Knowing what will happen does not mean we know why it will happen — RussellA
I'm not a Kant scholar. But my understanding of his Transcendental Idealism*1 is that it's merely an admonition to idea-mongering philosophers, not to confuse our artificial worldviews with absolute Reality. This is not exactly claiming, like Berkeley, that our perception of the world sees only "appearances" that represent the Ideal world as-if objects (ding an sich) ultimately exist in the mind of God. But merely to note that humans see only superficial Properties, that are meaningful to our space-time physical needs, instead of essential eternal Qualities.Does this mean that transcendental idealism is in the end unavoidable and there is no realistic alternative to this world-view? And is the possibility and success of science proof, that Kant was rightfully claiming that we can never attain to a knowledge of things surrounding us per se i.e. independent of us? — Pez
Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, Pez – "concepts" do not "change" themselves, we change our concepts in order to adapt. Turning on house lights at night in an unfamiliar house does not change the house, rather you change only your capability for orienting yourself within that unfamiliar house. Likewise, given that we inhabit the world, the 'models (i.e. pictures, maps, simulations) of the world' which we make conform with varying degrees of fidelity to the world and thereby inform our expectations of how we can adapt to the world. For instance, GR & QM were as true about the physical world in Aristotle's day and in Newton's day as they are today even though Aristotle, Newton and their contemporaries, respectively, were completely ignorant of them. Thus, changing our concepts of reality, in effect, only changes us and not reality itself. — 180 Proof
But philosophy might be considered as an attempt to understand why we can know what will happen (if at all). — Pez
Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, — 180 Proof
The most that philosopher Kant claimed about our knowledge of what exists outside us is in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 of the Critique of Pure Reason. He concludes "I am conscious of things outside me". IE, he can neither know what these things are or even why these things are as they are. — RussellA
It might be considered weird, that someone describing his philosophy as “transcendental idealism” writes a paragraph called “Refutation of Idealism”. — Pez
The sole point of interest here hinges around the notion “outside” — Pez
In the second edition, however, Kant inserted a new argument, the "Refutation of Idealism" (B 2 74-9), which attempts to show that the very possibility of our consciousness of ourselves presupposes the existence of an external world of objects that are not only represented as spatially outside us but are also conceived to exist independently of our subjective representations of them.
Only some (idealist) philosophers ... most of whom argue from rather than towards their conclusion. Anyway, at least since Democritus in the 5th century BCE, many philosophers have inferred and then modern natural scientists have demonstrated that nature is, in fact, vastly "outside of consciousness" and that "consciousness" is therefore nature-dependent (i.e. reality-dependent) rather than the other way around. In other words, Pez, it's reasonable to infer that it is also a (meta) "law of nature" that intelligent minds can abstract "laws of nature" from (modeling) nature.The question, if we can infer from this experience to something outside of consciousness, has been a long dispute among philosophers. — Pez
I'm not a Kant scholar, and have never read any of his works. But, "Transcendence" is inherently a debatable term, since it is based on subjective imagination instead of objective observation. Some critics seem to assume that Kant's "transcendental" referred to a religious heavenly realm of perfection isolated from the imperfect physical world. But others, such as the 19th century Transcendentalists, apparently believed in a parallel "spiritual" realm within this world, perceivable via intuition. For example, as depicted in movies : innocent children, guided by feelings instead of reason, can "see" dead people, or demons, or disguised alien monsters.The term "transcendental idealism" should be thought of as a name rather than a description, as the Champs-Élysées is a name and not a description.
In fact, he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," (Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason) — RussellA
... you vapidly conflate with Kant's use of transcendental (which you further confuse with "Transcendentalism"). Apparently, it never occurs to you, Gnomon, to first read, let alone study, what you wantonly bloviate about. More shameless sophistry. :sparkle: :sweat:I'm not a Kant scholar, and have never read any of his works. But, "Transcendence" ... — Gnomon
Non-Magical Intuition :
Intuition is a form of knowledge that appears in consciousness without obvious deliberation. It is not magical but rather a faculty in which hunches are generated by the unconscious mind rapidly sifting through past experience and cumulative knowledge.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/intuition — Gnomon
It is possible to hone your powers of intuition. To some degree, intuition stems from expertise, which relies on tacit knowledge. Strengthening intuition requires making use of feedback, comparing the real-life outcomes of situations with the intuitive decisions you made. Even so, being highly intuitive in one domain of experience doesn’t guarantee reliability in every area.
our knowledge comes to a certain extent before the object, making our concept of „objects“ and the inference to future occurrences from past ones possible — Pez
"Transcendence" is inherently a debatable term — Gnomon
A 369 I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.
But should laws not refer to something? Law itself being nature sounds, for me at least, a bit inconceivable. — Pez
Or is it more conceivable that electrons and protons don't actually have such properties, and are just following laws? — wonderer1
like the Michelson-Morley experiment didn't go so well with Newtonian physics, then we try to find a logical model for it. — ssu
are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them — Pez
I don't know if you mean that literally or not — bert1
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