As a common enough example, for such people proclaiming “science says so” is to proclaim the unquestionable truth of that which is stipulated. . . . .
Any position held on all of these many issues then being entirely metaphysical claims. — javra

Yes, but when I accuse them of holding a belief in authoritative Scientism, they don't seem to see what's wrong with that. Instead, they appear to think that Philosophy should be subservient to the final authority of infallible Empirical Science. But, when I ask for book, chapter & verse from their "unquestionable" Science Bible, I get no answer.

As I noted above, has a different definition of "metaphysics" from mine. And that discrepancy may be the reason for the topical question of this OP. In the 20th century, European physicists were still being trained in philosophy, and made metaphysical conjectures routinely, especially to explain the paradoxes of Quantum Theory. Are these aggressive anti-philosophy beliefs being promulgated in universities these days? I assume it's not just ignorance of philosophical concepts, of which 180 seems to be an expert. :smile:


DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SCIENTISM :
Scientism assumes that rational knowledge is scientific, and that everything else that claims to be knowledge is just superstitious, irrational, emotional, or nonsensical. Although Science and Scientism do share the same topics and content, their worldviews are entirely different.
https://journal.unpar.ac.id

There’s this saying: one can (try to) lead a horse to water, but …

We all consciously or unconsciously cling to some form of what Mircea Eliade termed an axis mundi when more abstractly appraised—some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information, without which we would loose our bearings, around which all of what we interpret to be the world pivots, and which, because of all this, we either implicitly or explicitly consider to be sacred (at the very least in relation to ourselves). To some this is the Abrahamic deity, to others it is scientism, to yet others it is the conviction that there are no correct facts, or otherwise some notion akin to the Platonic or Neo-Platonic notion of “the Good”, and so on and so forth. And we all hold confirmation biases in terms of this personal, typically implicitly maintained, axis mundi.

There is no convincing another that their own axis mundi is incorrect without the other being able to replace it with what they find to be a better axis mundi—one which accounts for the entire body of knowledge and values they already possess in addition to all new information they might be exposed to.

Or at least so I so far find. And so disagreement among humans on many but the most concrete of interpersonally experienced facts can be found.

But then this too is in itself a metaphysical perspective of sorts.

Are these aggressive anti-philosophy beliefs being promulgated in universities these days? — Gnomon

While it is likely that in some yes and in others no, I have no idea as to the overall reality of the matter. Opinionated as they might be, I doubt that others would know either in the absence of any impartial research regarding this topic.

As always, sir, your Dunning-Kruger, woo-of-the-gaps, quasi-scientism is :rofl: :lol: :razz:

We all consciously or unconsciously cling to some form of what Mircea Eliade termed an axis mundi when more abstractly appraised—some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information, without which we would loose our bearings, around which all of what we interpret to be the world pivots, and which, because of all this, we either implicitly or explicitly consider to be sacred (at the very least in relation to ourselves). — javra

I think this is an egregious generalization—all I can think of to say in response is "speak for yourself".

I think this is an egregious generalization—all I can think of to say in response is "speak for yourself". — Janus

As you've expressed in a post elsewhere last time we chatted, you don't care what I think. All the same:

1) I am speaking for myself: it's my established worldview. (Right up there with you not being a p-zombie.)

2) On what rational or empirical grounds do you affirm that what I previous expressed is "an egregious generalization"? (Hint: that "I don't like it" is not such a justification.)

And we all hold confirmation biases in terms of this personal, typically implicitly maintained, axis mundi. — javra

I suppose my own "axis mundi" consists of the 'principle of non-contradiction (PNC) sans principle of sufficient reason (~PSR) —> universal contingency (UC)'.

I suppose my own "axis mundi" consists of – begins with – the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). — 180 Proof

:grin: :up: Yup, it forms part of my axis mundi as well. :smile:

What do you make of dialetheias then?

I don't "make" anything of it; I'm not a logician.

As you've expressed in a post elsewhere last time we chatted, you don't care what I think. All the same:

1) I am speaking for myself: it's my established worldview. (Right up there with you not being a p-zombie.)

2) On what rational or empirical grounds do you affirm that what I previous expressed is "an egregious generalization"? (Hint: that "I don't like it" is not such a justification.) — javra

I don't care what anyone thinks meaning that what I think is most important to me. If you say all people have metaphysical worldviews and cling to them in the grip of confirmation bias I say you are not speaking for yourself but for all people and what you are according to your own argument clinging to is not a metaphysical worldview but a general psychological assessment of human nature.

