I trust those posts from twitter even more than the article, for reasons.

That's why I posted it. If you read my links, all of them are criticizing Zelensky's choice of replacing Zalushny with the Butcher. — neomac

Ah ok, noted.

Honestly surprising to me, both that he has this reputation and Western outlets would run with it.

The Duran had a theory that Zelensky picked Syrskyi precisely because he wasn't a political threat, so this would be further evidence of that.

↪boethius I trust the posts from twitter even more than the article, for reasons. — neomac

Well, I'm not saying twitter posts can't be credible, but if you're citing anonymous twitter posts as a journalist, I think the bare minimum is to explain why.

How do we know it's not some troll, larper, or even Russian intelligence?

So, if there are reasons to trust (history that is clearly credible), which I have no problem believing your reasons are good, the bare minimum I'd expect from a journalist is to explain those reasons, or at least assert that they've gone through the post history and find it credible.

The era of "someone close to the matter" and "anonymous poster" and "open source intelligence" is really zero-credibility journalism, as I'm sure you agree.

It's definitely starting to feel like Afghanistan 2.0 where it becomes just a normal practical necessity to cut loose our allies, nothing to see here.

Also, if Syrskyi isn't popular, it's definitely setting the stage for a coup.

Zelensky may not realize it's in many ways easier for Zalushny to execute a coup in this situation than as commander.

Now, "his boys" can do the coup to "restore democracy" and then he is just standing for election just like any other citizen has the right to.

Way cleaner.

I think it makes sense to see more western ciriticism of Zelensky, because they looked favorably on Zaluzhny.

Zaluzhny is also rumored to have been involved in talks with the Russians, whereas the West hasn't yet been able to pressure Zelensky into seeking for compromise.

This is likely because Zelensky was pushed into pursuing this "no negotiations" strategy, and now that the West is realizing its mistakes and pushing for compromise, it's basically asking Zelensky to take the fall, which he refuses to do.

Furthermore, there were a lot of rumors that Zelensky might appoint the head of intelligence (I forget the name) to replace Zaluzhny, which was seen by some as a clear signal that the Ukrainian strategy would be shifting to fighting an insurgency war. This is something the West probably wants, because that's what they have been counting on all this time would beat the Russians or at least make their life very difficult.

The fact that Zelensky didn't do that, and instead chose Syrskyi is basically a signal by the Ukrainians that they're still not done duking it out with the Russians on the battlefield.

Your points are certainly possible, but I'm not so sure.

The West has enormous leverage over Zelensky in terms of the money; of course, Zelensky has the leverage of letting the country totally collapse. But of the two, money is the far stronger negotiation position. Letting Ukraine collapse would be embarrassing for the West, but people would move on pretty quickly. Literally two weeks after people were literally falling off the last US planes to leave Afghanistan, it was basically a non-story.

We've had in person visits to Ukraine from the head of the CIA as well as very recently Nuland.

So it could be the changes we see are what the CIA wants. The head of Ukrainian intelligence could have been floated to just make the appearance of a contest, but it would really not make much sense for someone from intelligence to suddenly be the top military commander.

Moving to an insurgency also just doesn't make sense to me at all. These aren't the mountains of Afghanistan with a totally different culture and language and religion to a foreign occupier. Insurgency hasn't been a notable factor in any of the areas Russia already occupies.

Therefore, if Ukraine stopped maintaining the front, Russia would just advance to wherever it wants and declare victory, then build up the multi-layered defensive lines that proved barely movable by Ukraine at enormous cost in their much anticipated offensive.

A key part of the military leverage Ukraine has outposts like Avdiivka from which you can shell Donetsk, which is only about 15 km away.

People still live in Donetsk so the current front line is not very desirable.

Why there's so much confusion over the "strategic importance" of these front line fortress cities.

Bakhmut and Avdiivka aren't so important against a Russian campaign to conquer all of Ukraine, so it seems like an insignificant distance to accomplish that goal and so why not fallback.

However, if Ukraine starts falling back and is no longer in artillery range of important Donbas cities, then Russia can just establish a buffer zone where basically nobody lives. One consequence of the high intensity warfare we're seeing is nearly everyone is forced to leave these cities and they're nearly totally destroyed, so if the Russians can push the Ukrainians back enough then they have a safety zone where basically nobody lives.

Once they have a safety zone they can essentially declare mission accomplished, but since the war isn't over until Ukraine sues for peace then Russia will just continue with standoff munitions which I suppose Ukraine can just continue to deal with as it has provided Western support, but it would be heavily in Russias favour and the West is already getting critical of more money to Ukraine.

The West floats essentially the entire Ukrainian economy and that's how it's able to withstand the disruptions of the Russian missile campaign. As soon as that support ends, Ukraine is in a severe economic crisis.

To circle back to the original point of contention, I just don't see how insurgency tactics would help Ukraine in the scenario that Russia establishes a safety zone. Once Russia does, it's difficult to spin that as something other than a Russian victory and that Ukraine has little military strategic options left (something people are already saying after the failed offensive, but if they fail to maintain defensive lines and Russia establishes new multi-layered lines, probably more people will start saying it).

Therefore, to help Biden win the election the best plan is to prop-up Ukraine to maintain the status quo as much as possible (that can at least be spun as "holding the line") of slowing the Russian advance enough that a clear safety zone isn't established that even mainstream pundits could easily explain on a map of how the Ukrainians are here, the Russians are there, and this whole depopulated zone in between is the Russian's defensive matrix and Ukraine can do basically nothing, as we've already seen.

So, to do that, as Politico informs us, you want someone in charge willing to send wave after wave of their own men into a meat grinder and has the affectionate name of "The Butcher".

Of course, you'd still want to arrange the media in such a way that it's "Zelensky's choice" and "Ukrainians choice" to keep fighting, that they aren't "finished duking it out" just as you say.

Certainly some elements in the West want to push Zelensky to negotiate, but I don't see how that could serve Biden's image going into the election year.

Also, if anyone's wondering how you MacGyver a nuclear warhead out of one system and into another, such as an ABM missile, there's a really good starter video.


The main tools you need seem to be an electric drill and some leather jackets.

Once you have the leather jackets and drill, you're all set to begin your nuclear first strike adventure.

To defend against a Russian first strike?

And where do you even get what the "Russians really think" from?

You just makeup total bullshit, whatever is required to simply directly contradict obvious common sense.

Nuclear threats, first strike threats, are far greater than an ABM threat to your own first strike.

