I mean, given the right circumstances, I and the hunter gatherer can work out how to live together and talk to each other. Could we do this if there were not some general but suprabiological human form of life?

Edit: cross-post. Yes, I think so, that’s kind of what I was thinking.

As long as they speak my language, sure.

Just hasn't happened yet.

The aliens in the ocean seem to be speaking, though.

It's far from original to say that Wittgenstein's philosophy has a lot in common with Kant's — Jamal

There are striking similarities, but that's basically true for everyone else as well. Kant seems to be the dividing line in the history of philosophy, and everything is reaction to Kant, if one wants just to see it that way. It is still interesting to think about if Wittgenstein never read Kant properly.

The aliens in the ocean seem to be speaking, though. — Moliere

Cthulhu?

Heh. Naw, dolphins and whales.

Yeah. Well sure, everyone from octopuses to planet-encompassing sentient oceans is welcome. I was throwing "human" around carelessly.

"speak my language" was pretty careless on my part, among other things :).

Mostly it was an off-hand thought about language and animals and W.

It's probably worth pursuing it.

One more interesting thing to note is that Kant and Wittgenstein are similar not only in their transcendental perspective on human beings, but also in their use of this perspective to show that most philosophy hitherto has gone astray by asking questions that cannot be asked. — Jamal

This is an interesting statement. With "asking questions that cannot be asked", you seem to imply that philosophy is doing the impossible. And when I wonder, "what do you actually mean by this?", because "doing the impossible" doesn't make any sense, I come up with two completely different possibilities. One would be "asking questions that cannot be answered", and the other would be "trying to ask questions which cannot actually be asked". Since the former is rather boring, implying a sort of unintelligible type of question, I assume you would mean the latter.

But even "trying to ask questions which cannot be asked" is difficult to understand because of the different senses of "possible" which we use, and the variety in types of limitations which are evident relative to the different types of possibilities. So for instance, we have a relationship between language and logic, which with a formal understanding of "logic", would make logic dependent on language unlike @Fooloso4's representation of "Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible." But if we restrict the definition of "logic" in the way that I just proposed, we still need to come up with terms to describe the type of thinking which transcends logic.

This is not at all difficult, because we have the means to talk about irrational, and unreasonable thought, and the thinking of different animals which is not logical. This is the way language works, it is not limited by the activities which it empowers, and this is why it is extremely powerful. Language transcends logic, it can also transcend knowledge to talk about the unknown, and it further transcends all forms of thinking and thought, to talk about things which cannot even be thought about (we can speak nonsense). That's what the "private language" demonstrates, the transcendent capacity of language. This implies that there is no such thing as "questions which cannot be asked", leaving only "questions which cannot be answered".

This puts language in a very special, unique place, which seems counterintuitive, and many would argue against it. This is the place of infinite possibility, absolutely limitless, implying that there is nowhere tht language cannot go, nothing which cannot be said. To understand this phenomenal position of language, all one needs to do is take a look at the language of mathematics. The natural numbers are limitless, infinite, and this provides the capacity to count any quantity. This is indicative of the way that language is, in general, it is "designed" so as to give the user the capacity to go beyond any limitations, therefore to speak about anything whatsoever. Now we must rule out the second option "trying to ask questions which cannot actually be asked", because anything can be asked, that is simply the limitless capacity which language is.

So we're back to the first possibility, "asking what cannot be answered", in our interpretation of "most philosophy hitherto has gone astray by asking questions that cannot be asked". Since language can go anywhere, and it is designed to speak about anything, and therefore ask any question, why would we say that philosophy has gone astray by asking questions which cannot be answered? Isn't this exactly the job of philosophy, to venture into the unknown, and ask what cannot be answered? Didn't Socrates say that philosophy begins in wonder? Putting the transcend nature of language to work, utilizing its limitless capacity, to ask what cannot be answered, is exactly the role of philosophy.

Incidentally, I tend to think of forms of life hierarchically, as if there’s a multiply nested plurality all within the general human form of life. — Jamal

I would argue in favor of forms of human life.

It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No and countless other things. —– And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.

(PI 19)

To imagine such a language is to imagine a form of life that is different from ours.

“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.

(PI 241)

What we in our technologically advanced world say would not be what less technologically advanced peoples would agree with. They would think we were crazy.

Look also at Wittgenstein's use of an imagined people or tribe. Their way or form of life differs from ours

We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B, even the whole language of a tribe.

(PI 6)

When we do philosophy, we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this.

(PI 194)

We also say of a person that he is transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards our considerations that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country’s language. One does not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can’t find our feet with them.

(PPF 325)

... unlike Fooloso4's representation of "Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible." — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not my representation. It is what Wittgenstein says. I cited it. Unless you are claiming that he means something else by the term 'transcendental.

. . . and a general reply to this conversation: In his excellent book The Logic of Reflection, Julian Roberts reads LW as asserting in the Tractatus that “the structures of truth and certainty are only very inadequately rendered in natural language,” quoting 4.0002: “Language disguises the thought.” But by the time of the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, “Wittgenstein questioned whether there was any such thing as a ‛fact’ independent of the system we used to describe it. Arithmetic, for example, taught us to see particular sorts of ‛fact’.” So language, and the various language-games, would trump logic or structure.