I think that assessment is an egregious generalization based on my own experience of people. Maybe we simply move and mix in different circles. No empirical or logical grounds can be adduced to support or deny the contention. It comes down to how you see people and whether in this particular connection you see uniformity or diversity.

No empirical or logical grounds can be adduced to support or deny the contention. It comes down to how you see people and whether in this particular connection you see uniformity or diversity. — Janus

OK. So your contentions that it is an egregious - by which I understand “outstandingly bad” - generalization comes down to an opinion that you can provide no meaningful justification for, outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”.

Moreover, I take any and all ontological understanding - be it consciously upheld or else unconscious - to in itself be metaphysical in nature. Whereas from what I’ve so far perused of your expressed perspective you take it mean something akin to anything out of the ordinary in relation to ontology. This, of itself, would make a large difference in what I myself stated.

For just one example, were one to witness billiard balls randomly fall through solid table tops or else hover in midair, one would hold a confirmation bias in line with one’s core ontological understanding as to what is in fact possible. Most would assume it to either be stage magic or tricks of the eye precisely due to this confirmation bias. Whether or not miracles can occur is again determined by one’s core ontology’s confirmation bias.

But there are innumerable examples - many very different due to very different core ontological beliefs that can be held in theory if not also in practice.

And again, in the absence of evidence that people go about life in the complete absence of core ontological beliefs - if not consciously maintained than unconscious - around which they assimilate new information such that they hold a confirmation bias to these very core beliefs, your decrying my perspective egregious is, basically, completely unwarranted.

Read more carefully what I actually wrote and you might find I never once mentioned that we cling to “metaphysical worldviews” but to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information [...]" - which in my lexicon are quite distinct propositions.

comes down to an opinion that you can provide no meaningful justification for, outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”. — javra

Can you provide for your contention that people cling to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information"some "meaningful justification" for "outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”"?

Read more carefully what I actually wrote and you might find I never once mentioned that we cling to “metaphysical worldviews” but to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world — javra

Can you explain the difference?

Can you provide for your contention that people cling to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information"some "meaningful justification" for "outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”"? — Janus

Are the examples I just provided to this very effect rationally or empirically in any way contradictory to - or else do they in any way not cohere to - reality as we all know it?

But if you're in search of infallible proof I've none to give.

Can you explain the difference? — Janus

For one thing, a metaphysical worldview is a strictly conscious construct which is itself pivoted upon - and hence not equivalent to - some core conviction (or core set of convictions to be more precise) regarding the causal, spatial, temporal, etc. nature of the world, the latter often enough not being consciously analyzable in fully explicit manners the way that the metaphysical worldview is.

Are the examples I just provided to this very effect rationally or empirically in any way contradictory to - or else do they in any way not cohere to - reality as we all know it? — javra

I don't know, I don't know what examples you are referring to or what "reality as we all know it" refers to.

For one thing, a metaphysical worldview is a strictly conscious construct which is itself pivoted upon - and hence not equivalent to - some core conviction (or core set of convictions to be more precise) regarding the causal, spatial, temporal, etc. nature of the world, the later often enough not being consciously analyzable in fully explicit manners the way that the metaphysical worldview is. — javra

I don't deny that people may have unconscious or implicit metaphysical worldviews, whereas you seem to be doing so. What we variously might think "the causal, spatial, temporal, etc. nature of the world" (if we all have such a view, which is what I disagreed with and thought to be an egregious generalization) is
in my book nothing other than a metaphysical view. It seems we have different ideas about what constitutes a metaphysical view, so it looks like we are bound to disagree. I don't disagree that people generally have some basic orientation or other to the world, but I don't see those orientations as "core commitments" for those who haven't thought about it much.

I don't know, I don't know what examples you are referring to — Janus

This is mouth dropping to me. I'll highlight them for you:

For just one example, were one to witness billiard balls randomly fall through solid table tops or else hover in midair, one would hold a confirmation bias in line with one’s core ontological understanding as to what is in fact possible. Most would assume it to either be stage magic or tricks of the eye precisely due to this confirmation bias. Whether or not miracles can occur is again determined by one’s core ontology’s confirmation bias. — javra

Having done that, have a nice day.