This whole areas is far from US shores ... this ABM base does not protect Washington (or any part of the US counter-strike arsenal), from a first strike.

Totally moronic point. — boethius

Because, depending on who their narrative is directed to, Russians have often skipped that point.

Please explain how these missiles are simply "not capable" of having their ABM warhead swapped out for a nuclear warhead. We can literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells but this feet is just not possible. — boethius

Sure, I might be wrong. Can you provide evidence which specific nuclear warhead can be used with SM3? They keyword is 'specific'. Asserting that it can be is not evidence, not to mention that it takes down your whole argument, as I have already pointed out: if Americans can put their nuclear warheads into any missile (irrespective of its capacity and range), then the base is even less significant, as we can imagine anything that flies can be a carrier and there are alot more of those. Just put nukes on ATACMS and drive fifty of them to the border...

Therefore, if the same tensions emerged as in the sixties we could expect the US to deploy nuclear weapons to new countries.

Your imagination levels are literally zero. You can't even imagine something that has already happened, and a key point of yours, simply happening again. — boethius

No, your assertion was that Americans would certainly deploy nuclear nukes if they could. And that is simply false - they could for all those years and they did not. Maybe you should consider why.

Again, a ship you can get your own submarines, planes, other ships closer to than an inland base. — boethius

Lol. Hint: nowadays, ships do not battle by firing broadsides. If you believe that a base located TWENTY KILOMETERS from the shore is somehow out of range of modern weapon systems, then it just shows that your lack of knowledge is comical. Oh, wait, you still have not looked at the map, have you?

The land bases are also simply in different positions so expand the radar coverage and missile coverage. — boethius

Given the ranges of the missiles, the 150 km distance does not change the 'missile coverage' significantly. YOU. DID. NOT. LOOK. AT. THE. MAP. AGAIN. And we are not talking about 'radar coverage' at all, as both countries have other radar stations much closer than that base.

It's also easier to sink a ship than a land-base. — boethius

Yes, because land bases are not sunk at all. On the other hand hitting a stationary base is easier than a moving ship. So again you insist on providing the evidence you do not know what you are talking about.

This is really the most basic common sense possible that a single ship is less capable than a ship + land base. — boethius

No, we are comparing a SINGLE ship to a SINGLE base. Because, you know, NATO can always build another ship. So the question is: would NATO get a better offensive capacity if it just built another frigate instead of the Redzikowo base? And the answer is, yes it would (more tubes, better mobility, flexible deployment).

If it was so insignificant why would such a base be built? Answer: because it's not insignificant but increases capabilities in the theatre. — boethius

*sigh* Yes, I have already said so. The base is not insigificant, if it is used for the purposes which *surprise, surprise* it is actually built for.

"DRAMATICALLY" does not equal "dramatically".

"DRAMATICALLY" is significantly more dramatic than merely "dramatically".

A citation should be exact, I do not all-caps words because I can rely on "arguing a point". — boethius

Of all the hilarious of your backtracks this is the best one... You claim that you did not use 'the word'... When I have pointed out that yes, actually you did use the exact same word, you claim that the same word in all caps is not the same word? Seriously, can you get more absurd? Oh, yes, you can: you then argue that your use of the word 'dramatically' was less dramatic.

Ah yes, They can't! ... but if they could (because they obviously can) here's another goalpost move.

We've literally but nuclear warheads in artillery shells, so what's your argument that swapping out the warhead in these ABM missiles is beyond what US engineers are "capable" of? — boethius

Bare assertions are just that: bare assertions. Again, if you have evidence that the specific missiles can be used with nuclear warheads, provide it. Hilariously, even Russians with all their propaganda are not making that argument. And, again, this nonsensical point basically destroys your whole line of argumentation: if you can put a nuclear warhead into any missile, then the whole issue is moot, because both sides have literally thousands of untraceable missiles which then could be used (in your imagination) for dozens of strikes. You do not care about the sizes, capacities, ranges, it is all the same to you.

You're really saying that the missiles couldn't be modified (such as the ABM missiles or otherwise) to more easily fire from these tubes, and if went beyond what was "easy" in preparing your first strike, you couldn't do the difficult task of converting the tubes in some covert way, part of regular maintenance etc. on your own base? — boethius

So your bright idea is to take missiles specifically developed to counter the threat of ICBMs, which are quite effective in that role, and convert them to a role in which they would be much less reliable, with a range so short that they would not even reach Moscow, not to mention any control centers. Because it would enhance the offensive capacities dramatically (no caps), even though you can get a better effect with a SINGLE frigate, more suited for that purpose.

But sure, let us use our imagination... If you can rebuild launchers covertly, then you can just build another launcher in the ground somewhere else - after all, it is just a tube, as you claim...? If that is so, then what stops Americans from covertly putting such tubes anywhere they want? This is certainly something they are capable of? But then why Russians would protest that single overt base, if they know that Americans can put launchers wherever they want covertly (and if they can, they most likely did, because that is what they do, as you claim)?

Russia doesn't want to be nuked by North Korea or some other rogue nation or terrorist cell either. — boethius

Why would Russia be nuked by North Korea???? Would the US be nuked by the UK or France? I don't think so.

North Korea has just given a massive assistance to it's de facto ally Russia with the million or so munitions given to the Russian army to fight the war in Ukraine.

Let's remember the facts here: Soviet Union created North Korea. Kim il Sung was put to be the leader of North Korea by Stalin. Soviet Union provided support to North Korea during the Korean War, where air regiments of Soviet fighters fought it out on "MiG Alley" with the Americans over North Korea. Russia has a treaty of "Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations and Cooperation".

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un told Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday that his country offers its “full and unconditional support” for Russia’s “sacred fight” to defend its security interests, in an apparent reference to the war in Ukraine, and said Pyongyang will always stand with Moscow on the “anti-imperialist” front.

It's hilariously ludicrous to think that for Russia, North Korea is any kind of threat. It's one of those few loyal allies it has.

Donbas secedes. It's messy, like most secessions are, but they manage to maintain their independence. They need Russian support, but so too did the US need French support; once you're a new political entity it is incumbent on you to seek out support where you can find it.

The US guards jealously its right to secede from the British; the war of independence was costly and bloody but they won (with the help of foreign powers hostile to Britain).

I don's see why I would reduce in meaning the Donbas Declaration of Independence.

