For the obvious reason that they could deploy nuclear weapons there. — boethius
Notice how I explain that you could obviously substitute a missile, whether existing or to be developed, in an ABM as well as just putting a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to. — boethius
In your comparison, you'd have to get those ships close to Russia, likewise any planes to conduct a first strike, which are what are called "warning signs". — boethius
The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius
2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk. — boethius
Two things incorrect here. ABM bases being converted to nuclear launch sites is absolute nonsense. Just look at the Western nuclear deterrence: it's made up of land based missile silos in the heart of the US, submarine launched missiles, aircraft launched cruise missiles and free fall bombs. What is there to "convert" in ABM bases for these weapons? Just what system needs some fixed site?Go through this exchange and maybe consider the fact that not only is my position correct from the start:
1. ABM bases can be converted to launch nuclear missiles.
2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk. — boethius
Two things incorrect here. ABM bases being converted to nuclear launch sites is absolute nonsense. Just look at the Western nuclear deterrence: it's made up of land based missile silos in the heart of the US, submarine launched missiles, aircraft launched cruise missiles and free fall bombs. What is there to "convert" in ABM bases for these weapons? Just what system needs some fixed site? — ssu
Secondly, Russia has had actually the first ABM system in operation for decades. Its first operational system was the A-35, which came operational basically in the late 60's early 70's. — ssu
And thirdly, the ABM treaty talked (perhaps intentionally) only vaguely about "strategic" missiles, namely ICBMs and SLBMs. Hence the A-135 could wiggle it's way out of the ABM treaty. There were Theater Missile Defense negotiations, but these didn't go anywhere. And the Gulf war showed that TMD was something that wasn't limited to US/Russia confrontations. — ssu
boethius, so, in short, you say Russia is not really a threat to anyone, but NATO is an existential threat to Russia. :D *hah* — jorndoe
Is Russia a legitimate threat to NATO?
— Jabberwock
Obviously, has thousands of nukes. — boethius
Mearsheimer has argued that Crimea would be, or is, a great geo-political-power-military asset to Russia, which the Kremlin apparently couldn't pass up. Land grab. Then a variation of "neo-imperialism" or "neo-colonialism" or whatever. — jorndoe
Because they were actual offensive weapons! Not just SAM sites.Why was the US concerned about missiles in Cuba when the Soviets had silos, and submarines and aircraft launched missiles and free fall bombs and so on? — boethius
Real strawman there. Now your way off.By your (and others') logic here, the Cuban missile crisis was about literally nothing. — boethius
Yes. But NOT for the reason you gave. Converting ABM sites to offensive missiles sites is nonsense. The fact is simple: ABM systems shoot down ballistic missiles and thus they present a challenge to either a first strike or to a counter strike. Hence the whole reasoning for an ABM treaty.Russia doesn't like missile bases close to itself for the same reason the US doesn't like missile bases close to itself. — boethius
A-135 is operational. They basically have it for one place: Moscow. That the way to counter MIRVs and basically the complexity of hitting an extremely fast tiny object that actually slows down extremely fast when hitting the lower parts of the atmosphere has been to use an airburst nuke. Well, even if that doesn't have the similar effect than an ordinary nuke, I wouldn't like to be under the detonation. But I guess it's OK for other places around Moscow.For example, let's say the ABM treaty was still a thing, and indeed it's as you say that the A-135 could "wiggle" out of the ABM treaty, then one may naturally wonder if enough such bases and enough such missiles all around Russia would have the same overall strategic effect that is banned by the treaty. Whether it's technically "legal" or not, obviously Russia wouldn't like that and would react to it. — boethius
Of course.As a military man, I'm sure you understand that the Russians view de facto US bases close to Russia as long term strategic threats. — boethius
I think the disagreement is only in that I think that there were also other crucial reasons than just NATO enlargement for Putin to invade Ukraine. Putin has made them quite clear in his writings, speeches and actions.Therefore, it's a prudent strategic move to try to prevent these bases getting even closer to Russia's border. You can argue that invading Ukraine wasn't the best way of doing that, but it is a way. — boethius
I was clearly referring to this statement and all my arguments referred to this. I am not sure why you were unable to follow it, I tried to be as clear as possible. — Jabberwock
And I have asked you specifically which missiles you have referred to. — Jabberwock
Oh, so you did not look at the map, how unsurprising. Hint: Redzikowo is not 'close to Russia'. With current missiles it would reach about 300 km behind the Russian border (another hint for non-users of maps: Russia is a bit bigger than that). — Jabberwock
As he threatens Ukraine, Mr. Putin has demanded that NATO reduce its military footprint in Eastern and Central Europe — which Washington and European leaders have flatly refused to do. Mr. Putin has been fuming about American missiles near Russia’s border since the Romanian site went into operation in 2016, but the Polish facility, located near the village of Redzikowo, is only about 100 miles from Russian territory and barely 800 miles from Moscow itself. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk
Because they were actual offensive weapons! Not just SAM sites. — ssu
The Polish base, the heart of which is a system known as Aegis Ashore, contains sophisticated radars capable of tracking hostile missiles and guiding interceptor rockets to knock them out of the sky. It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk
Real strawman there. Now your way off.
