You need to parse each word or phrase in a nested set if that is any help.
Looks like four elements.
You probably need to start with your best theory of mind to make any progress. — Mark Nyquist
When we believe any thing of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment — David Hume
When we believe any thing of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment
— David Hume
That quotation is from the “Abstract”, which is a summary of the Treatise. The argument itself is around 1.4.2 (that’s Book.Part.Section).
But there must be secondary sources that could make it more manageable. — Jamal
Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not? — OwenB
Chapter 2 focuses on studies of infants’ knowledge of objects: the movable
bodies that we see, grasp, and act on. Before infants can reach for and manip-
ulate objects, they organize perceptual arrays into bodies that are cohesive,
bounded, solid, persisting, and movable on contact. Young infants use these
abstract, interconnected properties to detect the boundaries of each object
in a scene, to track objects over occlusion, and to infer their interactions with
other objects. Nevertheless, there are striking limits to young infants’ object
representations: Infants have little ability to track hidden objects by their shapes,
colors, or textures, although they do detect and remember these properties.
Above all, research reveals that infants’ early- emerging representations of
objects are the product of a single cognitive system that operates as an inte-
grated whole. This system emerges early in development, it remains present and
functional in children and adults, and it guides infants’ learning. The system
combines some, but not all, of the properties of mature perceptual systems and
belief systems, and it therefore appears to occupy a middle ground between our
immediate perceptual experiences on the one hand and our explicit reasoning on
the other. Research probing infants’ expectations about objects suggests hypoth-
eses concerning the mechanisms by which a system of knowledge might emerge,
function, and guide infants’ learning about the kinds of objects their environ-
ment provides and the kinds of events that occur when different objects interact.
Research described in this chapter also reveals that infants’ knowledge of objects
is at least partly innate. It suggests how innate knowledge of objects might arise
prior to birth, preparing infants for their first perceptual encounters with mov-
able, solid, inanimate bodies.
Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not? — OwenB
In the context of Neuroscience this seems very poor curriculum. A historical perspective maybe? — Mark Nyquist
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