Speech act theory proposes that language is often used to perform acts, like getting married, making promises, or christening a boat. According to Austin, these are different than statements and have no truth value. But beneath the act of saying or writing the words (locutionary act) are a series of other, invisible acts (illocutionary and perlocutionary acts).

So while I have no problem with different descriptions of the same phenomena, my problem is that speech act theory proposes multiple phenomena where only one is apparent.

...invisible acts... — NOS4A2

Invisible?

Any advice? — NOS4A2

Here you made some marks on the screen - a physical act.

Those marks are letters and words - you have written something in a language. You performed a locutionary act.

In performing that locution you asked a question - an illocutionary act.

By performing that illocution you elicited this response - a perlocution.

Nothing in this is "invisible".

"Any advice?" is a question, not a statement. It is not the sort of thing that is either true or false. It does not have a truth value.

In the right circumstances, one names a ship by saying "I name this vessel the SS Incomprehensible"; One marries a hetro couple by announcing "I now pronounce you husband and wife"; One opens a bridge by pronouncing "I declare this bridge officially open". One makes a promise by saying "I promise to read your posts with care". We do things with words.

my problem is that speech act theory proposes multiple phenomena where only one is apparent. — NOS4A2

The key insight in speech acts may be that the content and the force of the illocution are distinct.

For those interested in the topic - and it has many uses, in and outside of philosophy - see Speech Acts and John Langshaw Austin

In performing that locution you asked a question - an illocutionary act. — Banno

I think that's wrong, and I'm replying not so much to correct you but to demonstrate the difference between the locution and the illocution:

The question is the grammatical form; an aspect of loctution. But if "(Do you have a)ny advice?" were a question in the illocution, too, you could just say "Sure, lots," and then walk away, as you'd have answered the question.

What we really have here (if sincere) is a request. "(Do you have) any advice?" is equivalent to "Please give me advice, if you have any." Both locutions express the same illocution. You've made too choices: one to make a request, and one how to express it.

There's only one distinct behaviour: "Any Advice?" has been typed on some keyboard here. The typing itself, on its own, is an action (and I don't actually know for sure the words have been typed by the interlocutor; they could have been dictated to a secretary, or transcribed and modified by speech recognition software, or...). That this is is a question is part of the rules of the language; it's part of what makes this a locution. But the typical function of question, to inquire about a certain state of affairs, is no the social function of the question. The grammatical form might be interrogative, but the social function of the question is a request for advice, which is why saying "Yes, I have advice," and then walking away would be a rather unusual response.

So "Any advice" is a locutionary question, and an illocutionary request. And since questions and requests are both acts that people can engage in, you're engaging in two different acts via one and the same set of behaviours (typing; if the post's been typed rather than dictated to a human or to voice recognition software) - but they're not acts on the same level; locutions and illocutions have a systematic relationship such that they can be anlysed.. Of course, often loctuionary questions are also illocutionary questions - but because they needn't be we have systematic relationship between the locutionary and the illocutionary (whether you call them acts or force is secondary, and many experts use the terms interchangably, in my experience), and thus it makes sense to view a "locutionary question" as different from the "illoctionary question" - analytically. Which you're going to do when it makes sense to you, and not otherwise.

For example, were I to ask "Did anyone find any value in this post?" this would be a question that expresses a question, if I were actually interested in the answer, and a question that expresses a request if I just wanted people to assuage my insecurities. And because people never co-operate with analysts such that their work is easy, it could be a little bit of both.

(I didn't talk about perlocutions, because I always found those the hardest to integrate. Basically, I think you need perlocutions to check on the success of illocutions. It's not quite that, though. I think Austin's example is the difference between urging and persuading. You can urge someone to close the door without them ever intending to close the door, but you can't persuade someone to close the door without them ever intending to close the door. [Might have been Searle's example; I think it was Austin, but it's been... 20 years?)

, I won't object to such refinements. Differentiating requests from questions might be worthwhile. That would be an exercise within speech act theory.

So far as this thread goes, it remains unclear what 's objection to speech act theory per se is.

