↪Joshs
Perhaps my stance appears to be an unquestioning taking for granted because it appears so alien to your way of thinking. But I continually question everything about my philosophy.
It doesn't seem unquestioning at all. I was referring back to your statement that: "only within a taken-for-granted , unquestioned set of normative presuppositions concerning the nature of the real can empiricist notions like proof and validation be considered as definitive."
I am having trouble understanding how validation, proof, evidence, demonstration, etc. can rest only on what is taken-for-granted. If this was true, I don't get how radical relativism and skepticism wouldn't follow. Epistemology can be circular and falliblist, but it cannot be arbitrary without epistemic pessimism seeming to take hold. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I would give up both realism and anti-realism, then, in favour of what could be called a pluralist pragmatism. What the pluralist insists on is that there is no foundational version, one which anchors all the rest or to which all others can be reduced. The pragmatist insists that the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making.To erase the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way in the world gives us a fresh appreciation of the world. That world, however, is not given, waiting to be represented. We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.
One might find metaphysics to be a confusing mess and accept no metaphysical theory, and yet still find statements about truth and falsehood intelligible and use them effectively in their daily lives — Count Timothy von Icarus
↪Gnomon I'm closer to saying that there is no metaphysical speculation; it is rather metaphysical imagination. We speculate only about that which might later be confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus
Much of metaphysics consists in playing dialectically with language—what if such and such (such and such that is the dialectical opposite of what we actually encounter) is really the case.
For example, we appear to be mortal...but...what if we are really immortal? We appear to be finite intelligences...but... what if there is an infinite intelligence...and further what if that is our real nature? We appear to encounter only the physical...but...what if what appears physical is really mental? And so on. — Janus
This is what makes paradigm shifts revolutionary rather than evolutionary. — Joshs
That world, however, is not given, waiting to be represented. We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.
Our attempt to make our way around a constantly changing world is not fundamentally a matter of belief, but of engaged coping. Engaged coping has nothing to do with conceptual representation. It is more like intuiting the next move in a dance as it contextually unfolds.
We no more falsify a metaphysics than an organism falsifies its environmental niche.
My jam is negative ontology (i.e. a deductive process of elimination of the impossibie, or ways the world necessarily could not have been or cannot be described), a rationalist near-analogue of negative theology. :smirk: — 180 Proof
This is what makes paradigm shifts revolutionary rather than evolutionary.
— Joshs
Can you elaborate on this evaluation? Why could a paradigm shift not be both? — Pantagruel
if we are to embrace a position like Thompson's we must have some way of determining between it and Saint Augustine's formulation that "truth is equivalent with being; what is true is, and what is false is not." To say that Thompson is right is to say that Augustine is wrong. To say that they are both right, is still to say that Augustine is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus
All validation cannot depend on metaphysics, and metaphysics in turn necessarily be based on unquestionable presuppositions we take for granted. If this were the case, then all judgements re validation/truth/accuracy etc. would be equally valid, merely a matter of which presuppositions we have embraced — Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree that much of modern linguistic discussion is like a "what if" word-game played with abstruse terminology that wouldn't mean much to us mere mortals. But I prefer to think of Metaphysics, as Aristotle did : the study of Nature in general, and of ourselves as imaginative beings. This is the essence of Philosophy, as the search for useful Wisdom --- attempting to gain an omniscient worldview.I'm closer to saying that there is no metaphysical speculation; it is rather metaphysical imagination. We speculate only about that which might later be confirmed or disconfirmed. Much of metaphysics consists in playing dialectically with language—what if such and such (such and such that is the dialectical opposite of what we actually encounter) is really the case. — Janus
:up: :up: Thus, in the main 'kataphatic metaphysics' – the Classical / Aristotlean tradition – is ad hoc (e.g. "this is the Really Real"-of-the-gaps), mostly derived from invalid arguments, which usually amounts to dogma like "only Euclidean geometry is Really Real because non-Euclidean geometries are mere appearances" or as you suggest "what if this / my set of axioms is Absolute ..."Much of metaphysics consists in playing dialectically with language—what if such and such (such and such that is the dialectical opposite of what we actually encounter) is really the case. — Janus
:mask:I prefer to think of Metaphysics [ ... ] attempting to gain an omniscient worldview. — Gnomon
One could say that Thompson’s position subsumes and enriches Augustine’s without invalidating it.
They are equally valid, but not at the same time and in the same context.
No. It's a logical expression, not a scientific claim.Is the "elimination of the impossible," or discovery of "ways the world necessarily could not have been or cannot be described," not, broadly speaking, a form of falsification? — Count Timothy von Icarus
No. It's a logical expression, not a scientific claim.