Do you understand what nuclear weapons the US, France and the UK have? Those weapons don't need ABM missile sites or any kind of fixed forward sites to operate. In fact, bringing them closer to Russia just increases the ability to Russia to strike them. Please educate yourself first on the nuclear strategy of the Western powers. A fixed site has severe disadvantages: it can be targeted itself by nukes and other weapon systems. Hence there's a reason just why the US fixed silos are in the center of the US. And why Russian fixed silos aren't on the Russian border. Or that fixed Chinese sites are in the middle of China, not on the seashore. — ssu
Yes. But NOT for the reason you gave. Converting ABM sites to offensive missiles sites is nonsense. The fact is simple: ABM systems shoot down ballistic missiles and thus they present a challenge to either a first strike or a counter strike. — ssu
It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk
Anyways, the point I was making has less to do with Ukraine and more to do with your understanding of democracy vs totalitarianism. Replacing a top general (popular or unpopular) from leading the armed forces in wartime is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. Making unpopular decisions in wartime like imposing martial law, mass mobilization, and replacing a popular&competent top general is not something incompatible with democracy AT ALL. — neomac
Though I agree with you here, using martial law to ban critical media, ban any dissent of the war policies, banning political parties, postponing elections are all anti-democratic and despotic and arguably totalitarian.
Ukraine is only a democracy on paper at this point. — boethius
Protesters opposed what they saw as widespread government corruption and abuse of power, the influence of oligarchs, police brutality, and human rights violations.(29)(30) Repressive anti-protest laws fuelled further anger.(29) — Revolution of Dignity (Wikipedia)
↪boethius, again, it wasn't specifically about NATO†, it was about loss of control (any such control and influence, to anyone), hence the land grab: — jorndoe
But, hey, a "dire existential threat" promotes a sense of urgency (fearmongering), and is also neat for picking up any anti-NATO (or anti-West) sentiments anywhere. — jorndoe
Fine. Yet this is Russian rhetoric to give one reason more against the ABM sites. It is political rhetoric. Because just why would you put attack cruise missiles in a fixed well known position? Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty.Everything I've explained is not just "my theory about it", it is literally the New York Times explaining to us the Russia's views on the topic. I'm simply explaining the common reasons someone would have to express such an opinion. — boethius
Ok, so please explain why the New York Times writes:
It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk.
— On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk
Key word "easily". — boethius
Yes, I think we agree on this.you again repeat the obvious: "they present a challenge to either a first strike or a counter strike."
The fact forward deployed ABM present a threat to counter strike is what makes them a first-strike enabling system. — boethius
Or, if the possible actor has just few ICBMs and has a limited territory to shoot them from, you put an ABM site between your country and the launch site. Just look what is the shortest range between Washington DC and one certain Middle Eastern country the US hates so much. Which btw the US insisted on being the reason. :smirk:Rear deployed ABM protecting your own silos is where you'd put your ABM if you were just concerned about surviving a first strike and maintaining a counter strike deterrence (to then hopefully dissuade a first strike). — boethius
Fine. — ssu
Yet this is Russian rhetoric to give one reason more against the ABM sites. It is political rhetoric. Because just why would you put attack cruise missiles in a fixed well known position? Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty. — ssu
Cruise missiles are subsonic. Did the US field ground launched cruise missiles? Actually yes, during the Cold War they had few BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and they were mobile. Something you hide in a warehouse... somewhere, not in fixed site with actually not much if any protection to the missiles. And FYI, those were scrapped in the INF treaty. — ssu
Or, if the possible actor has just few ICBMs and has a limited territory to shoot them from, you put an ABM site between your country and the launch site. Just look what is the shortest range between Washington DC and one certain Middle Eastern country the US hates so much. Which btw the US insisted on being the reason. :smirk:
Russian ICBM go over the Arctic Sea and Canada into the US. Not over Poland. ABM sites in the tundra of Canada and Alaska would be a different issue. — ssu
Obviously a nuclear threat would include both nuclear weapons and whatever systems enable to use of those weapons. So "enabling weapons systems" such as ABM fall under the category of nuclear threat. — boethius
So your original position that the bases representing a nuclear threat is "nonsense" you have since debunked yourself. — boethius
Again, the Russians say themselves their concern is that the tubes could easily be converted to fire other missiles.