How many, and which, acts are involved depends on what one is doing with the description... — Banno

I'm late to this (language?) game.

But I'd say it more properly has to do with context. "I promise" may create a contract, for example. What the act is depends on what it's for, in a given set of circumstances.

In performing that locution you asked a question - an illocutionary act.

It is indistinguishable from the locutionary act. So which one is it? Either there is one act, or two acts and one is invisible.

By performing that illocution you elicited this response - a perlocution.

Your response is no act of mine.

We do things with words.

You spoke them or wrote them. No others acts have occurred or are apparent or can be measured.

The key insight in speech acts may be that the content and the force of the illocution are distinct.

At some point the philosopher stops analyzing the acts of the speaker and starts sifting through his words, none of which are capable of acting, none of which can be shown to possess any measurable properties called “content” or “force”. This is why I believe the theory ought to be reworked to include “listening acts”, the acts of a listener. This would include such acts as hearing, reading, understanding, responding, and so on. The acts are visible and measurable, and don’t involve non-properties such as “content” and “force”.

It is indistinguishable from the locutionary act. — NOS4A2

Well, no, it isn't. Making marks and asking a question are very different acts. Here are the same marks: "Any advice?". I am not using them here in order to asking a question. So there is a difference between making the marks and asking the question; which is to distinguish between the locution and the illocution. And neither is "invisible", what ever that might mean in this context.

Your response is no act of mine. — NOS4A2

No, but your eliciting a response is an act of yours. Just as your post elicited this reply. I would not have written this were it not for your post, and hence this post is an act resulting from your act.

You spoke them or wrote them. No others acts have occurred or are apparent or can be measured. — NOS4A2

You also made statements and asked questions. Are these not acts you performed? Why not?

...the theory ought to be reworked to include “listening acts”, the acts of a listener. — NOS4A2

Speech act theory is embedded in social discourse, implicitly and explicitly addressing the place of utterances in social activity. Perlocutions include the acts of the listener.

From recollection, you maintain a form of hyper-individualism, which it seems makes it difficult for you to see the social aspects inherent in speech acts. I remain unable to see what your objection is.

Perhaps; think the context part of the use, but the distinction might be made.

However the issue here seems more central to our basic accounts of language. seems to hold that while we can make marks and sounds, we do not ask questions or make statements; or that acts are bodily movements, and hence that questions and statements are not acts; or something, that i have not been able to fathom.

For those interested in the topic - and it has many uses, in and outside of philosophy... — Banno

Given politics, the power of the spoken/written word seems rather important.

I do wonder if his inability to understand speech acts is related to his extreme individualism.

Well, no, it isn't. Making marks and asking a question are very different acts. Here are the same marks: "Any advice?". I am not using them here in order to asking a question. So there is a difference between making the marks and asking the question; which is to distinguish between the locution and the illocution. And neither is "invisible", what ever that might mean in this context.

If you're not asking a question when you ask "Any advice?"then what are you doing? Are you quoting a question? Maybe you're pretending to ask a question? Yet, there it is: a question. So where in space and time has this illocutionary act occured?

No, but your eliciting a response is an act of yours. Just as your post elicited this reply. I would not have written this were it not for your post, and hence this post is an act resulting from your act.

I didn't elicit any reply from you, nor did I intend to elicit any response from you. It's just not an act I have committed. You read and responded all on your own and at your own leisure.

You also made statements and asked questions. Are these not acts you performed? Why not?

If you look at the words, sure, some of the writing took the form of statements and questions, as indicated by the punctuation. But words can't act. if you looked at me, the only agent of action you've been dealing with, you'll see that there is one act and one act only, the locution, in this case the writing.

Speech act theory is embedded in social discourse, implicitly and explicitly addressing the place of utterances in social activity. Perlocutions include the acts of the listener.

From recollection, you maintain a form of hyper-individualism, which it seems makes it difficult for you to see the social aspects inherent in speech acts. I remain unable to see what your objection is.

