I think that I have the ability to choose because I can come up with reasons and reach conclusions in accordance with my will; but I don’t think I have the ability to do otherwise because if you rewound the clock, then I would expect nothing other than myself to generate the same reasons and reach the same conclusion—afterall, nothing changed other than the rewinding of time. — Bob Ross
it seems to just be a slight of hand.because causal determinism [or some weaker variant] is true, one cannot do otherwise but they can choose — Bob Ross
If you can't freely choose your own belief, there's no point.
I'm arguing that 1) you ought to value leeway freedom (which I suppose is another argument in-and-of itself) and 2) if you value leeway freedom, then <insert above argument>
If one really thinks that free will does not exist (and not even in the compatibilist sense), then they are being irrational by holding people accountable
"What one is predetermined to do" being "holding people accountable".I never claimed it was irrational to do what one is predetermined to do.
This is a peculiar argument (to me), because it does not care about the truth at all. #1 is completely unjustified in the OP, and #2 is essentially saying that if one values leeway freedom then they should believe it exists even if they know it clearly doesn't--i.e., you are telling people to believe in illusions so long as they like that illusion, as opposed to giving them the truth. — Bob Ross
Appeal to consequences, also known as argumentum ad consequentiam (Latin for "argument to the consequence"), is an argument that concludes a hypothesis (typically a belief) to be either true or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences.[1] This is based on an appeal to emotion and is a type of informal fallacy, since the desirability of a premise's consequence does not make the premise true. Moreover, in categorizing consequences as either desirable or undesirable, such arguments inherently contain subjective points of view.
I agree. In order to avoid this, I think the OP needs to clarify that it is arguing for it being true that one should believe in leeway free will even if leeway free will is false. If it were presented that way, then I don't think it would be a fallacy anymore. — Bob Ross
we have nothing to lose if it ends up being false, and everything to gain if it is true.
I'm not sure whether or not I'm a compatibilist, but whatever determinism the world appears to have I believe is theoretically compatible with the ability to do otherwise, although the reasoning does invoke a type of indeterminancy.
For example, let me ask you this: how would you describe the determinancy of a die roll?
Because to me a die roll can basically function as determinant so long as the chance governing the die roll does not change
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