Do you not put forward Descartes as the poster child for "instrumental reason"? — Paine

Well, insofar as he was 'the first modern philosopher', which was how he was presented to me in undergrad philosophy. And the modern period is where the instrumental conception of reason really becomes entrenched. Prior to that it was accepted that reason was embedded in the fabric of the cosmos, whereas for modern philosophy it becomes subjectivised and relativised.

Sure there are countless difference of nuance and emphasis amongst those philosophers but what I believe they all share is the sense of the qualitative dimension, that there is a real good which is not a matter of definition or social convention.

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. — IEP

But in all these, 'reason' is being understood in a sense much nearer to 'logos' than today's 'instrumental reason', is it not? — Wayfarer

This begs the question of how logos is to be understood. I think it is safe to say that it is not instrumental reason.

As did his favorite god. The god who philosophizes. Dionysus.

Prior to that it was accepted that reason was embedded in the fabric of the cosmos, whereas for modern philosophy it becomes subjectivized and relativized. — Wayfarer

How that 'fabric' is conceived leads to significant differences in how the experiences of the subject are framed and looked for.

Fooloso4 was right to challenge my speaking of a "nature of reason" in this context. Spinoza placing the cause by God at an infinite distance from our processes is not only a call to not anthropomorphize the divine but an expulsion from a cosmos given as a place in both the Aristotelian and Augustinian imagination. The activity of reason has to be seen in a different and colder light.

When it comes to Fooloso4 asking about the appropriateness of attributing mind to God, the example of Kant comes to mind as one way to frame the thinking subject as unable to make such a claim. He does this through placing the limitations of reason within a surrounding universe of the unknowable. Hegel came along and said Kant was giving back to himself with one hand what he took away with the other. When discussing the relationship between freedom and necessity, Hegel made the following observation:

A criminal, when punished, may look upon his punishment as a restriction of his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to which he is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act: and if he recognizes this, he comports himself as a free man. In short, man is most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute idea throughout. It was this phase of mind and conduct which Spinoza called Amor intellectualis Dei. — Logic, Hegel, section 158

:ok: Karma!

I appreciate the thumbs up. I do see a resemblance to karma in Hegel's statement, if one makes it instant in the fashion of John Lennon.

That thought prompts me to reassert my argument that similar connections, drawn from different points of reference, are not all observing the same conditions. What Spinoza is putting forth as the activity of reason, for example, is not the same as Krishnamurti representing thought as that without a center.

The beliefs are based around the same question.

At the end of the day, they're both human made.

Let's look at it, not from the Ominous Subject of God. Let's whiddle it down and see how they're both made up Narratives, each equally stubborn in its attachment to itself (I say, a built-in attachment but that's for another discussion).

Whiddled down, they both reveal their Fictional natures, stopping short of Truth, necessarily incapable of surpassing the final leap which inevitably settles at belief. (And this applies to theism/atheism).

Take. You believe, not necessarily that Jesus of Nazareth is God, but even if it comforts you to dilute the myth, and say, that he preached love your enemies to the poor and was executed by Rome. You don't know that for certain, but it was revealed to you by the Christian Bible, has been input into you since childhood, and seems to have been adopted by enough people that it is safely a convention. It is still mysterious and you don't fully understand it, but still you took the leap, even if opposing Signifiers reawaken the Dialectic from time to time.


Now take. Water is made of two hydrogen and one oxygen atom. You don't know that for certain, but it was revealed to you by the Scientists, has been input into you since childhood, and seems to have been adopted by enough people that it is safely a convention. It is still mysterious and you don't fully understand it, but still you took the leap, even if opposing Signifiers reawaken the Dialectic from time to time.

Ah, but the Science Narrative demurs, our belief is supported by observation and can be tested by experience. Maybe not everyone can or has tested it, but we have authorites which confirm it.

And so too does the Jesus camp. Our belief is supported by witnesses and can be tested by experience. Maybe not everyone can or has tested it, but we have authorites which confirm it.

And it is only because we stand from within the Science Narrative that we reject religion's right to make all of the same claims. From Religion's perspective, using their tools and definitions, their claims are tested everyday and prove to be true.