Some methodological individualism is involved, as is nominalism, but I simply cannot detect any of these aspects you routinely speak of. When I try to understand what you mean by "speech act theory is embedded in social discourse", I'm at a loss because "social discourse" appears to be just individual people talking or writing to each other, and all of language appears to be embedded in them and nowhere else.

No, but your eliciting a response is an act of yours. Just as your post elicited this reply. I would not have written this were it not for your post, and hence this post is an act resulting from your act. — Banno

This seems an externality and not a result of the act.

Asking a question doesn't determine anything as response to it. Invites? Sure. Does not cause any response, I don't think. But you'd have been free to not respond, response with some irrelevant etc.. etc.. which would then be unconnected to the invitation in large part. But are your acts, entirely.

You read and responded all on your own and at your own leisure. — NOS4A2

Asking a question doesn't determine anything as response to it. Invites? Sure. Does not cause any response, I don't think.

If I ask someone "what is the capital of Florida?" and they respond "Tallahassee," would they have uttered the word Tallahassee if I hadn't asked the question? It seems not. Would this not seem to imply that the question plays a causal role in the second utterance?

This can be reduced to absurdity. Can we really have it that a man who charges into a victim's house, threatens them, and then requests sexual acts from them hasn't committed sexual assault because there is no way for a request to cause a response?

Hmm.. in the B&E example, the assault consists in their act. Not the response to it. So, i see nothing absurd there. Elicit was a better word, but the causal nexus is still totally unclear to me. You're given a choice, not a determined set of choices. We just, by habit, respond with relevance, close in time, usually.

If I ask someone "what is the capital of Florida?" and they respond "Tallahassee," would they have uttered the word Tallahassee if I hadn't asked the question? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who knows? It was certainly elicited by your invitation in this instance, but had they answered "Albany", could you make that same inference? In your eg, the cause may have actually been their knowledge of the correct answer.

That would account for how the idea has no room for harm to reputation.

cause may have actually been their knowledge of the correct answer.

It can't involve both? It seems prima facie unreasonable to me to assume that someone who responds to the question "what is the capital of Florida," with any city name was in any way likely to have just blurted out the name of a city if you were both sitting in silence. If this seems dubious to you, feel free to test this with an experiment and see how often people blurt out random cities' names unbidden, and then try asking them about a few state capitals. That questions can elicit responses that are incorrect answers seems trivial.

the B&E example, the assault consists in their act

So if the victim refuses to perform a sex act in response to the threats and no sex act occurs the assailant has still committed a sexual assault? I will allow that they will have certainly still committed a crime in both cases, but this doesn't appear to be the case. This would be like saying that if one person threatens another, telling them they will kill them if they don't murder a third person, then that person has committed a murder, even if the person doesn't give in to threat. But there cannot be a murder without a dead body, and I don't think you can have a sexual assault without a sex act. Yet if the murder or sex act does occur, it seems perfectly reasonable to find the person engaged in coercion responsible, and this is because one person's statements can certainly play a causal role in other's actions.

If asking someone to do something cannot cause them to perform an act, there would be no reason why war criminals who order mass executions should be considered criminals in the first place, so long as they don't pull any triggers. Ordering executions would be harmless. "Words don't kill people, people kill people," could be the slogan of the International War Criminal's Association.

It can't involve both? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It sure can - but on my view it’s not caused by the question. The response is caused by something the person responding. I Can’t grok the causal relationship. Putting someone in mind of something shouldn’t considered causal imo.

I don't think you can have a sexual assault without a sex act. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can, though. A “sex act” could be a text message. So depends how you’re defining it but legally, “sexually assault” doesn’t per se require physical contact. Might just be a bad example as that doesn’t change the premise of what you’re arguing.

et if the murder or sex act does occur, it seems perfectly reasonable to find the person engaged in coercion responsible — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not to me. And apparently not really to the law. Coercion only has a mitigating effect on sentencing for those types or crime. “Under duress” doesn’t remove the charge and responsibility for the act.
The coercive party did not commit the act. The actus Reus differs.

