I'm not saying that there are no intentions to do things, only that intentions don't work the way that you think they should.

I don't necessarily mean complete control of the action, but the ability to influence the action. — litewave

Yes. What it's being influence is the direction the body might move. A person may perceive the banana and try to avoid it, but again outcome is unpredictable.

If the intention causes the action instantaneously via some different/timeless way of causation, we can still ask whether the act of forming the intention is caused (via this different/timeless way of causation) by an intention to form that intention, and if it is then the act of forming the intention is intentional too, but this leads us to an infinite regress of intentions in a timeless instant. — litewave

Yes, indeed, which is why I am agreeing with you that intending to do something (or forming such an intention) does not require a prior act of intending to form that intention. Also, an intentional action, on the account I have been recommending, isn't a further act causally downstream from the act of intending. Rather, to say that an action is intentional just is a way to characterize the actions of rational animals as the sorts of rationally structured behaviors that they are.

Are you saying here that our actions cause our intentions to do the actions? In that case it is difficult to understand how we control our actions. It is more like our actions control us.

Yes and no. Intentions are internally structured by means-ends relationships. They are teleologically organized, we may say. That's because the parts of our action (their "proper temporal stages", we may call them, although this way of characterizing the "parts" of our action is slightly misleading) are actions done by us as means to realizing what our overarching action is done for the sake of. They are means to our ends.

So, to refer back to my earlier trip-to-Cuba example, if I intend to go to Cuba next month, then this already existing intention can be the cause, in a sense, of my forming today a new intention to book plane tickets. So, whenever A is a means of doing B, then what causes my intending to do A is my intending to do B. The sort of causation that is at play here might be called rational causation. It is because it is rational to do A when one intends to do B that one forms an intention to do A.

Now, this sort of causal explanation of intentional action could be thought to lead to troublesome regresses in two different ways. The first worry is that when the time comes to act on an intention for the future, one must then intend to act on one's prior intention when the time comes. (This is what John Searle views as the "gap" problem.) The second worry is that, if a prior intention to do A explains why one intends to do B, when A is a means to do B, then there ought to be another action C that one intends to do in order to explain why one intends to do B, and so on ad infinitum.

In order to block the first regress, my suggestion (similar to Fafner's) is that intending to do A and doing A intentionally just are two ways to characterize the very same thing. Intentions aren't purely mental acts that stand behind people's intentional actions. They rather are the manner in which such actions are rationally structured. (Compare Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind on "mental processes" and "intelligent acts").

I've also sketched a way to block the second regress through appealing to the considerations in the light of which an agent acts. When a chain of 'why?' questions terminates with the mention of the broadest intentional action (e.g. "Why are you breaking eggs?", ... , "Why are you making an omelet?", ... , "Why are you having guests for dinner?") then the final answer need not refer to an intention to form the intention of having guests for dinner. Rather, it terminates with the mention that one enjoys the company of those particular guests or whatever. (There'd be more to say about the way reasons can rationalize and, at the same time, explain, other actions in a way that is very similar to the way overarching actions rationalize their component actions.)

Free will entails having control over your acts, which seems to be missing when your acts are unintentional. Like, slipping on a banana peel - an unintentional and therefore unfree act. — litewave

Free will is ontological freedom in conjunction with will phenomena.

So no, your supposed support is question-begging.

I agree but it is so because you don't have an intention to do it. If you do an action without an intention to do it, it is as if the action or event "happens to you", it is outside of your control. — litewave

Yes, but there is no implication in the ability to choose a direction of action that there is also control of outcome.

Granted, there are certain authors and groups who suggest we create our worlds, but as you indicate, there does not seem to be any control of outcomes.

There are many, many constraints on actions, all we can do is try to move in a direction.

Also, an intentional action, on the account I have been recommending, isn't a further act causally downstream from the act of intending. — Pierre-Normand

The problem is that I don't understand how you can control the intentional action if your intention doesn't influence it. The intention on your view seems to be just an epiphenomenon that is formed simultaneously with your action.

So, to refer back to my earlier trip-to-Cuba example, if I intend to go to Cuba next month, there this already existing intention can be the cause, in a sense, of my forming today the new intention of booking plane tickets. So, whenever A is a means of doing B, then what causes my intending to do A is my intending to do B. The sort of causation that is a play here might be called rational causation. It is because it is rational to do A when one intends to do B that one forms an intention to do A. — Pierre-Normand

This seems to be ordinary causation where a temporally prior intention (to go to Cuba) causes another intention (to book plane tickets).