I think LW is open to the charge of what Habermas calls “performative contradiction,” in that he seems to be privileging a particular language-game in his later writing to discuss, criticize, and relativize language-games. It doesn’t matter whether we call this game “philosophy” or not. The question rather is whether such a critical perspective carries its own warrant, so to speak, or whether it is merely another way (among many) of seeing “particular sorts of ‛facts’.”

If your point is that according to Wittgenstein there are multiple forms of life, then of course I agree. My point—which was just an aside—was that in the interpretive debate over the granular level and the plurality or singularity of form(s) of life, I have a way of juggling the different interpretations, viz., that there is a plurality of forms of life among human beings, as well as an overarching singular form of life, and perhaps many levels in between. This is compatible with the presence of exclusive (and even incommensurable) forms.

Very amusing, MU.

Back when I used to pay a bit of attention to such things there was, as you note, disagreement as to whether he meant the human form of life or human forms of life.

With regard to an overarching singular form of human life, on the one hand:

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

He quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

On the other:

If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.

(PPF 327)

In this case, however, I think it more likely to be a difference in life form rather than form of life.

:up:

So language, and the various language-games, would trump logic or structure. — J

How do you see the 'relativizing' of separate language games as a rejection of logic and structure? That goes against the grain of passages like the following:

"When we do philosophy, we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this."
(PI 194)

Arguing for the limits to our explanations are not the denial of an existing order.

Do you know of an instance of Habermas bringing the charge of performative contradiction against Wittgenstein?

there is a logical structure underlying both language and the world — Fooloso4

and doesn't there also have to be a logical structure underlying mind?

and doesn't there also have to be a logical structure underlying mind? — Arne

I think Wittgenstein would say no:

Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake.—What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

(3.02)

It is the logical structure underlying language and not mind that is a check against illogical thought. I take this to mean that any illogical thought or propositions would evidently involve a contradiction.and would not be accepted.

It is the logical structure underlying language and not mind that is a check against illogical thought. I take this to mean that any illogical thought or propositions would evidently involve a contradiction.and would not be accepted. — Fooloso4

Logic, language, and the world can only make sense to beings for whom logic, language, and the world can make sense.

Why are you and I one of those beings and my hat is not?

Do you know of an instance of Habermas bringing the charge of performative contradiction against Wittgenstein? — Paine

I don’t. If anything, Habermas seems sympathetic to the later Wittgenstein (less so to the Tractatus). But there’s a lot I don’t know about Habermas.

“Performative contradiction”: I suppose it depends on how seriously you take the idea that LW was not doing philosophy in, e.g., the PI. The passage you quote begins “When we do philosophy . . .” and the meaning of the sentence implies that LW himself, in this “performance,” isn’t doing philosophy, but rather commenting on it or criticizing it. Is this really tenable?

It is not my representation. It is what Wittgenstein says. I cited it. Unless you are claiming that he means something else by the term 'transcendental. — Fooloso4

I apologize for the misunderstanding, but you really did say "I think...", and you did not mention Wittgenstein in that opening paragraph at all, so I assumed you were stating what you believe. As much as you went on to cite the Tractatus, this is what you said in your opening paragraph:

I think this misses the mark. It is logic rather than language which is transcendental. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible. Language and the world share a logical structure. Logic underlies not only language but the world. It is the transcendental condition that makes the world possible. — Fooloso4

I read Wittgenstein to be saying he is still doing philosophy at that juncture. This is a balancing point for many different interpretations. The matter seems to revolve around different methods of reduction. If the activity is no longer "philosophy", what is it?

Maybe you could say more about the implication that philosophy has been abandoned..

Very amusing, MU. — Jamal

Reality is actually very amusing, that's why metaphysicians are generally of a good humour.

It is the logical structure underlying language and not mind that is a check against illogical thought. I take this to mean that any illogical thought or propositions would evidently involve a contradiction.and would not be accepted. — Fooloso4

The problem with this perspective is that illogical thought is actually quite common, and even illogical speaking cannot be ruled out. So the reality that there is not necessarily a logical structure underlying language must be respected. The lack of an underlying logical structure is the position Wittgenstein moved on toward in the Philosophical Investigations, with "family resemblance", and the idea that boundaries (the prerequisite for logic) are created as required, for the purpose at hand.

The lack of an underlying logical structure is the position Wittgenstein moved on toward in the Philosophical Investigations, with "family resemblance" — Metaphysician Undercover

How is an appeal to "family resemblance" a negation of logical structure? What structure are you referring to?

If the activity is no longer "philosophy", what is it? — Paine

Right, that would be the question. PI 194 turns out to be a good test case, because the description
LW gives of philosophers -- "we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this" -- surely can't be self-referential; that is, refer to the very statement LW is making. (Presumably he doesn't think he has drawn any odd conclusions from misunderstanding "civilized" people.) Rather, it's a critique of what some philosophy leads to -- but critique in the name of what?