Ukraine tries to reconquer the Donbas, fails, creates the inevitable intervention of Russia to resolve the situation. — boethius

There was and is no such independence, remember? :D Rather, regions were grabbed by the (regressing) Kremlin empire after their campaigns. (odd how these ↑ comments keep skirting other stuff, oh well)

Also, if Syrskyi isn't popular, it's definitely setting the stage for a coup. — boethius

Covertly, no protests or the like? After all, Zelenskyy was democratically elected. Protests seem unlikely in the current (wartime) situation. But, hey, who knows.

Russia and West clash over Ukraine at Security Council meeting ahead of war anniversary
^{— Edith M Lederer · AP · Feb 12, 2024}

Had the Minsk agreements been implemented, Nebenzia said, “the tragedy that has taken place in Ukraine today would not have happened, a tragedy in which the U.S. and the collective West are complicit as they try to achieve their geopolitical aims at the cost of Ukraine and the lives of its citizens.” — Vasily Nebenzya

Whenever the Kremlin circle says ↑ this (emphasized), I can't help but wonder if they know how ridiculous it is. Along the lines of their alternate world type stuff. (Going by the latter part here, which isn't new.) How to talk with someone that doesn't care about truth?

Russian — not German Chinese American Antarctican Japanese — military is killing Ukrainians and the Kremlin has chosen to do so, more or less ongoingly. (besides, the attackers↔defenders relationship isn't symmetrical, attackers choose for both, defenders can't choose otherwise)

By the way, has Nebenzya considered North Korea (and Iran) to be "complicit" in "the cost of to Ukraine and the lives of its citizens"? After all, reportedly, North Korean bombs are on a killing spree, via Russian military, by Kremlin order.

So, the Kremlin circle evades/shirks their responsibility, and pseudo-offloads to others instead. I'm guessing one person could pick up the phone and change the killing in a jiffy, well, maybe. They indirectly admit to creating "a tragedy", but ... no ... (Misdirection.)

They cater to a particular argument (intended) to appeal to (against) supporters: The defense supporters cause the attacks that kill Ukrainians — implicitly, the attackers are one (unbendable righteous superior) and the killing is necessary. The defense supporters must cease and desist — remove cause and effect ("the tragedy") disappears. (Slippery slope.) Are the invaders unmovable and don't care about ("the lives of") people? In analogy, should supporters "be the bigger person" in some way, abandon the defenders, appearing to confirm the attackers' rhetoric?

It is Russia that is the aggressor and Ukraine which is simply defending its people, its territorial integrity and its freedom. — Robert A Wood

Accuse others of what you're doing. Kindergarten'ize victims. Grab land. Carry on with impunity. :ok:

There was and is no such independence, remember? :D Rather, regions were grabbed by the (regressing) Kremlin empire after their campaigns. (odd how these ↑ comments keep skirting other stuff, oh well) — jorndoe

The fact is US covertly interferes all over the place and governments change.

When that happens we point to the people in the country in question who wanted the change to legitimize it and recognize the new government and everything is totally fine and of course the West is going to support the people we like.

There's plenty of evidence a large amount of people in these Russian speaking regions did not like the CIA backed coup to change the government in 2014.

The exact same reasons used to legitimize the coup in Kiev can be used to legitimize the secessions from Ukraine in the South.

Russia was involved in the sessions exactly the same way the US was involved in the coup in Kiev (just way less sloppy as there isn't recorded phone calls with whoever Nuland's counterpart in Russia would be talking about hand picking the new governments).

And you can split hairs about the legitimacy was "really actually legitimate" in one case and not in the other, because Girkin!!!, so feel free to do so.

However, if you look at the history of governance changes the US, Europe, the world in general, accepts as legitimate, there's no standards. The only thing that matters in the end is control of the territory long enough (that's what governance is; do we like the Taliban all of a sudden? No. But they control the territory for long enough so they are now the legitimate government). Controlling territory includes diplomatic relations to get support.

So, the regions become independent and control the territory, there's not any other standard of legitimacy that can be employed that I view as particularly meaningful.

Not that control of the territory implies any sort of moral right. We still don't like the Taliban.

Rather, once control of a territory is established it becomes a consequentialist question of whether trying to change that from the exterior is sensible. Plenty of governments that have no moral claim to their rule, but we don't go toppling them because it does more harm than good or is unlikely to succeed.

Once Ukraine lost control of the territories the relevant moral question is not a moral evaluation of the new governments there or how the control was lost, but what's the consequence of trying to retake the territory. If there was a consequentialist case (not an abstract or hypothetical or wishful thinking case, but nitty-gritty real world case) that the territories could be retaken and result in a better situation for the inhabitants and everyone else (such as men forced to fight and sacrifice) that is the only justification.

For example, plenty of countries just fell to the Nazis without much a fight (Belgium, France, Denmark, Norway etc.) and literally no one makes the case that because the Nazi's were bad those countries should have fought harder or fought to the death. Why? Because that the Nazis were bad is not sufficient reason to fight them, one must consider the consequence and not waste lives.

So, why do we view it that the US and UK an obligation to fight the Nazis? Because the had more power and so more means to do so and get to a good outcome of winning the war (with the help of the Soviets of course).

Sending men to die for unattainable objectives is not justifiable, outside incredibly extreme circumstances that we don't even apply to the Nazis (we don't say Belgium and France should have fought to the death).

Reconquering the lost territories is simply an unattainable objective. It was clear that Russia would not let that happen, Ukraine can't defeat Russia, the campaigns to reconquer the lost territories were a fools errand, but worse because the attempt could predictably result in the present war and losing far more for Ukraine in both people and land.

Covertly, no protests or the like? After all, Zelenskyy was democratically elected. Protests seem unlikely in the current (wartime) situation. But, hey, who knows. — jorndoe

I'm talking about a military coup.

Zelensky was elected, but has since suspended elections, so pretty easy for a the military to have pretext for a coup to have elections.

I'm not saying Zaluzhny is actually planning a coup, but if he's popular and "The Butcher" isn't popular, then the only reason to sack Zaluzhny is fear of a coup. I'm just pointing out that's a double-edged sword, as a straight-up military coup and placing the top commander as president would be a bit "much", but a coup to have "elections" would be far easier to spin.

If Zaluzhny had the military support he needed to stage a coup as top commander, then removing him wouldn't change that much.

So we'll see what happens.

What we do know is that it wasn't so easy to fire Zaluzhny and he had no problem making that clear to everyone.

