Do you agree with these speakers' points? Why or why not. — Corvus
What would be your explanations or arguments on the gaps and the model and modeled?It still leaves us with an inner vs outer gap of map vs territory, the model vs what is modeled. It is not interactional enough, too focused on correspondence and not enough on enaction, movement and embodiment. — Joshs
What would be your explanations or arguments on the gaps and the model and modeled? — Corvus
“ Whereas physical structures, such as a soap bubble, obtain equilibrium in relation to actual physical condi-
tions of force and pressure, living systems seek equilibrium, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “with respect to conditions which are only virtual and which the system itself brings into existence; when the [system] . . . executes a work beyond its proper limits and constitutes a proper milieu for itself.”
“ Thus, Merleau-Ponty says, whereas physical structures can be expressed by a law, living structures have to be comprehended in relation to norms: “each organism, in the presence of a given milieu, has its optimal conditions of activity and its proper manner of realizing equilibrium,”and every living being “modifiesits milieu according to the internal norms of its activity.”
“...autopoiesis (in a broad sense that includes adapativity) is the “self-production of an inside that also specifies an outside to which it is normatively related,” and thus that autopoiesis is best seen as the “dynamic co-emergence of interiority and exteriority.” “the (self) generation of an inside is ontologically prior to the dichotomy in- out. It is the inside that generates the asymmetry and it is in relation to this inside that an outside can be established.”
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception also seem to addressing the physical body as the foundation of consciousness, which Seth seems to be agreeing. But M-Ponty seems to be adding the sensory-motor mechanism in the perceptual system as the central elements and principles for the operation, which gives more detailed explanation on the origins and workings of consciousness. I am not much familiar with Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Perception at this point of time, but will be reading his works soon, and trying to find more about them.Sensory-motor embodied enactivist approaches to perception and consciousness are based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. Evan Thompson explains: — Joshs
If brains aren't conscious, then what is consciousness?Clearly consciousness extends beyond the brain due to the simple fact that brains aren’t conscious. — NOS4A2
What do you mean by the being? Is AI a being? Is the world a being? Is God a being?As a description of conscious beings, consciousness and the being are in fact one-and-the-same. — NOS4A2
How would AI consciousness be different from that of human consciousness?I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not. — Philosophim
It is like any self-organizing (i.e. emergent) whole system is more than its constituent parts (i.e. nested patterns of functional nodes, relationships & structural-environmental constraints). Based on overwhelmingly extant physical evidence, every mind(ing) is embodied in an ecologically situated, or conditioned, brain; other than subjective anecdotes (corroborated only in folk psychological / spiritual terms & customs), there is not any publicly demonstrable contrary evidence of (e.g.) 'disembodied cognition' or 'nonphysical minds'. Also, assuming that 'mind-body duality' is incoherent for some reasons discussed in this old post ...Is the mind more than the physical brain? — Corvus
No.Is this the end of physicalism?
I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not.
— Philosophim
How would AI consciousness be different from that of human consciousness? — Corvus
Indeed. Different material. Different capabilities. Different senses. Different history. An existence as different from ours as can be. If a consciousness can come from there, it's impossible to estimate how different from ours it would be.By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel. — Philosophim
By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel. — Philosophim
By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.
— Philosophim
Could a rock be conscious? A shifting sand dune? A car engine? — RogueAI
The consciousness of a plant for example, would not be the consciousness of a human. — Philosophim
All things, even inanimate ones, must have some form, or they would not be anything at all. But living things have a distinctive and superior kind of form, called ‘soul.’* For a living thing is far more integrated, more one whole, than a non-living thing. The unity, and hence the identity and the being, of a non-living thing is little more than the contiguity of its parts. If a rock, for example, is divided, we simply have two smaller rocks. In a living thing, on the other hand, the members of its body constitute an organic whole, such that each part both conditions and is conditioned by the other parts and the whole.** A living thing is thus one being to a far greater extent than a non-living thing. It evinces a higher degree of unity, of integration, of formal identity, and its soul is this very integration of its parts into one whole. As such the soul is the reality of the living thing, that in virtue of which it is what it is and so is a being: “For the reality is the cause of being to all things, and to live, for living things, is to be, and the soul is the cause and principle of these” (De An. Β.4, 415b13–14). Life in living things, then, is not a character superadded to their mere being. Rather, life is their being, the higher, more intense mode of being proper to living things as distinct from others.
The distinction between living and non-living things is therefore not a mere ‘horizontal’ distinction, as if all things are equally beings, of which some are living and others are not. It is rather a ‘vertical’ or hierarchical distinction: a living thing is more a being than a non-living thing, in that it is more integrated, more a whole, more one thing. (p110)
For Aristotle, the hierarchical ordering of the different kinds of beings is based on the extent to which form predominates over matter in each. Non-living things have the lowest degree of form, of unifying selfhood, of activity that proceeds from themselves. Although they have some form, some nature, some behaviors of their own, without which they would be nothing at all, they come closer than all other things to being purely material, purely passive. A living thing, characterized by organic unity and the ability to nourish, maintain, and reproduce itself, is far more one, more active, exhibits a far higher degree of formal identity. A sentient living thing, an animal, exercises not only these life-functions but also consciousness, which, as the capacity to receive forms without matter, is a still higher degree of formality, of immateriality. A human being, in turn, has not only life and sense but the capacity for the wholly immaterial activity of intellection, which has as its content, and thus is one with, purely immaterial ideas. (p117) — Eric D Perl Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition
Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature. — Philosophim
Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature.