Free will is ontological freedom in conjunction with will phenomena. — Terrapin Station

Free will is about control. If you don't have control over your action then the action is not freely willed.

There are many, many constraints on actions, all we can do is try to move in a direction. — Rich

And this trying influences the movement. Even if there are other factors that influence the movement, your influence gives you at least partial control over the movement.

The problem is that I don't understand how you can control the intentional action if your intention doesn't influence it. The intention on your view seems to be just an epiphenomenon that is formed simultaneously with your action. — litewave

You don't need to control the intentional action since your being engaged in an intentional action already is your controlling what happens with your own body and surroundings. It's not as if you were a puppet and what you need in order to control your action is to be able to pull your own strings. On my view -- which I also take to be broadly consistent with the view of several contemporary philosophers of action -- our intentions aren't epiphenomena that accompany our bodily movements. Rather, they are being manifested in the rational structure of those voluntary movements. (Compare how the canvas of a tissue accounts for its tensile strength, but doesn't cause it in the manner of an antecedent condition.)

It might be useful to compare this with Gilbert Ryle's polemic against the "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". On Ryle's view, when you are talking intelligently you may on occasion, but usually don't, think how you are going to string your words together in order to convey an intelligent thought. Rather, in the usual case, your ability to intelligently come up with the correct words, on the fly, as it were, is partly constitutive of your ability to think out loud. Likewise, in the case of intentional action, your ability to intelligently manipulate the material world around you reveals your activity as intentional and responsive to instrumental reasons (among other sorts of reasons that you are freely endorsing at the time when you are acting).

This seems to be ordinary causation where a temporally prior intention (to go to Cuba) causes another intention (to book plane tickets).

I would rather say that your prior intention to go to Cuba, as well as your ability to reason instrumentally, is manifested in your now booking the plane tickets (and many other things that you do, or refrain from doing when that would interfere with your plans). This is a manifestation of your practical knowledge (i.e. your knowledge of what it is that you are doing and why you are doing it) being retained over long stretches of time: until such a time, usually, when your intention has been realized.

Compare this with the case of theoretical knowledge. If you acquire on Monday the knowledge that pi is an irrational number and are being asked on Wednesday whether the decimal expansion of pi is periodic, you will say that it isn't. This is a manifestation of you persistent knowledge that pi is irrational (and your ability to rationally infer things from what you know). It would be strange to say that your answer that pi isn't periodic has been caused by whatever caused you, in the past, to believe that pi is irrational. (Though that could be a sensible contrastive explanation to offer to someone who knew that you used to be ignorant of the fact that pi is irrational). Your answer to the question rather is, in the usual case, best explained as the continued manifestation of a piece theoretical knowledge that you once acquired and now retain together with your ability to make inferences on its basis.

And this trying influences the movement. Even if there are other factors that influence the movement, your influence gives you at least partial control over the movement — litewave

I would not characterize any influence as control. It it's more like intent of movement, so yes if a person is attempting to move against a wind force, no one force controls the movement, rather they create one holistic event with an unpredictable outcome.

So the support is a question-begging stipulation. Nice.

You don't need to control the intentional action since your being engaged in an intentional action already is your controlling what happens with your own body and surroundings. — Pierre-Normand

But if my intention does not influence the action then my being engaged in the action is not controlling the action. I wouldn't even say that the action is intended (intentional).

Rather, in the usual case, your ability to intelligently come up with the correct words, on the fly, as it were, is partly constitutive of your ability to think out loud. — Pierre-Normand

I would say that my intention to express something verbally causes the related words to come to my tongue. For example if I intend to communicate to someone that I have the feeling of hunger, this intention draws the word "hunger" from my lexical memory and pushes it to the speech center in my brain which activates my tongue, lips, breathing and so on in such a way that the sound of the word "hunger" is produced. I guess this is roughly the causal neurological process.

I would rather say that your prior intention to go to Cuba, as well as your ability to reason instrumentally, is manifested in your now booking the plane tickets (and many other things that you do, or refrain from doing when that would interfere with your plans). — Pierre-Normand

It seems that the part "is manifested in" can be easily substituted with "causes".

