You're arguing against an opponent borne of your own imagination.
"For example, in the following sentence--"We Americans need to defeat the Nazis before they spread their evil they showed in the Holocaust and fully destroy freedom"--we see concepts expounding on and moving beyond mere objects. "We" are no longer just the objects in a group, they are defined by the concept of nationhood: not an object. The same goes with the ideological concepts of evil and freedom, which have no clear object correspondent; they are concepts that have moved beyond them. And we haven't even discussed the lingusistic dynamics giving all these words meaning beyond their object correspondents."
Again, moving beyond 'mere' objects isn't a problem for my position. Getting to very complex notions without those consisting in/of more simple one would be.
Sigh. Offer an example and I'll gladly deconstruct it for you. I've seen no definition which claims what you've stated...
I know human thought goes beyond 'mere' correlations. Not all correlations are 'mere'. Most are quite complex...
There's something to be said about our ability to become aware of that which is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it.
Correspondence is one such thing. Thus, calling correspondence a concept would be equivalent to calling anything else that is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it... a concept.
Correspondence is presupposed within all thought/belief, including but not limited to pre and/or non-linguistic. Correspondence is not "correspondence". The former is the relationship that the latter takes an account of. It doesn't require being taken an account of.
You've shown no such thing Sand. Gratuitous assertions won't do here.
How about this Sand...
The term "we" is meaningful as a result of drawing correlations between the term itself, others, and oneself. The term "American" is meaningful as a result of drawing correlations between the term itself, the country, and a place of birth....
Looks like there's some reading comprehension issues.
Be well Sand. Come back when you actually know how to present an argument.
It means you can call anything you like "correspondence" but that does not make it correspondence. I can call a dog's tail a "leg" if I like but the dog still only has four legs.
I wouldn't say that truth collapses into true, because there is a distinction to be made, between the particular instance, something which is true, and the generalization, truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
Remember when I described justification. In my opinion, this is how we get objective concepts, objective knowledge, through agreement amongst us. This is what is accepted as right, correct. It is objective in the sense of "inter-subjective", so it is not a true objectivity in the sense of "of the object", independent of the subject. It is created by a unification of subjects through communication, and I call this justification because it comes about through the demonstration of what is believed to be the correct way to use words. — Metaphysician Undercover
A concept may come into existence and evolve, as the correct way of using words evolves, and this process is a justification of that usage which is accepted as the correct usage. This is contrary to platonic realism, which places concepts as independent of subjects, making them more truly objective, in the sense of "of the object", resulting in the need to assume eternal concepts or ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover
By the way, the inadequate, preconceived notion of knowledge, which led them astray, was the idea that knowledge had to exclude falsity. They could not find a way that knowledge as we know it could exclude falsity. And we can bring this to bear upon our search for instances of "being true". Should "being true" exclude the possibility that the thing which is true, is false? Is it correct to oppose true with false? — Metaphysician Undercover
In this case your argument is really about knowledge and not truth — Fafner
The problem here is not just that whatever warrant you have for asserting that P is no guarantee that P is true. — Srap Tasmaner
Yes, it is indeed the same word. The scare quotes indicate that the same word is being used in two different senses, of which one is perverse or confusing. So to say that a "leg" is not a leg is to say that there are two senses in which the word is being used: one sensibly and correctly and the other equivocally and strangely. Same with "correspondence" and correspondence.
Unless you are a disjunctivist. — Fafner
I was trying to stay kinda neutral, but back of my mind I was thinking about Dummett's idea that truth has its -- I guess "conceptual" -- origin in the idea of an assertion being objectively right or wrong — Srap Tasmaner
Every instance when meaning is first attributed. — creativesoul
The issue Meta, was whether or not truth is dependent upon language. I claimed it's not. You argued otherwise as above. Now you're saying that meaning isn't dependent upon language. If there is meaning without language, then truth is as well. — creativesoul
In this case your argument is really about knowledge and not truth (which are different topics), so it was false advertisement all along. — Fafner
And also, your argument doesn't really prove that we don't know the objective reality either. — Fafner
I see it as being unable to speak of - define - the generalization (except generally, of course) without resort to the particular. It seems to me that reduces "truth" to a shorthand that refers to something that truth isn't, and that beyond that "truth" has no meaning at all. Maybe this is a Socratic aporia: we look into the heart of a thing and are thrown back with some violence. — tim wood
I'd be happier if you had included the distinction between the a priori and contingently true. One is demonstrated, the other hermeneutic, a matter of persuasion. I assume you have a firm grasp of the difference.... But I take your point. The thing isn't green except as we agree it's green, whence the objectiveness of green. — tim wood
Here that distinction matters. I feel no need to assume eternal concepts, nor an eternal mind to maintain their being. 2+2=4 means nothing at all, except as and until someone has a use for it, on which occasion I trust it will always be so and not otherwise. That is, I create contingent truths; I merely find and recognize the a priori. — tim wood
Short answer, with the contingent, yes; with the a priori, no. Proof is immediate: the contingent could be false; the necessarily so, cannot not be so. — tim wood
Maybe here we catch a glimpse of truth, a gleam of it. Let's go back to green. Green is certainly subjective and a matter of agreement. But spectral analysis isn't. If we elect to denominate the results of the analysis "green," then that green is objective - not a quality of what we think and agree about, instead a recognition of something that is so (and that as it is, it cannot be otherwise). — tim wood
If you agree so far, do you care to assay a new definition of truth? — tim wood
If this is the case, then could you explain to me how you categorize both knowledge and truth, to maintain this separation which you are inclined to adhere to. — Metaphysician Undercover
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