If we hold an evolutionary view of truth, antinatalism is false :razz:

Moar argument please. Justify your "if, then".

If we hold an evolutionary view of truth, antinatalism is false — Lionino

Moar argument please. Justify your "if, then". — fdrake

Yes what fdrake said, please. Evolutionary as in truth is evolutionary? In what way? how does it fit in that schema of truth? Evolutionary as in the biological mechanism of change via natural selection and adaptation over time for an ecological niche?

I recall reading somewhere that for some, truth comes to be by evolution, where X is true because we would not survive by believing non-X — I cannot for the life of me find anything on it online however.
Adopting that view, antinatalism has to be false, at least after a few generations.

I am not here to argue that view of truth by the way :100:

Adopting that view, antinatalism has to be false, at least after a few generations.

I am not here to argue that view of truth by the way :100: — Lionino

Ok got it, you meant the latter definition I asked about- evolution, the biological mechanism. Well, this to me just stinks of the naturalistic fallacy. We evolved a lot of things, and culture has shaped our beliefs in ways that perhaps, originally, it was not physically intended for. I type here on this keyboard, not because my ancestors 100,000 years ago needed it, but because human biological makeup allows for tremendous general learning capacities (as compared with other animals), we can often reason out logical, moral/psychological, and empirical conclusions that are wildly varying "contradictory" to the if/then programming of other animals where things like, "Is it okay to kill?" or "Is it okay to impose suffering by procreation" is not even amenable to their psychological programming.

That is to say, just because "it's in nature", doesn't mean it is morally right, simply. And there are thousands of examples to speak against this naturalistic fallacy thinking. And also, contrary to this view, humans being so culturally "plastic", are naturally able to pose and try to answer various moral questions, so what of that fact?

It seems to me you are making a moral argument, where that was not my intention.

My point was more of, if we accept that truth is determined by the universally held views of the surviving group, antinatalism will soon enough become false, and it will do so every time, as the holders of that view will eventually extinguish themselves.

My point was more of, if we accept that truth is determined by the universally held views of the surviving group, antinatalism will soon enough become false, and it will do so every time, as the holders of that view will eventually extinguish themselves. — Lionino

Ok, so you are trying to pose a hypothetical scenario and treat it like a "meme" that gets phased out. But the problem is the same as the naturalistic fallacy as applied to humans.. Humans are so plastic that it is possible that humans have the ability to refrain from procreation and discontinue humans for ethical reasons, like suffering (that those future humans might face if born). Humans are not if/then enough to count out those possibilities. Granted, the likelihood is low, that is not due to some fixed law, simply people's preferences which rather than fixed by physical or innate mechanisms, are largely social, personal, and existential depending on how you look at it.

Ok, so you are trying to pose a hypothetical scenario and treat it like a "meme" that gets phased out. But the problem is the same as the naturalistic fallacy as applied to humans.. Humans are so plastic that it is possible that humans have the ability to refrain from procreation and discontinue humans for ethical reasons, like suffering (that those future humans might face if born). — schopenhauer1

Right, but even then, under evolutionary truth, antinatalism turns out to be false, even if there are no humans around anymore — especially when there are not more humans around. The truth value of something does not depend on whether there is someone there to state it.

That is to say, just because "it's in nature", doesn't mean it is morally right, simply. — schopenhauer1

Of course, but I will not pretend that the moral argument works either. Antinatalism can be rejected by default in frameworks such as virtue ethics and deontology, as well as ethical egotism. Being that AN works under the premise that suffering outweights joy in life, it could also be rejected within consequentialism, as most people would reject that premise.

Right, but even then, under evolutionary truth, antinatalism turns out to be false, even if there are no humans around anymore — especially when there are not more humans around. The truth value of something does not depend on whether there is someone there to state it. — Lionino

What makes it “truth”? It seems a category error to apply “truth” to a process. You haven’t explained how this term is meant to be used in this context. It seems like a misuse.

Of course, but I will not pretend that the moral argument works either. Antinatalism can be rejected by default in frameworks such as virtue ethics and deontology, as well as ethical egotism. Being that AN works under the premise that suffering outweights joy in life, it could also be rejected within consequentialism, as most people would reject that premise. — Lionino

This is all false. Antinatalism can be supported in almost any normative theory, including deontology.