It would be strange to say that your answer that pi isn't periodic has been caused by whatever caused you, in the past, to believe that pi is irrational. — Pierre-Normand

Why? To believe that pi is irrational means to believe that its decimal expansion is infinite and is not periodic. So that which caused me to have this belief also causes (indirectly, through the belief) my answer when I am asked what I believe about pi.

So the support is a question-begging stipulation. Nice. — Terrapin Station

Your stipulation is question-begging. Are you saying that slipping unintentionally on a banana peel is a freely willed action?

Are you saying that slipping unintentionally on a banana peel is a freely willed action? — litewave

Does that involve will phenomena?

Does that involve will phenomena? — Terrapin Station

What do you mean by "will phenomena"?

Well, you know what we're referring to by the term "will" right? It's kind of hard to talk about free will if we don't know what "will" is.

What do you mean by "phenomena" and what does it have to do with your denial that one must have control over one's freely willed action?

But if my intention does not influence the action then my being engaged in the action is not controlling the action. I wouldn't even say that the action is intended (intentional). — litewave

When we characterize an intentional action we often use a verb phrase that doesn't merely describe the bodily motions of the person who is acting but also the ends that she is pursuing. For instance, we might say that she is (intentionally) making an omelet. And this explains why she is heating the frying pan, breaking eggs, chopping up mushrooms, etc. All that purposeful activity is geared towards realizing the end characterized as "having made an omelet". As long as the person is performing this overarching action intentionally, all the component actions that are means towards that end are being performed by her thanks to her understanding them to be such necessary means. So, I am suggesting that what makes the action intentional under such a description (i.e. "making an omelet") is the fact that the agent is pursuing that goal while being able to deliberate practically towards realizing that goal; that is, judging what the necessary means are and executing them for that reason.

So, yes, you may say that the intention influences the action, but that is merely to say that the agent's self-determination of her own goals and her ability to reason instrumentally towards achieving them, explains how her basic actions are being structured by her while her overarching action progresses.

I would say that my intention to express something verbally causes the related words to come to my tongue. For example if I intend to communicate to someone that I have the feeling of hunger, this intention draws the word "hunger" from my lexical memory and pushes it to the speech center in my brain which activates my tongue, lips, breathing and so on in such a way that the sound of the word "hunger" is produced. I guess this is roughly the causal neurological process.

It seems doubtful to me that there is a wordless thought process that operates upstream from any of our exercises of abilities to use words when we are reasoning or forming intentions. And, in fact, I think there might be evidence to the contrary from cognitive neuroscience. but if you don't accept this then my Rylean example will not be helpful.

I may not absolutely need, however, to appeal to this Rylean model in order to argue that freely chosen courses of action need not be controlled by prior intentions that themselves are chosen intentionally, as you suggested in your original post (as an alleged requirement of libertarian free will). Even if we construe the forming of an intention as a purely mental act, that occurs prior to acting, and that controls our actions, there still need not be a separate act of choosing to intend in this way in order that the intention be free and that we be responsible for it.

As Fafner suggested, for an intentional action to be free in the relevant sense that secures the agent's responsibility, the source of the intention must be the agent herself rather than antecedent causes that lay beyond the scopes of her control and agency. But if, as I suggested, what the formation of an intention essentially reflects is the agent's sensitivity to the practical considerations that, by her own lights, make it reasonable and intelligible that she would pursue this intended course of action, then she is a free as anyone may wish to be when she so intends.

As I also suggested, such an explanation of action looks very much like a compatibilist account. But it is crucially distinguished from standard compatibilist accounts in an important respect. If what grounds the agent's decision is her being sensitive to the features of her practical situation that make it reasonable, by her own lights, that she ought to so act, then her actions aren't determined by prior causes that have receded in the historical past and that therefore lay beyond her control.

It seems that the part "is manifested in" can be easily substituted with "causes".

It can't be so substituted since what is being manifested in intentional action is the agent's sensitivity to the reasons why she acts and the rational outcome of this sensitivity isn't caused by past events. Such a capacity is only, at most, being enabled by the past history of the agent. We are not free the become rational agents because we are relying on our having suitable biological and social endowments. But when those necessary causal requirements are met, then we acquire the sort of rational and moral autonomy that make us free and responsible.

