Unperceived existence.....ask about this.... clear as mud?? — Mark Nyquist
Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not? — OwenB
Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not?
Can anyone point me in the right direction as I have no idea how to help her? — OwenB
… there belongs to every external perception its reference from the "genuinely perceived" sides of the object of perception to the sides "also meant" not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are "coming" now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth. In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner.
Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualize on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an "I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing" plays its part without detriment to the fact that this "freedom", like every other, is always open to possible hindrances. The horizons are "predelineated" potentialities…. the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open.” (Cartesian Meditations)
You can access a reality beyond a direct and immediate perception by looking at theories of a spectator’s or reader’s relation to a film, text, or artwork. Thus, Deleuze’s cinematic philosophy attempts to uncover the ‘unperceived’ in the perceived, to think that which is unthinkable. “The cinema does not have natural subjective perception as its model because the mobility of its centers and variability of its framings always lead to restoring vast a-centred and de-framed zones. One passes imperceptibly from perception to affective and re-active tendencies of actions” (Deleuze, Cinema 1, pg. 64). On the first level, we perceive isolated, separated things and objects. On the second, determinative one, there is an unfolding of a relational event. It takes up the pasts of different orders that include our habitual and acquired perceptions, inclinations, and desires and enacts the tendencies and potentials of the immediate future.Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not?
Can anyone point me in the right direction as I have no idea how to help her? — OwenB
Unlike others, I don’t see anything wrong with the wording of the question. It’s out of Hume. — Jamal
Thanks. That's what I suspected, since i couldn't think of what else it might mean. But Hume and I will have to agree to disagree. HehePerceived sometimes, other times unperceived. The cup in the cupboard and all that. Hume discusses continued existence and concludes we can’t justifiably infer it from having perceived it previously. — Jamal
Perceived sometimes, other times unperceived. The cup in the cupboard and all that. Hume discusses continued existence and concludes we can’t justifiably infer it from having perceived it previously. — Jamal
but aren't they only chimeras in reference to the external/empirical world? I think you can be a Humean skeptic while reserving a place for genuine analytic knowledge. For Hume, relations of ideas, which would include math and its proofs, are not problematic, because they can be known by reason alone, requiring no reliance on experience.(b) proof and absolute certainty are chimeras in epistemology — Jamal
but aren't they only chimeras in reference to the external/empirical world? I think you can be a Humean skeptic while reserving a place for genuine analytic knowledge. For Hume, relations of ideas, which would include math and its proofs, are not problematic, because they can be known by reason alone, requiring no reliance on experience. — J
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