and Russia should limit themselves to protesting that. That they can do. But they're just big meanie-boos if they do anything else about it.

Lol. Legitimately recognized by whom exactly? And locals might not want to attack armed militants, they might prefer for the military to show up. And if they did not care, it is not much of an argument for forcing their independence.

It is Russians that started the killing. That is what Russians themselves are saying. If you close your eyes and shout 'I do not care about Girkin', it does not change that fact. — Jabberwock

First, your main piece of evidence is Girkin saying things would have fizzles out if he didn't arrive.

Second, the definition of a government is control of territory.

Whether Girkin was "the key to everything" or not, at the end of the day there's a government in control of the territory, which Ukraine then waged war against for 8 years.

No, Ukraine did not start it. Girkin's unit of mostly Russians has crossed the border and started the hostilities. — Jabberwock

Girkin himself says in your citation of him that things would have "fizzled out" without him, so even your own evidence you use to support your claims clearly claims things had started before that.

What is clear is that a new government independent of Ukraine controls the territory in question (the definition of government) and Ukraine wages war against it for 8 years.

Obviously the separatists separated and so started the separation, but that is different than starting a civil war. The civil war starts with Ukraine trying to reconquer the territory.

If the official government in the Donbas did not declare independence or then didn't do it "legitimately enough" for you, then that would be a coup and not starting the civil war part.

If Ukraine did not try to reconquer the territory then there would not have been a war for 8 years, the new government would just be there and there wouldn't be any violence; it would be a diplomatic question what happens next.

The obvious difference is that the Ukraine's referendum was not made under the guns and threat from regular military forces of the neighbor. But I suppose you do not care about such details. — Jabberwock

I do not care if Ukraine cannot anyways re-conquer the territory.

It would matter if there was something that could be done to reverse things. If something is easily reversible then it is a moral question of whether the change was really justifiable or not.

To contrast, if some street in Monaco seceded from the rest of Monaco and the Monaco asked the European community to come in and compel the street back into the principality rather than tolerating this street trying to make a new dutchapality.

Obviously Europe, or just France, could easily reverse this dutchapality seceding from the principality of Monaco. So, it would be a moral question of whether it is right to do so. Should we recognize the citizens of the street right to self determination and support their effort to free themselves from the oppressive yoke of the Prince of Monaco? Or should we recognize Monaco's claim over the street?

In such a context, it would matter a great deal if the people on the street even wanted to secede and if anything was used to coerce them one way or another.

We could then get into hundreds of years of history, legal and moral precedent, to try to tease out who has just cause in the affair.

Whatever happened in the initial Donbas secession, it was reversible.

What is clear is that there's a lot of Russian speakers there unhappy with Ukrainian language and cultural oppression, so the idea that there were no genuine separatists at all I feel far fetched.

What exactly the majority genuinely wanted I think is up for debate and we may never know.

What is clear is that they become a separate government to that of Ukraine and Ukraine had lost control of the territory without any realistic way of reversing things (without being invaded by Russia).

They did not pick the fight, a foreign power has instigated an armed rebellion on their territory to destabilize them. If you believe that might makes right, then sure, it is not a problem. Not everyone does, though. — Jabberwock

Playing footsie with NATO, Russian language oppression, random violence against Russian speakers, promoting Bandera as a national hero, then attacking (including shelling civilians) the separatists, is all definitely picking a fight with Russia.

True, you can argue that Ukraine has "a legal right" to do all these things, join whatever alliance it wants and repress whoever is on their territory they want to repress and put down any rebellious activity. Definitely other countries (including Russia) claim to have the same rights.

Many of the factions supporting these provocative policies vis-a-vis Russia had no qualms of explicitly stating their main goal (to Western journalists on camera) is starting a war with Russia that will destroy said Russia.

All this does not change Ukraine's actions as "picking a fight". Picking a fight is not a moral expression, you could be in the right and so have a right to fight, doesn't make it wise though.

Ukrainian elites, decision makers and faction leaders knew the policies they were pursuing could easily, maybe even likely, start a war with Russia, especially waging war on the Donbas for 8 years. Some tried to reverse course (I have zero problem believing Zelensky legitimately wanted to make peace with Russia and avoid a way) but failed to do so and others bet NATO would save them and still others seem to have wanted a war as a "purifying" experience to Ukrainians.

So Ukraine should just let Donbas secede, because a band of armed thugs has said so. Then the same band would appear In Zaporozhia. And then Ukraine should let them secede, too, because you do not pick fights with Russia. But Odessa has always been Russian, Putin says. Then send some 'separatists' there, too. Is there any country that would allow that? — Jabberwock

Yes, once they lost control of territory filled with Russian speakers and right next to Russia, they should have recognized there was no military option to reconquer the territory: any potentially successful attempt would trigger an invasion by Russia.

Therefore, their options were diplomatic, and had they implemented Minsk I or II that would be far more likely way to regain the territory than what they've decided to do instead.

As for foreign intelligence agents operating elsewhere in the country, the response to that is counter-intelligence.