If asking someone to do something cannot cause them to perform an act, there would be no reason why war criminals who order mass executions should be considered criminals in the first place, so long as they don't pull any triggers — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, good. Tricky but my understanding is they are guilty of genocide which is intention-informed and not act-informed. It isn’t murder, basically. It’s another act deemed illegal based on the intent. Conversely, carrying out unjust military acts is illegal qua soldier (as Eg) and if circumstances allow, they’ll be charged with murder or the wartime equivalent of. I think this inversion is more telling - carrying out a killing on the say-so of another doesn’t reduce your culpability for committing the act (minor exceptions when one, or one’s immediate family is in mortal danger in a civilian setting - yet this still only mitigates and a guilty act has still been committed).

If you're not asking a question when you ask "Any advice?"then what are you doing? Are you quoting a question? Maybe you're pretending to ask a question? Yet, there it is: a question. So where in space and time has this illocutionary act occured? — NOS4A2

I agree entirely, and add that the where and when of the illocutionary act is the same as the where and when of the locution: In your having written "Any advice?" you performed both a locution and an illocution; which is to claim no more than that you both wrote a sentence and you asked a question.

I didn't elicit any reply from you... — NOS4A2

Yes, you did, and continue to elicit replies by your responses. I would not have posted this, had you not posted that.

But words can't act. — NOS4A2

Again, I quite agree. But you can do things using word - that's the point.

there is one act and one act only, the locution, in this case the writing. — NOS4A2

...which involves both making marks and asking a question. Again, the issue is that asking a question is different to making a mark, and this difference is well worth marking, and hence the terms locution and illocution.

Yep.

I agree entirely, and add that the where and when of the illocutionary act is the same as the where and when of the locution: In your having written "Any advice?" you performed both a locution and an illocution; which is to claim no more than that you both wrote a sentence and you asked a question.

I performed one visible act, did one measurable thing, but you saw two visible acts, or me doing two visible things. So did I really perform two acts, or are you describing the same act in two different ways?

If I were to record myself writing I would see one act. I can point to it, witness it again and again. I am unable to see two.

Yes, you did, and continue to elicit replies by your responses. I would not have posted this, had you not posted that.

I can’t say I made any such action. I wrote the thread, you showed up. And when you finally abort the discussion no amount of eliciting will bring you back. I suppose I can understand the logic—before this therefor because of this—but I just cannot see it. I mean, we can even test it: elicit me to do something.

At best these kinds of verbs are metaphorical and they don’t much give an accurate description of what is occurring.

...which involves both making marks and asking a question. Again, the issue is that asking a question is different to making a mark, and this difference is well worth marking, and hence the terms locution and illocution.

How is it different?

I performed one visible act, did one measurable thing, but you saw two visible acts, or me doing two visible things. So did I really perform two acts, or are you describing the same act in two different ways?

If I were to record myself writing I would see one act. I can point to it, witness it again and again. I am unable to see two. — NOS4A2

Again, you wrote a sentence and you asked a question. You can call it two acts, if you like, or one act with two descriptions. What is salient is that there is a difference between writing a sentence and asking a question.

I can’t say I made any such action. — NOS4A2

So did you utter "Any advice?" without intending that other folk might respond?

That would be odd. Indeed, that might be enough to render your utterance not a question.

How is it different? — NOS4A2

Simply in that someone might make the very same marks as part of, say, a random scribble - thumping on the keyboard, perhaps - and hence, not intending to elicit a response, not have asked a question.

It sure can - but on my view it’s not caused by the question. The response is caused by something the person responding. I Can’t grok the causal relationship. Putting someone in mind of something shouldn’t considered causal imo.

If you don't want to call is causal it still seems like you'd need to explain the counterfactual. How does B fail to occur without A, and when A occurs, B follows from it through a chain of consequences, but A cannot be said to cause B?

