As I said earlier, 'perfect' generally means that which can not be improved upon. I entered this discussion by looking for an example of this understanding of perfection in relation to morality. It is this I am interested in, not its imprecise and multifarious uses in ordinary discourse, poetic or otherwise.

The machine does a perfect Carnot cycle, here replacing perfect with efficient would turn a fine sentence into a nonsensical one. — Lionino

I didn't think it was nonsensical, but wow, ok. So who has built one of these perfect Carnot machines in actuality?

I didn't think it was nonsensical — Pantagruel

More redundant than nonsensical. The word Carnot cycle already summons the idea of efficient (100% efficiency to be exact), so "efficient Carnot cycle" is pleonastic, while perfect Carnot cycle is not.

So who has built one of these perfect Carnot machines in actuality? — Pantagruel

No one, because it requires 0 friction, 0 heat leakage, among other things.

What's the perfect definition of "perfect"?

Wouldn't the perfect definition of perfect, simply be, the definition of perfect? Just the definition of perfect, no more, no less, just the perfect definition of perfect.

Perfection, then would mean the actual.

An imperfect chair is only potentially a chair until it can actually serve as a chair, at which time it can be called perfect.

"Need a seat?" Slides over a chair with a broken leg. Slides a phone book under the broken leg to stand it up straight and solid. "Perfect!"

So is perfection subjective?

I think it can be, in the sense that something can be perfect to me, and maybe no one else. I say this chair is perfect, and then someone else tries it and says it is terrible. Sounds like perfection is subjective.

But if I can explain all the reasons it is perfect to me - allows my legs to bend at just the right height, gently supporting my back, soft, but firm - they might say "yeah, I see why you say it is perfect to you - that would be perfect - except to me, that chair hurts my knees and my ass."

So if we can convey why we think something is perfect, we might be conveying why actual things objectively would generate the same judgment of perfection if perceived in the same way to any subject. In this sense the perfect is an objective thing. This, I think is the perfect use of the word "perfect" to convey objectivity and actuality, not just subjectivity.

What is the perfect solution for X in the problem 2+2=X? This makes it easy to convey perfection.
But if the problem is, what is the perfect artform, abstract sculpture or live symphonic music - the argument could go on forever and maybe neither one is actually perfect. So we just say "shut up - you don't know perfection if it bit you in artform" or agree to disagree and say "perfection must be subjective."

In the, saying something is perfect to me, tells you nothing. Unless the question is something simple, like "Is 2+2=4 correct?"

A physical feeling can only be objective. It doesn't mean anything to call it subjective. The feeling of the chair is just a judgment that it feels good

The word perfect is used in various ways, sometimes it just means ‘great’ or ‘cool’. The more interesting philosophical aspect of this is the transcendental implications of the idea of perfection.

No one, because it requires 0 friction, 0 heat leakage, among other things. — Lionino

Ah. So this is that sense of perfection that precludes objective existence. Like a perfect vacuum. Or a perfect circle. Really more of a Platonic ideal.

More redundant than nonsensical. The word Carnot cycle already summons the idea of efficient (100% efficiency to be exact), so "efficient Carnot cycle" is pleonastic, while perfect Carnot cycle is not. — Lionino

If a Carnot cycle is, by definition, 100% efficient, isn't saying "perfect Carnot cycle" redundant too?

:up:

From Richard Bach's Illusions.

Look at the sky."

"Pretty sky," I said.

"It is a perfect sky?"

"Well, it's always a perfect sky, Don."

"Are you telling me that even though it's changing every second, the sky is always a perfect sky?"

"Gee, I'm smart. Yes!"

"And the sea is always a perfect sea, and it's always changing, too," he said. "If perfection is stagnation, then heaven is a swamp! And the Is ain't hardly no swamp cookie. — Richard Bach

The word perfect is used in various ways, sometimes it just means ‘great’ or ‘cool’. The more interesting philosophical aspect of this is the transcendental implications of the idea of perfection. — Tom Storm

"The word perfect is used in various ways.." This sounds like subjectivity is at play.

