What would you think if I told you I'd seen such things? — Janus

Since you asked: I'd think it a hallucination, or at the very least as not having anything to do with what can take place in the objective world, this due to my core metaphysical commitments. I'm certain I'd think this even if I myself were to "see" such things. Other's might not so interpret, but that would be due to their disparate core commitments.

I don't think any of this has much to do with metaphysics. — Janus

OK, thanks for sharing. But then we do disagree on what metaphysics is. My view being in general accord with this:

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality. This includes studies of the first principles of: being or existence, identity, change, consciousness, space and time, necessity, actuality, and possibility.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

... which to me fits in well enough with the answer I just provided to your question above regarding core metaphysical commitments (that, again, can be unconsciously held and thereby not be consciously analyzable worldviews but, instead, in part being - as you say - "habitual expectations based on what has been encountered and observed in the course of one's life"). I get it, you hold a different semantics and views and thereby find it important to assert that you disagree. But that, of itself, again doesn't warrant my view being egregious.

Got a few lightbulbs to change (metaphorically speaking) such that philosophizing right now will be a bit too distracting - so I'll be signing off for the time being.

But that, of itself, again doesn't warrant my view being egregious. — javra

When it comes to tendencies, attitudes, dispositions and so on, I have only encountered human diversity, so for me any view which characterizes people as all having the same tendency, attitude or disposition I find egregious.

OK, thanks for explaining.

When it comes to tendencies, attitudes, dispositions and so on, I have only encountered human diversity, so for me any view which characterizes people as all having the same tendency, attitude or disposition I find egregious — Janus

.

It’s not necessary that a metaphysical outlook be identically shared among members of a community. Each of those diverse humans you have encountered has an interpretive system for construing events which is partially unique to themselves.

It’s not necessary that a metaphysical outlook be identically shared among members of a community. Each of those diverse humans you have encountered has an interpretive system for construing events which is partially unique to themselves. — Joshs

Indeed. And there are limits both to the extent that it is actually "shared" (different degrees of understanding of the same thing (ability and specialization) and different aspects of the same thing (complexity) being some limitations. And there are similar limits constraining the extent that an individual can diverge, social pressures and norms, as well as the inherent need for one's core metaphysic to meet whatever constitutes its conditions of "adequacy" to be one's core metaphysic.

It’s not necessary that a metaphysical outlook be identically shared among members of a community. Each of those diverse humans you have encountered has an interpretive system for construing events which is partially unique to themselves. — Joshs

Yes, I agree and this in part is what I had in mind when I talked about "human diversity".

The problem with many answers here is metaphysics ends up very inflated, encompasing physics and epistemology and not distinguishing metaphysics and ontology. Physics and epistemology do use the notion of existence, but it`s just not very subtle to therefore say they are metaphysics. Physics isn`t mathematics, the theories within physics have additional assumptions and just make use of the theorems of mathematics. The same way things which can be results of metaphysics may be used in other sciences (please, can we not get pedantic about the use of the word science here).

There is a very old resolution for this problem going back to the definition of metaphysics given by Aristotle. Seriously one person quoted the definition of Aristotle in this thread and drew no conclusions. Sciences study things under a certain aspect, qua some aspect. Physics studies the objects as moving, qua moving. Metaphysics studies things as existing, it`s a study of being qua being. What it means for an object to exist. What are the necessary conditions of its existence. So it has a very specific subject matter, it does not encompass the equations of motion, moreover it can even not encompass ontology.

If ontology gives as the list of natural kinds, then certainly it`s not a matter of metaphysics to settle this. In this way physical theories have ontologies (according to scientific realists). Ontology is not necessarily derived from the very notion of being. In Parmenidean monism it is.

Ontology if it gives as the list of basic categories is not a result of metaphysics too. In Aristotle there`s a possible world where there is no place. But place is one of the categories. It`s not a matter of the notion of being to derive categories. Ontology is distinct from metaphysics. The list of categories may be derived from the notion of being in the Kantian aprioristic conception of metaphysics or in what Heidegger calls ontotheology. But for Aristotle all knowledge is a posteriori. So there are reasons to distinguish physics and metaphysics not even presupposing the existence of a separate objects of metaphysics. Just a separate subject matter or aspect suffices. Unless, for example, a thing`s being is identical with its motion.

Ontology if it gives as the list of basic categories is not a result of metaphysics too. — Johnnie

Ontology is the heart of metaphysics. And this is its traditional accepted definition, the nature of being, contrary to your assertion.