Yet all along, both are wrong. Neither is ever proving to be true. Both are constructing opposing Narratives out of tools particular to each, but in common, uaing the same Mind, and its same structure, Language; and, both require at the very last instance of the Dialectic, a settlement, and a leap to belief in that settlement as if it were True (thats built-in--by its evolution. But for another discussion).

And why should it be any different when we get way up there at God? Theism/Atheism, they're both Fictions, and Philosophy should at least, recognize that, just as it should recognize it in Itself. Afterall what is Logic and Reason, but made up tools constructing Narratives which can never be called True.

Test it. If you think anything I've said is true, isn't it because you believe it? And If you think anything I've said is untrue, isn't it because you believe something opposing?

At the end of the day... breathe. And let them each present their cases for belief.

But for God's sake, let them each present their cases.

This is a very interesting discussion. Philosophy is the starting point of most of the fields . Theology is not exactly part of philosophy. This has several dimension if you think about it. When it comes to Indian philosophy religion and philosophy go hand in hand. Here is there is no clear cut distinction between philosophy and religion. But that doesn't mean there aren't any atheistic school of thought. There was charvaka which is a materialistic school . Buddhism also is atheistic to some extend. So it is intertwined there. But when it comes to the Western philosophy. Greeks established a system and contributed to philosophy . Philosophy established others but even then gods where prevalent. Math was given importance by Pythagoras . Things changed in the scholastic period philosophy become the hand maiden of religion. Things changed in the modern era philosophy is compared to science. Theism and atheism doesn't matter. As philosopher we are free to take oru position about anything. For me we cannot know about God or prove it. That doesn't mean there is no Possibility of god. So i choose to be an agnostic and i believe that is the most convenient position a philosopher could hold. Mostly the extremes are a dark area.

For me we cannot know about God or prove it. That doesn't mean there is no Possibility of god. So i choose to be an agnostic and i believe that is the most convenient position a philosopher could hold — Abhiram

For me, the best argument against god isn't that there isn't enough evidence, but that regardless of whether or not there is evidence, the very idea of god is abhorrent. This is why I consider self-declared agnostics to be closet theists.

For me, the best argument against god isn't that there isn't enough evidence, but that regardless of whether or not there is evidence, the very idea of god is abhorrent. This is why I consider self-declared agnostics to be closet theists. — Joshs

One of the more intriguing responses I've read here in a while.

But is this an argument or more of reaction? Which very idea of god is abhorrent?

I might say the same of childhood leukaemia or herpes - but they still exist and aren't going away.

As philosopher we are free to take out position about anything. For me we cannot know about God or prove it. That doesn't mean there is no Possibility of god. So i choose to be an agnostic and i believe that is the most convenient position a philosopher could hold — Abhiram

For me atheism isn't about proof that there are no gods. It's whether I believe in gods or or not. I don't believe, so i am an atheist.

Abhorrent is a strong word don't you think .

For me, the best argument against god isn't that there isn't enough evidence, but that regardless of whether or not there is evidence, the very idea of god is abhorrent. This is why I consider self-declared agnostics to be closet theists.
— Joshs

One of the more intriguing responses I've read here in a while.

But is this an argument or more of reaction? Which very idea of god is abhorrent? — Tom Storm

Good question. I have in mind the platonic idea of god as an absolute substance, content, form, quality. A sun around which all objects revolve. An unfalsifiable, unchangeable criterion for the true, the real and the good. This idea is abhorrent to me because it is conformist, restrictive and violent in its sanction of blameful
moralisms.

I have in mind the platonic idea of god as an absolute substance, content, form, quality. A sun around which all objects revolve. An unfalsifiable, unchangeable criterion for the true, the real and the good. This idea is abhorrent to me because it is conformist, restrictive and violent in its sanction of blameful
moralisms. — Joshs

What if the pursuit of "God" as so defined, is akin to the pursuit of Being, or the Being of all beings? Is it truly the idea of God that is abhorrent, Platonic or otherwise? Or, is it what we have done to that via the corruptible vehicle of so called religion? I.e., the former, an absolute criterion for the true and real; the latter conformist, restrictive and violent in its sanction of blameful moralisms.