Even if you want to allow for some form of libertarian free will, it seems like it simply cannot be the case that other people's words or other communicative acts never "put things in mind," or motivate action. If you want to call this special case something other than cause, fine, but in virtue of what is it special? More to the point, even if words don't "cause" acts, it seems like their relationship to acts still has to fulfill pretty much all the characteristics of naive conceptions of cause (i.e., counter factual analysis, no B without A; A leads to a chain of events that causes B, etc.). Else, people leaving a crowded theater after someone screams "fire" is incomprehensible.

If people's words can never "put things in mind," for others, then communication seems completely impossible and doing philosophy is pointless. We are all hermetically sealed in our own minds and no matter what we do we cannot "put things from our mind, into others." But clearly there has to be some sense in which this is not the case, and at least parts of the process, sound waves propagation, ear drum vibration, etc. would appear to follow all normal causal laws. The question would be, when do we hit the sui generis "cause-like-but-not-cause" phenomena and why is it different?

Might just be a bad example as that doesn’t change the premise of what you’re arguing.

It is. The dictator who only orders executions indirectly is a better example, since they not only simply speak these orders, but they don't even speak them to the people who carry them out. Are they free from blame?

Coercion only has a mitigating effect on sentencing for those types or crime. “Under duress” doesn’t remove the charge and responsibility for the act.
The coercive party did not commit the act. The actus Reus differs.

I'll allow that the law might not be a good reflection of true responsibility, but it is certainly the case that:

A. In the US, if you coerce or negotiate in order to get someone else to commit a murder, you can be found guilty of murder. People who are the "buyer" in "murder-for-hire," plots are often convicted of murder in the first degree (as are the murderers, both are responsible). I think this gets the blame mostly right, as without the plotter there is no murder.

B. Coercion or deception can be partially mitigating or completely mitigating, and it depends on the prosecution or jury to determine guilt. I would maintain that even a Texas jury is not going to find a three year old who shot their mother guilty if it is the case that the father manipulated the three year old and told them to point the gun at the mother and pull the trigger. In this case, the father's act is not limited to criminal negligence in handing a child a loaded firearm, but something far worse in using words to instruct them to fire the weapon at the other parent, whereas the child lacks the capability to adequately think through the consequences of actions "put into their mind," by the father.

Likewise, someone who tricks someone into poisoning someone else by telling them cyanide is medicine, etc. is responsible for the murder, not the person who thinks they are mixing up some harmless medicine for their patient to take.

If deception can't shift responsibility then most instances of fraud could never be crimes because they only involve persuasion and not coercion. If words cannot cause people to act, then I don't see how we can prosecute fraudsters for tricking senior citizens into sending them cash by posing as their family members. After all, the fraudsters words, sent over the phone, could never cause the deceived to send the money. But this seems unreasonable.

Tricky but my understanding is they are guilty of genocide which is intention-informed and not act-informed. It isn’t murder, basically.

It can't be just intent. If this was the case, some random basement dwelling Chud posting on the Internet about the need to "exterminate the Jews," would be as guilty of "genocide" as top Nazi officials. I would maintain that one cannot have a genocide without murders. We might agree with states that have harsher hate speech laws, that the Internet troll has committed a crime, but it hardly seems that they have committed the same crime. Even the harshest hate crime law advocates do not say we should hang people for urging genocide, and yet even people who don't want any hate crime laws see hanging Nazi officials who oversaw the Holocaust as completely justified.

Social context matters. Screaming fire in your home with no one around differs from screaming fire in a crowded theater, and the difference lies precisely in what could reasonably be expected to be the causal fall out from the same act placed in different contexts. Muttering "someone should kill X," as a person no one takes seriously is different from being King Henry III and declaring: "will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?"

Hmm, almost all very reasonable and difficult points.

If you don't want to call is causal it still seems like you'd need to explain the counterfactual. How does B fail to occur without A, and when A occurs, B follows from it through a chain of consequences, but A cannot be said to cause B? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Understand. I guess, as an empirical consideration, sure, that may not have happened otherwise - but there's no reason why it couldn't. Perhaps that doesn't do anything for you - for me, its a fairly stark difference between a truly proximate cause and something which contributed to the event in question. I may be triffling here but I always find it hard to conclude a cause without some very clear, fairly exclusive, reason for the act being caused by whatever is in question. Here, I don't see it.