I would appreciate that you post your answers when you are sober. It would facilitate the discussion a lot. — Jabberwock

I guess you really don't much at all.

You're main counter argument against action vis-a-vis the military bases has essentially been the bases don't matter as we can think of a scenario in which they are superfluous to a first strike and other assets can easily deliver the maximum blow.

The AI example is that in all situations you can imagine a threat-model against which you can do nothing, indeed a threat model in which everything you do is actually counter productive.

For example, you could imagine me as a world-view threat model in which everything you in the conversation accelerates your descent into madness.

If you just "don't get it" I am happy to go deeper and explain to you why positing this kind of threat model doesn't lead to the conclusion that therefore no action is reasonable.

Anyways, the point I was making has less to do with Ukraine and more to do with your understanding of democracy vs totalitarianism. Replacing a top general (popular or unpopular) from leading the armed forces in wartime is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. Making unpopular decisions in wartime like imposing martial law, mass mobilization, and replacing a popular&competent top general is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. — neomac

Though I agree with you here, using martial law to ban critical media, ban any dissent of the war policies, banning political parties, postponing elections are all anti-democratic and despotic and arguably totalitarian.

Ukraine is only a democracy on paper at this point.

Which is exactly what I describe: The bases increase first strike capability, and so something to worry about, especially if the trend is allowed to continue and you end up with 100s of "limited continental missile defense". — boethius

Maybe this is what you describe NOW, when I have finally educated you about the matter. Your previous claim was 'You could literally take a ABM missile and simply put a nuclear warhead in it and fire it at a ground target'. Sure, you COULD do that, but its effectiveness when launched from a ground base would still be very limited as compared to the offensive mobile capacity NATO already has. Then you have wasted three pages of discussion about the supposed advantages of land bases as a 'forward offensive base', because you believed that ships have to 'surround Russian shores'. This was to prop your argument that: 'It's unstable, so Ukraine entering NATO could lead to a series of escalations that lead to the US forward deploying nuclear weapons'.

But now that you have finally educated yourself, we can finally close the argument 'the US will deploy nukes in Ukraine'. You could do that the first time I have pointed that out and save us both the trouble, but I guess you do you.

Girkin himself says in your citation of him that things would have "fizzled out" without him, so even your own evidence you use to support your claims clearly claims things had started before that. — boethius

Only if you do not know what you are talking about, which you clearly do not (because, as you wrote, you do not care). He referred to protests and demostrations, not to violence. And even 'things had started before' clearly contradicts your ignorant claim that 'Ukraine has started the war after separatists have declared independence'. That is still not what has happened, grasping at straws will not change that.

In such a context, it would matter a great deal if the people on the street even wanted to secede and if anything was used to coerce them one way or another.

We could then get into hundreds of years of history, legal and moral precedent, to try to tease out who has just cause in the affair.

Whatever happened in the initial Donbas secession, it was reversible.

What is clear is that there's a lot of Russian speakers there unhappy with Ukrainian language and cultural oppression, so the idea that there were no genuine separatists at all I feel far fetched.

What exactly the majority genuinely wanted I think is up for debate and we may never know.

What is clear is that they become a separate government to that of Ukraine and Ukraine had lost control of the territory without any realistic way of reversing things (without being invaded by Russia). — boethius

Sure, there were separatists who wanted independence and possibly join Russia. But as you say, it is now impossible to say whether that was the view of the majority. Given that it is unknown, and given what we know from the direct participants of the events, we can conclude that there would be no rebellion. So, again, Ukraine did not start this war - Russia did.

Playing footsie with NATO, Russian language oppression, random violence against Russian speakers, promoting Bandera as a national hero, then attacking (including shelling civilians) the separatists, is all definitely picking a fight with Russia. — boethius

Yes, I know the whole list of Russian grievances, they still have nothing to do with the real cause of the war.

Many of the factions supporting these provocative policies vis-a-vis Russia had no qualms of explicitly stating their main goal (to Western journalists on camera) is starting a war with Russia that will destroy said Russia. — boethius

Can you provide the exact quotes in which Ukrainians claim that they want to destroy Russia?

Ukrainian elites, decision makers and faction leaders knew the policies they were pursuing could easily, maybe even likely, start a war with Russia, especially waging war on the Donbas for 8 years. Some tried to reverse course (I have zero problem believing Zelensky legitimately wanted to make peace with Russia and avoid a way) but failed to do so and others bet NATO would save them and still others seem to have wanted a war as a "purifying" experience to Ukrainians. — boethius

I have already given you the number of casualties in 2020. The conflict was as deescalated as possible, Ukraine has practically given up any idea of recovering the territories, without openly admitting that. The status quo could be maintained practically indefinitely, just like in other frozen conflicts instigated by Russia in other republics.

Yes, once they lost control of territory filled with Russian speakers and right next to Russia, they should have recognized there was no military option to reconquer the territory: any potentially successful attempt would trigger an invasion by Russia.