, yes yes, I know, everyone should hate the US...and blame...at least suspect...always. Well, I've been asking "To what end" in contexts like this, and here's what they wanted (again):

Protesters opposed what they saw as widespread government corruption and abuse of power, the influence of oligarchs, police brutality, and human rights violations.^(29)(30) Repressive anti-protest laws fuelled further anger.⁽²⁹⁾ — Revolution of Dignity (Wikipedia)

Seems reasonable enough to me. Except, such a tedious lengthy damned process, surely if wanting to join modern democratic clubs and wrestle free from ghosts of the past. But the Gremlin threw a wrench in that with a roar...err war.

Anyway, the repetition is also getting tedious.

And there still was/is no such independence. Probably not really the Gremlin's plan in the first place.

"DRAMATICALLY" does not equal "dramatically".

"DRAMATICALLY" is significantly more dramatic than merely "dramatically".

A citation should be exact, I do not all-caps words because I can rely on "arguing a point". — boethius


Of all the hilarious of your backtracks this is the best one... You claim that you did not use 'the word'... When I have pointed out that yes, actually you did use the exact same word, you claim that the same word in all caps is not the same word? Seriously, can you get more absurd? Oh, yes, you can: you then argue that your use of the word 'dramatically' was less dramatic. — Jabberwock

:lol:

↪boethius, yes yes, I know, everyone should hate the US...and blame...at least suspect...always. Well, I've been asking "To what end" in contexts like this, and here's what they wanted (again): — jorndoe

Exactly, when the US interferes covertly in other countries it's ok because it's "for good".

Why we should suspect US intentions is that US officials have zero problem continuously stating basically every policy is for "US national interests" and whenever that conflicts with human rights: "Get real! US national interests!!"

However, for the purpose of this point of discussion, "legitimate governments" simply means control of territory over a long enough term regardless of how they come into existence.

Of all the hilarious of your backtracks this is the best one... You claim that you did not use 'the word'... When I have pointed out that yes, actually you did use the exact same word, you claim that the same word in all caps is not the same word? Seriously, can you get more absurd? Oh, yes, you can: you then argue that your use of the word 'dramatically' was less dramatic — Jabberwock

Capitalization is part of the spelling of a word.

"DRAMATICALLY" is not how you spell properly, and just shouting because you have zero points.

If you accuse me of using the word "DRAMATICALLY", you should be able to site where I use the word "DRAMATICALLY".

Or then add the caveat of "of course not all caps because you're not a moron and need to resort to all capitalization".

But go ahead, both of you, explain again how the bases are zero significance; that a missile base and a missile ship is not dramatically more missiles than just a ship.

It's just dumb.

For example, feel free to try to explain how if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM into Cuba, the US would be like "insignificant, we cool with it, soviets already have ships".

It's honestly incredible how deeply people believe the double standard delusions of American foreign policy analysis.

Or then add the caveat of "of course not all caps because you're not a moron and need to resort to all capitalization". — boethius

No, you need to resort to use words like 'dramatically' (and half a page pseudo-philosophical ramblings), because you do not know the basic facts of the things you discuss and when faced with that you have to resort to inane rhetorics. When asked about specifics, you flatly refuse to engage with facts, because you abhor the facts, you do not even look at the map.

For example, feel free to try to explain how if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM into Cuba, the US would be like "insignificant, we cool with it, soviets already have ships". — boethius

Lol, you do it again... The Cuban missile crisis was about land-launched ballistic missilies which had SIX TIMES (some argue more) the range of any ship-borne missiles that Russians could realistically deploy in 1962. For those map-averse: a regular-service Russian submarine anchored right at the Statue of Liberty equipped with R-13 could penetrate the American continent to about Pennsylvania. R-14s launched from Cuba could reach California. Admittedly, Russians had one submarine, K-19, which in 1961 was equipped with three R-13s (with the range doubled, but still three times shorter than land-based missiles), but it was only one unit and prone to failures (or, rather disasters: in 1961 and later twenty sailors died of radation, the boat was nicknamed 'Hiroshima').

So yes, at that time the land-based launchers did provide an enormous advantage over the ship-borne ones, which you would be aware of, if you had the slighest idea of the things you insist on talking about.

For example, feel free to try to explain how if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM into Cuba, the US would be like "insignificant, we cool with it, soviets already have ships".

It's honestly incredible how deeply people believe the double standard delusions of American foreign policy analysis. — boethius

First, as already argued elsewhere, I don't find the double standard accusation particularly compelling in geopolitics because indeed double standard reasoning can very much be part of the game: namely, depending on the circumstances, one may STILL feel rationally compelled to support an ally who is wrong, precisely because he is an ally, than an enemy who is right, precisely because he is an enemy.
Second, as far as I'm concerned, the Cuban Missile crisis serves better pro-US propaganda then pro-Russian propaganda: indeed, in the Cuban Missile crisis we are talking about an ACTUAL case of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles on site [1] not about a prospective deployment of nuclear weapons conditional on Ukrainian accession to NATO (which was far from being imminent while the existence of the NATO alliance itself was challenged by Trump and Macron), yet the US was able to solve the crisis without invading and annexing Cuba, massacring Cuban civilians, deporting Cubans (including kids) in the US, and colonizing Cuba with American beach boys, wasn't it?

[1]
"After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL–28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis."
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis

, you missed the point (again), or skirted or whatever. Regardless of Kremlin CIA Mossad Sri Lanka whatever, this is what the Ukrainians wanted (again):

Protesters opposed what they saw as widespread government corruption and abuse of power, the influence of oligarchs, police brutality, and human rights violations.^(29)(30) Repressive anti-protest laws fuelled further anger.⁽²⁹⁾ — Revolution of Dignity (Wikipedia)

^{(you're free to work backward from the facts, but no matter)}
And there still was/is no independence in the grabbed regions.
So, to what end?


:/ Another one bites the dust:

Russian activist and Putin critic Alexei Navalny dies in prison
^{— Andrew Roth, Helen Sullivan · The Guardian · Feb 16, 2024}

No, you need to resort to use words like 'dramatically' (and half a page pseudo-philosophical ramblings), because you do not know the basic facts of the things you discuss and when faced with that you have to resort to inane rhetorics. When asked about specifics, you flatly refuse to engage with facts, because you abhor the facts, you do not even look at the map. — Jabberwock

The person resorting the drama is the person screaming "DRAMATICALLY"!

