I would go further and say that all explanations based on reason are naturalistic.

I would not go that far. Reason can easily overstep its bounds, while still maintaining its principles, and this is why some supernaturalist accounts are logically consistent but still should be rejected.

I think you would be better off just critiquing the, external and internal, coherency of supernaturalist views than its application of pure reason.

"God did it" is not really a cogent explanation. Even if it were accepted as an explanation, there is no detail, no step-by-step explication of just how God could have done it. None that can really make any rational or experiential sense at all to us in any case.

I agree that it can often be very nebulous, but this is a straw man. Sophisticated theists have very detailed metaphysical accounts of God.

I do agree, and to the point of this OP, that when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing. As Oppy put in (in the link I gave in the OP), anything theism can posit with God is equally available for the naturalist to posit about the universe (or nature). If God is necessarily existent, then nature is. If God involves an infinite regress, then nature does. Etc. The interesting thing is that, because the same explanations are afforded to the naturalist, naturalism becomes the better option because it is more parsimonious.

Perhaps an ignorant question but isn’t this just a variation on Occam’s Razor?

The principle of parsimony seems like an Occum's Razor argument. Since God is an assumption, and naturalism makes less assumptions, this makes sense. The only way anyone could have a viable disagreement with this decision is if they could make God a provable entity, and not merely an assumption. I don't believe finding any phenomena that cannot be explained naturalistically matters to this fact. I think more importantly, there is no phenomena that necessarily requires a supernaturalistic explanation for its existence. Good post! :)

...when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing. — Bob Ross

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

anything theism can posit with God is equally available for the naturalist to posit about the universe (or nature) — Bob Ross

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

I would go further and say that all explanations based on reason are naturalistic. "God did it" is not really a cogent explanation. Even if it were accepted as an explanation, there is no detail, no step-by-step explication of just how God could have done it. None that can really make any rational or experiential sense at all to us in any case. — Janus

But what is the argument, here? Is it, <If we cannot say how X has done Y, then we cannot say that X has done Y>?

This relates to what might be called orders of being, and there is a sense in which you are right that it relates to faith. For example, a child's bicycle might break, and they might go to their parent and ask them to fix it. The parent says they will fix the bicycle, and a week later it is fixed. Is the child justified in believing that their parent has fixed the bicycle?

The key here is that the parent "transcends" the child, so to speak. The parent can do things that the child cannot do or even understand, and the child knows this. Thus the premise of your argument is that there are no "parents" vis-a-vis humans; there are no orders of being that transcend the human order. Once this premise is questioned the argument seems to collapse. What remains true is that the epistemology of things-above-us will tend to differ from the epistemology of things-below-us.

(I should also note that your argument pertains to discrete events, and this is only a subset of the subject of this thread.)

This doesn't answer the question in the OP; and isn't necessarily true. — Bob Ross

Not sure which of my comments you are responding to.

But how would you find out? In the absence of that kind of data, what criteria can be selected?

What do you mean? — Bob Ross

Go back a few steps - you asked:

it isn’t demanding a proof, per se, of God’s existence: it is demanding an example, at a bare minimum, of a phenomena (i.e, an appearance: event) which cannot be explained more parsimoniously with naturalism — Bob Ross

To which I responded:

Well, given the tendency to reject every account that is found in the world’s religious literature of such events, then probably not — Wayfarer

because accounts of Biblical miracles, and miraculous events described in other religious literature, might constitute the kinds of examples you're referring to, but as a rule these are not considered, because they're not replicable and generally not considered credible by any modern standards. So what examples are being referred to? Where to look for the data?

As it happens, there is one large body of records collected concerning allegedly supernatural events, which are the investigations of miracles attributed to those being considered for canonization as saints by the Catholic Church. These alleged interventions are the subject of rigorous examination - see Pondering Miracles.

Aside from those, I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake's research in telepathic cognition, which is considered supernatural by some, in that it seems to require that there is a non-physical medium through which perceptions and thoughts are transmitted.