Maybe you could say more about the implication that philosophy has been abandoned. — Paine

Here I'm just referencing the usual idea that LW's program was "therapy," an attempt to get us to stop engaging in certain fruitless lines of thought and speech. Maybe "murder-suicide" would be more accurate! Can you end philosophy, using philosophy? For my part, I prefer to take LW's brilliant speculations at face value, for what they add to our understanding of rationality and language, and not worry too much about whether he was right that 1) philosophy ought to be/can be abandoned and 2) LW himself has stopped doing it, as of . . . right now . . . . or no, wait, he means at the end of this sentence . . . no, wait . . . . OK, now he's stopped . . .

You have framed this in an interesting way. I understand the doubt that the passage was self-referential. If the observation is accepted as sincere, the meaning is different. That would be working within conditions rather than rising above them.

Why are you and I one of those beings and my hat is not? — Arne

Ask your hat.

Is it necessary that there be a logical structure underlying mind in order to identify a contradiction? If someone is given contradictory orders they will be at a lot as to what to do if they attempt to follow those orders. Even an obedient dog will not be able to.

The problem with this perspective is that illogical thought is actually quite common, and even illogical speaking cannot be ruled out. — Metaphysician Undercover

A common response to this is: "think" or "think about it" or "think it through". We might also ask for an explanation.

The lack of an underlying logical structure is the position Wittgenstein moved on toward in the Philosophical Investigations ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You are late to the party. This has been part of the discussion since the OP.

How is an appeal to "family resemblance" a negation of logical structure? What structure are you referring to? — Paine

I wouldn't use that word "negation", and I don't particularly like the framing of the op, with the term "sublimation". This is because I do not believe that Hegel's dialectics of logic provides a very good description of the process we would call the "becoming" of knowledge.

Logic is an activity which consists of applying formal rules ("logic" being defined in that way for the purpose of the following argument). Notice that induction is a process which is often called "inductive reasoning" rather than classing it as a form of "logic". This way of classifying allows that reasoning, and thinking in general, is not necessarily "logical". Plato demonstrated the necessity for defining words in this way, because we are known to intentionally break rules. This type of act, where we intentionally do what we know is not-good, becomes very problematic if virtue is knowledge.

What Wittgenstein shows with the concept of "family resemblance" is that the way that the same word ("game" in his example) is used to refer to very different types of things, does not demonstrate that there is a logical relationship between those different types of things. This indicates that there is not a logical structure which supports the way that language is commonly used.

You portray this as a negation of the idea of "logical structure", in the mode of Hegelian dialectics, but I don't think that Hegelian "sublimation" adequately captures the real process which creates the structure of "family resemblances"). The issue being that Aristotle already demonstrated that "becoming" is fundamentally incompatible with the logic of being/not-being, and I see Hegel's sublimation as an attempt to understand "becoming" under the logical terms of simple negation. Even within the concept of "sublimation", elements of the two opposing principles, which ought to annihilate each other if they are truly negations, are allowed to coexist, so "negation" is not even a correct term to be used if we are to understand "sublimation" in the way that it is intended by Hegel.

Notice that when Wittgenstein uses "family resemblance" at 67 of the Philosophical Investigations, he takes a stab directly at the heart of supposedly rigorous logic, with the concept of "number". There is not a logical relation between the different kinds of "number" (cardinal, rational, real, etc.) only an indirect relation between them. The various concepts of "number" are supposedly held together by some form of overlapping, like fibres woven to make a rope, the rope being the concept "number", which supposedly holds them all together. But the strength of that rope is questionable, because the relations which it is composed of are not logical. And in reality the supposed "rope" is just the fact of the same word being used, and some indirect, non-logical relations between those different usages.

So he goes on to explain how the use of a word is fundamentally unregulated, unbounded, and this is what supports my claim that there is no limit to what can be said. Language is fundamentally, at it's base, unrestricted, and this feature of it allows for infinite capacity, and infinite possibility of expression, just like "number" allows for infinite capacity of quantification.

The issue now is that infinite possibility provides for nothing actual, no actual understanding. Therefore we have to enact boundaries, which we do for various reasons, or purposes, as Wittgenstein explains. This act of circumscribing is what empowers logic, such that we might define "number" as "natural", or "real", depending on the purpose intended, and logic can proceed within that closed conceptual space. This indicates that logic is not inherent within language, because the nature of language to provide infinite capacity for understanding, does not allow that logic inheres within, because logic proceeds by constraining that capacity.

A common response to this is: "think" or "think about it" or "think it through". We might also ask for an explanation. — Fooloso4

I don't understand your "common response". In any case, explanation is provided above.

You are late to the party. This has been part of the discussion since the OP. — Fooloso4

That's me, I like to think of it as "fashionably late". But I'm even late to pick up on the fashions. So by the time I'm starting to get it, and start showing up late because I think it's fashionable, the new fashion is to show up early, and I'm just old-fashioned.