:chin:

It seems to me that the terms 'worldview' and metaphysics' are too often used interchangeably and this is confusing. I think, by reflective reasoning, the latter attempts to globally make sense of (i.e. translate into conceptual categories) the local 'presuppositions and implications' (i.e. parochial biases ~ e.g. mythological, theological and/or ideological blindspots) of the former; in other words, 'worldview' is to (native) grammar plus (naive) vocabulary/idioms as 'metaphysics' is to theoretical linguistics – or object-discursive & meta-discursive, respectively – such that 'metaphysics' problematizes the limitations-constraints (i.e. the nature) of 'having a worldview' as such. Thus, given this distinction, one's (implicit, lived) 'worldview' can be either commensurate or incommensurate with one's (explicit, contemplated) 'metaphysics' without inconsistency (e.g. religious atomist or agrarian immaterialist or patriarchal nominalist).

All that, plus, I’d submit, that people in general are more conscious of their respective worldviews than they are of the metaphysics from which they are given.

Cart before the horse, if there ever was such a thing.

It seems to me that the terms 'worldview' and metaphysics' are too often used interchangeably and this is confusing. I think, by reflective reasoning, the latter attempts to globally make sense of (i.e. translate into conceptual categories) the local 'presuppositions and implications' (i.e. parochial biases ~ e.g. mythological, theological and/or ideological blindspots) of the former; in other words, 'worldview' is to (native) grammar plus (naive) vocabulary/idioms as 'metaphysics' is to theoretical linguistics – or object-discursive & meta-discursive, respectively — 180 Proof

Wow, it sounds like a person would need a PhD in order to be qualified to form metaphysical presuppositions. I may be wrong, but I’m going to go out on a limb here and connect your take on what metaphysics is with an Analytic approach. This makes sense give that, historically, the Analyric community has been much more interested in Hume, Leibnitz and Kant than Hegel. I am thinking that it is only in the philosophies that came after Hegel and were strongly influenced by him that we get an articulation of metaphysics as comparable to worldview. That is, as an overarching framework of intelligibility that orients us to the world and ties all its aspects together in a global unity, but that in most cases is held naively, unconsciously.

Metaphysics is the result of specific techniques. Like all philosophy, it is not a thing, but a process, an approach. It results from and requires a misuse of language, mostly in imprecise definitions and ambiguity. It is the rendering of that which cannot be observed (even theoretically) as a higher order of reality than that which can be observed.

It requires that we conceive of the world as having more than one kind of reality, which is a grave error if misunderstood. It can also be seen as mere overgeneralization, but this is not quite correct. Humans are capable of abstraction, and abstraction is and certainly can be performed in ever higher orders. That doesn't mean the world exists in ever higher orders, but only that abstraction does.

It's clearly possible to abstract until all meaning vanishes. Metaphysics occurs when no meaningful context remains for a statement.

Metaphysics is difficult to define if it's treated as a 'thing". It's an activity.

I am thinking that it is only in the philosophies that came after Hegel and were strongly influenced by him that we get an articulation of metaphysics as comparable to worldview. That is, as an overarching framework of intelligibility that orients us to the world and ties all its aspects together in a global unity, but that in most cases is held naively, unconsciously. — Joshs

In many a way I agree, but how would you account for discrepancies such as these:

I’ve met self-proclaimed non-spiritual atheists that uphold this metaphysical worldview but are in practice superstitious and affirm things like “your car was broken into today because you weren’t cordial to person A last week” or, as an example of the flipside, self-proclaimed Christians that adhere to all ritual aspects of their faith and uphold this metaphysical worldview while at the same time in practice being in many a way atheistic (e.g., they fear - and hence innately believe - death to be a cessation of being; or else don’t believe in the occurrence of spiritual realities in the here and now, as contrasted to occurring for biblical figures (e.g., “burning bushes” are OK biblically but not in reality that is lived); etc.) - this to not address the grave hypocrisies in ethical principles relative to Jesus Christ’s teaching that often enough occur (the ontology of values being in many a way metaphysical).

Here, there seems to me to be a professed and defended metaphysical worldview that is explicitly maintained which is in at least some ways in direct contradiction to the metaphysical beliefs/principles implicitly maintained.

Because of examples such as these, I don’t then necessarily equate a being’s often unconsciously occurring Umwelt (for lack of a better word) to - in the case of humans - the self-professed worldview which is consciously upheld and maintained.

Because of examples such as these, I don’t then necessarily equate a being’s often unconsciously occurring Umwelt (for lack of a better word) to - in the case of humans - the self-professed worldview which is consciously upheld and maintained. — javra

The two don’t have to be in conflict. There are communities of scholars devoted to a particular metaphysics or philosopher, and yet no two people interpret that ‘same’ metaphysics or philosophy in exactly the same way. The publicly agreed-upon understanding is a shorthand, an abstractive generalization which conceals within itself the variety of ways it is implicitly used by different people. You may be surprised by the fact that “self-proclaimed Christians that adhere to all ritual aspects of their faith and uphold this metaphysical worldview at the same time in practice are in many a way atheistic”, but they may see no contradiction here.