Both these appeal to empirical data. The following argument is philosophical.

For intents of this OP, naturalism is the view that everything in reality is a part of the processes of nature; and supernaturalism is the view that some things transcend those processes of nature. — Bob Ross

In order to declare that everything is 'a part of the processes of nature' we need to understand where the boundary lies between what is natural and what might be supernatural. I simply pointed out that even the metaphysical status of natural laws is itself contested: are natural laws part of nature? It seems obvious, but it is contested by philosophers, and it is a question that itself not scientific, but philosophical.

Furthermore, where in nature do your examples of inductive and deductive logic exist? As far as I can tell, they are purely internal to acts of reasoned inference, they're internal to thought. Science never tires of telling us that nature is blind and acts without reason, save material causation; so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'?

so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'? — Wayfarer

It's looking ever more likely to me, that the answer is, "Yes."

I’ve been reviewing a bit of Rupert Sheldrake’s material again. He claims to have evidence of psychic phenomena that call naturalism into question, at least insofar as they’re paranormal. The phenomena he speaks of are fairly quotidian in nature - dogs who know when their owners are about to come home, the sense of being stared at, and so on. He is, of course, characterised as a maverick or crank by a lot of people, but he persists, in his quiet way, and claims to have significant evidence. The argument then turns into one about whether he does present evidence. — Wayfarer

There are often problems in arguments such as the OP's, such that "supernatural" (or non-natural) is effectively defined out of existence, and many responses have referred to this problem.

When Newton first posited his theory of gravity it was met with incredulity as an "occult"/hidden account, insofar as it posited no intermediary or reason for gravity. At that time it was believed that objects at a distance could only interact through some physical medium, and Newton posited a kind of instantaneous interaction without any medium. Newton's account was question-begging or "magical" in the very same sense that supernatural causality is often referred to as magical or question-begging. I think we could even go so far as to say that, at the time, Newton's account was non-scientific or non-naturalistic insofar as it disregarded the prevalent canons of scientific reason. For the opacity of Newton's account would call into question its rationality.

I believe so. At least, I use them interchangeably.

Newton's account was non-scientific or non-naturalistic insofar as it disregarded the prevalent canons of scientific reason. — Leontiskos

I'd say it's quite scientific, to recognize new and better ways of understanding things. Casting Newton as non-scientific seems rather bizarre to me.

:up:

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

Can you elaborate?

I don’t see how any phenomena requires an appeal to something supernatural; so I don’t see why a theist has more justified recourse to lack an explanation.

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them

That is entirely fair; but that is the point of the OP! It is to get supernaturalists to name things that they think require supernatural explanation.

Let me go through your examples: let’s break it down.

1. Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. It is more parsimonious to hold an atheistic substance dualism or idealism. What’s incoherent with believing in a soul without believing in God? I don’t see why that couldn’t be a natural process. Bernardo Kastrup’s idealism is a great example: in that metaphysical view, one’s mind has supremacy over matter, because matter is weakly emergent from it. The minds which are derived from the universal mind are derived via a natural process of dissociation. The point is not that it is a correct theory, it is just that if a supernaturalist can posit a soul or incompatibilist free will, then so can a naturalist; but the latter will posit less entities.

2. Soul: already discussed in #1.

3. Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. Same goes for supernatural accounts that are atheistic, like neo-platonist accounts: they are less parsimonious than naturalist accounts.

4. Miracles: let’s just say, for the sake of the argument, that a ‘miracle’ can and has occurred in the sense of something fundamentally extraordinary happening which defies our understanding of the laws of physics. It seems, by my lights, to be a better and more parsimonious answer to say that miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself (and there are thousands of examples why this is the case).

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. I am sure you probably agree on that point, but disagree that naturalism affords us an equal footing on most of the examples you gave.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

I think they do tend to, but I may be mistaken on that.

I responded to your only comment (that I see most recently in thread).

because accounts of Biblical miracles, and miraculous events described in other religious literature, might constitute the kinds of examples you're referring to, but as a rule these are not considered, because they're not replicable and generally not considered credible by any modern standards. So what examples are being referred to? Where to look for the data?