Therefore, their options were diplomatic, and had they implemented Minsk I or II that would be far more likely way to regain the territory than what they've decided to do instead.

As for foreign intelligence agents operating elsewhere in the country, the response to that is counter-intelligence. — boethius

Maybe try to read why the Minsk agreements failed. Neither side was interested in implementing them, so blaming just Ukraine is pointless. And obviously you still do not understand why Russia has started the hostilities in Donbas in the first place.

Maybe this is what you describe NOW, when I have finally educated you about the matter. Your previous claim was 'You could literally take a ABM missile and simply put a nuclear warhead in it and fire it at a ground target'. — Jabberwock

This is the key exchange that created the discussion on this topic:

You start by dismissing the 'nuclear threat' as nonsense.

Beside the obvious nonsense of 'nuclear threat' (again, no nuclear missiles have been deployed in any of the new NATO countries, so why exactly should that be an issue?) — Jabberwock

I point out the obvious (that nuclear weapons and risks aren't "nonsense"):

For the obvious reason that they could deploy nuclear weapons there.

Furthermore, the US started the dismantling of the non-proliferation architecture (based on mostly treaties that the US didn't ratify anyways, so was never US law to begin with, which doesn't inspire much trust as a starting point) in abandoning both in official "executive policy" (what I guess best describes non-ratified treaties that we're just going to pretend are meaningful) and action (actually developing the weapons systems banned by the treaties) the ABM treaty and then the INF treaty.

The US makes clear they are a "first use" nation. — boethius

You then double down on your no-risk position:

Oh, please do tell which missiles in European bases can be 'easily loaded with nuclear warheads'. But be specific... which types and ranges did you have in mind exactly? — Jabberwock

I then explain exactly the points you now claim to have had since the beginning:

The whole point of exiting the INF treaty (which was never entered anyways, just pretend entering and exiting) is to develop exactly those kinds of missile with size and range to ABM missiles.

You could literally take a ABM missile and simply put a nuclear warhead in it and fire it at a ground target.

Keep in mind also that ABM missiles are themselves first strike risks, which the ABM treaty was negotiated in the first place. — boethius

Notice how I explain that you could obviously substitute a missile, whether existing or to be developed, in an ABM as well as just putting a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to.

Then notice how I state very clearly that "Keep in mind also that ABM missiles are themselves first strike risks".

Go through this exchange and maybe consider the fact that not only is my position correct from the start:

1. ABM bases can be converted to launch nuclear missiles.

2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk.

So after all this you're actually capable of claiming:

Maybe this is what you describe NOW, when I have finally educated you about the matter. Your previous claim was 'You could literally take a ABM missile and simply put a nuclear warhead in it and fire it at a ground target'. Sure, you COULD do that, but its effectiveness when launched from a ground base would still be very limited as compared to the offensive mobile capacity NATO already has. — Jabberwock

Which, if you aren't able to retain what I cite you claiming at the top of this post, let's compare:

Beside the obvious nonsense of 'nuclear threat' (again, no nuclear missiles have been deployed in any of the new NATO countries, so why exactly should that be an issue?) — Jabberwock

Obviously ABM is not nonsense when it comes to increasing nuclear risks not the bases, as you now explain yourself with the absolutely incredible claim of "educating me" going along with it.

Even more ludicrous, you then complain about:

Then you have wasted three pages of discussion about the supposed advantages of land bases as a 'forward offensive base', because you believed that ships have to 'surround Russian shores'. — Jabberwock

While again demonstrating your inability to either in good faith have a clue what the discussion even is or then, more likely, your bad faith in trying to just spew bullshit in the discussion as you think that's a good propaganda tactic.

For, surrounding Russia's shores is your scenario of the US having 1000 points of first strike nuclear capability anyways and thus the bases are irrelevant.

In your comparison, you'd have to get those ships close to Russia, likewise any planes to conduct a first strike, which are what are called "warning signs".

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around".

Now, you'd certainly want a lot more bases before actually conducting a first strike, and ideally in Ukraine, which is one explanation of why Russia has made counter-moves to prevent that happening.

You can disagree those moves (invading Ukraine) were optimum or morally justified or political astute or whatever, but the argument that "NATO isn't a threat" and "nuclear threats are nonsense" is just dumb.

Yes, nuclear war today is unlikely, likewise tomorrow and the next day.

The problem analysts tasked with managing nuclear capabilities and deterrence have is that the likelihood is low but non-zero (and much higher than some super low 1 in a 10 trillion realm of odds, considering we've already had close calls with nuclear war). Therefore, something happening has some level of appreciable odds, given enough time, will likely happen; so, if escalation begins even small changes in the balance of power could be decisive in both deterring an opponent (i.e. pushing the odds as low as possible) as well one's side surviving a nuclear exchange better than worse (at least taking out a large proportion of the opponents capacity so as to have more people / organs of the state survive, once nuclear exchange begins).

You obviously don't take the subject seriously enough to even read your own sources you cite, but maybe you can stretch your imagination enough to realize that people who actually deal with nuclear force issues do take the issue seriously.