Is it truly the idea of God that is abhorrent, Platonic or otherwise? Or, is it what we have done to that via the corruptible vehicle of so called religion? I.e., the former, an absolute criterion for the true and real; the latter conformist, restrictive and violent in its sanction of blameful moralisms — ENOAH

If you believe in an absolute criterion of the true and the real, and the rest of the world fails to be properly guided by your absolute, you won’t consider your blameful condemnation and rejection of that world to be unjustly moralistic, conformist and restrictive. If, on the other hand, you don’t believe in absolutes, you are in a much better position to avoid moralistic condemnation and rejection of others to begin with.

Persuasive! Mulling it over. Thank you

So... if a philosopher arrives at a hypothesis of the Absolute Being of all beings; and derived therefrom, a corresponding morality; a strict deontology, she is no less offensivel than an adherent to a religion who subscribes to an Absolute God and a corresponding morality? It's not strictly the idea of God that is abhorrent, but adherence to any Absolute because of the threat such adherence brings to morality? Just trying to understand what it is that is truly offensive to reasonable minds who often raise morality as the problem with belief in (an) Absolute. Neither of which I am necessarily advocating for.

So... if a philosopher arrives at a hypothesis of the Absolute Being of all beings; and derived therefrom, a corresponding morality; a strict deontology, she is no less offensivel than an adherent to a religion who subscribes to an Absolute God and a corresponding morality? It's not strictly the idea of God that is abhorrent, but adherence to any Absolute because of the threat such adherence brings to morality? — ENOAH

There are degrees of abhorrentness, corresponding to the nature of absoluteness being claimed. The absolutism of religious fundamentalism (Evangelical Christian , Haredi Judaism, Muslim, etc) is more intolerant than the absolutism of Hegelian dialectic, or the hidden absolutism of scientistic atheists like Dennett and Dawkins, for whom the validity of empirical truth is grounded in unquestioned presuppositions.

Good question. I have in mind the platonic idea of god as an absolute substance, content, form, quality. A sun around which all objects revolve. An unfalsifiable, unchangeable criterion for the true, the real and the good. This idea is abhorrent to me because it is conformist, restrictive and violent in its sanction of blameful
moralisms. — Joshs

Got you. Thanks.

For me atheism isn't about proof that there are no gods. It's whether I believe in gods or or not. I don't believe, so i am an atheist. — Tom Storm

The question for me, however, is whether or not 'claims about g/G (e.g. theism, deism) are demonstrably true'. AFAIK, such claims are not demonstrably true; therefore, I am an atheist.

Also, as the ultimate or absolute "mystery", g/G is neither an explanation nor a justification because attempting to answer such questions as "Why do we exist?" and "What is right or good?" with "mystery" – g/G created and g/G said – only begs those questions.


addendum to:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/875902

The question for me, however, is whether or not 'claims about g/G (e.g. theism, deism) are demonstrably true'. AFAIK, such claims are not demonstrably true; therefore, I am an atheist. — 180 Proof

Yes, arguments and the lack of demonstration of gods has maintained and sharpened my atheism. But my initial impulse was not based on arguments as such. The intriguing thing about gods is that they have no explanatory power, so as a solution to any fundamental questions, it just seems to be kicking the can down the road.

↪Joshs Also, as the ultimate or absolute "mystery", g/G is neither an explanation nor a justification because attempting to answer such questions as "Why do we exist?" and "What is right or good?" with (a/the) "mystery" only begs those questions. — 180 Proof

:up:

But my initial impulse was not based on arguments as such. — Tom Storm

Same here, despite a decade or so of Catholic Catechism, altar boy service & bible study, I couldn't shake the (naive?) question: why believe in this religion, or this god, rather than any of the others? I suspect I'd outgrown 'magical thinking' in elementary school a few years before I'd explicitly realized in high school that I did not believe in 'Christian myths'. Most of the arguments, as you say, Tom, came years later.

