Solipsism is a philosophical idea. It is a language construct.
— creativesoul
The idea that all ideas boil down to language... — Lionino
On ChatGPT, here is an example of it contradicting itself three times in a row.
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
And don't ever ask it to do any engineering https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad — Lionino
ChatGPT doesn't reason. It basically just repeats what it's read elsewhere. — Michael
Several are mentioned in the Wikipedia article, e.g. Boltzmann, Eddington, Feynman, Sean Carroll, and Brian Greene. — Michael
Those are people who have considered the possibility that we are Boltzmann brains. Not people who claim what you attribute to them. I already quoted Sean Carroll on the topic and it seemed pretty clear to me that Carroll doesn't make the claim that you are attributing to him. — wonderer1
Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains: observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang.
...
The issue is not that the existence of such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.
"The consensus amongst cosmologists is that some yet to be revealed error is hinted at by the surprising calculation that Boltzmann brains should vastly outnumber normal human brains."
They accept that the science entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains. They consider this proof that something is wrong with the science. — Michael
What you put in quotes there was something that someone wrote on Wikipedia. Can you quote a physicist making such a claim? — wonderer1
I am confident that I am not a Boltzmann brain. However, we want our theories to similarly concur that we are not Boltzmann brains, but so far it has proved surprisingly difficult for them to do so. So, I see Boltzmann brains as a mathematical problem that we need to solve, as opposed to an existential affront. I believe it is a problem that we will one day overcome.
Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains: observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang.
...
The issue is not that the existence of such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.
We're not arguing that Boltzmann Brains exist — we're trying to avoid them.
The author proposes a big bang model in which our Universe is a fluctuation of the vacuum, in the sense of quantum field theory. The model predicts a Universe which is homogeneous, isotropic and closed, and consists equally of matter and anti-matter. All these predictions are supported by, or consistent with, present observations.
Any method for calculating probabilities ought come to the conclusion that the most likely observer is the one we know exists - us. — Banno
Your reasoning (or Vilenkin's) seems to beg the question. — Michael
The problem of induction is that there is no reason to be sure that the future will be like the past, or simply that we can't derive a "will be" from a "has been". We agree on that? — Lionino
If we do, according to your proposal that "something should be thought to be less likely if it is less plausible in light of our experience", the problem of induction dissolves. — Lionino
I understand what you say about consistency with our past experiences, but in this one case I don't think it applies, since we are questioning the background of our experiences. — Lionino
For the most part, yes, people who are just as smart as or smarter than me are still arguing about it. And for them it is profession, not hobby. So it leads me to conclude it is not something that we can brush aside easily. — Lionino
Another, the argument from language is bad, — Lionino
In a single de Sitter universe with a cosmological constant, and starting from any finite spatial slice, the number of "normal" observers is finite and bounded by the heat death of the universe. If the universe lasts forever, the number of nucleated Boltzmann brains is, in most models, infinite; cosmologists such as Alan Guth worry that this would make it seem "infinitely unlikely for us to be normal brains". — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain#In_single-universe_scenarios
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