"...it just means..." This sounds like objectivity is at play.

"The more interesting..." Wait, more interesting than my post?

"The transcendental implications of the idea of perfection."

What would really be interesting is what you mean by "transcendental implications" in general, and then apply it to "perfection".

Did you say "the idea of.." for a reason, or do you just mean "transcendental implications of 'perfection' which happens to be an idea"?

It strikes me that 'perfection' is a word which we use in various ways - from a mere superlative to an almost transcendental category. Which usage is correct? — Tom Storm

"The word perfect is used in various ways.." This sounds like subjectivity is at play.

"...it just means..." This sounds like objectivity is at play. — Fire Ologist

You're almost there. Keep going....

What would really be interesting is what you mean by "transcendental implications" in general, and then apply it to "perfection". — Fire Ologist

Yes, what a great question! Wouldn't that be interesting? Imagine if there were a Platonic category of perfection - an instantiation of perfection that operates above and beyond any human criteria of value. The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category?

For my understanding "subjective" is thoughts which are opinion instead of knowledge. When you are mulling over an issue you are thinking subjectively. When the truth is discovered it becomes objective. Our sense of objects' existence and features is objective unless it's diseased in some way. Even then we can still call it objective because it arises in and from a real world. To be talked about implies a things existence in some way. If something was purely subjective it would be absolute nothingness. So feautures such as beauty, when perceived without some disease of the understanding, truly witnesses something real and true

If a Carnot cycle is, by definition, 100% efficient, isn't saying "perfect Carnot cycle" redundant too? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Kind of, yes, if you use it in the restricted sense.



You can still say this is a Carnot cycle, since it is isothermal and adiabatic overall except for a small period.

Ah. So this is that sense of perfection that precludes objective existence. Like a perfect vacuum. Or a perfect circle. Really more of a Platonic ideal. — Pantagruel

It is not instantiated, sure, but it is objective, as it refers to a body. Though the OP is about whether perfection is objective or subjective; if we are platonists (about abstract objects), we would have to automatically grant that perfection can also be objective, yeah?

But for a more concrete example of "objective perfection", I would simply use this example again.

The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category? — Tom Storm

I don't think there are forms, floating in an eternal world of the forms, objectified for us to know (by recollection or experience of participating things....).

I can see why Plato said that. That schematic of universal forms and particulars fits over-top of experience easily. But it seems too easy. Not to belittle Plato at all, but it lacks a curiosity into the physics, so to speak, of the 'perfect'.

Then instead of forms, if we skip straight to the example of the perfect - the perfect thing - and see if we can understand perfection from a perfect thing, we get nowhere. Once you hold up an example, you get bogged down in all of difficulties of being clear about making any claim about any physical thing. I say that chair is the perfect chair, and as a chair, exemplifies perfection itself, but you could just say, "perfect how? Perfect for sitting? So is that stool. The chair doesn't help at all and you've said nothing about perfection." And again, we are no closer to understanding what a 'perfection' is, arguing back and forth about mere uses that beat around the bush.

Still, I think we all have to admit that there is something distinct about 'perfection'. I mean no one would say another word for 'perfection' is 'shoddy'. (You might describe a shoddy thing as a perfect example of shoddiness, but you aren't defining perfection here, but only defining shoddiness.) Perfection has a distinct use, or a distinct meaning, that shoddy can never replace. There is something distinct there when one is trying to speak of 'perfection'.

So maybe I place perfection's thereness (so to speak) in the community of minds that would agree, sort of make an agreed upon use, and the few parts we all agree on, how we all use 'perfection' perfectly well, in that transcendental space we've constructed, we'll insert an objectified 'perfection'. "There are three knives, two of them are rusty. Which one is the most perfect? Since we all agree the one with no corrupting rust is the most perfect, we will together admit the perfect is like the uncorrupted knife, and we agree that every time we use the word perfect, we will use it consistently with this use."