If you believe in an absolute criterion of the true and the real, and the rest of the world fails to be properly guided by your absolute, you won’t consider your blameful condemnation and rejection of that world to be unjustly moralistic, conformist and restrictive. If, on the other hand, you don’t believe in absolutes, you are in a much better position to avoid moralistic condemnation and rejection of others to begin with. — Joshs

That seems to be a question of ethics more than anything. My absolute criterion is not killing kids, if the rest of the world fails to be properly guided by that, is my condemnation and rejection unjustly moralistic, or just?
If you are a deontologist: someone who doesn't believe in absolutes might be more likely to avoid moralistic condemnation, but someone without absolutes is in a worse place to condemn what is supposed to be condemned.
If you are utilitarian, there is no such thing as a (correct) absolute, there is only whatever will bring the greatest welfare. Maybe killing a kid to save thousands is good — some primitive societies believed so.
Your post seems to assume utilitarianism.

. My absolute criterion is not killing kids, if the rest of the world fails to be properly guided by that, is my condemnation and rejection unjustly moralistic, or just? — Lionino

The devil is in the details, no? One can unproblematically posit an absolute of process, an injunction against my acting to insure the loss of something I care about. But as soon as I fill in the content of what it is I can’t abide losing, absolutism gives way to the relativism of interpretation. Is a fetus a kid? Is a murdering bad seed a kid? And what constitutes murder, and bad intent?

If you are utilitarian, there is no such thing as a (correct) absolute, there is only whatever will bring the greatest welfare. Maybe killing a kid to save thousands is good — some primitive societies believed so.
Your post seems to assume utilitarianism — Lionino

The problem with utilitarianism is its need to universalize the concept of pleasure. As Hilary Putnam writes of Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism:

The assumption that people act only on self-interested motives was sometimes defended on the basis of the hedonist psychology of Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, which held that everyone ultimately "really" desires only a subjective psychological quantity (called "pleasure" by Bentham) and that this "quantity" was a purely subjective matter. As John Dewey put it long ago,

"When happiness is conceived of as an aggregate of states of feeling, these are regarded as homogenous in quality, different from one another only in intensity and duration. Their qualitative differences are not intrinsic, but are due to the different objects with which they are associated (as pleasures of hearing, or vision). Hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken by itself as an end."

This disappearance of the qualitative differences is (as far as importance to the agent's "happiness" is concerned), of course, just what makes it possible for the utilitarian to speak of "summing pleasures, "maximizing" them, and so on. But if Dewey's alternative view is right (as I believe), and if

“agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"

then

"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another."

Dewey continues,

"Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect of character which they express. But if the good is only a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as good as any other-the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindness, simply as pleasure.”

The problem with utilitarianism is its need to universalize the concept of pleasure. As Hilary Putnam writes of Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism: — Joshs

I should have said consequentialism instead of utilitarianism. Your post implies people who don't subscribe to absolutes have intellectual privilege in ethical matters, that to me seems prejudiced against non-consequentialism.

But this misses the point, which is that for those who actually believe in God, it has real consequences. Whereas to believe that it's simply a 'puzzle-solver is a meaningless hypothetical. — Wayfarer

That's a pointless point that deserves to be missed. Belief in anything, however absurd, (Nazism, scientism, Zionism, scientology, you name it) has real consequences, since belief is a primary driver of action.

As I understand it Spinoza was a thorough determinist. He denied freedom of will even to God (or nature). The freedom that may be enabled by reason is to come to understand that all our thoughts and actions are determined, and thus to become free of the troubling illusion of free will.

I don't think he was advocating a kind of quietism. In the passage I quoted above, there is the emphasis on the wise being more influential than the ignorant:

It is clear from this how potent a wise person is and how much more effective he is than an ignorant person who is driven by lust ​alone. For apart from the fact that an ignorant person is agitated in many ways by external causes and never has true contentment ​of spirit, he also lives, we might say, ignorant ​of himself and of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, at the same time he also ceases to be. — ibid. part 5 proposition 42

In the passages where he criticizes the anthropomorphizing of God, he points to the natural activity of men seeking their own ends as the point of contrast. How our deliberations change things for us is not how the causality by God works.

When Spinoza puts forth his vision of determinism, he always adds that when it seems like our actions are free causes, that is because we do not know the causes well enough. The more effective we become is in the direction of greater knowledge rather than a capacity that can be identified as will in the Augustinian choice between sin and Grace.

... belief is a primary driver of action. — Janus

:up: :up:

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