So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Let me clear this up a bit.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. That's just a first cause causing something else.

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously.

I hope that answers the question.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with potentially unlimited number of first causes and yet no first cause for the set of first causes? — ucarr

Correct because a first cause cannot cause another first cause. If A causes B, B is not a first cause.

You've said you're not making a claim that a thing -- such as a God, or the Big Bang -- acts as the first cause. — ucarr

No Ucarr, I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. If the big bang is a first cause, then it is. I'm not claiming that it is. That's not what this is showing. I'm not saying "X" is a first cause. Just noting there must be at least one.

Also, you've clarified that your thesis only posits the logical necessity of a first cause. Now you say you don't know if immaterial existence is a thing. — ucarr

Right. Its not anything I cover in here, nor is necessary to do so. I don't even know what immaterial existence is. Let someone else prove that.

Is it pertinent to the content and intentions of your thesis to suppose you take no definitive position on the materiality or immateriality of the logically necessary first cause? — ucarr

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. I talk about existence, and the adjective does not change that. It doesn't matter what form it takes.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. — Philosophim

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes?

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously. — Philosophim

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes?

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause?

I don't even know what immaterial existence is. — Philosophim

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real?

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct! — Philosophim

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. — Philosophim

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it?

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Correct only in the technical fact that it is possible there were two different 'firsts' that happened at the same time.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

Its been a while, so recall the 'chains'. The start of each chain is separate and independent, though they might cross paths. Nothing I've stated here has negated what I've stated before.

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause.
— Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. I'm just noting at least one first cause must exist. If you wish to claim that 'This thing right here is a first cause," you have to prove it.

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real? — ucarr

No. I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. That's all that matters.

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it? — ucarr

I am speaking to Gnomon in the context that I know he understands, and only one aspect of it. That is not your context. I do not want to explain his full context and what parts I do and do not agree with, because I have already done that while speaking speaking to him. If he has questions, he can ask me. I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it. If you have questions from our previous conversations, please ask. Do not worry about Gnomon and myself.

I commend you on your durable patience with me.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent.

The start of each chain is separate and independent — Philosophim

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain.

I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. — Philosophim

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent?

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept — ucarr

I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. — Philosophim

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? Do you agree your indifference in this situation leaves open the door for inferring that logical necessity of first causes is amenable to both material and immaterial causes? I ask this question because the ontic identity of first causes is not normally a matter of indifference within examinations of causation.

I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it [Philosphim's dialogue with Gnomon]. — Philosophim

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous?

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic.

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent. — ucarr

You are correct.

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain. — ucarr

This is also correct.

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote.

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? — ucarr

Ucarr, you are overcomplicating things again. I told you, "I don't know what immaterial means. Its not something I brought up." If it exists, it doesn't matter if its material, immaterial, in immaterial, or bizantiane whibble material. :) Real is what exists.

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words. — ucarr

I don't think they're darts, but you do seem to take strange leaps from what I'm saying. You read far too much into my words many times and often make conclusions I never assert.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous? — ucarr

No. This is what I mean by you reading into things that aren't there. Why do you think this? Where did I tell you to stop? If I had one piece of advice when reading my writing, read only what I write. If I don't outright say I intend something, I don't.

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you? — ucarr

I don't think so. Why do you think that?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic. — ucarr

Sure. I'm just telling you that nothing has changed.

So, our world is an eternal following-causal-chain in the sense that its origin, Prime Cause, is an eternal logical necessity. — ucarr

I could agree with that statement, except that the "eternal" adjectives could be mis-interpreted. AFAIK the "causal chain" is spatial & temporal, not eternal : AFAIK, space-time began with a bang. The "logical necessity" is a concept in my mind, to explain the existence of the space-time world. It may be "eternal", but all I'm saying is that it is necessarily pre-big-bang. :smile:

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it? — ucarr

Ha! Gnomon is not conspiring with to get our "story" straight. We just happen to view the First Cause postulate as a plausible philosophical explanation for the existence of a contingent & sequential Reality, in which a new thing or event necessarily follows from a previous event. The prior thing or event is what we call the "Cause"*1 of the subsequent thing or event. How we articulate that notion may vary. But in general we both seem to agree with the reasoning of Plato and Aristotle. If that sounds like Idealism to you, then so be it. :joke:

*1. What is Hume's theory of cause and effect? :
Hume saw causation as a relationship between two impressions or ideas in the mind. He argued that because causation is defined by experience, any cause-and-effect relationship could be incorrect because thoughts are subjective and therefore causality cannot be proven.
https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-metaphysics-of-causation-humes-theory.html

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real? — ucarr

I suspect that the term "immaterial"*2 may mean something different to you than to Gnomon & Philosophim. For example : concepts & ideas are not "real" but ideal. We are not trying to say what an abstraction is "made of", because it's not a material object, and is not "made of" any physical substance.

I know that conceptual abstractions, such as Souls or Selves*3, do not fit neatly into the worldview of Materialism. But, regardless of their "true nature", they are useful concepts for philosophical understanding. And abstractions are essential for material technology*4. For example, the imaginary (as-if) notion of an Electrical or Quantum Field has allowed engineers to build cellular communication systems that work well, even though we don't know the "true nature" of the invisible mathematical relationships that constitute the so-called "Field". :nerd:

*2. On the Meaning of "Immaterial" :
Things we think of as immaterial, such as consciousness and soul, are material phenomena that we think must be immaterial because we do not yet know their true nature. To claim that something is immaterial implies it does not exist. Consciousness surely exists, and there are many good reasons to think souls do too.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/memory-medic/202103/the-meaning-immaterial
Note --- I don't agree with this materialistic concept of "existence". Objects and Concepts "exist" in different "senses" : one is objective (sensory) and the other is subjective (ideational).

*3. The Soul is a Self-concept :
Self-concept is an overarching idea we have about who we are—physically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and in terms of any other aspects that make up who we are.
https://positivepsychology.com/self-concept/
Note : I tend to use the secular concept of a "Self" to replace the religious concept of a "Soul". Neither is a material object, but a summation of all properties & qualities of a "Person", which is another abstraction. Hence, one abstraction can be a "component" of another concept, but you can't make anything physical from a pile of abstractions.

*4. Abstractions in Science & Technology :
Abstraction is an integral part of computational thinking and problem solving. It is also one of the most difficult parts of computational thinking to conceptualize. Much of this difficulty has to do with the semantics of the word “abstraction,” which is often inferred to mean unclear or vague. However, the more relevant definition of abstraction as it pertains to computer science is “the summary of something” or “the extraction from something.” . . . .
Abstraction, as used in computer science, is a simplified expression of a series of tasks or attributes that allow for a more defined, accessible representation of data or systems. In computer programming, abstraction is often considered a means of “hiding” additional details, external processes and internal technicalities to succinctly and efficiently define, replicate and execute a process.
https://www.learning.com/blog/examples-of-abstraction-in-everyday-life/

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote. — Philosophim

Here are the pertinent things you wrote:

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. — Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — Philosophim

In the first statement above in bold -- yours -- you ask for an explanation of my question:

... Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

Your first quote above -- I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. -- is a logical descendent of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be."

My question was motivated by your second statement above in bold: "I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause."

Why is it not a contradiction of: "There're no limitations on what a first cause can be"?

The question is important because it's an essential supporting argument for your thesis.

On the same note: "A first cause is logically necessary." is the central focus of your thesis. Considering this, consider: Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis?

I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — ucarr

There're no limitations on what a first cause can be — ucarr

When something exists, its potential is realized. If it is a first cause, it must be proven that it is a first cause.

Prior to a first cause's inception, there is no limit as to what can potentially be incepted.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality.

As you can see, no contradiction.

You have said: "... before first cause, nothing."

How do your descriptions of the inception of first cause have anything to work with other than nothing?

Consider -- In a valid argument, when all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality. — Philosophim

Do you think your above premise -- rooted in something instead of in nothing -- avoids being evaluated as false and thus avoids casting doubt on the conclusion being true?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

Consider: x = the (all of) existence is necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die premise (F)

We see in the conditional operator truth table that when

x ⟹ y, with x = T and y = F, the statement evaluates as F

Do you think your above premise -- demonstrably false -- avoids plugging into the x ⟹ y implication such that the statement evaluates as False?