Oh, I think I understand now: you are saying that, because you don’t think the examples which you have readily available are legitimate sources (or are problematic), that you can’t give any example of a phenomena that requires supernaturalism to account for it, correct?

If so, then I totally agree.

As it happens, there is one large body of records collected concerning allegedly supernatural events, which are the investigations of miracles attributed to those being considered for canonization as saints by the Catholic Church. These alleged interventions are the subject of rigorous examination - see Pondering Miracles.

Are you saying that miracles require a form of supernaturalism to account sufficiently for them? I can’t tell if you are giving me a history lesson, or providing an answer.

Aside from those, I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake's research in telepathic cognition, which is considered supernatural by some, in that it seems to require that there is a non-physical medium through which perceptions and thoughts are transmitted.

Could you elaborate more on their research? I do not think we can transmit thoughts to each other with solely minds; but I am open to its consideration.

are natural laws part of nature?

Yes.

It seems obvious, but it is contested by philosophers, and it is a question that itself not scientific, but philosophical.

Yeah, I guess I don’t see why it is so contentious.

Furthermore, where in nature do your examples of inductive and deductive logic exist? As far as I can tell, they are purely internal to acts of reasoned inference, they're internal to thought. Science never tires of telling us that nature is blind and acts without reason, save material causation; so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'?

I am not here trying to claim that reality is inherently rational. I am convinced that we do afford reality some rationality in the phenomena which are representative faculties produce.

Oh, I think I understand now: you are saying that, because you don’t think the examples which you have readily available are legitimate sources (or are problematic), that you can’t give any example of a phenomena that requires supernaturalism to account for it, correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, that's generally what I was getting at. Added to that, the difficulty involved in vaidating or falsifying accounts of anything so-called 'supernatural' in a controlled environment.

Are you saying that miracles require a form of supernaturalism to account sufficiently for them? — Bob Ross

:chin: Isn't that what you asked for?

is there anything which seems to demand we posit, conceptually, something supernatural? — Bob Ross

I would have thought that 'miracle cures due to prayers' would fit that bill rather nicely. The account I linked to was from a medical scientist, Jacalyn Duffin, who was called to give evidence at an ecclesiastical tribunal. This tribunal was tasked with discerning whether a case of permanent remission from a usually-fatal form of leukemia could be attributed to the prayers of one Marie-Marguerite d’Youville, the founder of the Order of Sisters of Charity of Montreal and a candidate for canonization.

Duffin, who says she is atheist, and is an historian of medicine as well as a haemotologist, had her interest sufficiently piqued by the case to research and write several books on such cases.

You may be aware that the saying 'the devil's advocate' originated with such ecclesiastical enquiries. The role of the devil's advocate was to aggressively question the evidence of miracles to establish whether they had a natural explanation. Indeed, Duffin notes in the article that she 'never expected such reverse scepticism and emphasis on science within the Church', saying that the majority of such enquiries result in dismissing the purported miracles and declaring natural causes instead.

So, anyway, the reason that came to mind, is that one of Duffin's books discusses '1400 miracles from six continents and spanning four centuries. Overwhelmingly the miracles cited in canonizations between 1588 and 1999 are healings, and the majority entail medical care and physician testimony.' I'm not saying that you or anyone should draw any conclusions from that, but so far as empirical evidence is concerned, that at least constitutes a respectable data set, and one which does have bearing on the question.

As far as Rupert Sheldrake is concerned, if you're not familiar with him, it's a long story to tell. He's routinely described as a maverick scientist (or 'crackpot theorist') for his initial research in something he designated 'morphic resonance', the tendency of nature to form habits. His initial book was fiercely denounced, with the then-editor of Nature saying it was a candidate for burning. He is, however, an actual scientist, a plant biologist, and claims to have evidence in support. He also has written on telepathic effects, such as the 'sense of being stared at' and 'dogs who know when their owners are about to come home', for which there is no physical explanation. He's a frequent guest on discussion panels nowadays, alongside contemporary philosophers and public intellectuals. Again not saying you or anyone should believe what he says, but it's worth noting in the context. You can find more information at https://www.sheldrake.org/.

are natural laws part of nature?