What makes it “truth”? It seems a category error to apply “truth” to a process. You haven’t explained how this term is meant to be used in this context. It seems like a misuse. — schopenhauer1

I recall reading somewhere that for some, truth comes to be by evolution, where X is true because we would not survive by believing non-X — Lionino

If a belief leads to a groups' extinction while its opposite leads to its survival, the belief would be false.

Antinatalism can be supported in almost any normative theory, including deontology. — schopenhauer1

Right, that is why I said can be rejected, just like you said can be supported.

If a belief leads to a groups' extinction while its opposite leads to its survival, the belief would be false. — Lionino

How is that about truth or falsity?

Right, that is why I said can be rejected, just like you said can be supported. — Lionino

Ok

How is that about truth or falsity? — schopenhauer1

It is one of the theories of truth (or so I remember reading it).

The pragmatist theory of truth is about practical consequences based on their success in solving a problem, and thus is an argument for pluralism for methods that lead to an outcome. As far as I see, it has nothing to do with what outcome is deemed as successful. If we are going for someone not suffering in the future, that would be antinatalism.

If we are going for someone not suffering in the future — schopenhauer1

Right, but if we are going for survival, which was my initial premise, natalism would be the answer.

Right, but if we are going for survival, which was my initial premise, natalism would be the answer. — Lionino

Sure. But obviously one could contend that "survival" is some moral mission, especially above and beyond that of imposing the conditions of suffering for a future person.

But obviously one could contend that "survival" is some moral mission, especially above and beyond that of imposing the conditions of suffering for a future person. — schopenhauer1

Well, everything can be contended in ethics, which is why I use more common sense than a philosophical approach when I am faced with a dilemma in real life — not my intellectual topic of interest.

But to talk about, the future conditions of suffering are an unknown, which is an argument against suicide. Not only that, but the conditions of suffering are also relative. A young adult athlete might end up killing himself after a tragit accident that puts him on a wheelchair. People born without movement in their legs do not kill themselves over being on a wheelchair, because that is all they have known, and they make do without being able to walk, and sometimes they make do wonderfully. Of course, there is a limit to this, such as Harlequin disease or glass bones, but we do put down Harlequin disease patients and always have — they end up dying shortly after birth anyway.

But to talk about, the future conditions of suffering are an unknown, which is an argument against suicide. Not only that, but the conditions of suffering are also relative. A young adult athlete might end up killing himself after a tragit accident that puts him on a wheelchair. People born without movement in their legs do not kill themselves over being on a wheelchair, because that is all they have known, and they make do without being able to walk, and sometimes they make do wonderfully. Of course, there is a limit to this, such as Harlequin disease or glass bones, but we do put down Harlequin disease patients and always have — they end up dying shortly after birth anyway. — Lionino

My response is not based on the empirical per se, but the empirical can be added to it. Rather, it is contra the paternalistic idea that imposing the limitation of life's choices (as life can only provide a range of choices one may have ultimately never wanted to choose from), known suffering (one knows of suffering but is willing to expose others to it anyways), and unknown suffering (one doesn't know ALL the forms of suffering), is acceptable. Rather, it indicates that procreation is in fact a violation of a deontological sort against the person who is so affected by this decision (the child born).

In Kantian terms, it is violating the principles of non-malfeasance which ultimately has its basis in not using people for a means to your ends.

As I said before, I don't think that most people would accept that the duty of sparing the person of suffering trumps the duty of bringing someone to life and not depriving them of all joys.

In any case, my original comment was mostly playful. As a personal dogma, I don't think antinatalism is a serious idea that has to be debated. So I will just hide this thread. Cheers.

What are antinatalist counterarguments to a more stoic perspective on life? I.e., one that values self-improvement and a sort of indifference to suffering, such that avoiding suffering isn't necessarily a primary tenet of living a good life. In general, antinatalism seems to focus so heavily on the aspect of inevitable suffering, but if one doesn't think suffering is necessarily bad, what leg do they have to stand on?

Interesting. I can’t see how an obligation to bring humans into existence is a serious point to be argued.

I am an antinatalist and it is patent to me so perhaps that’s just par for the course

to suffer is to have a bad experience.

And the argument would go like this: you are delusional.

A bad (negatively feeling) experience =/= badness overall. It's kind of the whole point of resiliency and growth: you fight through temporary displeasure to become a stronger person. You seemed to gloss over the argument I was making to nitpick a mostly semantic issue. Plus, it's kind of ironic that you seem to dismiss discussion right after ridiculing someone else for the same thing.

in reverse, I did no such thing. Please don’t make accusations like that up.