If you do, can you explain the avoidance?

Ucarr, I read your reply twice and I don't understand what you're trying to say. Instead of asking me if I think my premise does something, just point out what you see and I'll respond once I understand.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. For this reason, I evaluate the supporting premise as false.

From here it follows that if this supporting premise is false, and therefore not all of your premises are true, then your conclusion might still be true, but it's not a certainty.

I further underscore this point with sentential logic:

Consider: x = the (all of)-existence-is-necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die supporting premise (F)

The binary logical operator takes two input values -- x and y -- and converts them into a truth-content value: with x = all of existence is necessary (T) and y = a roll of a die examples inception of first cause (F), we get

(x ⟹ y) ⟹ (T ⟹ F) ⟹ F

So, truth does not imply falsity.

If you want to arrive at a conclusion that is certainly true, you must develop pertinent, probative premises, all of which are true.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. — ucarr

Let me break this down because this is still a run on of a sentence.

1. Before a first cause, there was nothing. Assume true.
2. A rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing.

Sure, I never used this as an example of a first cause from nothing. Its an analogy to make it simpler to understand the abstract point we're discussing Ucarr, not an actual example. The 'die' is an example of potential randomness. The result of a 'six' is an example of potential being realized. Nothing more. There is not an actual six sided die. There is nothing being rolled. We've gone over this before.

The point is that prior to a first cause's inception, the potential is limitless. After its inception, the result is what is. Thus prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." After the inception of a first cause, and all the causality that follows from it, there is a definitive first cause and definitive caused objects and states.

Thus, if I'm looking at things that already exist, not everything I look at can be a first cause. In this case, it must be proven that something which exists, or existed, was a first cause. Just like we don't know what side a six sided die will come up before we roll it, but we have to demonstrate what side it showed after it was rolled. Its just an analogy, not literal dice Ucarr.

You have said: "... before first cause, nothing."
How do your descriptions of the inception of first cause have anything to work with other than nothing? — ucarr

I think you are sincerely trying to grasp an Idealistic worldview*1 that is radically different from your own Materialistic worldview*2. {pardon the pigeon-holing} Both are Metaphysical concepts created in philosophical Minds. Each perspective has developed a peculiar vocabulary of its own. So, you may think that Gnomon's worldview is Idealistic (no thing), and in direct opposition to Materialism (no thought). But my Enformationism worldview is not so easy to pigeonhole, because it is moderated by the Holistic BothAnd approach to understanding the Things of Reality and the Non-Things of Ideality.

Application of the BothAnd Principle*3 requires one to look at both sides of any Either/Or argument as-if they are merely qualitative aspects of an inclusive holistic comprehensive worldview. But it doesn't mean that you have to ultimately accept one side or another. Instead, its goal is 3D stereoscopic vision : attempting to approximate a god-like understanding of Everything Everywhere All-At-Once, yet without the power of omniscience. So, that ballpark conjecture may appear to straddle the conceptual gap between the polar opposites, like the Colossus of Rhodes.

For example : I just read this passage in Bernardo Kastrup's Science Ideated : "What seems to be beyond Coyne's ability to comprehend is that the dualism between mind and matter he implicitly relies on . . . . doesn't exist. To an idealist like me, there is no brain or matter outside or independent of mind. Instead, the 'material' brain is merely the extrinsic appearance, in some mind, of the inner mentation of (some other) mind." I understand the words, but I cannot imagine that bodies & brains are imaginary --- unless the image is in the Mind of God, which is itself a recursive idea in my mini-mind. So, it's also beyond my ability to imagine a world in which my own body is imaginary*4. My power of abstraction is not that omniscient.

Therefore, I can't grok Exclusionary Materialism (no mind) or Absolute Idealism (no matter). My body & brain seem to automatically "see" the world in terms of material phenomena. Yet, my brain-functions are able to Abstract the matter away, and to treat its logical structure (noumena) as-if it is a real thing. So, I can only make sense of that Metaphysical Duality by reminding myself that the "Map is not the Terrain". From that perspective, I can enjoy the pristine idea of a Mind, and the messy reality of a Brain. And I can imagine an abstract-logic First Cause, without leaving my idea-causing Brain behind. :smile:

Note --- The hypothetical "as-if" means an imaginary situation or a situation that may not be true but that is considered likely or possible.