The question would be, when do we hit the sui generis "cause-like-but-not-cause" phenomena and why is it different? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Im unsure your description is all that accurate. The act itself arises from the mentation of the subject, not the causal train of physically receiving whatever information we're talking about. The empirical causal relationship between lets say utterance in A and thought B cannot be rightly extended to the act, imo. Im unsure i need to answer the question above here.

Even if you want to allow for some form of libertarian free will, it seems like it simply cannot be the case that other people's words or other communicative acts never "put things in mind," or motivate action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. But motivation is not a cause on my account. Its an invitation or inspiration. I don't think anyone would claim that Kant's CPR was caused by Hume. I distinguish between something being 'put in mind' and an act being 'caused'. It seems you're not? Sorry if i've got that wrong - if i've not got it wrong, it would explain some of the daylight here.

It is — Count Timothy von Icarus

A better example might be promissory estoppel. If its reasonable that someone(B) acted in good faith pursuant to a purported commitment from (A) which was then either ignored or disregarded entirely, it's held that if the commitment caused B to do something (think: promise to buy/sell property where B takes that as commitment and sells their property in order to buy A's property). Here, a law takes your definition of 'cause' wholesale, so I must concede my use of law to defend my point was at best inconsistently applied. That said, I do think there's a significant difference between an 'act' in general and an 'act' as against another person.

More to the point, even if words don't "cause" acts, it seems like their relationship to acts still has to fulfill pretty much all the characteristics of naive conceptions of cause — Count Timothy von Icarus

it seems like their relationship to acts still has to fulfill pretty much all the characteristics of naive conceptions of cause — Count Timothy von Icarus

With this I would agree, and just rest on my emphasis within the above. I think the idea that a fully indirect act, from which there is no connection to the act save for the subject's interpretation, is a proximate cause, is just plainly wrong. No one can reasonably claim that GTA causes similar types of crime as shown in the game, despite someone claiming it did. You'd say no, you're culpable by the fact of your actually having carried out a guilty act. The game has nothing to do, per se, with that act.

A. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. My understanding of both how those laws are written (cross-jurisdictionally) and the case law around them is that it is purely the intent (which matters later) that the person is being charged for. It is not the act of murder. It is the setting-in-motion a chain of events. It does not mitigate the actor's guilt. I am not all that up on US law though, so if you can provide a caase where someone is plainly convicted of 1st Degree Murder, but hte actor isn't, Id be happy to retract all this. I just can't see that ever happening. They both have the mens rea but their actus reus differ. If i'm wrong, i'm wrong.

B. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Important, but a truly held belief that what you did wouldn't cause the consequence in question is a defense to almost any charge. Including rape, which is pertinent here as its an act against another for whom your mindstate has zero mitigating effect. But, if you can successfully argue that you thought there was consent, you're good to go basically.

Likewise, someone who tricks someone into poisoning someone else by telling them cyanide is medicine, etc. is responsible for the murder — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe this is inducement, by deception, and not 'murder', which is the act of killing someone unlawfully. Again, I could be wrong as i'm not across US law fully. Which speaks to what Im saying - it didn't cause the death, it induced someone to cause the death.

It can't be just intent. If this was the case, some random basement dwelling Chud posting on the Internet about the need to "exterminate the Jews," would be as guilty of "genocide" as top Nazi officials. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is entirely wrong to me. At what point has some internet Chud had any part in a Holocaust? If you can point to one, we will have a discussion about the two cases. Otherwise, this isn't relevant. Internet Chuds get fined and arrested for their intentions regularly (at least in places with Digital communication regulations). Their intent, and not their act, is an actus reus of its own. Going further to the act would be another actus reus for a different charge. If they knew they had some real-world minions carrying it out, they would be. Osama bin Laden is in this camp., but he was cave-dwelling. You seem to note this, but don't note its consequences for the position..

lacks the capability to adequately think through the consequences of actions "put into their mind," by the father. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed, but there's a significant difference between adults and children when it comes to culpability, either morally (on almost anyone's account) or legally. Im unsure what this is doing for either side of the discussion. I think a better example would be one between two adults - the second adult is not somehow less culpable because they were told to shoot. That just isn't a move available to them unless they are mentally impaired - which is equivalent, by degree, to being a minor in the law's eye.