It is literally a tube where you put in a missile and fire said missile. There's nothing special about the tube that would prevent you from firing things other than ABM missiles, and you could also put a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to.
If the US doesn't have this capacity today it could easily develop the capacity tomorrow. It's really not a an insane complicated task that no one has ever accomplished before and pushes up against the laws of physics to take (or develop) a missile of the appropriate size for the tubes or then develop a nuclear warhead that you simply put in the ABM missiles (the literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells in the past, so I'm sure the US military industrial complex could manage the feat). — boethius
There's no need to look at a map, the New York Times calculated the distances: — boethius
The first critical thing to do in a first strike is hit command and control to disrupt, delay, and ideally prevent a strategic counter-strike even being ordered. With a little bit of delay one's chances of hitting those strategic nuclear launch facilities and other equipment increase dramatically.
So missile bases getting closer and closer increase the effectiveness of a first strike. The closer you are, the less warning time and so more able to decapitate the leadership and other systems. — boethius
Okie then, you concur, land grab, because power and such, NATO or not. (By the way, they have other Black Sea presence + Sea of Azov.) — jorndoe
Beside the obvious nonsense of 'nuclear threat' (again, no nuclear missiles have been deployed in any of the new NATO countries, so why exactly should that be an issue?) — Jabberwock
When you have described the 'nuclear threat', you have specifically used the phrase 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. Pretending that it was not your main point is just silly. — Jabberwock
My original point was that it is nonsense that there is significant risk that US will deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine. You can try to obfuscate that as much as you want, it will not change the fact that you are unable to support that claim. — Jabberwock
It is hilarious how hard you are trying to undermine your original argument... If the Redzikowo base is just a tube in the ground and Americans can shoot nuclear missiles from anything, then the base loses all sigificance, as it would be equally easy to put the said tubes in the ground covertly and quickly anywhere else. — Jabberwock
Then maybe that should be the lesson that you should not take anything that the press publishes for granted...
Yes, the '100' sounds scary, unless you are familiar with the geography. 100 is to Kaliningrad, which is actually a tiny piece of Russian territory wedged in between NATO countries. Yet somehow the New York Times does not write about the Russian missiles 40 miles from the Polish territory and 300 miles from Warsaw. — Jabberwock
So if two Russian frigates leave the Kaliningrad port, they immediately have three times the firepower twice as close to NATO borders than Redzikowo. Should NATO leaders be fuming? — Jabberwock
Then I ask for the third time: how does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to a German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters? — Jabberwock
We've recently experience Trump being the best of friends with Kim Jong Un. No other US president ever has met with the North Korean dictator. So go figure.We just recently experienced Trump threatening to turn North Korea into a lake of fire, maybe there's someone even more unhinged in power in the future. — boethius
We've recently experience Trump being the best of friends with Kim Jong Un. No other US president ever has met with the North Korean dictator. So go figure. — ssu
And btw during Trump's administration, North Korea tested quite large nuclear weapons in 100+ kiloton range. So at least now the US isn't in denial about the North Korean nuclear weapon... as it for the first test said it might be just a large conventional explosion. But a 6,9 earthquake on the Richter scale you don't get with conventional explosives. — ssu
That you can deploy nuclear weapons to these bases is a larger threat than the ABM missiles. — boethius
It is not logistically as easy to deploy nuclear weapons to a barn or seal team six on the USS rusty fishing boat than it is to a military base. If tensions starts to rise, it's far easier to deploy nuclear missiles to the bases in "routine" shipments than other locations.
You'd have no way of knowing. Likewise, ABM missiles themselves are duel-use and can be programmed to attack a ground target and loaded with warheads. — boethius
We were talking about forward deployed bases. There is significant risk that the US deploys nuclear missiles to those bases, if not today then maybe tomorrow, as well as that they'd continue to march their bases closer to Russia, and so into Ukraine, if Russia let them.
Why wouldn't they? — boethius
"NATO borders" aren't the US' borders. Poland is not close to Washington. You would not launch a first strike against the US to take out command and control etc. from Poland or Estonia.
You're trying to conflate "NATO borders" with a threat to counter-strike capability.
That Poland, Latvia, and Estonia are close to Russia is not a risk to the US counter strike capability, as their counter strike capability is not in Poland, Latvia or Estonia. — boethius
"Nonsense" then you defended this position by simply ignoring that ABM is anyways a nuclear first strike enabling system, and focusing on the "insignificance" of these bases, by comparing the missiles (so far) deployed to these bases to all the missiles tubes in the entire US navy.