*1. Idealism :
As an analytic idealist, Kastrup proposes that consciousness is the ontological primitive, the foundation of reality.
https://danielpinchbeck.substack.com/p/analytic-idealism-a-revolutionary

*2. Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

*3. Both/And Principle :
# My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system.
# The Enformationism worldview entails the principles of Complementarity, Reciprocity & Holism, which are necessary to offset the negative effects of Fragmentation, Isolation & Reductionism. Analysis into parts is necessary for knowledge of the mechanics of the world, but synthesis of those parts into a whole system is required for the wisdom to integrate the self into the larger system. In a philosophical sense, all opposites in this world (e.g. space/time, good/evil) are ultimately reconciled in Enfernity (eternity & infinity).
# Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ─ what’s true for you ─ depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.
# This principle is also similar to the concept of Superposition in sub-atomic physics. In this ambiguous state a particle has no fixed identity until “observed” by an outside system. For example, in a Quantum Computer, a Qubit has a value of all possible fractions between 1 & 0. Therefore, you could say that it is both 1 and 0.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

*4. Cognitive dissonance occurs when a person believes in two contradictory things at the same time.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO BELIEVE (dueling) IMPOSSIBLE (incompatible) CONCEPTS?

...prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." — Philosophim

Yesterday, I attacked this claim thus:

Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis? — ucarr

After writing this, I thought it a pretty good argument. However, proceeding with caution, I decided to ask 180 Proof to examine the argument for flaws. He got back to me quickly with this:

It seems to me your argument misses a significant distinction: 'that there is first cause' & 'what the first cause is'; "there is no limitation on what the first cause is', not in reference to 'that there was a first cause'. — 180 Proof

Correct.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity.

Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity. — ucarr

On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617855

On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts: — 180 Proof

I'm taking serious note of these links to additional thinking on some implications of the thesis.

In my acknowledgment above, I'm only addressing the error in my reasoning you brought to my attention: In attacking: There's no limit on what a first cause can be, I made the mistake of applying my accusation of paradox to There's no limit on what a first cause can be as if it said: There's no limit on that a first cause can be. This is not something Philosphim has claimed, so the attack -- at least in its present form -- has no bearing on the correctness of the thesis.

Through my acknowledgement I don't intend to imply I now think Philosophim's thesis correct. I'm just clearing away the debris of my erroneous attack.

If you've already assumed the gist of this clarification, please forgive my superfluity.

:up:

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. — ucarr

180 proof is a great person to ask Ucarr. :) I'm glad he was able to clear up the issue for you. Feel free to read his argument against the OP. I did not think it addressed the argument back then, but I would be happy to discuss it with you if you would like.

I think you are sincerely trying to grasp an Idealistic worldview*1 that is radically different from your own Materialistic worldview*2 — Gnomon

*2. Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism — Gnomon

Handshakes across the aisle.

In broad terms, which of the following is closest to your own materialist position:

(A) philosophical materialism (i.e. every concrete thing is "matter"-in-motion aka monism)

or

(B) methodological materialism (i.e. populating models with immaterial data – entities, causes – amplifies experimental error, therefore scientific (and historical) practices require eliminating as much immaterial data as possible as the preliminary method of decreasing a model's experimental error – making it (more) testable)

or

(C) ??? materialism ...

NB: (A) & (B) are how I use the terms which I think are a bit clearer than the standard (wiki? non-academic?) muddle. Btw, I consider myself a (nonstandard) p-naturalist ...