The two don’t have to be in conflict. — Joshs

This can be in full accord to "not necessarily equating". To be clearer, do you find that hypocrisy in what is maintained in praxis and what is professed via propositions cannot occur and, if so, due to what reason(s)?

". To be clearer, do you find that hypocrisy in what is maintained in praxis and what is professed via propositions cannot occur and, if so, due to what reason(s)? — javra

One can certainly lie to others about one’s views for various reasons, but I don’t think that apparent hypocrisy between opinion and action generally involves self-deception so much as failure to take into account the practical implications of one’s views. Theory is rarely able to account for the unpredictability and indeterminateness of real life situations.

OK. Thanks.

As an example, though I do not uphold the claim of "no atheists in foxholes", I do have evidence that some atheists no longer act according to their atheistic principles in dire situations. Although of course disagreements can abound regarding this, to me this does illustrate that sometimes one's professed worldview - while in no way being a lie - can in some ways be self-deceptive when put the test, so to speak. But this is one example among potentially many.

Thanks again for your views, though.

Spinoza is my (modern) 'metaphysical' touchstone ... then Freddy & Witty, Zapffe-Camus, C. Rosset ... and more recently Meillassoux-Brassier. Not the usual post-Humean/Kantian suspects or Hegelians either. Nonetheless, my point is: when discussing the history of (western) metaphysics I think it's more useful to clearly distinguish it from an anthopological / social psychological term like "worldview" rather than to conflate them (pace Hegel). If clarity is "analytical", Joshs, then I'm guilty as charged. :smirk:

I’ve met self-proclaimed non-spiritual atheists that uphold this metaphysical worldview but are in practice superstitious and affirm things like “your car was broken into today because you weren’t cordial to person A last week” or, as an example of the flipside, self-proclaimed Christians that adhere to all ritual aspects of their faith and uphold this metaphysical worldview while at the same time in practice being in many a way atheistic (e.g., they fear - and hence innately believe - death to be a cessation of being; or else don’t believe in the occurrence of spiritual realities in the here and now, as contrasted to occurring for biblical figures (e.g., “burning bushes” are OK biblically but not in reality that is lived); etc.) - this to not address the grave hypocrisies in ethical principles relative to Jesus Christ’s teaching that often enough occur (the ontology of values being in many a way metaphysical). — javra

I don't find any of this surprising and I don't think professed worldviews tell us much. I've met many atheists who believe in clairvoyance, astrology and magic. Atheism is just a position on one idea. God or not. People often assume it means Richard Dawkins acolytes.

Materialistic Christians are pretty common too. I grew up in the Baptist tradition in the 1970's We were taught that most of the stories in the Bible were allegories. Most Christians I knew did not believe in ghosts, demons, miracles or anything supernatural. Religion seemed more about community than anything else.

Having worked with people dying in palliative/end of life care, I have noticed how often Christians no longer have faith or any interest in God. Deathbed deconversations seem to be more common than non religious people finding god/s in their pending mortality.

I don't find any of this surprising and I don't think professed worldviews tell us much. — Tom Storm

Yea, my point being about the same.

While I’m here, getting back to the OP:

Metaphysics might be viewed as being in part comprised of discerning just how many philosophers it takes to change a light-bulb - tricky issue because many, if not all, will sit about endlessly debating the topic.

Else, it might be viewed as those aspects of ontology universal to all beings which facilitate both the possibility of the light-bulb being changed and the possibility of debating the issue without end - aspects that objectively are irrespective of one’s beliefs on the matter, if any.

I so far like this generalized appraisal; though, of course, other perspectives - some of which will disagree - are possible.

:smirk:

:up: :up:

For just one example, were one to witness billiard balls randomly fall through solid table tops or else hover in midair, one would hold a confirmation bias in line with one’s core ontological understanding as to what is in fact possible. Most would assume it to either be stage magic or tricks of the eye precisely due to this confirmation bias. Whether or not miracles can occur is again determined by one’s core ontology’s confirmation bias. — javra

If youve never seen a billiard ball float in the air or fall through tabletops, then you might hold a view as to what is physically possible, and that might form a part of your general worldview as to what seems to be the case. What would you think if I told you I'd seen such things?

I don't think any of this has much to do with metaphysics. What you term "core commitments" I would simply characterize as 'habitual expectations based on what has been encountered and observed in the course of one's life'.