This is the better place (the transcendent place we make) to start to define 'perfection', I think. However, if 'perfection' only exists in convention among minds, I still have to admit that I don't know what I have in my own mind alone when I think to myself that I know what 'perfection' is. I can't have a floating form. I am not looking at an example. I am still distinguishing 'perfect' from 'shoddy', but if I don't know what a mind thinking 'perfection' is in itself, why would adding other minds thinking 'perfection' to themselves AND adding the two minds creating some agreed upon, transcendental 'perfection' as if it was objective...this starts to sound like the same wishful thinking as Plato, making a floating form.

It's still better - two minds are more likely to make a more perfect 'perfection' than one.

The question is "Is 'perfection' subjective?" But don't we have to ask first, "Is anything objective?" You kind of just asked that, so I think you would agree this question is in the mix here. I mean, if nothing is objective, or we can't know it if it is, than what measuring stick can we hold up to anything to adjudge "No, this one is subjective." And then to ask about a thing like 'perfection' whether it is subjective or not - difficult question.

After all of that, I would still say that I do believe in objectivity itself. Along with objectivity, there is the subjective experience of these objects. And perfection is useful in describing things in subjective experience and things in the objective world. Sometimes we agree that some performance, some experiment, some physical act, was perfect, and we all can agree. Other times I see perfection and know no one else could ever possibly see it because I am looking through eyes and at phenomena that no one else could ever experience, but I still see perfection and could care less what anyone else thinks.
Perfection lives with the subjective, and can be inserted in the physical world for others to live with as well.

Still haven't defined perfection though. Then we are throwing in language, definition, use of a concept. I'd say perfection is a mix of 'complete' (but that's not it), with 'actualized' (but that's not enough), with superlative (that may be too much), with 'good' (but that's still not enough), and with 'perfecting' the verb, bringing it to life as an activity (but this seems opposite to 'complete' and "actualized')... tough word to define. I say it has it's objectivity (allowing us to avoid using 'shoddy' in it's place and carving it's distict contours), and it's subjectivity (allowing us to use it all). But no forms.

Yes, what a great question! Wouldn't that be interesting? Imagine if there were a Platonic category of perfection - an instantiation of perfection that operates above and beyond any human criteria of value. The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category? — Tom Storm

I thought you were only interested in perfection's application to morality; that perfection being one and the same with Neo-platonic, if not also Platonic, notion of "the Good", which you've stated you find unwarranted. At any rate:

Placing aside interpretations and/or misinterpretations pertaining to the metaphysics of Platonism, and here addressing objectivity as that state of being which is fully impartial relative to all coexistent sentience (let me know if you have a better but incongruous definition of “objectivity”), here’s an argument for the occurrence of objective perfection:

p1) There either can occur or cannot occur such a thing as an objectively perfect circle (this in contrast to the subjective perfection of a circle which my five-year old niece has drawn on paper).

p2) If there is no such thing as an objectively perfect circle, then neither can there be such thing as an objectively imperfect circle.

p3) If there is no such thing as an objectively imperfect circle, one can then objectively have a circle which takes the shape of an octagon.

p4) A circle in the shape of an octagon, however, is not a circle when objectively addressed - as is commonly confirmed by all sane humans.

c1) Therefore, there is such a thing as an objectively perfect circle.

c2) Ergo, objectively perfect givens can and do occur.

Nice work.

But don't we have to ask first, "Is anything objective?" You kind of just asked that, so I think you would agree this question is in the mix here. I mean, if nothing is objective, or we can't know it if it is, than what measuring stick can we hold up to anything to adjudge "No, this one is subjective." And then to ask about a thing like 'perfection' whether it is subjective or not - difficult question. — Fire Ologist

Good point. I guess I would say that instead of ‘objective’ there are intersubjective agreements on matters. These are held by communities which share values and world views. Politics, religion, art and science are examples of such intersubjective communities and yet even here there are schisms.