One could say it, but whether or not they would nonetheless be contradicting Augustine's standpoint is another matter. If I claim that "truth is absolute," and you in turn claim that "yes, truth can be absolute, but only ever relatively," this seems more like negating my claim than "subsuming" it. Further, the claim that "truth can be absolute, but it is only ever absolute in relative terms, based on presuppositions that are taken-for-granted, and people can always accept multiple equally valid, but different presuppositions," itself appears to be an absolute statement about truth to the effect that "there can be no absolute statements re truth." So aside from contradicting the position it claims to still affirm, it also refutes itself — Count Timothy von Icarus
So what would Thompson consider to be the difference between his valid thematic and Augustine’s valid approach? It can’t simply be that they contradict each other, since everything exists in a state of contradiction with respect to everything else.
He might say that Augustine’s self-contradicting thematic approach unfolds more slowly and ploddingly than his own, and he prefers approaches that transgress into new territory more aggressively since they bring him pleasure and a richer sense of meaning. We could say Thompson swaps out the ethical notions of refutation , truth and falsity for fast vs slow speeds of transformation.
A metaphysical position is closely related to a scientific paradigm. To empirically confirm a paradigm is just to tighten up the definitions and boundaries that were formed prior to confirmation . Such validating procedures allow us to identity what it is we are overthrowing when we eventually dump that paradigm in favor of another. But the movement from one paradigm to another is not driven by confirmation. It is driven by a wholesale qualitative reconceptualization of premises, the fabricating of a new world. This does not have to do with what is ‘true’ but with how the world can be organized to make sense in a qualitatively different way. Truth is then a secondary procedure within the newly created frame. — Joshs
You do realize I was kidding? :joke: — Gnomon
I think of it this way: Any world that contains, or is constituted by, either contradictions or objects with inconsistent properties is, in terms of modal logic, impossible; therefore, such constituent entities (i.e. versions of the world) are necessary fictions.Does your negative ontology "eliminate the impossible," or does it simply eliminate "what is impossible given certain unquestioned and taken-for-granted presuppositions?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes and no. I use terms of modal logic (e.g. actual, contingent, possible, necessary, impossible) since it is the clearest, most precise "framework" I've found. Specifically, actualism rather than possibilism.Can it only ever say what is impossible from within a given framework and are all frameworks equally valid?
No. They are equally fictional.Is it a problem for "impossible" or contradictory claims to be considered equally valid?
I agree. "Total relativism" (like global skepticism; existential/semantic/epistemological/ontological nihilism) is self-refuting. I think (aspect, property & valence) pluralism is a more reasonable principle – and very strongly correlated with actualism (as well as N. Goodman's irrealism) – for which variations, or counterparts, are neither equivalent (i.e. "equally valid" in every circumstance) nor always, or even mostly, commensurable. Yes, like the heights and depths of a landscape, most(?) valid paths / positions are patently better or worse – more adequate or less adequate – than others.... total relativism. And the problems related to relativism seem particularly acute when claims about "how the world is," "how experience is," etc. are brought in ...
Is it a problem for "impossible" or contradictory claims to be considered equally valid?
No. They are equally fictional. — 180 Proof
Unless I'm mistaken, I think contradiction
in (non-dialetheistic) logic = necessary falsity;
in modal logic = necessary impossibility; and
in modal metaphysics = necessary ontic-impossibility (e.g. sosein)*. — 180 Proof
↪Joshs
So what would Thompson consider to be the difference between his valid thematic and Augustine’s valid approach? It can’t simply be that they contradict each other, since everything exists in a state of contradiction with respect to everything else.
He might say that Augustine’s self-contradicting thematic approach unfolds more slowly and ploddingly than his own, and he prefers approaches that transgress into new territory more aggressively since they bring him pleasure and a richer sense of meaning. We could say Thompson swaps out the ethical notions of refutation , truth and falsity for fast vs slow speeds of transformation.
Again, he might say it, but he'd have no justification for it. For it would be equally valid to say that it is Augustine's approach that unfolds more quickly and with more agility than Thompson's, traversing greater depths of creative space. But presumably, in choosing to advance his interpretation, and in choosing to label it "pragmatism," Thompson does not think his speculations are simply equally pragmatic and unpragmatic, worthwhile and not worthwhile, when compared to all other possibilities. — Count Timothy von Icarus
We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.
The statement was aimed at those - including some hereabouts on a philosophy forum - which are antagonistic toward metaphysical enquiries period, to include investigations into the nature of causation, time, space, and identity, among others issues of metaphysical concern. And to me it goes hand in hand with what I've said here. — javra
I agree that Aristotle was concerned with Reality in general, and included Mental phenomena under the heading of Phusis (nature). But, since modern empirical Science split-off from traditional Philosophy, to go its own way, for some the term "metaphysics" came to mean "unscientific", with implications of "irrational". For my own purposes, I equate Metaphysics with Modern Philosophy, which has abandoned Empirical research to focus solely on Theoretical speculation. I even spell it with a hyphen, Meta-Physics, to emphasize that it's primarily the study of non-physical phenomena, such as Consciousness, and causation-in-general (vs specific causes).To put this as colloquially as I can, metaphysical enquiry is the attempt to figure out what reality is really all about. — javra
Because, for one example, there’s nothing wrong with a bunch of lemmings actively swimming their way toward a climate change catastrophe in today’s status quo metaphysics of a meaningless universe. — javra
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.