Handshakes across the aisle. — ucarr

Thanks. Speaking of philosophical aisles :

It seems to me your argument misses a significant distinction: 'that there is first cause' & 'what the first cause is'; "there is no limitation on what the first cause is', not in reference to 'that there was a first cause'. — 180 Proof
I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity. — ucarr

is much more knowledgeable of Philosophy than I am. But his worldview & belief system (Immanentism ; p-Naturalism) has an inherent limit that precludes consideration of some logical possibilities that go beyond space-time : his "conclusive limitation". I suspect that you might agree with that physical barrier, while disagreeing with the implied logical limitation : Abstract Reason can go (in imaginary scenarios) where no material body can go. The human Mind can project (fantasy or logic) into the Future and into the Past, in order to learn about otherwise unknowable possibilities : e.g. Arthur C. Clarke, 2001 A Space Odyssey*1.

In this thread, I never got the impression that you were arguing for any specific kind of First Cause (What), but merely reasoning about the logical necessity for something to kick-start the chain of Causation (That). The OP poses the question in generic (X or Y) & abstract (infinite prior causality) terms. So, I don't think 180's "distinction" really applies to this thread. He may be filling-in the "X" with a god-model of his own imagination.

When says that there is "no limit" on what the Cause of Being might be {see PS below}, he's merely admitting that we are speculating about a state & event that is empirically unverifiable (no known rules), but logically plausible (rules of reasoning) : for example -- the Multiverse conjecture tries to have it both ways : Eternal Laws of Nature, and Unlimited Causal Energy (i.e. no Entropy).

Nevertheless, for the purposes of an amateur forum, we can reasonably conclude that a contingent world (big bang beginning) requires a prior Cause of some kind (infinite ; recursive?), without taking the next step of identifying specific characteristics (loving, merciful?) of that Cosmic Causal Potential*2. However, space-time does place physical limits on "how causality functions". So, most causal conjectures are eventually forced to go beyond the physical barrier into the realm of Pure Reason .

Some anti-first-cause arguments attempt to refute "Logical Necessity" and Metaphysical Necessity with alternative definitions and modalities. But Philosophim also offers Mathematical Necessity. So, take your choice : Physical Limits, Logical Limits, Mathematical Limits, or anything goes. All human reasoning has inherent limits, beginning with our physical senses and motives. :smile:


*1. 8 predictions Arthur C. Clarke got right decades ago
https://www.cnet.com/pictures/8-predictions-arthur-c-clarke-got-right-decades-ago-pictures/3/

*2. "Because there are no other plausibilties to how causality functions, the only {logical} conclusion is that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause". — Philosophim

*3. "I'm a p-naturalist¹ and thereby speculatively assume that aspects of nature are only explained within – immanently to – nature itself by using other aspects of nature, which includes "consciousness" as an attribute of at least one natural species." ___180 Proof
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/867837
Note --- The First Cause speculation is not about any particular "aspect" of Nature, but about all aspects of Nature : the Cosmos as a whole living (dynamic, if you prefer) system that was born and is fated to die. Who or What caused this system of Causation?


PS___ 2 years ago : If a first cause is necessary
" Understood, but my argument counters that. If a first cause is logically necessary, it is not necessary that it be a God, because a first cause is not bound by any prior rules of causality for its existence." — Philosophim
I agree. That's why I refer to the philosophical Principle of First Cause or Necessary Being by various alternative names, including "BEING". But most people would equate those names with their own notion of "God". Which is why, for a while I spelled it "G*D", in order to indicate that it's not your preacher's notion of deity. Instead, it's what Blaise Pascal dismissively called "the god of the philosophers". Others call it simply "the god of Reason". That's what's left when you strip Religion of its traditional mythology & social regulations & emotional commitments. The power-to-exist is essential to living beings & non-living things, and is fundamental to philosophical discourse. It's the unstated premise of every assertion about what-is. So, I try to deal with the elephant-in-the-room head-on, instead of pretending it doesn't "exist" in conventional reality. ___Gnomon

possibilities that go beyond space-time — Gnomon

I.e. mere possibilia :smirk:

↪180 Proof is much more knowledgeable of Philosophy than I am.

:up:

In this thread, I never got the impression that you were arguing for any specific kind of First Cause (What), but merely reasoning about the logical necessity for something to kick-start the chain of Causation (That). — Gnomon

Correct.