I thought you were only interested in perfection's application to morality; — javra

Indeed, but you know what it's like here; you enter a conversation and come out the other side covered in the conceptual detritus of ideas others raise in your passing.

objectivity as that state of being which is fully impartial relative to all coexistent sentience (let me know if you have a better but incongruous definition of “objectivity”), — javra

I don't understand that sentence.

p1) There either can occur or cannot occur such a thing as an objectively perfect circle (this in contrast to the subjective perfection of a circle which my five-year old niece has drawn on paper).

p2) If there is no such thing as an objectively perfect circle, then neither can there be such thing as an objectively imperfect circle.

p3) If there is no such thing as an objectively imperfect circle, one can then objectively have a circle which takes the shape of an octagon.

p4) A circle in the shape of an octagon, however, is not a circle when objectively addressed - as is commonly confirmed by all sane humans.

c1) Therefore, there is such a thing as an objectively perfect circle.

c2) Ergo, objectively perfect givens can and do occur. — javra

I'm not a big syllogism guy. Firstly I can never understand them and secondly it seems to me (as my old philosophy tutor used to argue) that one can make a valid argument for anything using a syllogism. But reality will always have its own ideas. I stay away from them.

Let's just take P3

The fallacy here lies in the equivocation on the term "imperfect circle." In the first part of the statement, "imperfect circle" I assume refers to a circle that deviates from the ideal geometric definition of a circle, perhaps in terms of symmetry or roundness. However, in the second part of the statement, "imperfect circle" seems to be interpreted as any shape that is not a perfect circle, including polygons like an octagon.

The fallacy occurs because the two interpretations of "imperfect circle" are not equivalent. A circle that takes the shape of an octagon is not objectively a circle; it's objectively an octagon. An octagon lacks the defining characteristics of a circle, such as being round and having a single continuous curve.

But let's not do syllogisms.

You did give me a chance to use the word 'objectively' so maybe there is progress. :wink:

The fallacy occurs because the two interpretations of "imperfect circle" are not equivalent. — Tom Storm

Would an oval then be an "imperfect circle" any more than any polygon? Why, when both are clearly not circles but yet resemble circles each in their own way?

Poetically addressed, an octagon is very much roughly circular when looked at from afar, and hence can be construed to be an imperfect circle - this just as much as an apeirogon can. Only that the apeirogon, being far nearer in shape to a perfect circle than an octagon, is then far less imperfect by comparison - but is imperfect (edit: as a circle) nonetheless.

No. I'm not going for it. But nice try. Someone else may buy it.

Someone else may buy it. — Tom Storm

I'm not selling anything, you. So to you an apeirogon is not an imperfect circle. Hard to comprehend, but fine. What then is an imperfect circle to you?

I'm not selling anything, you — javra

Surely you know this expression essentially means, 'I do not accept the proposition you are putting to me'. Or are you not, in fact, trying to convince me of something via argument? Anyway, I've already said syllogisms don't do it for me. Let's see what others think.

This being a philosophy forum where debates and disagreements unfold, I just find your implicit assertion that objectively perfect givens do not occur, else that there is no evidence for them occurring, to be irrational, that's all. Would have liked to see the reasoning to it. But so be it,

I just find you implicit assertion that objectively perfect givens do not occur, — javra

Fair enough. You are entitled to that reaction.

But have I said that objectively perfect things do not occur? I actually don't think this, so if you can find me saying it, I withdraw it.

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing.

And I'm not even sure if we came to an agreed working definition of perfection.

Have I said that objectively perfect things do not occur? I actually don't think this, so if you can find me saying it, I withdraw it. — Tom Storm

I did say "implicit assertion". Which is corroborated by the following.