What facts are you even talking about? That the US doesn't have a weapon right this moment with publicly available specifications that literally says "for nuclear deployment in ABM tubes"?

I literally posted a video showing how to take a warhead out of a nuclear bomb.

What are the salient facts:

1. Obviously you can load a nuclear warhead into an ABM missile tube or then just an ABM missile itself. (After denying this was possible, you finally accepted it was possible but not "easy" and could not be done covertly. When I ask you why it being easy or hard matters to someone setting up a first strike, and also why it couldn't be done covertly ... nada, no specifics, just random denials based on nothing.)

2. The ABM treaty (which the US withdrew from) was negotiated because ABM is first strike capability, arguably anywhere but for sure in forward deployed missile bases.

3. The bases we're talking thus represent an increasing nuclear first strike capability and the Russians would make the same analysis and same conclusion and take mitigatory measures. Perhaps they view the risk as low and the only mitigatory measure they saw reasonable to take was simply diplomatically complain about it (to for example setup taking stronger measures if more bases are forward deployed) or then maybe it was one factor in the decision to invade Ukraine.

What facts have I not engaged with?

Lol, you do it again... The Cuban missile crisis was about land-launched ballistic missilies which had SIX TIMES (some argue more) the range of any ship-borne missiles that Russians could realistically deploy in 1962. For those map-averse: a regular-service Russian submarine anchored right at the Statue of Liberty equipped with R-13 could penetrate the American continent to about Pennsylvania. R-14s launched from Cuba could reach California. Admittedly, Russians had one submarine, K-19, which in 1961 was equipped with three R-13s (with the range doubled, but still three times shorter than land-based missiles), but it was only one unit and prone to failures (or, rather disasters: in 1961 and later twenty sailors died of radation, the boat was nicknamed 'Hiroshima').

So yes, at that time the land-based launchers did provide an enormous advantage over the ship-borne ones, which you would be aware of, if you had the slighest idea of the things you insist on talking about. — Jabberwock

I asked if the US would not have reacted if the Russians deployed ABM.

For example, feel free to try to explain how if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM into Cuba, the US would be like "insignificant, we cool with it, soviets already have ships". — boethius

You can't even read correctly.

My question is, make the Cuban missile crisis of similar nature to the US bases in East-Europe. So whatever analogue of ABM missiles you want to imagine being deployed to Cuba.

For your whole "it's insignificant!" argument to work, obviously you have to hold that same argument if things were reversed.

Would US just go ahead and ignore the ABM missiles in Cuba and not do anything?

Your answer should be "yes, of course, if the Soviets did some analogous thing of a land based ABM missile system in Cuba, then that would have been insignificant and the US, being a more reasonable nation, would not have taken any measures whatsoever".

Since you basically can't read and you'll just answer again that it wasn't the same situation, my question is imagine it is a comparable situation: ABM missile bases increasing the Soviets ABM capability to the same extent these bases in Eastern-Europe increase US ABM capability?

Go with your 1000 to 1 ratio if you want, as that's your position, from there you should have no problem concluding that if the Soviets had done a similar thing it would not have provoked a reaction from the US as the bases would be insignificant.

If you're unable to say that, it's because you don't even believe yourself in your position, it's just a lie.

First, as already argued elsewhere, I don't find the double standard accusation particularly compelling in geopolitics because indeed double standard reasoning can very much be part of the game: namely, depending on the circumstances, one may STILL feel rationally compelled to support an ally who is wrong, precisely because he is an ally, than an enemy who is right, precisely because he is an enemy. — neomac

First, I have not forgotten your long post explaining this pick-a-hegemon position, which at least strives to resolve surface level contradictions. I will get to it when I have time.

But, in short, you are describing realpolitik and the justification for supporting the ally in the wrong is going to be ultimately a consequentialist argument that not-doing-so would lead to some worse outcome (losing a war to some fascist state, for example).

I do not mind this realpolitik approach, it is essentially my basic argument in this debate just I have different realpolitik conclusions:

1. That Ukraine very likely cannot win militarily.
2. That the war very likely strengthens, rather than weakens, Russia.
3. That most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Russia and don't give much of a crap what we Westerners think (most of the rest of the world is authoritarian, anti-gay, anti-trans, and have a long memory vis-a-vis Western colonialism and CIA interference); Russia is "standing up to the West" in this alternative view point.
4. That the war greatly harms the European economy and makes it structurally less competitive over the long term significantly decreasing Western leverage in general (and most ceding it to China).
5. That creating a global economic schism in which Russia is pioneering a totally different economic framework structurally decreases Western leverage over the long term.

So the war isn't good neither for Ukraine nor the West, and the idea that Ukraine is harming Russia is a dangerous myth.

Of the objectives the US achieves:

1. Destroying the EU as a competition to the Dollar.
2. Selling LNG to Europe.
3. Fully subordinating the (current) European political class.
4. Making mad bank in arms exports.

Are terrible for Europe (and I'm European) and I would also caution that they are in the "careful what you wish for" category even for the United States.

As the RAND documents makes clear, escalating military conflict between Russia and Ukraine would likely result in Russia winning any such escalation and would significantly harm US prestige and strategic position if Russia were to win.

So, if Ukraine could win and Russia was actually an enemy (which I don't buy that it was) then there would be at least the realpolitik case for supporting Ukraine, even if it would be a double standard vis-a-vis plenty other causes as or more just.

Second, as far as I'm concerned, the Cuban Missile crisis serves better pro-US propaganda then pro-Russian propaganda: indeed, in the Cuban Missile crisis we are talking about an ACTUAL case of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles on site [1] — neomac

As I already responded to @Jabberwock, my question is to imagine the situation analogous, it would follow that your position is the same if the situation was analogous.

That there would not only be no crisis but the US would not react at all to such insignificant ABM bases (with radars, missile and missile tubes and connected to Soviet logistics) on Cuba.

It's a simple question: had the Soviets some analogous ABM system to Cuba, the US would not (or at least should not have) reacted in anyway because such ABM bases are insignificant?

↪boethius, you missed the point (again), or skirted or whatever. Regardless of Kremlin CIA Mossad Sri Lanka whatever, this is what the Ukrainians wanted (again):

Protesters opposed what they saw as widespread government corruption and abuse of power, the influence of oligarchs, police brutality, and human rights violations.(29)(30) Repressive anti-protest laws fuelled further anger.(29)
— Revolution of Dignity (Wikipedia)

(you're free to work backward from the facts, but no matter)
And there still was/is no independence in the grabbed regions.
So, to what end? — jorndoe

I am talking about who controls the territory.