I've explained how that it is just completely wrong. For the entire US navy to be of equal threat, it would need to be equally close and maybe Russia would be like "hmm, wonder why all these ships are coming to our shores". — boethius
I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY". — boethius
The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius
I've explained what role the bases would play (both in launching nuclear missiles by surprise and their ABM capability) in a first strike. Of course, plenty of other assets would be needed as well. — boethius
No, it is not. The main Russian concern is the defensive capability of ABMs. However, for obvious reasons that does not sell as well, as I have already explained. — Jabberwock
No, the ABM missiles deployed in the bases are not capable of carrying nuclear missiles. — Jabberwock
For the same reason they have not deployed any nuclear missiles in any new countries since the sixties. — Jabberwock
I see the question was too hard. OK, I will try again:
How does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to ONE German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?
Be sure to notice the word ONE (1). It means that I ask you to compare the offensive potential of the Redzikowo base to a SINGLE German frigate. That means a number less than two. Will I get an honest answer to that question or not? — Jabberwock
I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY".
— boethius
What is this then?
The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around".
— boethius — Jabberwock
Sure, the issue is that you are just wrong. The base does not have missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and even if they were, their range would be too short for the first strike. The tubes could be loaded with different missiles, but that cannot be done easily or covertly. Not to mention that it would be rather pointless, given that a single frigate sailing where it is regularly sailing could have the exact same effect. — Jabberwock
Good insert that according to Putin. Because when you look at modern surface to air missile development, the longer range systems are all basically developed to engage ballistic missiles. So the idea of any ABM treaty now is a bit hypocritical. So it's not only the Russians who are here hypocrites.However, the Russian perspective (at least according to Putin) was they were willing to renegotiate ABM and other treaties to deal with rogue nuclear threats while maintaining the non-proliferation architecture. — boethius
Of course it's a concern to the Russians. But basically those ABM sites in Poland would basically protect... France and the UK. It's a simple fact that Russian nukes launched from Russia will fly over the Arctic, over Canada to hit continental US and the USAF missile silos in the center of the US. If those sites were planned to be in the tundra wastes of northern Canada, then the role would be totally obvious. ABM missiles have to be very close to the actual flight paths of the missiles as simply there isn't much time to defend against an ICBM launch.Now, all I've tried to explain on the subject is that building ABM missile bases closer to your nuclear opponent is a noticeable increase in first strike capability (certainly worth analyzing and placing on the list of risks to consider mitigatory action). Obviously for the Russians it's a big enough concern to take diplomatic action against. — boethius
Good insert that according to Putin. Because when you look at modern surface to air missile development, the longer range systems are all basically developed to engage ballistic missiles. So the idea of any ABM treaty now is a bit hypocritical. So it's not only the Russians who are here hypocrites. — ssu
For example Israel had no trouble of hitting the Houthi ballistic missiles and the success of the Arrow system obviously can be seen from the simple fact that the Houthis aren't lobbing long range missiles to Israel anymore. Much time has gone from the time Saddam Hussein was firing Scuds to Israel and basically got half of the USAF fighter bombers searching in vain the empty vast desert of Western Iraq. — ssu
Of course it's a concern to the Russians. But basically those ABM sites in Poland would basically protect... France and the UK. It's a simple fact that Russian nukes launched from Russia will fly over the Arctic, over Canada to hit continental US and the USAF missile silos in the center of the US. If those sites were planned to be in the tundra wastes of northern Canada, then the role would be totally obvious. ABM missiles have to be very close to the actual flight paths of the missiles as simply there isn't much time to defend against an ICBM launch. — ssu
Opinions over Syrskyi "the butcher":
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/02/08/zaluzhny-is-out-the-butcher-is-in-00140206 — neomac
But Syrskyi’s also known for leading forces into a meat grinder in Bakhmut, sending wave after wave of troops to face opposition fire. In the end, Kremlin-backed Wagner Group mercenaries captured the city.
For that and other reasons, Syrskyi is deeply unpopular with Ukraine’s rank-and-file. — Zaluzhny is out, the ‘butcher’ is in
Another person knowledgeable of Syrskyi’s operations echoed that view. His appointment is unlikely to have a positive effect for Ukraine, as Syrskyi is seen by those on the frontlines as a stern Soviet-style general who callously puts his men in danger.
This person added that Ukrainian troops have given Syrskyi a gruesome nickname: “Butcher.” The captain confirmed that the nickname has stuck, as has “General200” — which stands for 200 dead on the battlefield.
The negative reviews keep pouring in: “General Syrski’s leadership is bankrupt, his presence or orders coming from his name are demoralizing, and he undermines trust in the command in general,” a Ukrainian military officer posted on X. “His relentless pursuit of tactical gains constantly depletes our valuable human resources, resulting in tactical advances such as capturing tree lines or small villages, with no operational goals in mind.”
A Ukrainian soldier also tweeted a message in a group chat of veterans of the Bakhmut fight: “We’re all fucked.” — Zaluzhny is out, the ‘butcher’ is in
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