Yes. — Bob Ross

The philosophical arguments are more subtle. Academics like Nancy Cartwright (see No God, No Laws) have critically addressed the problematic nature of referring to observed natural regularities as 'laws', by asking in what sense they can be considered laws at all if not decreed or enforced by an authority. Her critique underscores a broader skepticism about the metaphysical foundations of scientific laws, suggesting they are better understood as descriptions of consistent patterns or behaviors in nature rather than prescriptive rules imposed upon it. It also throws into relief whether the status of scientific laws is itself a scientific question; arguably, it is not. The consideration of the nature of these laws belongs more in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy, where the focus shifts from empirical validation to conceptual analysis. Whereas, naturalism tends to simply assume these laws, but itself has no explanation for them.

In practice, 'naturalism' often amounts to a kind of demarcation between 'rational science' and 'superstitious religion' (a.k.a. 'woo'), but it's also part of the debate between physicalism and idealism in philosophy.

Occam's Razor Humor

But what is the argument, here? Is it, <If we cannot say how X has done Y, then we cannot say that X has done Y>? — Leontiskos

I haven't made that argument. That said, if we cannot say how X has done Y, and there is no empirical evidence that X has done Y, what possible justification could we have for claiming that X has done Y? And note I haven't said we should not believe X has done Y if we feel somehow convinced of it despite lack of evidence or modus operandi, but that would be a belief supported by faith, not by reason.

What I believe on the basis of faith or feeling can never provide justification for you to believe it. Your own feelings or faith are the only non-rational justification for your own beliefs. So, one should never make argumentative claims based on feelings and faith alone lest one embarrass oneself.

I would not go that far. Reason can easily overstep its bounds, while still maintaining its principles, and this is why some supernaturalist accounts are logically consistent but still should be rejected. — Bob Ross

I haven't criticized supernaturalist accounts on the basis of failures of "pure reason'. To say the accounts are logically consistent is only to say that they do not contradict themselves. You can say all kinds of nonsense without contradicting yourself.

My criticism was made on the grounds that supernaturalist accounts that claim to be explanatory are really not so, because they present no clearly understandable causal series of events and conditions. No mechanism of action in other words.

I agree that it can often be very nebulous, but this is a straw man. Sophisticated theists have very detailed metaphysical accounts of God. — Bob Ross

I don't think this is true at all. Can you cite an example? How could theists have a "sophisticated metaphysical account of God" when God is generally considered to be unknowable?

I don't think this is true at all. Can you cite an example? How could theists have a "sophisticated metaphysical account of God" when God is generally considered to be unknowable? — Janus

You ask some tough ones and well done.

This comes up a lot. I think the gist of it is that unsophisticated accounts of god are the magic man in the sky who has temper tantrums and demands obedience. Pretty much the literalist Biblical account. It is philosophically unsophisticated and an easy target for the Dawkins brigade. Despite the idea's great power across the globe, many theists are ashamed of this god and ridicule atheism for even addressing it.

A sophisticated account of god seems to lend itself to a greater mystery, more in line with perennialism and associated traditions which hold that all created beings participate in and derive their being from the ultimate Being of God. God as the source and ground of all existence, the "Absolute" or "Ultimate" Being from which everything else derives its existence.

And so from theological thinker and philosopher David Bentley Hart we get this:

The soul’s unquenchable eros for the divine, of which Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa and countless Christian contemplatives speak, Sufism’s ‘ishq or passionately adherent love for God, Jewish mysticism’s devekut, Hinduism’s bhakti, Sikhism’s pyaar—these are all names for the acute manifestation of a love that, in a more chronic and subtle form, underlies all knowledge, all openness of the mind to the truth of things. This is because, in God, the fullness of being is also a perfect act of infinite consciousness that, wholly possessing the truth of being in itself, forever finds its consummation in boundless delight. The Father knows his own essence perfectly in the mirror of the Logos and rejoices in the Spirit who is the “bond of love” or “bond of glory” in which divine being and divine consciousness are perfectly joined. God’s wujud is also his wijdan—his infinite being is infinite consciousness—in the unity of his wajd, the bliss of perfect enjoyment.