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing. — Tom Storm

Abstractions are abstracted from concrete givens, and as far as I know there are no concrete examples of perfect circles. If the latter is then true, then perfect circles cannot be abstractions by definition.

That touched upon, whatever they might be conceptualized as being by you, are you saying that (perfect) circles do not occur in the real world, but only in fictitious worlds?

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing. — Tom Storm

Exactly. Can we demonstrate perfection in any thing?

Abstractions are abstracted from concrete givens, and as far as I know there are no concrete examples of perfect circles. — javra

A perfect circle is still an abstraction even if there is no such thing as one in real life. Abstractions are not always directly derived from concrete examples. They can also emerge from conceptual reasoning, logical deduction, or mathematical principles. But my point doesn't rest on use of the word abstraction. Call it 'theoretical' if that sounds better to you.

are you saying that the (perfect) circles do not occur in the real world, but only in fictitious worlds? — javra

Do we know if a perfect circle can be realised? I call it an abstraction because until it is concrete it is just an idea that represents general qualities or features distinct from specific instances or occurrences.

But even if there were a perfect circle what does this mean for perfect morality? Is it the same use of the word perfect or is this another equivocation?

And by now I've forgotten what Bob Ross was arguing about morality and perfection in the first place. :wink:

Do we know if a perfect circle can be realised? — Tom Storm

That's the hitch. A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. Such that this understanding is objective. Not so with abstractions proper: ten people will provide ten different examples of what the abstraction "bird" is epitomized by: from a finch, to maybe an eagle, and so forth. All can however only provide the exact same example of what a perfect circle is epitomized by. And from this universality of agreement in understanding among all sapience then gets derived things such as the number pi.

Is pi a realized, actual, number that occurs in the real world? I'd myself say of course: it is not unrealized, nor a mere potential, nor a fictitious construct. In which case, so too must the objectively perfect circle then also be a given that is realized all the time in the real world. For there can be no number pi in the absence of the circle's actuality.

In short, the answer to this quoted question would be "yes", albeit not physically within matter.

But its getting a bit late for me. And, again, I've got nothing to sell. So I'll leave it at that for the time being.

A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. Such that this understanding is objective. — javra

Nice. I hear you but i don't think this is all that useful a formulation. We can find any number of minds to agree and visualise a unicorn but it still doesn't make it true. In this way we can also have objective accounts of ghosts and UFO too. Not sure what the word objective adds to this understanding.

But its getting a bit late for me. And, again, I've got nothing to sell. So I'll leave it at that for the time being. — javra

No worries. I don't have the right currency, anyway. Have a good one.

t is not instantiated, sure, but it is objective, as it refers to a body. — Lionino

You cannot say that something is objective because it "refers to a body." Unicorn refers to a body in that sense too, but it is not objective, it is a construct of the imagination. Moreover, the perfection of what you are describing explicitly precludes its material instantiation.

You cannot say that something is objective because it "refers to a body." — Pantagruel

Well, that is quite literally the meaning of objective.

Unicorn refers to a body in that sense too, but it is not objective, it is a construct of the imagination — Pantagruel

If you mean that 'unicorn' is subjective insofar as it only exists as a thought inside the mind, yes.

Moreover, the perfection of what you are describing explicitly precludes its material instantiation. — Pantagruel

Not always.

You cannot say that something is objective because it "refers to a body."
— Pantagruel

Well, that is quite literally the meaning of objective.

Unicorn refers to a body in that sense too, but it is not objective, it is a construct of the imagination
— Pantagruel

If you mean that 'unicorn' is subjective insofar as it only exists as a thought inside the mind, yes.

Moreover, the perfection of what you are describing explicitly precludes its material instantiation.
— Pantagruel

Not always. — Lionino

You are equivocating between the sense of an objective perspective and an objective thing. An objective is something intended and can be either a material thing or an idea. An objective thing has a real, independent existence, ie. is an object. All you are doing is declaring that realism (or maybe Platonism) is true, nominalism false.