Why? To believe that pi is irrational means to believe that its decimal expansion is infinite and is not periodic. So that which caused me to have this belief also causes (indirectly, through the belief) my answer when I am asked what I believe about pi

That would be correct if we were always being passively caused to acquire our beliefs through the impact of brute external events. But this would be to deny that we have rational abilities to critically assess our beliefs and their sources in such a manner as to secure genuine knowledge. This is why my example was focused on knowledge rather than belief, since our rational ability to know is analogous to our ability to reasons practically and determine our ends.

When we have a rational ability to know, then the reasons why we come to endorse specific beliefs and repudiate others can liberate us from the past vagaries that caused us to acquire them in the first place. We can then submit them the rational criticism (which may be a quite trivial business, such as checking for commons sources of illusion, or ceasing to trust habitual liars, etc.) and what thereby comes to be the cause of our states of genuine knowledge becomes our own self-determined power to asses the justifications of our beliefs.

What do you mean by "phenomena" and what does it have to do with your denial that one must have control over one's freely willed action? — litewave

"Phenomenon" - simply an occurrence, something that obtains. "Phenomena" is the plural.

"Phenomenon" - simply an occurrence, something that obtains. "Phenomena" is the plural. — Terrapin Station

So, in summary, you account of free will is that it's real freedom accompanied with things that obtain. Have you thought about submitting it to a philosophical journal?

You should think about trying to edit a journal, given the reading comprehension you're displaying. Good thing we're not attempting anything more complicated than a few words.

Here's one way to illustrate what's wrong with your account of intention.

Your basic idea seems to be that the relation between the intention and the resulting action is causal (e.g., your talk about influencing our actions and so on), but here's why it can't be causal. Causality is a relation between events that we discover aposteriori through experience. As Hume has taught us, there's no way to deduce apriori the effects from their causes, but you have to observe causes and effects and see if they come in constant conjunctions etc.

But now, do we learn by experience that every time when we have a certain sort of intention, we always find ourselves behaving in some corresponding way? Imagine that you have the intention to go outside for a walk. Can you imagine the possibility that while you are having this intention (you are about to go outside), your body suddenly 'decides' to do something else entirely? Of course all things can happen: your body may become paralyzed, you can change your mind in the meantime etc. But whatever happens, you are not going to say to yourself "I was wrong, it wasn't an intention to go for a walk after all, but something else". Or suppose that you have intended to go for a walk, but suddenly a burglar appears and at gun point forces you to hand him all your money. Would you say that you were wrong about your intention, that you really didn't intend to go for walk, but actually to hand all your money to a burglar? (or does this possibility even make sense?) After all, how did you know that you had the intention to go outside, if something totally else happened to your body as a result?

All this shows that you can always recognize in the intention itself what sort of action is the 'correct' or the 'corresponding' action that would count as the realization of that intention. And this is not a prophecy about the future (since you can intend something, while you fail to realize it for all sorts of reasons - you cannot predict the feature in some extraordinary sense just based on your intentions), but rather it is a logical connection that we draw between intentions and the actions that realize them. And so it is wrong to try and explain this relation by postulating the existence of some hidden psychological mechanism where intentions simply cause actions as a matter of contingent psychological fact.

What actually happens -- and this is how we come to have the concepts of intention and free actions -- is that we simply, as a matter of fact, are not being constantly surprised by what our bodies do. We don't first recognize in ourselves a distinct psychological state of 'intention' and then wonder or try to guess what kind of behavior it is going to cause; rather we just act as a matter of course, and make the distinction between voluntary actions and other sorts of unintentional or forced behavior on the basis of this fact. So when we explain our actions by citing our intentions, we are not giving a causal explanation that involves two distinct entities that always coincide for some reason, but we are simply making a logical distinction between two different sorts of behavior: behaviors that we control as agents, and the behaviors that we don't.

Of course it is a matter of experience what sorts of behaviors are and aren't under our control; but the crucial point is that you don't infer that you did something intentionally on the basis of first recognizing that an intention has preceded it, and then conclude for this reason that it must've been you that caused your behavior and not someone else. And compare this to a case of some unknown mechanism in which you try to identify which part causes some other part to move. Here it makes sense to form hypothesis about what causes what, but not in the case of inferring which of our behaviors are voluntary.