Ukraine lost control of the territory, regardless of what legal or moral arguments you want to make about it, Ukraine lost control of the "grabbed regions" if you want to call them that.

Ukraine had and has no way of getting them back by military force and trying to do so would super very likely trigger a Russian invasion (plenty experts predicted this).

If your point is just "well I don't like it, phoooey", ok, yeah, sure, I have no trouble believing you don't like it.

You can make as many moral and legal arguments as you want, believe Russia is as bad as you want, doesn't change the fact Ukraine lost control of territories in question in 2014 and their attempt to reconquer them was met with a Russian invasion (predictably).

And the facts now are that Ukraine is very severely damaged and has lost even more territory.

I can see literally not a single fact of factor supporting the strategy of trying to impose Ukraine's will on Russia by force.

It has not worked, and will continue not to work.

The person resorting the drama is the person screaming "DRAMATICALLY"! — boethius

It was you who have used the word, because you were unable to show how the base is more significant than a single frigate. And obviously still cannot do that, so you resort to such comical claims as that a base located 20 km from the shore (of which you were unaware, of course) is somehow more difficult to hit than a ship.

What facts are you even talking about? That the US doesn't have a weapon right this moment with publicly available specifications that literally says "for nuclear deployment in ABM tubes"?

I literally posted a video showing how to take a warhead out of a nuclear bomb. — boethius

The fact is that the US does not have a nuclear warhead that is capable of putting into the ABMs deployed in the base. AND you still ignore the fact that their range is too short for the first strike.

As I wrote, even Russian propaganda does not make that point - they only refer to Tomahawks (which, as you seemingly are still blissfully unaware, are not ABMs), not SM3. In other words, Russian simply ignore what you believe is the greatest threat (i.e. 'easily switching the warheards in ABMs'). Why do you think is that?

1. Obviously you can load a nuclear warhead into an ABM missile tube or then just an ABM missile itself. (After denying this was possible, you finally accepted it was possible but not "easy" and could not be done covertly. When I ask you why it being easy or hard matters to someone setting up a first strike, and also why it couldn't be done covertly ... nada, no specifics, just random denials based on nothing.) — boethius

After five pages of discussion you still have no idea what missiles you refer to... I have pointed out that that while theoretically it is possible, it would be pointless, because ABMs (and SM3 in particular) are rather poor surface-to-surface weapons AND they do not have sufficient range for the first strike. That is why Russians are NOT saying this. And yes, you can put Tomahawks into them, but it is rather hard to do it covertly. On the other hand, you CAN put covertly the exact same missile into a frigate launcher sailing 100 km from the very same base and you get the same effect (only more tubes).

2. The ABM treaty (which the US withdrew from) was negotiated because ABM is first strike capability, arguably anywhere but for sure in forward deployed missile bases. — boethius

And I have explained more than twice already that sure, ABMs play a defensive role in first strike capability. I cannot help that in your confusion you got it to mean 'ABMs can be easily loaded with nuclear warheads and used for the offensive first strike'.

3. The bases we're talking thus represent an increasing nuclear first strike capability and the Russians would make the same analysis and same conclusion and take mitigatory measures. Perhaps they view the risk as low and the only mitigatory measure they saw reasonable to take was simply diplomatically complain about it (to for example setup taking stronger measures if more bases are forward deployed) or then maybe it was one factor in the decision to invade Ukraine. — boethius

Except that you have insisted that the biggest threat is using ABMs as an offensive weapon and that a single base 'dramatically' (your word) increases the offensive capacity. Neither of the claims are true.

I asked if the US would not have reacted if the Russians deployed ABM. — boethius

You have asked specifically 'if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM', so I have retained all other characteristics of the particular event taking place at particular time and just switched the weapons in question - and then the question makes no sense, because there were no equivalent weapons at that time. Your question could not be 'how would the US react if Russians have deployed ABMs in Cuba today', because you wrote specifically 'Soviets'. So which particular time and technical and political situation did your question refer to? The obvious answer is: none, because you had only a vague idea of what you were asking.

My question is, make the Cuban missile crisis of similar nature to the US bases in East-Europe. So whatever analogue of ABM missiles you want to imagine being deployed to Cuba. — boethius

If Russians have deployed ABMs in Cuba today, they would be significant in intercepting all the ICBMs flying from the States toward the South America. So I suppose their significance depends on how serious are the US plans of nuking South America.

As for their offensive capacities, if the analogues of SM3 were used, they would be capable of nuking Florida, maybe a bits of Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana. So their sigficance depends on the fact how much of the US command control infrastructure is located in Florida (or bits of Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana).

Russian activist and Putin critic Alexei Navalny dies in prison
^{— Andrew Roth, Helen Sullivan · The Guardian · Feb 16, 2024} — Feb 16, 2024

A fictional dialogue ("When what happens in Moscow, goes to FUK3") translated to English:

Putin: "Get him out of my sight."
Unknown: "Yes, sir."
Putin: "Get rid of him but do not allow him to become a martyr."
Unknown: "Understood, sir."
Putin: "Forgotten by election season."
Unknown: "Yes, Mr President."

Some of the footage that came out of the imprisonment reminds a bit more of Hannibal Lecter treatment than a political opponent. Putin fears Navalny, Putin makes example of Navalny, Russians fear becoming another example?

(my emphasis)

would super very likely trigger a Russian invasion (plenty experts predicted this) — boethius

Not saying right/wrong, just that you keep interspersing postulates. Per earlier, the war was about loss of control. (Aren't resources/assets among the most common reasons for warring?)

First, I have not forgotten your long post explaining this pick-a-hegemon position, which at least strives to resolve surface level contradictions. I will get to it when I have time.

But, in short, you are describing realpolitik and the justification for supporting the ally in the wrong is going to be ultimately a consequentialist argument that not-doing-so would lead to some worse outcome (losing a war to some fascist state, for example).

I do not mind this realpolitik approach, it is essentially my basic argument in this debate just I have different realpolitik conclusions:

1. That Ukraine very likely cannot win militarily.
2. That the war very likely strengthens, rather than weakens, Russia.
3. That most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Russia and don't give much of a crap what we Westerners think (most of the rest of the world is authoritarian, anti-gay, anti-trans, and have a long memory vis-a-vis Western colonialism and CIA interference); Russia is "standing up to the West" in this alternative view point.
4. That the war greatly harms the European economy and makes it structurally less competitive over the long term significantly decreasing Western leverage in general (and most ceding it to China).
5. That creating a global economic schism in which Russia is pioneering a totally different economic framework structurally decreases Western leverage over the long term.