I gave the arguments for why I think there’s a distinction and it’s not without precedent in the litterature. There are different understandings of the word but the ones I gave: deriving an exhaustive list of natural kinds or categories is not a proper part of metaphysics as conceived by Aristotle. See for example On the Early History of 'Ontology'. Ontology was a word popularized in the XVIIIth century by Wolff and Baumgarten, it`s a project rationalistic at heart.

It was claimed that ontology has being as its object; but upon examination, we see that its object is really the concept of being or possible being rather than being as such. — „H. McDonald"

Wolffian ontology is the proper target of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. He even calls it ontotheology. Because It assumes that we know the perfect notion of being a priori. Kant even called it ontotheology for this reason.

Ontotheology is for Kant a theory of God obtained by pure reason with pure transcendental concepts, which imply God’s existence as ens realissimum. To put it even more precisely ontotheology is a theory of being wherein being makes possible what Kant calls an “ontological proof". — O. Boulnois

If ontology is a proper part of metaphysics then we can know the notion of being which somehow includes the information about all kinds of possible existents. In Aristotle’s metaphysics the notion of being is equivocal, you can’t know all information about other beings just by knowing one’s object way of being. Ontology was only recognized as a proper part of metaphysics under early-modern conception of rationalistic metaphysics. Not without reason it has immediately come under fire. Deriving a list of all possible kinds of beings is an ambitious project and earlier conception of metaphysics was a little subtler.

Physics isn`t mathematics, the theories within physics have additional assumptions and just make use of the theorems of mathematics. — Johnnie

Physics doesn’t just make use of mathematics. Even if all of the equations were removed from physics, its starting point in objective relations makes its goal calculative exactitude, the essence of the mathematical, even if it can only vaguely approximate this goal.

The problem with many answers here is metaphysics ends up very inflated, encompasing physics and epistemology and not distinguishing metaphysics and ontology — Johnnie

You are right that we can pick and choose from mutually exclusive definitions of metaphysics. What I’m about is
your view toward a holistic model of scientific understanding. There are many examples of such holistic models, but I dont think you’ll find them in Aristotle. They emerge after Kant , and particularly in the wake of Hegel’s historical dialectics. Hegel paved the way for Heidegger’s ontic/ontological difference, which directs us to become attuned to the conditions of possibility (metaphysics) of the ontological manner of being of ontical beings. For Heidegger, a list of natural kinds pertains to ontical beings. But any category of existing entities derives its sense and intelligibility from a wider context of relevance. This wider context of relevance comes first, and the meaning of the list of beings is derived from it.

...any category of existing entities derives its sense and intelligibility from a wider context of relevance. This wider context of relevance comes first, and the meaning of the list of beings is derived from it. — Joshs

Is it correct to characterize your statement thus: abstract rules of organization have conceptual influence (the conferring of sense and intelligibility) upon concrete things?

Is it correct to infer from the above that in a reverse direction, concrete things make it possible to discern abstract rules emergent from concrete things?

Is it correct to induce a bi-conditional operator linking concrete things and abstract rules within a causal identity: concrete things imply abstract rules if and only if abstract rules imply concrete things?

Is it possible QM exemplifies a networked reality: wave functions and particle functions are interwoven within a universe that supports superposition regulated by probability measurements?

Is it correct to characterize your statement thus: abstract rules of organization have conceptual influence (the conferring of sense and intelligibility) upon concrete things? — ucarr

I would prefer to say that concrete things are articulations and modifications of an internally interconnected web or Gestalt of referential meanings. This structure is not a logically causal whole, but a a reciprocally interaffecting totality in which changes to any subordinate aspect modifies the whole in some fashion.

Is it possible QM exemplifies a networked reality: wave functions and particle functions are interwoven within a universe that supports superposition regulated by probability measurements? — ucarr

Quantum physicist Karen Barad has produced a model
of interaffecting matter that was inspired by the double
slit experiments.

Phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing relata. On the basis of the notion of intra-action, which represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality, I argue that it is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the ‘‘components'' of phenomena become determinate and that particular material articulations of the world become meaningful. A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘‘apparatus'') enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent
distinction—between subject and object), erecting a separation between ‘‘subject'' and ‘‘object.'' That is, the agential cut enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy. In
other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. (Meeting the Universe Halfway)

Quantum physicist Karen Barad has produced a model
of interaffecting matter that was inspired by the double
slit experiments.

Phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing relata... — Joshs

Does Barad claim a scientific justification for the claim?

Quantum physicist Karen Barad has produced a model of interaffecting matter that was inspired by the double slit experiments.

Phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without pre-existing relata. On the basis of the notion of intra-action, which represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality, I argue that it is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the ‘‘components'' of phenomena become determinate and that particular material articulations of the world become meaningful. A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘‘apparatus'') enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), erecting a separation between ‘‘subject'' and ‘‘object.'' That is, the agential cut enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. (Meeting the Universe Halfway) — Joshs

Maybe you'll help me unpack the Barad definition:

• Classically measurable things are primatively real connections; they are connections without implications of supervenient principles.

• Intra-action -- action within as distinguished from action between -- represents a profound conceptual shift in our traditional understanding of causality...

• ...through agency-mediated intra-actions boundaries and characteristic expressions of parts of classically measurable things become defined and, likewise, natural material systems featuring jointed parts become describable.

• A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of a complex, multi-part system) enacts an agency-mediated cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut - an inherent distinction - between subject and object), erecting a separation between "subject" and "object."

• ...the agency-mediated cut enacts a resolution within the clasically measurable real and narratable indeterminancy.

• ...related things do not preexist their grammatical organizing principles; rather, natural, related things classically measurable cyclically foreground via phase shifts through specific actions within.

Conclusions: a) subject_object is an intra-active phase-shifting dynamical process; b) intra-action nuances abstractly conceptualizable grammar of relations as emergent-property-of-material-things-
cum-foregrounded-interiority.

It requires no proof here that Language isn't the "thing" it only re-presents the "thing." — ENOAH

But why is language any less a "thing" than whatever "thing" it represents? Can we even talk about language if we do not consider language to be the "thing" about which we talk? Are you suggesting that thing-ness itself is the fiction?

I'm submitting that everything going on in the human Mind is Fiction. So yes, Language, too, and thing, and thing-ness. There is Real but that can only be accessed in being; once knowing is engaged, it is ultimately knowing Fiction. Yes, of course, this too. Then what's the point? 1. Exactly, but 2. Remember, there is Reality; it's accessed by being, not knowing. My Body is Real, and to access its reality, there is nothing I need to do but be (it's reality) 3. With respect to Mind, which for we humans, displaces that reality, and, with respect to the topic at hand--metaphysics, and "knowing,"--just because it is ultimately fabricated out of empty images, Signifiers stored in memory, and "made" "real" by processes of dialectic, fabricating meaning, never discovering, but, rather, always only settling upon true (belief), doesn't mean it is not functional. To wit: the wheel, rocket, democracy, and economy, the theories of evolution and relativity, plus the billions of other things, so-called good and so-called bad, constructed out of these images stored in memory and settled upon for their function.

Remember, there is Reality; it's accessed by being, not knowing. — ENOAH

Interesting. Though I agree that knowledge is derivative of being, what is the basis upon which you imply "reality" is any less derivative of being than is knowledge?

And even Plato did not go so far as to claim the shadows upon the wall were "fictions."

Well, yes, I should've clarified. "Reality" too is a fiction. Whatever Reality is, we can only know it as a fiction. Within human Mind alone is reality even spoken of, and so, I speak of it. I cannot cross thr gap between Fiction and Reality while remaining in Fiction. When I speak of Reality I am already beyond/alienated from being (Reality. Although, I have no business saying so). I apologize for how frustrating it may seem. But it is what it is.

As for Plato. Yes. And had he remained true to Socrates, he might have concluded that the shadow paintings are Fictions, and that upon ascension from the cave the philosopher sees no forms, no Signifiers, no thing, no ideal of a thing (no thingness). Instead, the philosopher just is, is just see-ing.

Sorry, the philosopher does not even see things as they are nor thing in itself. These too are constructed out of Reason and dialectic and perhaps because we intuit the Fiction and are forced to construct meaning leading us to such concepts. But really, even there, we are in the cave, using Fictional tools to excavating fiction.

But really, even there, we are in the cave, using Fictional tools to excavating fiction. — ENOAH

Perhaps.

Have you read Being and Time?

As best I could. I like to think that my (albeit corrupted and elementary) understanding of that, helped shape my thinking. I'm not attempting false modesty. I think that all positions, metaphysical or otherwise, are arrived at by a collective writing, and that sometimes, particularly for the metaphysical, even if the reading is impure, it may still elucidate (even if varied from the so called author's intent). So much more to say...

I'd be interested if your understanding of Heidegger might shed more light on our discussion. If so, I'd be happy to hear, and will respond tomorrow. If not, it's been a pleasure.

Heidegger is easier to understand if one grasps that his primary concern is ontology rather than metaphysics no matter how much of a fiction one considers either or both to be.

I remind myself from time to time that carving up philosophy into parts is intended to facilitate rather than impede an understanding of the whole

Beyond that, philosophy as industry is the primary driving force behind the notion that it matters whether the subject matter is technically ontology, metaphysics, or epistemology.