I can't see any relevance in what you say here. If libertarian free will is, according to rational thought, inexplicable, and you want to conclude from this that it is impossible, then although you might still have fellings of your own, and feelings about others', moral responsibility, it certainly doesn't follow that those feelings are rationally justifiable.

You need to show how the special idea of moral responsibility which is necessarily based on the belief that human behavior is not exhaustively determined by natural forces could be compatible with its being exhaustively determined by natural forces and the idea that no human decision or act reaaly could have been other than it was.

So, I am suggesting that what makes the action intentional under such a description (i.e. "making an omelet") is the fact that the agent is pursuing that goal while being able to deliberate practically towards realizing that goal; that is, judging what the necessary means are and executing them for that reason. — Pierre-Normand

But all of this can be explained by ordinary temporal causation. Factors like the feeling of hunger, food desires/preferences, belief about what ingredients are available in the kitchen, knowledge of how to make an omelet etc. cause the agent's intention to make an omelet. Then this intention, along with other factors like the knowledge of how to make an omelet, causes the agent to perform actions like heating up the frying pan, breaking eggs, chopping up mushrooms. Logical and physical operations can also be performed by a machine - no libertarian/incompatibilist free will is necessary.

Even if we construe the forming of an intention as a purely mental act, that occurs prior to acting, and that controls our actions, there still need not be a separate act of choosing to intend in this way in order that the intention be free and that we be responsible for it. — Pierre-Normand

But then the act of forming the intention is not freely willed (since it is not controlled by an intention to do the act) and thus the act that is controlled by the formed intention is controlled by something, an intention, that is not freely willed. For a compatibilist it is not a problem, but the fact that the final act is ultimately controlled by something that is not freely willed would clash with the libertarian concept of free will.

As I also suggested, such an explanation of action looks very much like a compatibilist account. But it is crucially distinguished from standard compatibilist accounts in an important respect. If what grounds the agent's decision is her being sensitive to the features of her practical situation that make it reasonable, by her own lights, that she ought to so act, then her actions aren't determined by prior causes that have receded in the historical past and that therefore lay beyond her control. — Pierre-Normand

But what does "being sensitive" mean? It seems we can again explain it causally - being sensitive to something means being able to be influenced by something, for example by the agent's needs, habits, desires, beliefs, knowledge, intentions... These factors influence the agent's actions.

That would be correct if we were always being passively caused to acquire our beliefs through the impact of brute external events. But this would be to deny that we have rational abilities to critically assess our beliefs and their sources in such a manner as to secure genuine knowledge. — Pierre-Normand

Of course in real life the process of "critically assessing" our beliefs and their sources may be complicated, but in principle these seem to be logical operations that also a machine could perform, reducible to causal processes.

As Hume has taught us, there's no way to deduce apriori the effects from their causes, but you have to observe causes and effects and see if they come in constant conjunctions etc. — Fafner

But since there are stable regularities in nature that we can describe in terms of causation, we can also successfully predict effects from causes. Often there is more than one significant cause in a given situation and then the effect is caused by several causes that may be difficult to identify and thus the natural regularity may be obscured. Science is successful in the causal explanation of such cases too.

But now, do we learn by experience that every time when we have a certain sort of intention, we always find ourselves behaving in some corresponding way? — Fafner

Since our behavior is generally influenced not only by our intentions but also by other factors, our intention to do a certain act need not always be followed by that act. But there are plenty of cases where such an act occurs pretty regularly because other factors that might block it are insignificant, for example when I intend to raise my right hand I usually do it successfully.

I can't see any relevance in what you say here. If libertarian free will is, according to rational thought, inexplicable, and you want to conclude from this that it is impossible, then although you might still have fellings of your own, and feelings about others', moral responsibility, it certainly doesn't follow that those feelings are rationally justifiable. — John

What do you mean by rational justification of feelings? How can we rationally justify compassion? It seems to be an evolved feeling that is useful in some way. It enables us to form emotional bonds with others and seems to be a part of integrative processes in our brains/minds.