Even the harshest hate crime law advocates do not say we should hang people for urging genocide, and yet even people who don't want any hate crime laws see hanging Nazi officials who oversaw the Holocaust as completely justified. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Disagree with the former and the latter just seems to be a emotional position on either party's part. The holocaust was a genocide, so I think they're confused to distinguish too strictly. The Holocaust isn't sufficiently different from genocide as either a definition, or an historical concept, to be held apart imo. Just an extreme example of.

Social context matters. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree here, but it would have us speaking on an entirely case-by-case basis which I don't think either of positions can result in.

the difference lies — Count Timothy von Icarus

in the intended fall out. Not the actual fall out. If you yell Fire in a crowded theater, but are mistaken, you are not culpable since you believed there was a fire. The resulting fracas and potentially injuries are not on your head, if you truly believed there was a fire.

I may be trifling here but I always find it hard to conclude a cause without some very clear, fairly exclusive, reason for the act being caused by whatever is in question. Here, I don't see it. — AmadeusD

Such a reluctance should be equally applied to a claim that all is caused by the choices of a single individual.

If you yell Fire in a crowded theater, but are mistaken, you are not culpable since you believed there was a fire. The resulting fracas and potentially injuries are not on your head, if you truly believed there was a fire. — AmadeusD

If it turns out that the calling out of fire served another purpose, that other purpose will be an intention to consider. That is the basis of Tort law in the U.S.

Hey mate,

Unsure I get what you're saying in the first response. Your choice and your act aren't separable. I've made room for inspiration and incitement, which are in some sense both covered by different laws of liability that those which apply to an actor.

On the second, torts require either intention or negligence. Being convinced of an incorrect fact wouldn't raise a claim to that level, I don't think. But, more to the point, I didn't involve any other purpose.

The person was merely honestly mistaken. The results are the same, and no other purpose has been fulfilled. They are not liable as it was neither intended, or a result of negligence.

In saying "choice and your act aren't separable" are you agreeing with the thesis of the OP that the actor is ultimately the only "cause" that matters? That seems to be an important criterion when separating incitement from action.

In regard to being "honestly mistaken", how far can that logic be applied when the actor expresses a clear goal in the aftermath? The line between reporting a perception and creating one.

I do wonder if his inability to understand speech acts is related to his extreme individualism. — Banno

I think he plays, purposefully for the sake of playing... an agent provocateur. He cannot believe everything he writes.

I don't think anyone would claim that Kant's CPR was caused by Hume. — AmadeusD

Kant did.

Kant did. — creativesoul

This may speak to where i highlight 'naive conceptions of cause' earlier in Timothy's reply.

I see nothing in Kant which does this, rather I see much that says Kant took Hume to have caused his 'awakening' or more importantly 'discomfort' or 'repulsion' at his conclusions. The cause of the CPR was Kant's need to solve the problem. If you feel there's something from Kant that shows he left off hte middle man in that, please do show me! In this case, I think 'cause' being a few steps behind the proximate cause removes from it that title.

The SEP article on Action was updated recently and addresses many of these issues. I have quite a bit of sympathy for Davidson's view (from Anscombe, mentioned above), that flicking the switch, turning on the light and alerting the burglar (a by now standard example) is one act, with several descriptions. But that is about theory of action, not so much speech acts. There is much overlap, of course, but as I've argued, it doesn't seem to mater much if the locution and illocution are seen as one act or two; but that what is of import is the distinction between content and force.

an agent provocateur. — creativesoul

Maybe. If it gets a few more folk to learn a bit of philosophy of language it might be for the greater good.