You have to be more realistic. The idea of god and Santa are real and we can imagine the idea and understand it.

The idea of god and Santa are real and we can imagine the idea and understand it. — Arbü1237

1. It was a question about if the existence of God and Santa are real. Not the ideas.
2. Does it make sense to say that for us to be able to imagine and understand it, it has to be real?
3. Does the world care if we can or cannot imagine or understand it?

Here is some logical grounds for believing in the existence of the world from ChatGPT. — Corvus

Philosophy has become a classifying system for concepts and lines of reasoning, and all the branches the definitions and arguments could take. For instance there must be at least 20 types of panpsychism by now. New research, such as PhD dissertations, consists of following a line as far as it can go and then extending it in some way, probably by further splitting the track. Philosophy ends up having the same organizational structure as a book of chess openings.

ChatGPT has adopted the philosophical approach. Everything seems factual and devoid of evaluation, at least until the conclusion that "belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it," for which no support is provided.

ChatGPT has adopted the philosophical approach. Everything seems factual and devoid of evaluation, at least until the conclusion that "belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it," for which no support is provided. — Gary Venter

Do you think the statement is lacking in support? I would think randomly polling people on the question would show general agreement with ChatGPT.

At the very least, it's fairly easy to prove that *most philosophers* are realists about the world

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all

Accept or lean towards non-skeptical realism
79.54%

That may not satisfy the full sentence in question, but it's at least a start towards it.

Maybe so. That's sort of a popularity contest. ChatGPT didn't give any data to support that either, but I meant conceptual support was not provided.

Some physicists are now saying that physics does not support the existence of the quantum world, which the classical physical world is made of. All it does, and all we need it to do, is predict our observations.

I expect that most people would agree that acting like the physical world is real would would work well in practice.

I personally take a skeptical viewpoint that there is no reason to accept any theories about the reality of anything, including the reality of the quantum world and everything built from it. Still there are appealing theories about quantum reality, all worth entertaining.

Good info. Thx.

This are real delusions.

Philosophy has become a classifying system for concepts and lines of reasoning, and all the branches the definitions and arguments could take. For instance there must be at least 20 types of panpsychism by now. New research, such as PhD dissertations, consists of following a line as far as it can go and then extending it in some way, probably by further splitting the track. Philosophy ends up having the same organizational structure as a book of chess openings. — Gary Venter

Interesting point. :ok:

ChatGPT has adopted the philosophical approach. Everything seems factual and devoid of evaluation, at least until the conclusion that "belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it," for which no support is provided. — Gary Venter

ChatGPT seems to be ok for getting quick summarised info on the topics. But it is not for anything more detailed, deeper or serious source of info. What portion of the info from ChatGPT and all the online based description source would be reliable and objective knowledge in terms of the factual and verified truths is another matter.

↪Corvus

This are real delusions. — Arbü1237

The post was just asking you for clarification on your claims, which sounded confused and muddled. How can "asking for clarification" be delusions?

A short compilation of ChatGPT screwing up pathetically:
https://chat.openai.com/share/a3c86a67-ff27-4ec9-8ffa-ebc8fb95e01c
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad
https://chat.openai.com/share/f924090e-a7eb-4b67-9e62-389db1f6c87b
https://chat.openai.com/share/025521ed-ac2b-4156-bd15-e74053f66cba
https://chatgpt.com/share/239b3d25-6ec1-4268-af0b-609a47c25d2c

Indeed. It is famous for making things up. If you ask it about it, it says its task is to provide plausible responses. I asked if that makes it a con artist, and it quibbled about definitions.

I asked if that makes it a con artist, and it quibbled about definitions. — Gary Venter

Philosophers often seem to quibble about definitions, when the definitions are unclear for the arguments. :nerd: But shouldn't the AI Knowledge Expert System be able to present with the correct definitions at the press of the button instead of quibbling about them? :D

But shouldn't the AI Knowledge Expert System be able to present with the correct definitions at the press of the button instead of quibbling about them? — Corvus

Presenting someone with a correct definition will look like quibbling to a person who is using the word a different way. It's not like the AI described itself as quibbling -- don't forget the principle of untrustworthy narrator.

Presenting someone with a correct definition will look like quibbling to a person who is using the word a different way. — flannel jesus

Sure, it can be done.

"The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting point of belief for me." (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Sec. 209)

"That world is there before all belief." (Heidegger, Prolegomenon, GA20, p.295)

Missed this before. It doesn't seem apt to speak of all maps, simply inasmuch as they are not the territory, as "wrong" and as you say some maps are better than others anyway. Perhaps it would be alright to say that maps are more or less adequate, or if you lean towards the negative, more or less inadequate.

It's a funny metaphor in a way, because ordinarily we can know both map and territory.

Just something I saw while reading the SEP and wanted to add here:

Balaguer's response, on the other hand, is based on the claim that to demand that platonists explain how humans could know that FBP is true is exactly analogous to demanding that external-world realists (i.e., those who believe that there is a real physical world, existing independently of us and our thinking) explain how human beings could know that there is an external world of a kind that gives rise to accurate sense perceptions. Thus, Balaguer argues that while there may be some sort of Cartesian-style skeptical argument against FBP here (analogous to skeptical arguments against external-world realism) — SEP's platonism

If an SEP article about an unrelated topic seems to bring up skepticism about the outside world as an unproblematic analogy, it is unlikely that laymen would be justified in seeing realism as self-evident.

Relevant for the discussion surrounding solipsism and action:

Thus the importance of Descartes’ First Meditation remark that “no danger or error will result” from the program of methodical doubt, “because the task now in hand does not involve action” (AT 7:22, CSM 2:15). Methodical doubt should not be applied to practical matters. Prudence dictates that when making practical decisions I should assume I’m awake, even if I don’t perfectly know that I’m awake. Judgment errors made while mistakenly assuming I’m awake do not have actual practical consequences, unlike those made while mistakenly assuming I’m dreaming. — SEP's Descartes' Epistemology