You need to show how the special idea of moral responsibility which is necessarily based on the belief that human behavior is not exhaustively determined by natural forces could be compatible with its being exhaustively determined by natural forces and the idea that no human decision or act reaaly could have been other than it was. — John

The idea of moral responsibility that is based on the concept of libertarian free will is just as meaningless as libertarian free will. But I offered an idea of moral responsibility that doesn't need libertarian free will.

But all of this can be explained by ordinary temporal causation. Factors like the feeling of hunger, food desires/preferences, belief about what ingredients are available in the kitchen, knowledge of how to make an omelet etc. cause the agent's intention to make an omelet. Then this intention, along with other factors like the knowledge of how to make an omelet, causes the agent to perform actions like heating up the frying pan, breaking eggs, chopping up mushrooms. Logical and physical operations can also be performed by a machine - no libertarian/incompatibilist free will is necessary. — litewave

Let me grant you, for the sake of argument, that libertarian free will isn't required. You are still agreeing with my main point in that case. If the obtaining of all of those causal relations between the agent's prior states of mind (beliefs, desires) and her intentional actions is all that is required for those intentional actions to count as being free, then there is no need for the agent to "control" her intentions for the future and there is no regress looming. This was the main argument that I was making here. The conditions for intentional actions to count as being free don't include a requirement that the intentions themselves be controlled by the agent. It is sufficient that the mental states of the agent that are manifested in the pattern of her intentional actions reflect her sensitivity to whatever features of her practical situation she takes to constitute good reasons for them. So, this is something that I am in broad agreement with many compatibilists about.

But then the act of forming the intention is not freely willed (since it is not controlled by an intention to do the act) and thus the act that is controlled by the formed intention is controlled by something, an intention, that is not freely willed. For a compatibilist it is not a problem, but the fact that the final act is ultimately controlled by something that is not freely willed would clash with the libertarian concept of free will. — litewave

On my view, the action is indeed controlled by the intention of the agent (and therefore, by the agent). What makes it the case that an action is controlled by an agent precisely is the obtaining of the conditions under which the action is intentional. Granted, there arises a problem for some libertarians who believe that acts of the will only are free if the agent could have acted differently in the exact same circumstances, where those circumstances include all of the agent's states of mind and the dispositions of her character. But that's not my account.

But what does "being sensitive" mean? It seems we can again explain it causally - being sensitive to something means being able to be influenced by something, for example by the agent's needs, habits, desires, beliefs, knowledge, intentions... These factors influence the agent's actions. — litewave

Sure, but the relevant factor that I am identifying as the ground of the agent's intentional actions are the features of her practical situation that she can adduce as the reasons why she is doing what she is doing.

If you ask me why I am doing something, you can then challenge my reasons, or try to convince me that I am not acting in a way that furthers my own self-interest, or that my choice has been made on the ground of some false beliefs, etc. But if you tell me that I am not free since my action is being "influenced" by my awareness of the reason that I just gave you, then I can shrug this off. Who would want to be acting "freely" on no rational ground whatsoever?

If, on the other hand, you are arguing that my action isn't free since my being aware of the particular reason why I act depends on my having the beliefs and motivations that I in fact had immediately prior to making my choice, then it seems that I can also shrug this off. This is only relevant if you can show me that some of those beliefs and motivations are states of mind that are interfering with my awareness of better reasons that I might have for acting differently right now. But then, what you really should be offering me are those better reasons. My having prior beliefs only constitutes a limitation (of sorts) on my freedom if the beliefs are false and therefore interfere with my ability to achieve my goals. And likewise regarding misguided motivations or bad character traits that may cloud my judgement regarding what it is that I should set as my goals.

Of course in real life the process of "critically assessing" our beliefs and their sources may be complicated, but in principle these seem to be logical operations that also a machine could perform, reducible to causal processes. — litewave

To the extent that a robot would perform those rational tasks just as well as a mature human being, then it would also be free. But the mere fact that the computer controlling the robot might run a deterministic algorithm would be irrelevant, on my view. If the robot's emergent behavior is such that it manifests sensitivity to good reasons for acting, and the robot is able to revise its beliefs, and steer and adjust its own motivational states accordingly, then its emergent behavior will not be deterministic even though the mechanism that produces its bodily movements might be. Some emergent properties of complex systems can be indeterministic even if the laws that govern the evolution of its constituent parts aren't. The behaviors of animals or robots characterized in high level intentional terms are such emergent features that are distinctive from the 'raw' bodily motions and the antecedent neural/computational states that generate them.