Neither of the two provide any explanatory power as I see it. The latter is more baroque and fun and I guess would align itself with philosophical traditions of idealism and a robust critique of naturalism.

Hence this from Hart (again).

The very notion of nature as a closed system entirely sufficient to itself is plainly one that cannot be verified, deductively or empirically, from within the system of nature. It is a metaphysical (which is to say “extra-natural”) conclusion regarding the whole of reality, which neither reason nor experience legitimately warrants.”

Has any more sophisticated writing about god like this ever resonated with you?

Don't sulk ...

Cite a 'supernatural-Y' that (testably) explains some natural-X. — 180 Proof

And so from theological thinker and philosopher David Bentley Hart we get this: — Tom Storm

That passage reads to me like reificatory 'theo-babble'. I can relate to the feelings some of the words evoke: devotion, passion, love, a sense of divinity, fullness of being, the truth of being, consummation in boundless delight—William Blake wrote about these feelings, and also many another mystic.

These are evocations of very human, very poetic, feelings. But there is no rational warrant to draw any metaphysical or ontological conclusions therefrom as far as I am concerned.

So, I agree they don't explain anything, and they don't point to anything beyond the human potential to feel such things. But that just aint enough for some people.

The very notion of nature as a closed system entirely sufficient to itself is plainly one that cannot be verified, deductively or empirically, from within the system of nature. It is a metaphysical (which is to say “extra-natural”) conclusion regarding the whole of reality, which neither reason nor experience legitimately warrants.” — Tom Storm

Of course, the closedness of natural systems cannot be proven, but I can't see that we have any reason to think otherwise. Not only can we not prove such a thing to be wrong, we cannot find a shred of evidence that it might be wrong. We cannot but treat nature as a closed system because that system is all we can know. How could science incorporate something unknowable into its methodology? Methodological naturalism is not merely the only game in town, it is the only possible game in town.

Has any more sophisticated writing about god like this ever resonated with you. — Tom Storm

Some mystical writings have resonated powerfully with me, but I understand such resonance to be a matter of feeling, not of rationality. It is perilously easy to fall into wishful thinking. All that said, I see nothing wrong with people having their own personal faiths, but I think it's important in respect of intellectual honesty, to call a spade a spade. These faiths cannot be rationally argued for, but there are many who don't want to admit that.

But there is no rational warrant to draw any metaphysical or ontological conclusions therefrom as far as I am concerned. — Janus

Fair enough. It doesn't work for me either, but some folk around here may go for it.

Methodological naturalism is not merely the only game in town, it is the only possible game in town. — Janus

I don't see how we really have any alternative.

Some mystical writings have resonated powerfully with me, but I understand such resonance to be a matter of feeling, not of rationality. — Janus

Which is why I often think that we approach so many of our values and beliefs aesthetically. We recognise a kind of aesthetic, poetic truth and, perhaps, mistake it for something more.

These faiths cannot be rationally argued for, but there are many who don't want to admit that. — Janus

If feels a little like a stalemate. I wonder if there will ever be a breakthrough, some new science, some new philosophy?

interesting point. Why exactly not walk into a wall - what is the reason not to?

This question sounds sillier than I mean it.

I guess my point is, doesn't pragmatism always assume some goal or make some kind of commitments?

What about questions like: What is my purpose? Where do I ultimately come from? Why do bad things sometimes happen? What is justice, or love for that matter? Can naturalism explain these questions in a satisfying way? I think supernaturalism gives some answer, if not a complete answer for every question.