When ↪Philosophim says that there is "no limit" on what the Cause of Being might be {see PS below}, he's merely admitting that we are speculating about a state & event that is empirically unverifiable (no known rules), but logically plausible (rules of reasoning) — Gnomon

Also correct. Just one caveat for Ucarr. Currently we are unable to verify that something is a first cause, but we know what would be needed to do it. Thus any claim that "X" is a first cause would need to prove it.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of an amateur forum, we can reasonably conclude that a contingent world (big bang beginning) requires a prior Cause of some kind (infinite ; recursive?) — Gnomon

According to the OP, looking at just the big bang and nothing else, it is not rationally necessary that it requires a prior cause of some kind. However, if we are to empirically claim, "The big bang is the first cause of the universe", we must prove that it is so. Until its proven, the possibility that something prior caused the big bang must rationally be explored as well.

*3. "I'm a p-naturalist¹ and thereby speculatively assume that aspects of nature are only explained within – immanently to – nature itself by using other aspects of nature, which includes "consciousness" as an attribute of at least one natural species." ___180 Proof
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/867837
Note --- The First Cause speculation is not about any particular "aspect" of Nature, but about all aspects of Nature : the Cosmos as a whole living (dynamic, if you prefer) system that was born and is fated to die. — Gnomon

This is what I think 180 Proof failed to understand. He's an intelligent person, but I believe was convinced the argument was trying to say something it wasn't. The major struggle I've had in this OP was getting people break free of the "first cause is a God" argument that has been locked in debate for decades. It can be hard to shake for some. My hopes were to get both atheists and theists to see that we're missing an incredible point in the midst of the overwhelming concern about proving/disproving deities.

The point is that the logical conclusion results in there necessarily being one first cause, and that there was nothing prior which caused or limited what that first cause could have been prior to its inception. Thus sure, a God is possible, but not necessary. To claim, "A God is the first cause" requires proof, and cannot be logically concluded. On the flip side, I think its a fascinating point to consider that the inception of our universe logically required an unlimited potential. That there logically is a beginning to reason. Further, the idea that a first cause could happen at any time is a fascinating concept that should be considered as a possibility in any causal exploration. Understanding the nature of it, as well as expected patterns can be very useful in critically analyzing any claims that this "X" is a first cause. We can close the philosophical debate on the logical necessity of a God, and move instead of the empirical proof required to demonstrate if any one belief that "X" is a first cause can hold against scientific rigor.

This is what I think 180 Proof failed to understand. He's an intelligent person, but I believe was convinced the argument was trying to say something it wasn't. The major struggle I've had in this OP was getting people break free of the"first cause is a God" argument that has been locked in debate for decades. It can be hard to shake for some. My hopes were to get both atheists and theists to see that we're missing an incredible point in the midst of the overwhelming concern about proving/disproving deities. — Philosophim

In his smirking reply to my post above --- "possibilities that go beyond space-time" --- indicates his prejudicial opinion that there can be nothing outside of space-time. {how do he know?} That working hypothesis may be necessary for the purposes of Empirical science, but it is self-limiting for the explorations of theoretical Philosophy. That would be like Columbus assuming the conventional belief of the era, that there is nothing over the horizon to the west of Europe.

That space-time-is-all presumption may be a convenient position for a confirmed Immanentist, but may also be a self-imposed blindfold for someone who is not so sure that what-you-see-is-all-there-is. Ironically, what 180 is missing, due to his no-god prejudice, is that the OP says nothing about going beyond the bounds of space-time to find a First Cause. It even specifically warns against "Infinite causality", which some might identify with a biblical god. So, I'd be interested in his astute argument for-or-against the notion of a logically necessary First Cause, for a chain-of-events that is integral-with and directly-connected to the physical sequences of space-time*1. In other words, a Self-Caused sequence, or Spontaneous Generation. Did our world have a First Cause or merely a First Step?*3

Many cosmologists have concluded that our bubble of space-time is bounded by a mysterious energetic beginning and an evanescent entropic ending*2. Some have postulated that the Big Bang was not an explosion from nothing into something, but merely an expansion of some pre-existing matter squished into a dimensionless mathematical Singularity. So, the experts disagree on the necessity for a First Cause, versus a resurrection from a previous incarnation of an un-caused (self-existent) eternally-cycling Multiverse. The M-verse has some basic characteristics of a traditional god, but presumably it's merely a cosmic mechanism without Consciousness or Entention. Sort of like a driverless taxi.