Also there are trained philosophers like Tim Maudlin who say that physics is metaphysics because physical theories have ontologies. That’s the kind of confusion we don’t want. There are physicalists among metaphysicians but even they recognize that they’re not doing physics just because they make use of physical ontology. That’s why I like Aristotle’s distinction, the sciences may not differ in object, a difference in aspect suffices. And certainly existence as such is not the aspect under which physics study the world.

Does Barad claim a scientific justification for the claim? — wonderer1

I would say yes. She cites studies of the neurobiology of the brittlestar as an example of the use of her approach in predicting the behavior of phenomena.

Yes, and the "problem" with "pure" ontology as I see it, is you cannot arrive at "knowledge" of the nature of being that way. And, if that, presumably, is the goal of ontology extracted from the rest of metaphysics as I have inferred about Heidegger from your statement, then truly, what's the point? With the rest of metaphysics and with epistemology, though ultimately futile because fictional, functions are served. From my reading of Being and Time, at least, I think H does go beyond ontology, and provides a very functional report about Mind and metaphysics in general. But that's just my reading.

and the "problem" with "pure" ontology — ENOAH

I do not understand what you mean by pure ontology. I have never referred to pure ontology. I am not familiar with the term.

And you may rest assured that my understanding of the nature of being (my ontological disposition) provides me with useful knowledge each and every day.

If your understanding of the nature of being fails to provide you with useful knowledge each and every day, then your understanding of the nature of being is insufficient. And that is on you.

I took the liberty of adding pure to ontology. Why? Because I view H as engaging in metaphysics, notwithstanding his (extremely impressive, far superior to anything I could do) effort to focus on ontology. So I'm relying upon what I presume to be, your better understanding of H and submitting that, if there is such a thing as an inquiry into the nature of Being divorced from other metaphysical, epistemological, and (I think even) psychological (in the Freudian/Lacanian sense) considerations, it ought to be differentiated, and I (lazily) selected to preface it with pure.
In any case, I found H not to be pursuing "pure" ontology.
BUT, and here was the point I guess I failed to make. If one is to pursue purely ontology: what is being; it is futile to do so with thought, or anything else which tries to gather (construct) knowledge. Because knowledge is constructed out of empty Signifiers, and while admittedly useful, will not shed an iota of Truth about the Nature of Being which can (in my estimation) only be accessed by Being.

extracted from the rest of metaphysics — ENOAH

I do not know what that means. Ontology is not "extracted" from the rest of metaphysics. Metaphysics is an emphasis upon what is, epistemology is an emphasis upon how do what know what is, while ontology is an emphasis upon the nature of what is. There is no necessary hierarchical relationships upon the separate areas of emphasis.

Indeed, the areas of emphasis are to a large degree artificial and serve the purpose of making philosophy in general more accessible by dividing it up in a somewhat artificial manner. When I say my primary area of interest is ontology, I am not saying to the exclusion of all other areas.

You want to talk metaphysics, then we can talk metaphysics and you may run circles around me. If you want to talk epistemology, then we can talk epistemology and you may run circles around me. If you want to talk ontology, then we can talk ontology.

And if you do not want to talk ontology, then that is fine too. But only a metaphysician would attempt to persuade that metaphysics is some sort of umbrella term that includes ontology and epistemology. It is not.

And if you do not want to talk ontology, then that is fine too. But only a metaphysician would attempt to persuade that metaphysics is some sort of umbrella term that includes ontology and epistemology. It is not. — Arne

To add my two-cents worth, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, what he calls also the ontic-ontological difference, is not at all the same thing as the traditional philosophical meaning of ontology as the meaning of extant beingness. Heidegger considers this classical understanding of being to belong to metaphysics, whereas his fundamental ontology overcomes metaphysics.

Ok, I think I understand, including how what seems like my recklessness is frustrating. I did not intend that. I respect what you're saying, and am trying to understand how it might be impact my own thinking. So, is your point about isolating ontology, to say that Fiction or not, for ontology that's not relevant? And if so, why (sincerely, not argymentively)? And if not, then why--in the context of expressing that (to keep it simple) all our experiences are Fictional if we accept that human Consciousness is limited by its own "structure," made up signifiers--does it matter to "isolate" an ontological approach? Is there something about ontology that necessarily transcends human Consciousness (given we might acknowledge that the same can't necessarily be said of metaphysics or epistemology)? Is there a reason one cannot say of ontology that any truth regarding same cannot be accessed by Language but only by being (that) Being?