I didn’t miss anything. I agree, but that’s not what suffering consist in. Suffering is not a “bad feeling”. It is the state of being emotionally perturbed by an experience to the point you cannot integrate it. It precludes a silver lining type framing, without further fact.

Negative experiences can be sublimated. Suffering is the end state of failing to sublimate an experience. Most people choose to do this first, unfortunately. But nevertheless I am not nitpicking at all. Suffering and “having a bad time” are not synonymous and can be separate in some sense

Negative experiences can be sublimated. Suffering is the end state of failing to sublimate an experience. Most people choose to do this first, unfortunately. But nevertheless I am not nitpicking at all. Suffering and “having a bad time” are not synonymous and can be separate in some sense — AmadeusD

I must begrudgingly comment that you make a good point here.

A bad (negatively feeling) experience =/= badness overall. It's kind of the whole point of resiliency and growth: you fight through temporary displeasure to become a stronger person. You seemed to gloss over the argument I was making to nitpick a mostly semantic issue. Plus, it's kind of ironic that you seem to dismiss discussion right after ridiculing someone else for the same thing. — QuixoticAgnostic

So there are a lot of points to make, that it is hard for me to distill it in a concise way. However, I'll try from the perspective of deontology...

So deontologically, if one believes that others should not be used as means to an ends, it would be wrong to put others in a situation whereby they have to be put in harms way in order to "grow". Thus, knowingly putting someone in harms way so that they can grow, when that situation could have been avoided, is still wrong, even if they "grow" from it.

Of course, there are mitigating factors for this. If someone is already in a situation where it is judged they will be harmed if you do not take care to mitigate the harm in some way with a less harm, then this is permissible. For example, it is better to give children shots to immunize them against disease. It is better to put children in some form of education so they an survive well in society etc. However, that is only due to the fact that the children were put in that situation in the first place. It is a different question whether they should even be put in the situation for which one must mitigate greater harms with possibly lesser negative experiences/harms/suffering.

See this thread for more detail as it is almost exactly to do with this discussion of purposefully putting people in harms way for "growth":
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14291/the-ethics-of-burdening-others-in-the-name-of-personal-growth-when-is-it-justified

(I will use your term "burden" rather than "harm's way")

So deontologically, if one believes that others should not be used as means to an ends, it would be wrong to put others in a situation whereby they have to be put in harms way in order to "grow". — schopenhauer1

The Kantian deontological maxim is something like, "Do not use others as a means to your own ends." If a parent teaches a child a skill, then arguably, according to your ideas, they are "burdening" the child. So when Honest John teaches and forces Pinocchio to perform, he is taking advantage of him and using him as a means for his own selfish ends. But suppose that Geppetto teaches Pinocchio to make toys in order that Pinocchio might make a living. In this case he is using Pinocchio as a means to Pinocchio's own ends, and it is actually a parent's duty to educate their children in this manner. A relation between a parent and child is different from a relation between two adults. Thus your means/ends analysis is flawed.

Your distinction between example 1 and example 2 does not hold water given the fact that example 2 also fits your definition of "necessity" (). In example 2 the burden was not created "just to see that person overcome the burden," but rather to provide the child with skills of survival and independence. Further, the duty of the parent to educate includes more than helping the child survive. If a parent teaches their child to dance for the sake of the child's happiness, they are not violating Kant's morality. It doesn't matter that dancing is not necessary for survival.

Kant's maxim does not include a dispensation for cases where the end is necessary for survival. The maxim is not, "Do not treat others as a means to an end unless the end is their own survival." Your Kantian argument and your survival argument are therefore two different arguments, but neither one succeeds.

(Another odd presupposition here is that everything a parent subjects their child to is necessarily a burden.)

(Another odd presupposition here is that everything a parent subjects their child to is necessarily a burden.) — Leontiskos

This isn’t in any way odd. Compared to not existing, it’s inarguably a burden to be, do or know anything

Compared to not existing, it’s inarguably a burden to be, do or know anything — AmadeusD

According to Aristotle the depraved man does feel this way, so I will take your word for it. :joke:

No need to overthink it mate - nothing is factually less of a burden than something. How you feel about that could be considered depraved. But I didn't say how I felt :)

So stasis and boredom are never burdensome? We have a word to describe people for whom all activity is a burden: lazy.