So the war isn't good neither for Ukraine nor the West, and the idea that Ukraine is harming Russia is a dangerous myth.

Of the objectives the US achieves:

1. Destroying the EU as a competition to the Dollar.
2. Selling LNG to Europe.
3. Fully subordinating the (current) European political class.
4. Making mad bank in arms exports.

Are terrible for Europe (and I'm European) and I would also caution that they are in the "careful what you wish for" category even for the United States. — boethius

So, if Ukraine could win and Russia was actually an enemy (which I don't buy that it was) then there would be at least the realpolitik case for supporting Ukraine, even if it would be a double standard vis-a-vis plenty other causes as or more just. — boethius

To my understanding, the scenario which I find more compelling for European risk analysis is roughly the opposite of yours:
- If Ukraine can not “militarily win” (in some debatable sense), maybe neither can Russia “militarily win” (in some debatable sense) if the West keeps supporting Ukraine enough. While if the West stops supporting Ukraine, Russia can more likely “militarily win”.
- If the war very likely strengthens, rather than weakens, Russia. Surrender to Russia in Ukraine will strengthen Russia even more.
- The claim that “most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Russia and don't give much of a crap what we Westerners think”, could sound to Westerners as compelling as “most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Palestinians and don't give much of a crap what Israelis think” to Israelis, if not less. Yet, the Israelis seem willing to handle it and far from being intimidated by it.
- Concerning the fourth and fifth point, letting Russia win (and indirectly China as its strategic ally), betraying the American leadership which is still (but hardly) policing international commercial routes with its military navies/air force and reasons to refrain from a more aggressive economic competition with Europeans as an ally, while leaving Europeans (in demographic declines) dependent for its input and output on a world contended by more equipped and aggressive powers, could not only destabilise the system of strategic alliances within the West (which NATO and EU are expression) from internal and external pressure, but make more likely democratic backsliding, social unrest and proxy wars inside Europe. And in this case, I deeply doubt that Europeans will be in a better position to compete with China in any meaningful sense.
- Concerning the US, if the US wants to keep its world dominance, it needs Europeans (and other allies) to reduce the burden of imperial overstretch, so plausibly a enough economically and military strong EU. Or give up on world dominance and leave Europe to be contended as Africa and Middle East by other hegemonic competitors (as anticipated in my previous comment https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/872479). In the latter case, the 4 benefits that a predatory US will earn at the expense of Europeans in your scenario, will simply be split among 3 predatory hegemonic competitors STILL at the expense of Europeans in my scenario:
1. Destroying Euro as a competitor to any hegemonic competitor’s currency.
2. Making European countries dependable on any hegemonic competitor’s commodities.
3. Fully subordinating the European political class to hegemonic competitors’ will.
4. Making mad bank in arms exports.

To make your assessment more compelling to me, you should seriously argue for why 3 hegemonic competitors (2 of which are consolidated AND, POSSIBLY, "VICTORIOUS" authoritarian regimes while the third at risk to become more authoritarian and more confrontational e.g. if Trump wins [1]) will give any chance to Europeans (= the ex-Great Satans which turned into the current Great Satan’s lapdogs) individually or, worse, collectively either to economically and democratically prosper in a peaceful limbo safe from power projections and security threats coming from these 3 hegemonic powers (to put it simple, because there is also Islamism that one can add to the scenario), or to grow as a military force capable of power projection (which, notice, may also require nuclear proliferation) and therefore support hegemonic ambitions in a contended world. Alternatively, you could argue in support of European politicians which will peacefully & safely make their countries economically and democratically prosper (and even militarily intimidating) DESPITE the external pressure of powerful and predatory hegemonic powers OUT OF SHEER WILL, MORAL SUPERIORITY, POLITICAL WISDOM, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SKILLS, HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, EGALITARIAN MISSION, EXEMPLAR PATRIOTISM after that an avalanche of WESTERN populist propaganda ALREADY ABUNDANTLY INFILTRATED, BRIBED, LOBBIED by hegemonic competitors kept SHITTING OVER AND OVER AND OVER Western democracies, media, economy, economic/political elites and leaders, EU and NATO ON WORLD STAGE FOR SEVERAL DECADES. And in this case, I’m just looking forward to hearing their names.

Until then, I’m fine with my understanding of the stakes. According to it, the LEAST benefit of the war in Ukraine for Europeans is to BUY TIME for European politicians to figure out their approach in a contended world in order to minimize the damage, and this may very much require greater investment in the Western system of strategic alliances (among European countries and with the US, Ukraine included) and greater effort to do more economically/militarily within greater international constraints (difficult but maybe not unfeasible). Anyways, given the predicament in which we are, I can't ignore that European populists will do their worst to screw that too, though.

[1]
Notice, I don't need to take Trump's words about NATO at face value. It's still arguable that Trump is very much interested in keeping NATO and the US in Europe and/or that the American establishment will make it hard for Trump to really disengage from Europe. Yet the future of the American support for the European security is getting dangerously uncertain while the threats are dangerously increasing.

As the RAND documents makes clear, escalating military conflict between Russia and Ukraine would likely result in Russia winning any such escalation and would significantly harm US prestige and strategic position if Russia were to win. — boethius

What RAND documents?

It's a simple question: had the Soviets some analogous ABM system to Cuba, the US would not (or at least should not have) reacted in anyway because such ABM bases are insignificant? — boethius

As the Multivac, I’d say “Insufficient data for meaningful answer”.
I’m far from being a military analyst, even at an amateurish level. So instead I would argue against the way you framed your question (”my question is to imagine the situation analogous, it would follow that your position is the same if the situation was analogous”) because it looks grounded on either a non sequitur or a tautology. Indeed, I don’t see why I should assume that threat perception would be the same over similar factual/hypothetical military scenarios and, if the same, that the reaction would be the same. On the other hand, if the “analogous situation” already includes also threat perception and response, then of course the position would be analogous by definition. Not to mention that threat perception can be miscalculated or inflated for propaganda reasons.
Besides, as far as I’m concerned, there is no need to make such a convoluted thought experiment, because the Cuban Missile crisis readily offers a historical study case about threat perception and copying mechanism from the US that we can use for comparison. And what this study case suggests is that while the US chose diplomacy to an actual present threat, Russia chose aggression to a hypothetical future threat.
Not to mention that from a political point of view: 1. the US needs Ukraine neither to put its nuclear bases closer to Moscow because Baltic countries could be enough for that, nor to widen the front of nuclear threats since Finland could be enough for that. 2. While the US was the only country to use nukes against a rival which was aggressed by on mainland, the ONLY one which keeps threatening to use nukes, in the current crisis, is Russia after aggressing and annexing part of an acknowledged sovereign country. 3. The US has shown a concern toward perceived nuclear threats by Russia, in at least three significant occasions: Cuban missile crisis, not deploying further east offensive nuclear weapons, Budapest Memorandum in which the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was returned to Russia (with great disappointment of Mearsheimer himself, go figure).

