I have various commentaries on Kant by different authors, but the one I accept and follow is the commentary books by Graham Bird. His 2x books on Kant are my favourite, which are "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" and "The Revolutionary Kant".It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.
If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena,
— Corvus
The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.
So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined. — AmadeusD
Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses, that it needs food and something is pinching you, or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? :grin:For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?
— Corvus
For example, perceptions, hunger, pain. — Lionino
Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page? — Mww
Yet he goes on to note that we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought. — Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves
But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant? — Corvus
Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common. — AmadeusD
I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one. — Lionino
…..proper account….. — Corvus
The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding. — AmadeusD
Putting these pieces together we can see that “things in themselves” [Dinge an sich selbst] and (negative) “noumena” are concepts that belong to two different distinctions: “thing in itself” is one half of the appearance/thing in itself distinction, which Kant originally defined at A491/B519 in terms of their existence: appearances have no existence “grounded in themselves” while things in themselves do. “Noumena” is one half of the distinction phenomena/noumena which Kant characterizes at B307 as the distinction between what can be an object of our sensible spatiotemporal intuition and what cannot be an object of sensible intuition.
However, we can make a connection between them: things in themselves, the objects whose existence is “ground in itself”, and which appear to us in space and time, cannot be objects of any sensible intuition, so they are negative noumena. Whether, additionally, they are also objects of an intuitive intellect, is a separate matter.
And logically, if a noumenon was proven to be existent, then would it be still a noumenon? Or a phenomenon? — Corvus
All objects of empirical intuition are appearances, but only those that are “thought in accordance with the unity of the categories” are phenomena. For instance, if I have a visual after-image or highly disunified visual hallucination, that perception may not represent its object as standing in cause-effect relations, or being an alteration in an absolutely permanent substance. These would be appearances but not phenomena.
Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses — Corvus
or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? — Corvus
This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern. — Mww
Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.I don’t agree with much of this. — AmadeusD
Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here. — AmadeusD
I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium. — Lionino
I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects. — Lionino
I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon. — Lionino
I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge…. — Corvus
But reason when applied to the appearance…. — Corvus
From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself. — Mww
How can judgement function for rational conclusions — Corvus
Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to the experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement. — Corvus
Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes. — Mww
I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how all those are possible in the first place, and they are all only possible iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.
THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!! — Mww
Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes.
— Mww
Why does it synthesise? What does synthesis do, if it doesn't offer conclusion? — Corvus
But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties. — Corvus
:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement. — Mww
The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere. — Mww
The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant is not that the different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the car parts as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. — Corvus
Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?
Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others? — Mww
….judgement needs reason for its proper operation. — Corvus
It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding. — Mww
How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good. — Corvus
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