Can you elaborate? — Bob Ross

You said, "...when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing." How do you think this affords naturalism an equal footing? Does naturalism believe in an infinite being? Is a system which posits an infinite being on "equal footing" with a system that denies an infinite being, so far as the inexplicable goes? Of course not. Infinite things are less explicable than finite things.

Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. — Bob Ross

What is the proportion of naturalist incompatibilists to non-naturalist incompatibilists? Why?

The minds which are derived from the universal mind... — Bob Ross

Generally we would say that someone who believes in a universal mind is a theist.

Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. — Bob Ross

These are just question-begging assertions, and I spoke of transcendent moral norms, not moral realism. Again, what is the proportion of naturalists who believe in transcendent moral norms (or also moral realism) to non-naturalists who believe in such a thing? Why? At every juncture you will end up saying something like, "Well, 90% of incompatibilists are non-naturalists, but incompatibilism is still way more parsimonious on naturalism," which is a prima facie irrational claim. Beyond that you still haven't told us (and specifically @NotAristotle) what parsimony has to do with anything, much less truth.

miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself — Bob Ross

Then you've botched the definition of a miracle, and you are equivocating.

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. — Bob Ross

The very fact that so many people are and have been non-naturalists is itself strong evidence against the OP. If naturalism was such an obviously better explanation then everyone would be naturalist.

I think they do tend to... — Bob Ross

They do, and that's the point. For example, theists (tend to) believe in miracles; naturalists don't. The explanandum differs. Each camp is attempting to account for a different set of existing things, because each camp believes different things exist. Oppy falsely presupposes that they are trying to account for the same set of things.

I haven't made that argument. — Janus

Then what is the reasoning underlying your argument? It seems pretty clear to me that it is what I laid out, but if you reject that interpretation then you will need to tell us what the reasoning is. "Neti, Neti," does not an argument make.

A few sentences later you give the same underlying reasoning that I imputed to you:

My criticism was made on the grounds that supernaturalist accounts that claim to be explanatory are really not so, because they present no clearly understandable causal series of events and conditions. No mechanism of action in other words. — Janus

Ergo: <If the theist can't explain how God did it, then the theist is not justified in claiming that God did it>. I explained the problem with this presupposition: .

The parallel argument is:

• "God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God cannot be said to do things.
• Or more simply:
• "God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God does not do things.

Ergo: <If the theist can't explain how God did it, then the theist is not justified in claiming that God did it>. — Leontiskos

I generally hold that god has no explanatory power. To say god ‘did it’ seems identical to saying the magic man did it since we have no further information. When theists say (for instance) atheism can’t explain why there’s something and not nothing, but they (the theist) can by inserting ‘god’, What has been explained? I would question why we would need to accept a deity (whatever that means) as a candidate explanation. Thoughts?

- This goes directly back to my original post that @Janus papered over: . That is how I would want to begin answering this premise underlying Janus' argument.

What is my purpose?

I am assuming you mean objective purpose, and I think a naturalist could just say there is a purpose embedded into the evolution of nature: a law, or set of laws, that provides Telos overtime. No need to add God into the equation.

Where do I ultimately come from?

Nature.

Why do bad things sometimes happen?

Because it is up to sufficiently intelligent beings to uphold the moral law.

What is justice, or love for that matter?

Justice is the act of providing a fairness which, in turn, is derived from what is (objectively) good.

I find “love” to be a bit too ambiguous: there’s a reason the greeks had like 9 words for it. There’s “love” in the sense of a sexual, primitive attraction; “love” in a maternal/fraternal sense; “love” in a selfless sense; “love” in a ‘soulmate’ sense; etc.

"God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God cannot be said to do things.
Or more simply:
"God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God does not do things. — Leontiskos

The last part is what I was disagreeing with, which I would have thought was clear. If there were a God that did things, whether or not we can explain how he did them is irrelevant. If we want to say that there is a God who does things, on the other hand, believing we have rational justification for such a claim then a cogent explanation would be required. But such an explanation is impossible since we have no idea how an immaterial entity could do things.