For them (the West - TASS) this is about improving their tactical position, but for us this is about our destiny, a matter of life and death. I wanted people that will listen to this [interview with Carlson] to realize that. It’s not up to me to judge whether it hit the mark or not. — Putin · TASS · Feb 18, 2024

The largest country in the world...? :brow: Russia will persist, Putin is 71. Once again conflating grand (somewhat USSR-style) vision, at the expense of Ukraine (and Russia(n youth) for that matter). ^{2024Feb16, 2024Feb12, 2024Feb7}

War In Donbas
Milchakov participated as a volunteer in the war in Donbas from 2014,[2] stating later he wanted "to kill".[6] According to his own account, Milchakov formed Rusich together with Yan Petrovsky in the summer of 2014, after going through a paramilitary training program run by the Imperial Legion, the military branch of the Russian Imperial Movement.[8] He has openly bragged about photographing the bodies of mutilated and burnt Ukrainian bodies from the paramilitary Aidar group in 2014.[2] Milchakov is also reputed to have cut ears of Ukrainian corpses and scratched swastikas on their faces.[9] By 2015, he had been sanctioned by the European Union, United Kingdom and Canada.[2] He has used the call signs "Fritz" and "Serb"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexey_Milchakov

Russian Neo-Nazi, GRU officer Alexei Milchakov (him of puppy torture/killing fame), who fought in Ukraine in 2014, talks about how he cut off the ears of the Ukrainian military (Aidar Battalion) and got high on the smell of burning flesh.
In Russia this pillock is called an "anti-fascist' and "Defender of Donbas".
Milchakov has links to Dmitry Utkin, founder of Wagner Group.
He's a Russian GRU operative and Neo-Nazi - a supporter of Nazi SS formation.
Utkin's career with Putin shows Russian hypocrisy. Moscow falsely accuses others of "Neo-Nazism" while itself using services of true fascists.
Translation of Milchakov's mad ramblings:
-I'm a Nazi. I'm a Nazi. I'm not going to develop this - am I a nationalist, a patriot, imperial direction etc, I'm saying directly I'm a Nazi. I could raise my hand.
- You see, when you kill a person, you experience a hunter's rush of excitement. Those who have not been on a hunt, try it, it's interesting.
- Regarding Aidar (Ukrainian Battalion), the guys have burned. Burnt out at work. It happens. They smelt great. I'll tell you honestly, when we went on to the road, the smell was... my jaws clamped together, we were hungry, we were looting a car with gingerbread and condensed milk, and it smelt great.
- Here are ears, here are guys, burning asses. It's my trophy. Those who judge me can go f**k themselves, this is my trophy. I'm like a hunter. It's mine, I took a photo. What's taken in a fight is sacred and these photos made the necessary impression that I expected. Everyone was laughing at the base, yes, the ears were meant to go as gifts... by the way, the photo of one cut off ear, it's just the one that you have. Yandex and Google had a lot of stuff...
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=648020209618444

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) released an audio recording on 5 May that they said was a phone call between a Donetsk separatist leader named Dima Boitsov, and the leader of the far-right paramilitary Russian National Unity group Alexander Barkashov. In the recording, Boitsov said he wanted to postpone the referendum due to the DPR's inability to control all of Donetsk Oblast. Barkashov said that he had communicated with Putin, and insisted Boitsov hold the referendum regardless of the separatist leader's concerns. He suggested that Boitsov tabulate the results as 89% in favour of autonomy.[26][27] Separatists stated that the recording was fake.[28] However, the 89% mentioned in the phone call exactly match the result of the referendum, which took place on 11 May 2014, i.e. several days after the recording had been published.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Donbas_status_referendums#Allegations_of_fraud


On 16 October 1990, Barkashov and a few dozen followers gathered at his home on Moscow's Dubinin Street and founded "the National Unity for a Free Strong Just Russia" (soon shortened to "the Russian National Unity", and informally among the Barkashovtsy [Barkashovites]: "the Unity" [Yedinstvo]). Historian Walter Laqueur writes that Barkashov stated in an interview that he is a Nazi.[2]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Barkashov


The Russian National Unity movement was founded on 16 October 1990 by a splinter group of the National Patriotic Front "Memory" (NPF "Pamyat"). It grew from 1990 to 1991. Members have been reported to wear black and camouflage uniforms. The group also adopted a red and white swastika emblem and openly expressed admiration for German National Socialism and public celebrations of the rise of the Nazis, although the organization officially denied any support for Nazi ideology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_National_Unity

As we can see from the example of just one single day, the war came not only to Donetsk, but also to other cities of Donbass. However, there were not many people willing to defend their native land. Enough for certain operations and at least some resistance, but nothing more.

According to unofficial statistics, in 2014, 0.28 percent of the total number of men living in Donetsk and the Donetsk region who were old enough to hold a weapon joined the militia. This is not even 1% or 5%, but 0.28%!!! At that time, local militias made up 50% of the total militia, 40% were militias from other regions of Ukraine, and 10% were volunteers from Russia.

I remember how in August 2014 I went to Makeevka, to the center. We were then based on the outskirts, closer to Khanzhonkovo. From there we went on missions. A man, about 35 years old, approaches me in the center with a beer in his hands. He tells us how much he’s rooting for us (probably putting likes on our contacts) and asks when this will all stop. I didn't know what to answer him. I was ashamed of him and others like him. I simply invited him to go on his way in peace.

https://asd-news.translate.goog/articles/voyna/kto-stoit-za-donbass/?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en

Key insurgent admits there was no civil war, just Russian aggression
https://khpg.org/en/1608808721
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/21/7412402/