— Philosophim
Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog. — Wayfarer
What behavior is the plant doing that would lead you to think it might be conscious? — RogueAI
There are humans with enough cognitive impairment that they cannot learn what 'prime' is either. Same with young children until they reach a certain age. Does this mean they aren't conscious Wayfarer? — Philosophim
A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely". — Philosophim
I think one of the unfortunate consequences of popular Darwinism is the myth of h. Sapiens being ‘just another species’. There’s a leap - an ontological gulf - between h. Sapiens and other species. We’re of a different kind. — Wayfarer
A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely".
— Philosophim
I understand. Don't you think plant behaviors could be replicated by fairly simple machines (or a system of pretty simple machines)? — RogueAI
Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly. — Philosophim
Don't you think plant behaviors could be replicated by fairly simple machines (or a system of pretty simple machines)? — RogueAI
:monkey:the myth of h. Sapiens being ‘just another species’. — Wayfarer
Agreed – a "different kind" of species that fetishizes its imaginary differences which do not make an existential difference – "h. sapiens" is, no matter the ontological stories we flatter our fleeting smallness with, fundamentally inseparable from nature like all other natural species.We’re of a different kind.
C'mon, Wayf, that's our limitation, not the dog's. :smirk:Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog. — Wayfarer
Here is another short video for his talk on "Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality." — Corvus
…to perceive the world isn’t to hallucinate and get things right. To perceive is to explore the world with your sensing and moving body. Perception creates meaning through sensorimotor exploration. You don’t get a being with a sense of self by taking a hallucinating brain and tacking on some sensory inputs and motor outputs. You get a being with a sense of self by taking a brain with a capacity for imagination—for imaging its past and future—and embedding it within a sensing and moving body. Perception, therefore, isn’t online hallucination; it’s sensorimotor engagement with the world. Dreaming isn’t offline hallucination; it’s spontaneous imagination during sleep. We aren’t dreaming machines but imaginative beings. We don’t hallucinate at the world; we imaginatively perceive it.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the relation between self and world is not primarily that of subject to object, but rather what he calls, following Heidegger, being-in-the-world. For a bodily subject it is not possible to specify what the subject is in abstraction from the world, nor is it possible to specify what the world is in abstraction from the subject: “The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects”. To belong to the world in this way means that our primary way of relating to things is neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor cognitive or intellectual, but rather bodily and skillful. Merleau-Ponty calls this kind of bodily intentionality “motor intentionality”. His example is grasping or intentionally taking hold of an object. In grasping something we direct ourselves toward it, and thus our action is intentional. But the action does not refer to the thing by representing its objective and determinate features; it refers to it pragmatically in the light of a contextual motor goal effected by one's body.
If the dog had the capacity to understand mathematics, and it was our inability to teach it that was the problem, it would not need teaching any more than we did. It would have developed mathematics as we did.Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog.
— Wayfarer
C'mon, Wayf, that's our limitation, not the dog's. :smirk: — 180 Proof
We know we cannot do these things. The dog doesn't know it doesn't understand primes. Although we know very well what these animals are doing, we cannot do those things because of differences in our physiology, our senses. The dog cannot learn primes because it doesn't have the intellectual capacity to even know it doesn't understand primes, much less understand them.How about you (we) try to learn from a hound how to follow a rabbit's or lost child's days-old scent through a teeming woodland; or learn from a bat how to echolocate; or learn from a cuttlefish how to continuously camouflage themselves unseen against any background while moving from place to place — 180 Proof
An amazing sight! Do you suppose it knows it is doing that? Do you suppose it could learn the least mathematical concept, and the problem is our limited ability to teach?or learn from a cuttlefish how to continuously camouflage themselves unseen against any background while moving from place to place — 180 Proof
We think it's adorable playfulness. They are actually learning how to fight and kill when they do this. People put as much time into that as any other creature. But I suspect animals actually play. I've had dogs that fetched without me making any attempt to teach them. I suppose there could be a reason along the lines of cats learning to fight and kill when "playing" with string, but I'm willing to assume there is playing. The reason they can fetch, seemingly, endlessly, every day of their lives is because they lack the intelligence to become bored. They don't know they're doing the same thing over and over, or think of the repetitiveness. They naturally so what zen students strive to do. They are totally in the moment, every moment, with no desire to be doing anything else. (Until you stop. :lol: )or learning from a cat how to play with utter abandon with a dangling string — 180 Proof
If the dog had the capacity to understand mathematics, and it was our inability to teach it that was the problem, it would not need teaching any more than we did. It would have developed mathematics as we did — Patterner
If the dog had the capacity to understand mathematics, and it was our inability to teach it that was the problem, it would not need teaching any more than we did. It would have developed mathematics as we did — Patterner
We often think of mathematical ability as being uniquely human, but in fact, scientists have found that many animal species—including lions, chimpanzees, birds, bees, ants, and fish—seem to possess at least a rudimentary counting ability or number sense. Crows can understand the concept of zero. And a study published in April found that both stingrays and cichlids can take this rudimentary "numerosity" to the next level, performing simple addition and subtraction for a small number of objects (in the range of 1 to 5).
Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly.
— Philosophim
Neither a bat nor a fly will ever know that. — Wayfarer
us being a 'different kind' from other animals is simply the same pattern repeated in nature again and again. Having an intellectual or consciousness gap between other animals does not mean we are separate from them. — Philosophim
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