On my view, the action is indeed controlled by the intention of the agent (and therefore, by the agent). What makes it the case that an action is controlled by an agent precisely is the obtaining of the conditions under which the action is intentional. Granted, there arises a problem for some libertarians who believe that acts of the will only are free if the agent could have acted differently in the exact same circumstances, where those circumstances include all of the agent's states of mind and the dispositions of her character. But that's not my account. — Pierre-Normand

If the intention is not freely chosen then all of the agent's actions are completely determined by factors that the agent has not freely chosen. This is something that I think libertarians would have a problem with because the idea of libertarian free will seems to require a freedom that can override any determining factors.

What do you mean by rational justification of feelings? How can we rationally justify compassion? It seems to be an evolved feeling that is useful in some way. It enables us to form emotional bonds with others and seems to be a part of integrative processes in our brains/minds. — litewave

What you're failing to see is that the ordinary everyday feeling of being morally responsible is based upon the feeling of being free and the belief that we are in fact free. What I am saying is that the belief that we are free is not rationally justifiable, but that the logic that underlies that belief is nonetheless
the logic of libertarian free will.

The idea of moral responsibility that is based on the concept of libertarian free will is just as meaningless as libertarian free will. But I offered an idea of moral responsibility that doesn't need libertarian free will. — litewave

The idea is not nonsensical at all, we all understand it perfectly well. It is just that it is un-analyzable. It's kind of like Zeno's Paradoxes of movement; analysis produces infinite regress. What you have to realize is that being is not thought; being cannot be analyzed rationally without producing seeming paradoxes and aporias, and this is so not just with the case of human freedom.

There is no coherent idea of moral responsibility that "doesn't need libertarian free will"; the idea of responsibility without the latter notion collapses into causal responsibility which is the same as with all natural phenomena, and you have definitely not offered any account of such an idea that "doesn't need libertarian free will".

If the intention is not freely chosen then all of the agent's actions are completely determined by factors that the agent has not freely chosen. This is something that I think libertarians would have a problem with because the idea of libertarian free will seems to require a freedom that can override any determining factors. — litewave

I agree that this a problem that afflicts many traditional libertarian accounts of free will. But I think the main assumption that generates this problem is a mistaken assumption that is generally shared by (most) libertarians and (most) compatibilists. And this is the assumption that the antecedent features of the agent's ability for practical deliberation (including her antecedent beliefs and motivations) -- which she had prior to the time when she deliberated and/or chose what to do -- constitute antecedent constraints on her power of deliberation that she has no power over. Where the traditional libertarians and the traditional compatibilists disagree is whether this lack of present control does constitute a threat on the very idea of freedom of choice.

I am actually agreeing with compatibilists that "present control" on (or ability to override, as it were) the causal efficacy of one's own antecedent beliefs and motivations isn't a requirement for freedom and responsibility. One's own antecedent character indeed isn't something that is external to one's own power of agency. It is rather constitutive of it. I am however disagreeing with compatibilists that the manner in which an agent's antecedent beliefs and desires make intelligible the actions that she chooses to do can be construed in a deterministic fashion.

There are two reasons for that. First, just because one's antecedent beliefs and motivations contribute to explaining what one does doesn't generally absolve one from responsibility. And that's because one's responsibility for those features of one's character often extend to the past. If one acts badly because one has acquired a bad habit, one often is responsible for having acquired the bad habit in the first place.

Secondly, and more importantly, in order to explain what someone does on the basis of the beliefs and motivations that she has, it isn't generally sufficient to merely mention those beliefs and motivations as brute facts about her and her antecedent "dispositions". It is also generally necessary, in order to so much as *make sense* of what it is that she is doing (and hence construe her behavior as genuine intentional actions as opposed to mere conditioned responses to present stimuli, say) to get a handle on the reasons why she takes some of her motivations and some of her beliefs to be relevant to her present decision. One does not always act merely on the strength of one's "strongest" antecedent desire, whatever that might mean. Rather, one acts on desires, values or considerations that one takes to highlight specific features of one's practical situation that are salient on rational and/or moral grounds. And this can't generally be explained in terms of "antecedent" states of mind.