Is it possible to ontologically understand the Big Bang theory without considering a context of "possibilities that go beyond space-time"? :smile:



*1. Big Bang Self-Caused?
The Big Bang was the moment 13.8 billion years ago when the universe began as a tiny, dense, fireball that exploded. Most astronomers use the Big Bang theory to explain how the universe began. But what caused this explosion in the first place is still a mystery.
https://www.amnh.org/explore/ology/astronomy/how-did-the-universe-begin

*2. Beginning of Time :
The conclusion of this lecture is that the universe has not existed forever. Rather, the universe, and time itself, had a beginning in the Big Bang, about 15 billion years ago. ___ Steven Hawking
https://www.hawking.org.uk/in-words/lectures/the-beginning-of-time

*3. Space & Time are Matter & Energy :
That makes Matter = Energy; Energy = Space; Space = Time. Therefore matter, energy, space and time are all interchangeable characteristics, which implies strongly that they are all forms of one thing.
https://alasdairf.medium.com/are-matter-energy-time-space-all-interchangeable-e2dbf7d411e5
Note --- Space-time is not a real thing, but the concept entails both Matter and Energy. Without Matter, there is no Space. Without Change, there is no Time.

↪180 Proof indicates his prejudicial opinion that there can be nothing outside of space-time. {how do he know?} — Gnomon

I did not claim or imply this.

As I've stated in several of our exchanges, Gnomon, my metaphysical position more or less agrees with Spinoza's: there is no "outside of space-time" (or "beyond" with "possibilities") insofar as nature is unbounded in all directions (i.e. natura naturans is eternal and infinite) ... just as there is no edge of the Earth off of which one can fall, no north of the North Pole, etc.

Stop making up sh*t. :sweat:

I don't see how any logic can be applied to the situation if we don't know the physics involved first. It's rather futile to try. Want are you doing? Applying a mental overlay to unknown physics?
It doesn't seem reasonable.

Maybe it's a process of testing ideas. That's fine.

Here's one. We don't know the exact nature of time. An interesting twist is the possibility of retrocausality or back propagation of signals.

The idea is if the present moment has some duration instead of being defined as only an instant, then there is a question of back propagation of signals. This would take the form of a physical remnant of a future state existing in present matter. Very much debated but it's a thing.

Another form of retrocausality is information based. Our brains hold concepts of past, present and future so an anticipated future event can affect the physical present. For example we do things based on future projections like storing food, preparing for storms, launching space probes and preparing for wars. All things not possible without brains so brains can affect matter. Would it be relavent to a first cause? I don't know but it's a mechanism that appears to operate differently than lesser forms of physical matter are capable of.

I use the terms retrocausality and back propagation loosely, as they have different meanings in other contexts.

:up:

methodological materialism (i.e. populating models with immaterial data – entities, causes – amplifies experimental error, therefore scientific (and historical) practices require eliminating as much immaterial data as possible as the preliminary method of decreasing a model's experimental error – making it (more) testable) — 180 Proof

Doesn't the {belief that eliminating immaterial data decreases a model's error} imply that immaterial things have no causal relationship with material things? By then, wouldn't methodological materialism imply a sort of metaphysical commitment against interactivism?

I don't see how any logic can be applied to the situation if we don't know the physics involved first. It's rather futile to try. Want are you doing? Applying a mental overlay to unknown physics?
It doesn't seem reasonable. — Mark Nyquist

Here's one. We don't know the exact nature of time. An interesting twist is the possibility of retrocausality or back propagation of signals. — Mark Nyquist

The OP covers this. Let me break it down for you as simply as possible.

Lets take the idea that the universe has a clear finite start. A -> B -> C with A being the start. What caused A, or the entire set to be? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Now lets take a set of looped time. A -> B -> C -> A... What caused the entire set to be? In other words, why is there no D? Nothing. There is no prior cause.

Logically, whether infinite regress or finite regress, we will reach a point in causality in which there is no prior cause for its existence. Feel free to ask for more details if needed.